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Abstract
Anastasio Bustamante was born in the modern day state of Michoacan in
1780. He served the Royalist Army during the insurgency (1810-1821). He was one
of the first officers to adhere to Agustin de Iturbide's Plan of Iguala in 1821, and a
signatory of the Act of Independence (28 September 1821). He was a member of
Mexico's first independent government, the Junta Provisional Gubernativa (1821-
1822) and served as the Captain General of the Eastern and Western Internal
Provinces during Iturbide's short-lived reign as Emperor (1822-1823). He served as
the Commander General of the Eastern Interior Provinces between 1826 and 1829. In
1829 he became Vice-President of the Republic. In December 1829 he led a
successful rebellion against the incumbent President, Vicente Guerrero. He served as
acting Head of the Executive between 1830 and 1832. In 1837 he was elected
President. He occupied this position until 1841. He commanded the troops of the
Western Division during the war with the United States (1846-1848). Between 1848
and 1849, he oversaw the pacification of one of the many rebellions of the Sierra
Gorda (now the Sierra de Queretaro). He died in Guanajuato in 1853, aged 73.
This study examines Bustamante's military and political career. It rejects the
traditional interpretation of the General, which portrays him as a weak and indecisive
man lacking in any real political principles. Instead, it argues that Bustamante was a
resolute and pragmatic leader, who supported the cause of moderate federalism for
most of his career.
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Introduction
Anastasio Bustamante' was an important political figure in independent
Mexico. Born in 1780, in the present day state of Michoacan, he trained originally as a
doctor. He served in the Royalist Army between 1810 and 1821. He was one of the
original supporters of Agustin de Iturbide's Plan of Iguala in 1821. He was a member
of the Junta Provisional Gubernativa, the first independent government in Mexico,
and was one of the signatories of Act of Independence. He was a close friend and ally
of Iturbide throughout his short-lived Empire and unlike many of his military
colleagues, remained loyal to the Emperor until his abdication m April 1823.
Bustamante was elected as Vice-President of the Republic in January 1829. In the
following December he led a successful revolt against the incumbent President,
Vicente Guerrero. Between 1830 and 1832 he served as acting Head of the Executive.
In 1837 he was elected as President. He occupied this position until October 1841,
when he was overthrown by a triumvirate of Generals led by his great rival, Antonio
Lopez de Santa Anna. In 1846 he was appointed to the Senate and was elected as
President of that body a year later. He commanded the troops of the Western Division
during the war with the United States (1846-1848). Between 1848 and 1849, he
oversaw the pacification of the one of the many rebellions of the Sierra Gorda (now
the Sierra de Queretaro). He died in Guanajuato in 1853, aged 73.
Despite Bustamante's leading role in Mexican politics, he has been, as Michael
Costeloe rightly points out, 'one of the forgotten men of early nineteenth century
Mexican history." With the exception of Brian Harnnett's study of Bustamante's career
I Because of Mexican pronunciation, which does not distinguish between the 'c' and the 's', it is
possible to see two versions of Bustamante's name in the primary sources: Anastasio and Anastacio.
Bustamante himself always used the former, which is the correct modern day speIling. For that reason
I have chosen to adopt this spelling throughout my thesis.
2 Michael P. Costeloe, "The Triangular Revolt in Mexico and the Fall of Anastasio Bustamante, ..
Journal of Latin American Studies 20 (1988), p. 337.
Introduction
in the Royalist Army,' he has received little biographical attention. This thesis will try
to take the first steps to rectify this neglect. It proposes to examine Bustamante's
military and political career, and to assess the contribution he made to the principal
events of the early national period in Mexico.
The overall aim of the work will be to investigate and analyse Bustamante's
political stance from the beginning of his military career in 1810 until its close after the
final campaign against the rebels of the Sierra Gorda in 1849. Most of Bustamante's
contemporaries alleged that he had no fixed political opinions, but was easily
dominated by those who advised him. Guillermo Prieto, who was adopted into
Bustamante's circle of friends in 1840, claimed that he suffered from 'una ausencia
completa de convicciones politicas, [...] se desentendia de toda cuestion moral y
seguia el dictado de las gentes que Ie rodeaban." When Bustamante's career is looked
at superficially it is easy to understand how such an opinion could come about. During
his time in government Bustamante seemed to dally between the two major causes of
the time: centralism and federalism, and betray one cause for the other on various
occasions. He began his career nominally as a centralist in the court of Agustin I, but
on the fall of the Empire he became associated with the federalists and the Masonic
Lodge of York. He was elected as Vice-President with the help of this Rite in 1829.
However, during 1829 he allied himself with many former members of the Scottish
Rite of Masons, who were considered to be centralist sympathisers. With their help he
led the Plan of Jalapa against the yorkino government of Vicente Guerrero in
December 1829. His subsequent administration was, and still is, continually accused of
trying to impose a centralist system upon the Republic. In 1837 he was chosen as a
candidate for the first Presidential elections conducted under the Centralist
.1 Brian R. Hamnett, "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de independencia 1810 - 1821. " in Virginia
Guedea (ed.), La revolucion de independencia (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1995). pp. 99 -
129.
4 Guillermo Prieto, Memorias de mis tiempos (Mexico City: Porrua, 1996), p. 180.
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Constitution of 1836 by members of the centralist faction. But a year later he became
associated once more with the federalists and with their attempts to replace the
Constitution of 1836 with the Federal charter of 1824. This alliance came to an abrupt
end in December 1838 when he refused to support a revolution in favour of federalism
organised by his federalist associate, Manuel Gomez Pedraza.
This study will argue that this version of events is comprehensively disproved
by a detailed analysis of Bustamante's political career. It will demonstrate that far from
being a turncoat and a moral ignoramus, Bustamante had strong political views that he
followed throughout his life. It will contend that, despite appearances to the contrary,
once Bustamante allied himself with the federalist cause in the 1820s he remained
committed to federalism for the remainder of his career. It will argue that those who
condemn Bustamante for his disloyalty fail to take into consideration the
circumstances that prompted him to behave in the manner in which he did.
A secondary aim of the investigation will be to assess Bustamante's leadership
qualities in both the army and government. Most of his contemporaries had no great
opinion of his disposition or capacity to govern. Lorenzo de Zavala commented that
Bustamante was not 'un hombre de grandes capacidades ni de genio superior," and
claimed that he was 'sin talentos para dirigir." Carlos Maria de Bustamante, for his
part, came to the same conclusion. He described Anastasio Bustamante as being: 'un
hombre de bien, caballero e hidalgo como el que mas, compasivo y generoso, bravo en
la campafia; pero sin disposicion para gobernar en grande." Both Prieto and the
Scottish wife of the first Spanish Minister in Mexico, Frances Calderon de la Barca,
considered Bustamante to be ignorant and quite stupid." Again, this work will propose
5 Lorenzo de Zavala. Ensayo historico de las revoluciones de Mexico desde i808 hasta 1830 (Mexico
City: Oficina Impresora de Hacienda. 1918). vol. 2. p. 294.
I> ibid .• p. 269.
7 Carlos Maria de Bustamante, Continuacion del cuadro historico de la revolucion mexicana: El
gabinete mexicano durante el segundo periodo de la administracion del Exmo. Senor D. Anastasio
Bustamante (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economico/Instiruto Helenico, 1985). vol. 1. p. 42.
x Frances Erskine Calderon de la Barca. Life in Mexico: The Letters of Fanny Calderon de la Barca
(Garden City. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966). p. 106. She writes that Bustamante was
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that this judgement upon Bustamante is not altogether correct. It will point out that
Bustamante's extended education in Guadalajara and Mexico City demonstrates quite
clearly that he was neither ignorant nor stupid. It will show that Bustamante's qualities
as a leader and governor are usually assessed with reference to his performance as
President between 1837 and 1841, and do not take into account his behaviour as Vice-
President or as a military chief It will also suggest that the weak government over
which Bustamante presided as President was brought about, not by his own
shortcomings, but by the conventions of the Constitution of 1836, which allowed the
executive only limited power.
Finally, this study will try to reconcile Bustamante's reputation amongst his
contemporaries as a kind, well-meaning man with the image of Bustamante as a
ruthless soldier and politician drawn by the evidence of his behaviour during the wars
of independence and as Head of Government. How is it possible that the man
described by Calderon de la Barca as looking 'like a little New York merchant or
doctor-fat and pursy-a good man with honest, benevolent face, frank and simple in
his manners and not at all like a hero;" or who Prieto characterised as 'tratable,
sencillo, sin odios ni aspiraciones bastardas sin instintos carniceros y sin deseo de
dafiar personalrnente a nadie;"" was able to order the executions of countless
insurgents during the wars of independence, or sanction the repressive measures which
characterised his Vice-Presidency between 1830 and 1832? This study will contend
that Bustamante behaved in a manner typical to that of his class. He was after all, an
hombre de bien imbued with the values and prejudices of the comfortable classes of
nineteenth-century Mexico. In this world it was perfectly acceptable to execute
insurgents or rebels from the lower classes, in order to dissuade others from following
'remarkably ignorant' and made 'a very stupid President.' Prieto, Memorias de mis tiempos, p. lRO.
Prieto comments that Bustamante's conversation 'realmente no era digno de un muchacho de veinte
afios. '
9 Calderon de la Barca, Life in Mexico. p. 107.
10 Prieto. Memorias de mis tiempos, p, 181.
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their example. It will argue that the repression during 1830 and 1832, for which
Bustamante was later condemned, including the execution of Vicente Guerrero, was
not opposed by the vast majority of the hombres de bien. Instead, it will demonstrate
that the success of Santa Anna's rebellion in 1832 was not wholly dependent upon
outrage at the violence practised by Bustamante's government, but rather upon
opposition to its strong support of the Church and army.
The examination of Bustamante's military and political career will be
undertaken chronologically. This structure has been adopted for two reasons. In the
first place, the development and evolution of Bustamante's political opinions can be
charted very clearly in this format. Secondly, it permits the biography to enter into a
number of discussions upon certain events in which Bustamante played no active part,
but by which the progress of his career was profoundly affected. The study will begin
by looking at Bustamante's early career as a doctor and an officer in the Royalist Army
during the insurgency. In Chapter Two, Bustamante's relationship with Agustin de
Iturbide will be explored. Chapter Three will discuss Bustamante's rise to power at the
end of 1829. The following two chapters will examine Bustamante's role in
government, as Vice-President between 1830 and 1832, and as President between
1837 and 1841. The final chapter will consider Bustamante's post-Presidential career
and focus upon his participation in the war with the United States and the pacification
of the Sierra Gorda in 1849.
Anastasio Bustamante was not the only 'forgotten man' of early nineteenth-
century Mexican history. The careers of other figures, like General Gabriel Valencia,
who formed part of the military triumvirate which deposed Bustamante in 1841, and
General Luis Quintanar, one of Agustin de Iturbide's most important allies, and friend
of Bustamante, still await detailed study. One of the reasons that these men have been
ignored is that they belong to the group of traditionalist and conservative politicians
and caudillos, which have traditionally been vilified and condemned since the time of
5
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the Porfirato. It is hoped that this study will shed some light upon this hitherto
neglected group, and that its conclusions will contribute to the better understanding of
this period of Mexican history.
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The War of Independence
Chapter One: The War of Independence
Trinidad Anastasio Francisco Sales Bustamante y Oseguera was baptised
on 27 July 1780 in the parroquia of San Francisco, Jiquilipan in what is today the
state of Michoacan.! His parents were Jose Ruiz Bustamante and Francisca
Oseguera; both recorded as being Spaniards and residents of the village.
According to Manuel Rivera Cambas, during his childhood he lived with his
parents in Tamazuela and Zapotlan el Grande, in the present day state of Jalisco.
His father made a modest living in the transportation of ice from the volcanos of
Colima to the city of Guadalajara. In other words, the future President was of
relatively humble beginnings, a member of what has been called 'the provincial
bourgeoisie.r' By birth, he belonged to the lower strata of Creole society' and he
could only have expected that his future would be contained within these confines.
If his parents did not wish him to follow in his father's footsteps, and instead
wanted him to make a career for himself, there were only four respectable
professions open to a man in his position: that of clergyman, doctor, soldier or
lawyer. In fact, he would try his hand at the first three, before the events of
September 1810 convinced him to make what would be the crucial decision of his
I Archivo General de la Nacion (henceforth referred to as AGN): Genealogia AGG 469 34-8,
contains the archives of the parroquia of San Francisco, Jiquilipan.
2 According to Doris Ladd, the title of "espafiol ' did not necessarily mean that the titular was
actually a Peninsular Spaniard. This title was used by Creoles and Peninsular Spaniards alike to
separate themselves from the great mass of indigenous and mixed race population. Doris M.
Ladd, The Mexican Nobility at Independence 1780-1826 (Austin: Institute for Latin American
Studies The University of Texas at Austin, 1976), p. 7.
~ Brian R. Hamnett, "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de independencia." in Virginia Guedea
(ed.), La revolucion de independencia (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1995), p. 121. Also
see, Brian R. Hamnett, Roots of Insurgency. Mexican Regions. 1750-1824 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986). p. 19.
4 Secretaria de la Defensa de la Nacion (henceforth referred to as SON), Seccion de Cancelados
(henceforth referred to as SC) XIIIII/l-235/1-31/00002. 00005. Service Records for Anastasio
Bustamante, dated December 1817 and December 1820. In these records, Anastasio Bustamante
describes himself as a 'noble.' Ladd explains that this term was used much like the title 'espanol'
to separate white inhabitants of New Spain from the mixed race and indigenous population. It
very rarely indicated that the person in question was in possession of 'noble' blood in the
nineteenth-century European sense of the word. Ladd, The Mexican Nobilitv at Independence. p.
7. Ibid., XIIIIIIl-235/1-31/00001. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante. dated December
1812. In this service record. Bustamante terms himself an American Spaniard. This is probably
the most accurate description of his status.
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life: to become a full-time soldier. This action proved to be a turning point for
Bustamante. The Royalist Army in Mexico during the wars of insurgency was full
of opportunities for any ambitious young man. From the very beginning, a chronic
lack of troops and healthy officers meant that promotions were not difficult to
come by. The conditions of the war allowed all officers considerable autonomy of
action and granted them a great deal of local power. In this way, a humble son of
the provincial bourgeoisie, who began his military career as a lowly Lieutenant,
could reach the rank of Colonel in less than eight years.
However, Anastasio Bustamante's case is hardly unique in the history of the
Mexican Royalist Army. Other members of the Creole provincial bourgeoisie also
benefited from their decisions to join this Army. The examples of Antonio Lopez
de Santa Anna, Agustin de Iturbide, Manuel Gomez Pedraza and Miguel Barragan
immediately spring to mind. So, in a way, the experiences of Bustamante during
this time are illustrative of a general movement. Through charting his progress we
also chart that of countless other Creole officers. We will note how the make-up of
the Royalist Army, which before 1810 was predominantly commanded by
Peninsular officers, was changed by the sudden influx of Creoles after the events of
September 1810. We will assess the effect their experiences as commanding
officers, of power and authority, had on their perceptions of themselves and on the
army in which they served. Finally, in light of the above, we will consider whether,
by arming the Creoles and putting them in positions of authority within the army,
the viceregal government freed the Creoles from their centuries' long dependence
upon their Peninsular masters, and in so doing, sowed the seeds of its own
destruction.
A: Life before 1810
Initially, Anastasio Bustamante seemed destined for an ecclesiastical career.
In 1795, at the age of fifteen, he enrolled into the Colegio Seminario Conciliar de
8
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San Jose in Guadalajara on the recommendation of the village priest of Tuxpam,
Marcelino Figueroa. This school offered a ten-year course of education and
training for the ministry and had gained an excellent reputation in its hundred-year
history.' Its entrance requirements demanded that the prospective student be able
to read, write and do mental arithmetic. In order to enrol, Bustamante would also
have been expected to know the catechism and show a distinct talent and aptitude
for learning. We do not know whether the young Anastasio was a boarder at the
school or whether he was simply a day pupil. But, given the less than affluent
status of his parents, it is more likely that he fell into the latter category, as
students who boarded at the Seminary were charged 125 pesos annually" It is
likely that Bustamante studied grammar and rhetoric in his first years at this school.
Then, probably at the age of seventeen or eighteen, he would have begun to study
the Arts and Philosophy for a further three years. These lessons would have been
conducted entirely in Latin and involved the study of Logic, Metaphysics, Physics,
Moral Philosophy, Arithmetic, Geometry and Algebra.I It seems that the future
General did apply himself in lessons and often achieved some of the best marks in
his class. This can have been no small achievement, considering that his
contemporaries included Valentin Gomez Farias, Juan Cayetano Portugal, Juan de
Dios Canedo and Diego Garcia Conde.8
5 The Colegio Seminario de San Jose first opened its doors in 1699 . Its former building now
houses the Regional Museum of Guadalajara. Rosario Ramirez. "Constitucion y reglamentos del
Seminario de Guadalajara en los trescientos afios de su que hacer," in Jaime Olveda (ed.), El
Seminario Diocesano de Guadalajara. Tercer centenario (Guadalajara: El Colegio de Jalisco,
1996). pp. 21 and 23.
6 Angelica Peregrina "La ensenanza y los alumnos del Seminario, siglo XIX," in Olveda (ed.), El
Seminario Diocesano de Guadalajara, p. 53.
7 As Bustamante and Gomez Farias enjoyed parallel careers up until 1808, I have based my
assumptions upon the information provided by Lilian Briseno Senosiain, Laura Solares Robles
and Laura Suarez de la Torre in their work, Valentin Gomez Farias V su lucha por el
federalismo, 1822-1858 (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco, 1991), p.
26
K Armando Martinez Moya, "El Seminario Conciliar de Guadalajara en el contexto colonial." in
Olveda (ed.), El Seminario Diocesano de Guadalajara, pp. 47-48. Also see Manuel Rivera
Cambas, Los Gobernantes de Mexico (1822-1843) (Mexico City: Editorial Citlaltepetl, 1964).
volume 4. p. 324 and Briseno Senosiain, Solares Robles and Suarez de la Torre, Valentin Gomez
Farias y su lucha por elfederalismo, p. 26.
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At the end of these three years, Bustamante would have had to pass an
examination which would qualify him to continue his studies at the Seminary with
a view to eventually becoming a priest, or to leave the school and enrol in a
university or college in order to begin studying another profession. The young man
chose the second option and moved to Mexico City where he undertook the study
of Chemistry and Medicine. He studied Chemistry under Dr. Ligner, at the Colegio
de Mineria and Medicine, probably at the Royal University. It is difficult to know
precisely the studies Bustamante undertook as there are few sources available on
this subject. However, it was believed later that he followed courses in Mineralogy
at the Colegio, probably to complement his Chemistry studies.I He most likely
undertook his practical medical experience with Dr. Jose Ignacio Garcia Jove,
Professor of Anatomy and Surgery at the Royal University and Director of the
Hospital of the Indies, who later recommended him for his first medical position in
San Luis Potosi. I 0 He seems to have again been a model student, applying himself
tirelessly to his work and was well appreciated by his teachers. During his studies,
the poverty of Bustamante's family caused him financial worries. However, his
tutor, Dr. Ligner, managed to arrange for him to live in the Dominican Colegio de
Porta-Cae/i, and thus alleviate many of his problems. Here in Mexico City, his
studies once more brought him into contact with Valentin Gomez Farias who was
also a medical student at that time. Such a long acquaintance between the two
men, from the Seminary to the capital, suggests the possibility that they may have
9 E/ Atleta, 24 February 1830. This newspaper attributed him the qualifications of Bachelor of
Philosophy (referring to his qualification from the Seminary in Guadalajara) and Bachelor of
Medicine. It also states that Bustamante studied Mineralogy. In order to demonstrate what they
described as their respect for the then Vice-President's intellectual merits, they gave him the
nickname 'el general bach iller' or 'the student General.' E/ At/eta was fiercely opposed to
Bustamante's administration at this time and such a nickname was most likely intended to be
ironic, and was almost certainly not designed to flatter.
10 Gomez Farias did his practical experience with this doctor at more or less the same time. It is
likely that he and Bustamante were colleagues. Briseno Senosiain, Solares Robles and Suarez de
la Torre, Valentin Gomez Farias y su /ucha par e/federalismo, p. 27. Rivera Cambas tells us it
was Dr. Garcia Jove who recommended Bustamante for his first job. Rivera Cambas, Los
Gobernantes de Mexico, vol. 4, p. 325.
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been friends. II Certainly in the early years after independence Bustamante wrote
personal letters to Farias,12 although their opposing political views would soon
bring this friendship to an end. His studies at the Cofegio de Mineria may also
have brought him into contact, and even friendship, with Jose Antonio Facio, who
attended the Cofegio in the same years as Bustamante.13
Upon attaining his medical qualification in 1808, Bustamante obtained a
position as a family doctor in San Luis Potosi, thanks largely to the
recommendation of Dr. Garcia Jove. His salary was 500 pesos per annum. In San
Luis his merit as a doctor was quickly noticed and in the same year he was
appointed as the Director of the local hospital of San Juan de Dios.14 He was also
paid 50 pesos each year by the city's Ayuntamiento to tend to the sick amongst the
poorer classes of society. IS According to the biographer of Maria Francisca de la
Gandara, the wife of the future Vice-Roy, Felix Calleja, Bustamante was well-
received by the potosinos and held them, and their city, in high regard for the rest
of his life.16
The young doctor's stay in San Luis proved to be the turning point of his
career. Here he first met Brigadier Felix Calleja and took the decision to join one
of the cavalry regiments which made up part of the Tenth Militia Brigade of San
Luis Potosi. Bustamante had been used as the family doctor by the Calleja family
since his arrival. However, his services did not bring him to the attention of the
Brigadier until Calleja's wife fell ill with an eye infection and the ointment
II Hamnett, "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de independencia." p. 102. He suggests that
Farias and Bustamante became friends in Mexico City.
12 Valentin Gomez Farias Archive, in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection,
University of Texas at Austin (henceforth referred to as VGFA) no. 93. Bustamante to Valentin
Gomez Farias, Guadalajara, 27 February 1824.
IJ Santiago Ramirez, Datos para la historia del Colegio de Minerla (Mexico City: UNAM,
1982), p. 203.
14 Rivera Cambas, Los Gobernantes de Mexico, vol. 4, p. 325.
15 Jose de J. Nunez y Dominguez, La virreina mexicana: dona Maria Francisca de la Gandara
de Calleja (Mexico City: Imprenta Universaria, 1950), p. 101.
16 In order to back up this assertion, Nunez y Dominguez refers to an event which took place in
San Luis Potosi in 1838. In June of that year the image of the Virgin of Guadalupe resident in the
city's parish church had accidently caught fire. The municipal authorities then arranged, directly
with the then President Bustamante, for a new image to be commissioned and made. Bustamante
undertook the payment of the image himself as a gift to the city. Ibid .. p. 102, footnote 5.
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prescribed by Bustamante brought about a swift recovery. 17 This medical success
transformed him into a friend of the family and of Calleja himself, which in tum
brought him into contact with many of the Brigadier's other young acquaintances,
including Manuel Gomez Pedraza, Manuel de la Sota Riva and Miguel Barragan.
But, most importantly of all, he decided to join Calleja's Militia Brigade. It is clear
that Bustamante entered this force as an officer, probably as Lieutenant.i ' more
than likely buying his commission, as was the custom in the Bourbon Army.i"
However, it is unclear which regiment he did join, although as the Tenth Brigade
was made up almost entirely of cavalry regiments it is probable that his regiment
was a mounted one. Lucas Alaman and Jose de J. Nunez y Dominguez assert that
he began his military career as the surgeon for the Dragoons of San Luis.20 Other
historians simply record that he joined el Cuerpo del Comercio. a company of the
above Dragoons.i' His service records do not begin until 1811 and state that he
enlisted in the Lancers Regiment of Calleja's Army of the Centre, a regiment that
was only set up in September 1810.22 They make no mention of any medical
duties. What is most likely is this: that Bustamante did join the Militia, probably the
Dragoons of San Luis, in the capacity of doctor, but re-enlisted in 1810 in the
Lancers Regiment as a regular soldier. The confusion arose from that fact that in
1811 he transferred back into the Dragoons of San Luis.23
Joining the Militia Brigade, especially as a surgeon, is hardly an indication
of Anastasio Bustamante's inclination for a military life. The Militia Brigade in San
17 Ibid., pp. 101-102. Nunez y Dominguez gives the probable recipe, based upon those found in
the hospital archives, for this ointment as being (in modem terms): 60 ml of distilled water and
50 ml of tanin. lbid., pp. 102-103. footnote 6. The tanin was extracted from flower buds of a local
Pt1ant, the mesquite.
S SDN: SC XIIIII/I-235/1-31/00001. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante. dated December
1812. This is the rank he held in this, his first service record.
19 Christon I. Archer, El ejercito en el Mexico borbonico, 1760-1810 (Mexico City: Fondo de
Cultura Economica, 1983), p. 245.
20 Lucas Alaman, Historia de Mexico desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon .\'11
Independencia en el aiio de 1808 hasta la epoca presente (Mexico City: lnstituto Cultural
Helenico/ Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1985). vol. I p. 454. Nunez y Dominguez. La virreina
mexicana, p. 101.
21 Hamnett "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de independencia," p. 103.
22 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. I, p. 455.
23 SDN: SC XI/III/I-235/1-31100001. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, dated December
1812.
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Luis was a part-time force and its major military challenge was in the north of the
province where it served to protect villages against Indian raids. His decision to
enlist was very likely to be connected with his admiration for Calleja; the tact that
many of his friends had done so; and finally, ifnot most importantly, because of the
prestige and social standing a commission in the Militia afforded him. The Militia
Brigade in San Luis, unlike those of Veracruz or Guanajuato, was well-regarded
and admired. This was mainly due to the fact that this Brigade was made up almost
exclusively of cavalry regiments in contrast to the infantry-dominated Brigades in
other areas. Being mounted upon a horse immediately commanded more respect. It
also gave those with dazzling uniforms countless opportunities to show off The
fact that these regiments actually had work to do also helped immeasurably. Those
Brigades in the centre and south, whose existence was merely a long wait for a
foreign invasion, could only have difficulty in projecting an image of
indispensability. Moreover, being in the San Luis Militia was an extension of a
member's social life. The militia assemblies were usually timed to coincide with
religious holidays and any reunion, whether for the purposes of training or
inspection, were often simply social occasions.i" All in all, Bustamante's decision
to join the Militia may have indicated nothing more than a fondness for a uniform
and social prestige. He probably did not seriously expect to have to fight any real
battles. But then again, neither he nor anyone else, could have foreseen the way
events were about to tum.
B. The Early Years of War (1810-1812)
Felix Calleja received word of Father Hidalgo's Grito de Dolores at 10.30
in the morning of 19 September in the Hacienda de los Bledos, one of his wife's
properties.f The news caught him and the rest of viceregal establishment
24 Archer, El ejercito en el Mexico borbonico, p. 299.
25 Alaman, His/aria de Mexico, vol. I, p. 452. Christon I. Archer ... La Causa Buena': The
Counterinsurgency Army of New Spain and the Ten Years War," in Jaime E. Rodriguez O. (ed.),
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unawares. The army created by the Bourbon reforms in New Spain was designed
to repel foreign aggression, not to put down internal unrest. Only 8, 257 regular,
permanent soldiers existed in the colony. The rest of the 27, 000 strong army was
made up of part-time militia brigades, such as the one to which Bustamante
belonged.i" Such an army required considerable notice to mobilise effectively. This
was all very well when the expected aggressor would be coming by way of the sea.
It spelt disaster, however, in the conditions of September 1810. Moreover, the
army in existence in New Spain was not a disciplined or trained force. All garrisons
suffered an acute lack of arms and the officers in command were for the most part
old and infirm Peninsular Spaniards who had not resigned for fear of slipping into
destitution.Y In San Luis Potosi, the make-up of the Tenth Militia Brigade was
hardly ideal for the job in hand. As we have said, it was almost entirely made up of
cavalry regiments and contained no infantry at all.28
Thus, when Calleja was informed of events in Dolores, he had no troops at
his immediate disposal. Even his militia cavalry regiments were not based in the
capital of San Luis, but scattered throughout the province. In turn, their horses
were also not centrally located but grazing on various haciendas.t" The simple
assembly of this force was going to take a long time. On the other hand, the
numbers of his Brigade were not nearly sufficient to take on the size of the army
Hidalgo was reported to have. So he had to begin the painstaking task of raising a
new army capable of marching upon Hidalgo's hordes. Weapons and uniforms had
to be made; whole new regiments established and manned; and raw recruits had to
be trained in the basics of warfare. Local artisans were commissioned to make
lances, machetes and sables and much-needed, but as yet non-existent artillery
The Independence of Mexico and the Creation of the New Nation (Los Angeles: University of
California, 1989), p. 87.
16 Juan Ortiz Escamilla, Guerra y gobierno. Los pueblos y la independencia de Mexico (Seville:
Instituto MoralEI Colegio de Mexico/Universidad Internacional de Andalucia/Universidad de
Sevilla, 1997), p. 60.
17 Ibid., pp. 60-62 and Archer, El ejercito en el Mexico borbonico, p. 253-255.
28 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. I, p. 454.
2q Ibid., p. 453.
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pieces, such as cannons. Servants, labourers, cowboys and other employees were
conscripted from the local haciendas, bringing with them agricultural tools as
make-shift weapons.30 New regiments were set up, such as the infantry force
which came to be known as the 'tamarindos' because the leather of their uniforms
was the same colour as this fruit. 31 All this preparation was going to take time, and
it is little wonder that when Vice-Roy Venegas ordered Calleja to march his
Brigade to Queretaro immediately, Calleja had little choice but to ask that this
order be delayed.32
One of the biggest problems facing Calleja in raising this army was finding
enough officers to command the new regiments and battalions. The existing
Brigadiers and Field-Marshals of the Bourbon Army were for the most part old
men, whose physical infirmities prevented them from taking part in active service.
Even those who were fit to serve had very little practical experience or talent to
speak of In the case of the Dragoons of San Carlos, a regiment of the Tenth
Militia Brigade, the Colonel in charge had been ill for four months and the only
commander on active duty was Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Gutierrez, who
according to Calleja was of 'edad avanzada y sin experiencia ni talento militar.' In
order to counter this problem, Calleja was forced to give commands to those he
described as 'jovenes inteligentes' who would be able to learn the art of warfare on
the battle field.33 According to Alaman, these young men were recruited from two
sources. The first were the owners or managers of the haciendas, mines and
ranches of the area. These men commanded the units composed of their ranch-
hands and labourers, and therefore filled the positions of authority quite naturally.
The second were chosen not because of their military knowledge, but because
Calleja was certain of their personal loyalty, which, in Alaman's words 'era 10
30 Archer, "The Counterinsurgency and the Ten Years War," p. 8R. Ortiz Escamilla, Guerra y
~abierno, pp. 66-68 .
. I Alaman, His/aria de Mexico, vol. 1, p. 455.
32 Archer. "The Counterinsurgency and the Ten Years War." p. R8.
D AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 169 ff 79-81. Calleja to Vice-Roy Venegas, Leon, 4
December 1810. Quoted by Ortiz Escamilla, Guerra y gobierno, p. 61.
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esencial.' These men included many members of Calleja's circle of friends and
admirers, such as Miguel Barragan, Gabriel Armijo, Manuel Gomez Pedraza, and
of course, Anastasio Bustamante.34
On 1 October 1810, therefore, Bustamante enlisted in the newly created
Lancer Company. He joined, not as the regiment's surgeon, but as a regular officer,
in the position of Lieutenant. 35 It is unlikely that he viewed this decision as a
permanent change in his career. The Lancer Company was another militia force
and it would have been expected to demobilise once Hidalgo had been defeated.
He must have thought that he would return to San Luis and his medical practice
within a matter of months. Again, he was not to know in 1810 exactly how long
the insurgency would last. His reasons for joining Calleja's army were likely to
have been mixed. In the first place, the pressure from Calleja, who was trying
desperately to organise a force in the quickest possible time to meet the challenge
posed by Hidalgo's rebellion, must have been intense. The Brigadier needed
intelligent men, above all those whom he felt he could trust, to occupy positions of
authority in his new units. Bustamante evidently fell into both categories and so
was an obvious target for Calleja's recruiting crusade. Secondly, the fact that
friends such as Gomez Pedraza were also rallying to Calleja's cause must have
influenced him, even if only slightly. Finally, the news that reached San Luis Potosi
on the nature of Hidalgo's rebellion very probably also convinced him to play his
part in the fight against the rampaging hordes of the indigenous and mixed race
plebe. As Hugh Hamill has pointed out, the propaganda issued by the viceregal
government in the weeks following the Grito de Dolores, firmly emphasised the
social implications of Hidalgo's revolt. Stress was placed upon the indigenous
origins of Hidalgo's followers, their insatiable appetite for the murder of the white
man and the destruction of his property.i'' He, like the majority of Creoles not in
34 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. I, p. 454.
35 SON: se Xl/III/I-235/1-31/00001. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, dated December
1812.
36 Hugh Hamill Jr., The Hidalgo Revolt. Prelude to Mexican Independence (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 1966), p. 156.
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contact with Hidalgo or his fellow conspirators, would have been ignorant of the
true objectives of Hidalgo's plan to oust the gachupines from their position of
dominance in New Spain. Instead, like them he most likely took the decision to
join Calleja's army, believing the rebellion to be a class struggle or a caste war.37
Even once he became aware of the insurgents' aims, reports of the violence,
looting and murder practised by Hidalgo's men would probably have convinced
him, as it convinced so many other Creoles, that even if the autonomy of New
Spain were desirable, they could not support the use of such means. As so many
historians since Alamein have pointed out, the social dimension of the insurgency
was a key factor in deciding the Creole population against the insurgents. The
Royalist Army, recruited almost entirely from Creoles,38 did not regard the fight
against the insurgents as a fight against independence, but rather as Agustin de
Iturbide would have us believe, a fight against robbers and bandits.39 In the eyes of
the officers, the activities of the Royalist Army constituted the 'restauracion del
orden social. ,40 Their role was the defence of civilisation, of order, of property
against the onslaught of the barbarous hordes.41
By mid-October Calleja had raised a force of 1, 500 foot soldiers and 2,
600 cavalrymen. He and these troops, including the thirty year-old Lieutenant
Bustamante, marched from San Luis Potosi in the direction of Dolores, where he
met with Manuel de Flan, the Intendant of Puebla and his 2, 000 strong force. In
the three months that followed, the new Army of the Centre would defeat the
insurgents in two pitched battles, at Aculco (7 November 1810) and the Puente de
37 lbid., p. 171.
38 As Brian Hamnett points out, the first reinforcements to be sent from Peninsular Spain did not
arrive unil May 1812. They numbered some three thousand men and can hardly be said to have
made a significant contribution to the early counterinsurgency effort. Brian R. Hamnett,
Revolucion y contrarrevolucion en Mexico y e/ Peril. Liberalismo. realeza y separatismo (18()()-
1824) (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1987). p. 65.
39 Agustin de Iturbide, A Statement of Some of the Principal Events in the Public Life of Agustin
de Iturbide. Written by Himself (Washington D.C.: Documentary Publications, 1971). pp. 6-7.
The terms used by the Royalist Officers to describe the insurgents are illustrative of the point of
view. For example. Anastasio Bustamante refers to the captured insurgents as 'Iadrones',
'bandidos', 'canalla' and 'picaros' as well as 'rebeldes' and "insurgentes'.
40 Hamnett, "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de independencia," p. 106.
41 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 1, p. 454.
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Calderon (17 January 1811) and recapture the main towns and cities of the Bajio.
We know very little about Bustamante's role in these actions, although it is
impossible not to assume that these months would have been extremely important
in the terms of his military education. Granted that the engagements with the
insurgents were one-sided affairs that usually resolved themselves in the flight of
the insurgents after the firing of the heavy artillery,42 he cannot have learnt much in
the art of warfare. However, he certainly must have learnt much of the art of
command in the face of danger. At both Aculco and Calderon, the general body of
Calleja's army did not acquit itself with professionalism or commitment. At Aculco,
several units appeared to waver in their loyalty upon seeing the size of the
insurgent force: both Carlos Maria de Bustamante and Anastasio Zerecero
gleefully record that more than one battalion appeared on the point of changing
sides.43 At Calderon, the story was much the same. Calleja gloomily reported in a
private letter to Vice-Roy Francisco Javier de Venegas that his troops appeared
'poco 0 nada imbuida en los principios del honor y entusiasmo militar;' many
companies had deserted completely; and that the Royalist victory had been simply
down to the fact the insurgents were worse cowards than his own men.44
Convincing the remaining troops not to follow the example of their peers must
have been a difficult job and can only have taught Bustamante valuable lessons in
how to lead a company into action.
In terms of how to treat insurgents and suspected collaborators, and how
to impose authority upon rebellious towns, the lessons he received from his
commanding officer, Calleja, could not have been clearer. The Brigadier believed
42 Christon I. Archer. "La revolucion militar de Mexico: Estrategia, tacticas y logisticas durante
la guerra de la independencia, 1810-1821," in Josefina Zoraida Vazquez (ed.), Interpretaciones
de la independencia de Mexico (Mexico City: Nueva Imagen, 1997), p. 134.
43 Carlos Maria de Bustamante, Cuadro historico de la revolucion mexicana (Mexico City:
Fondo de Cultura Economica/Instituto Helenico, 1985). vol. 1. p. 92. Anastasio Zerecero,
Memorias para la historia de las revoluciones en Mexico (Mexico City: UNAM, 1975), p. 92.
44 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 171. f. 90. Calleja to Vice-Roy Venegas. Campo de
Zapotlanexo, 18 January 1811. Reservado.
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that fear was the most important weapon in order to re-establish Royalist
government in towns and villages previously controlled by the insurgents.
Al pueblo se Ie impone de un modo mas espantoso y terrible que le
haga temer, y perdida toda la esperanza, maldice el delirio de
Hidalgo. La experiencia me ha hecho conocer que los pueblos por
donde pasa el ejercito arreglando sus autoridades, exhortando a los
eclesiasticos al cumplimiento de sus obligaciones, publicando el
indulto, y castigando con el ultimo suplico uno, dos, tres 0 los mas
revoltosos, se han mantenido fieles hasta el dia; lisongeandorne de
. ,45que contmuaran.
The inducement of fear was crucial to the success of this process. Insurgents and
their sympathisers were unlikely to surrender their weapons and identify their
leaders (the usual terms for obtaining an amnesty) if they did not fear the
consequences of remaining silent. In Irapuato, when one of the notices announcing
Calleja's promise of an amnesty was tom down in the night and no one came
forward to identify the culprit, all those found near the torn notice were arrested.
Calleja ordered that one man in each ten be shot. The victims were chosen by the
drawing of lots.46 In Guanajuato, Calleja arranged for the hanging of eighteen
prisoners, captured in the Alhondiga, to take place in the city centre in the late
evening. According to Alaman, the event was watched by all the inhabitants of the
city in complete silence. All that could be heard were the priests muttering the last
rites and the pleas for mercy from the condemned. It was an image that haunted
Alaman for the rest of his life.47 However, perhaps most significantly, Calleja's
example promoted a system of class-discrimination. He would show no mercy with
captured members of the plebe, but was much more inclined to grant another
chance to those of higher social standing. This double standard was designed to
45 Carlos Maria de Bustamante. Campahas del General D. Felix Calleja. Comandante en Gefe
del Ejercito Real de Operaciones, llamado del Centro (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila.
dirigida por Jose Ximeno, calle de Medinas. no. 6. 1827), p. 61. The passage quoted is from the
plan to counter the insurgency proposed to the Vice-Roy by Calleja. Leon. 16 December 1810.
46 Christon I. Archer. "The Royalist Army in New Spain. Civil-Military Relationships. 1810-
1821." Journal of Latin American Studies 13: 1 (1987). p. 66.
47 Alaman, Historia de Mexico. vol. 2. pp. 58-59.
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convince any Creoles who had participated in the rebellion in the early months to
abandon their support for Hidalgo. For example, after the recapture of San Miguel
el Grande (now San Miguel de Allende), twelve insurgents were executed and their
bodies displayed in the town square. Calleja reportedly 'aplaudio este succso, no
tanto por su importancia, cuanto por ver con este paso comprometidos contra los
insurgentes a los vecinos de San Miguel. ,48
Despite the Royalist successes in the Bajio, which eventually led to the
capture and execution of Father Hidalgo and his main accomplices, the Army of
the Centre did not succeed in ending the revolt. Critically, the disturbances had
spread far beyond the limits of Guanajuato and there seemed no shortage of those
willing to take up arms against the colony. Moreover, the insurgents abandoned
their tactics of meeting the Royalists in pitched battles, and transformed themselves
into guerrillas under the guidance of another priest, Jose Maria Morelos, who rose
up to take on Hidalgo's mantle.49 During 1811 an insurgent junta was set up in
Zitacuaro, in the modem state of Michoacan, while in the South, Morelos began to
prepare for an offensive on Puebla and its surrounding region. Calleja and his
troops marched against the junta in late December, arriving at the outskirts of
Zitacuaro on 1 January. The next day, after a bloody attack on the town, the
insurgent members of the junta fled, and Calleja entered in triumph. 50 He
immediately ordered the town to be evacuated and for it then to be razed to the
ground. 51 From Zitacuaro, Calleja was ordered to march upon Cuautla, where
Morelos had just established his base. He and his troops arrived in Pasulco, about
two leagues away from Cuautla, on 17 February 1812. The next day he led an
4H Ibid., pp. 296-7. Also quoted by Jose Antonio Serrano Ortega, "Votes, contribuciones y
milicias en Guanajuato, 1810-1836" (Unpublished PhD. dissertation. El Colegio de Mexico.
1998), p. 93.
49 For a description of the fragmentation of the insurgency. see Ortiz Escamilla. Guerra y
ft0bierno, pp. 77-8.
o Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 2, pp. 453-459.
51 Calleja issued an edict to this effect on 5 January 1811. It is published in Bustamante,
Campahas de Calleja, pp. 143-147.
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unsuccessful assault upon the fortified town and resolved to besiege it.52 For, he
reasoned:
Si Cuautla no quedase demolida como Zitacuaro, el enemigo
creeria haber hallado un medio seguro de sostenerse: multiplicaria
sus fortificaciones en parajes convenientes en las que reuniria el
inmenso numero que de temor se le separa, y desde las que
intercept aria los caminos y destruiria los pueblos y haciendas: las
pocas tropas con que contamos se aniquiliarian y acaso se
intimidarian, y la insurrecci6n que se halla en su ultimo termino,
cundiria rapidarnente y tomaria un nuevo y vigoroso aspecto.i''
He calculated that, with sufficient troops and supplies, he could recapture the town
in six to eight days. 54 However, this estimate would prove to be overly optimistic,
and the siege of Cuautla dragged on for three months. It ended with Morelos and
his followers fleeing the town in the dead of night, effectively robbing Calleja of
the resounding victory he so desired.
Bustamante transferred from the Lancer Company to the Provincial
Regiment of the San Luis Dragoons on 1 December 1810, just before the action at
Zitacuaro. After the capture of the town he was promoted to Captain and took on
the command of a squadron of guerrilla soldiers. 55 This was a mounted unit which
specialised in the pursuit of small groups of insurgents who had fled from, or were
travelling between, the larger bands of rebels. In this capacity, his guerrilla
squadron was kept busy at Cuautla. For, as the situation in the besieged town
became worse and worse, with supplies running low and disease spreading, more
and more insurgents tried to escape.56 In the end, the siege of Cuautla could only
52 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 2, pp. 489-495.
53 Ibid .. p. 497.
54 Bustamante, Campaiias del General D. Felix Maria Calleja, p. 171. Calleja to the Vice-Roy,
Cuautla, 20 February 1812.
55 SDN: SC XIIIII/I-235/1-31/00001. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, dated December
1812. His promotion is dated 6 February 1812.
56 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 200 ff 576-586. Calleja to Vice-Roy Venegas, Cuautla, 18
April 1812. Ibid., ff. 505-506. Agustin de la Vifia to Calleja, Reducto de Calvario, 22 April 1812.
Ibid., f. 529. Calleja's Diary of Operations 19-24 April 1812. Ibid., f.1. Anastasio Bustamante to
the Cavalry Major General (Pedro Menezo), Campo de Santa Ines, 1 May 1812. These
communications report the activities of Bustamante and details of his pursuits of the insurgents.
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be resolved by the weather. Calleja tried repeatedly to attack the fortifications and
gain entry into the town, but the defences and defenders of Cuautla were well-
organised and steadfastly resisted the Royalist assaults throughout March and
April. Both sides suffered a shortage of supplies and a burgeoning population of
invalids caused by illnesses brought on by contaminated water, poor alimentation,
and excess alcohol. Even Calleja himself suffered from nasty attacks of
dysentery. 57 It was a race against time to resolve the conflict before the onset of
the rainy season and the diseases that would follow in its wake. Things were
brought to a head on 2 May, when in the early hours of the morning, Morelos and
his remaining men slipped past the enemy lines and made their escape. ss Calleja
sent Juan Amador, Anastasio Bustamante and his squadron of 25 guerrillas in hot
pursuit. Bustamante and Amador chased the insurgents for seven leagues (about
21 rniles)59 to no avail and eventually returned empty-handed. Even so, their
Commanding Officer, Pedro Menezo, recommended them for their 'distinguido
merito ' in his report to Calleja on the day's happenings.I"
The anti-climactic end to the siege of Cuautla must have been a
disappointment for Calleja and his army. Morelos had out-manoeuvred the
Royalists and although they tried to declare a victory, it was clear that no battle
had been won. Calleja retired to Mexico City where he set up his residence on a
fashionable street and surrounded himself with his old friends and admirers:
including Manuel Gomez Pedraza, Miguel Barragan, Manuel de la Sota Riva and
Anastasio Bustamante. According to Doris Ladd, the erstwhile Royalist hero 'was
sulking in his tent,' offended that Venegas had not rewarded him for his services in
Cuautla.61 Rivalry had long existed between Calleja and Vice-Roy Venegas due to
57 lbid., ff 467-474. Calleja to Vice-Roy Venegas, Cuautla, IS April ISI2. Alarnan, Historia de
Mexico, vol. 2, pp. 515-520. Bustamante, Cuadra historico, vol. 2. p. 67. These contain
descriptions of the situation in Cuautla in April 1812.
58 Alarnan, His/aria de Mexico, vol. 2, p. 522.
59 "Pesos y medidas espafioles tradicionales", Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Collins Spanish
Dictionary (Glasgow: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 2140. One league is roughly equivalent to three
miles or five and a half kilometres.
60 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 201 f.4. Cavalry Major General, Pedro Menezo to Calleja,
Cuautla, 3 May 1812.
61 Doris M. Ladd, The Mexican Nobility at Independence. pp. 117-118.
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the former's military success and obvious ambition. Now, after Cuautla, this rivalry
became more acute. According to Alaman, what Calleja established in Mexico City
was nothing less than a rival court, 'no menos frecuentada que la del virrey.' It was
a focal point for those unhappy with the present government and the subject of
much gossip. It was clear that Calleja coveted Venegas' position; the question was
how far was he prepared to go to attain it? Rumour had it at the time that he may
have been prepared even to join the insurgents.P' Later on, in the post-war period,
Anastasio Zerecero claimed that, during this time Calleja became involved with the
Guadalupes, a secret society of the pro-insurgent elites in Mexico City, and
plotted with them to over-throw Venegas and set up an independent
government.P' However, Virginia Guedea is sceptical. She notes Calleja's tendency
to surround himself with Americans, which could have been seen as a sign of his
own identification with the Creoles, and accepts that his known association with
opponents of Venegas may have convinced some of the Guadalupes that they may
be able to use their rivalry to their own advantage. But, she argues, there is no
evidence to support Zerecero's assertion. Some members of the group may have
been involved in indirect negotiation with Calleja, but it is impossible that he knew
of the society's existence until later.64 Even so, the possibility that pro-insurgents
believed that Calleja might be sympathetic to their cause and that they may even
have attended Calleja's alternative court is intriguing. What was being discussed in
the confines of Calleja's house that gave rise to the rumours of his inclination for
independence? If there were talk of independence, did Bustamante, Barragan,
Gomez Pedraza and Sota de la Riva take part? After all, it is interesting to note
that Gomez Pedraza went on to become one of Iturbide's collaborators in the
62 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 2, p. 548.
63 Virgina Guedea, En busca de un gobierno alterno: los Guadalupes en Mexico (Mexico City:
UNAM, 1992), pp. 166-167. She quotes from Zerecero, Memorias para la historia de
revoluciones de Mexico (Mexico City: Imprenta del Gobierno, lM. Sandoval, 1869), pp. 253-
254. He claims that his father, Valentin, was a member of the Guadalupes, and that from
meetings that had taken place in his house, he had become aware of the plans of the Guadalupes
and Calleja. The plotting, of course, came to an abrupt end when Calleja was appointed as
Venegas' replacement.
64 Guedea, En busca de un gobierno a/lema, pp. 166-171.
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organisation of what would eventually become the Plan of Iguala.65 Bustamante,
Barragan and Sota de la Riva would also work closely with Iturbide after the
proclamation of the plan.
c: After Calleja: Coyoacan, Tlalnepantla, and Los Llanos de Apan (1812-1816)
Whatever might have taken place in Mexico City after the siege of Cuautla,
Captain Bustamante would only have been able to take a minuscule part, if any at
all. For, by July 1812, he was back in active service with his San Luis guerrillas. He
was sent to Coyoacan, where, as captain of his detachment, he was the effective
commanding officer of the area. Here, he enjoyed considerable independence of
action and corresponded directly with the Vice-Roy on the subject of his
manoeuvres. Evidently his two years of service in the Army of the Centre had
transformed the doctor into a capable soldier, and had earned him a small measure
of respect in the Royalist Army. In Coyoacan, Bustamante's orders were to
'proteger todas esas cercanias e imponer respeto a los malhechores.' He was also
under the obligation to shoot anyone found in the act of rebellion.66 Bustamante
and his men formed part of the Viceroyalty's new counterinsurgency programme
designed to combat the guerrilla warfare employed by the rebels. They operated as
a 'destacamento volante' or flying detachment, patrolling the major roads and
protecting the towns in their district. The aim was to prevent the insurgent bands
from taking food and other supplies from local villages, and from communicating
with each other, or joining forces. This tactic was often combined with that of
exemplary terror; a practice employed by Calleja from the very beginning of his
65Manuel Gomez Pedraza, "Manifiesto que Manuel Gomez Pedraza, ciudadano de la republica
de Mexico, dedica a sus compatriotas, 0 sea una resefia de su vida publica," in Laura Solares
Robles, La obra politica de Manuel Gomez Pedraza 1813-1851 (Mexico City: Instituto
Mora/Instituto Matias Romero/ Acervo Hist6rico Diplomatico de la Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores), pp. 175-177.
66AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 98, f. 6. Vice-Roy Venegas to Bustamante, 5 July 1812.
This order was the same in all New Spain. On 25 June 1812, Vice-Roy Venegas issued an edict
which obliged all officers to courtmartial and shoot any captured rebels. Hamnett, Revolucion y
contrarrevolucion, p. 71.
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campaign, which involved the execution of captured rebels and the display of their
bodies, or simply their heads, in local towns. These methods had been exported
from Spain by the Peninsular officers who had taken part in the guerrilla struggle
against the French occupation. The Spaniards had studied their enemies' techniques
well, and in Mexico, employed them vigorously. They were first used by Jose de la
Cruz in Huichapan and Tula, in December 1810, and were soon adopted
throughout the colony for the remaining period of the war.67 Bustamante, for his
part, operated his detachment in the environs of Coyoacan. His jurisdiction
extended as far west as San Agustin de las Cuevas and Xochimilco, and as far east
as the Valley of Tenango and the village of Oculian. In this area their main
adversary was the insurgent Father Jose Maria Herrera, who, despite various
attempts, he failed to capture.l"
Bustamante left Coyoacan at the beginning of September 1812, and in
November was sent, with a section of fifty-five men from the Regiment of San
Luis, to Tlalnepantla.f" Here, throughout 1813, he operated his flying detachment
in the defence of the road to Queretaro. The main settlements in his care were the
Villa de Carbon, Palo Hueco, Chapa de Mota and the surrounding haciendas. But
his persecution of the rebels, under the control of Epitacio Sanchez and Atiliano
Garcia, often took him as far north as Cuautitlan or Tula. His unit was part of the
force controlled from Tula by Colonel Cristobal Ordonez. In addition to the duties
he had performed in Coyoacan, he was also responsible for the protection of the
regular convoys of silver, which travelled on the Queretaro road to the capital,
when they passed through his jurisdiction.I" During his time in this area,
Bustamante and his mounted guerrillas took part in the recapture of Huichapan
from the insurgent, Chito Villagran, in May 1813. He was awarded a medal of
67 Archer, 'The Counterinsurgency and the Ten Years' War," pp. 93-95.
68 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 98, if. 2-71 deals with the time that Bustamante spent in
Coyoacan.
69 Ibid., f. 72. Bustamante to Vice-Roy Venegas, Tlalnepantla, 5 November 1812.
70 Ibid., vol. 101, ff 1-167, contains details of Bustamante's activities in Tlalnepantla. For details
of the troops under the control of Cristobal Ordonez, see Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 3, pp.
503-504.
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honour for his part in the action.71 The attack on Huichapan led to the capture and
execution of Villagran, a member of one of the most feared insurgent families of
the area.72
In April 1814, Bustamante and a detachment of 100 men were transferred
to the Llanos de Apan. Here they were to be joined by 60 artillery men under the
command of Jose Joaquin Ponce and 350 foot soldiers sent from Mexico City.
These troops were destined to provide reinforcements for the beleaguered
Commander General of the area, Major Jose Barradas. The Llanos de Apan had
been more or less completely in the hands of the insurgents since 1810. These
rebels were well-organised, numerous and mostly mounted. This was mainly due to
the efforts of Carlos Maria de Bustamante and Father Antonio Lozano, who in
1813 had undertaken its military and political organisation.v' A government had
been set up in Zacatlan that co-ordinated the military activities of the insurgents in
the Llanos and the Sierra de Puebla and new troops were being trained and
weapons made. However, the Royalist campaign had also helped the insurgents, as
it had remained entirely on the periphery and had not attacked any of the insurgent
bases.74 The insurgent stranglehold on this area caused many problems for the
viceregal government. The Llanos was usually a major provider of pulque for the
markets of the capital. Its haciendas also supplied meat, maize and vegetables.l '
The outbreak of the insurgency meant that these products, especially pulque. did
not reach Mexico City with any regularity.I" It is little wonder that Calleja, who
had been Vice-Roy since 1813, wanted things to change.
With his new men, Barradas was ordered to set up his headquarters in
Apan from where he was to control the Llanos and surrounding provinces,
71 SDN: SC XIIIII/I-235/1-31/00002. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante, dated December
1817.
n Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 3, p. 461. and Bustamante, Cuadra historico, vol. 2, p. 354.
73 Virginia Guedea, La insurgencia en el Departamento del Norte. Los Llanos de Apan y la
Sierra de Puebla, 1810-1816 (Mexico City: UNAM/Instituto Mora. 1996), pp. 61-62.
74 Ibid., p. 107 and Bustamante, Cuadro historico, vol. 2, p. 259.
75 Guedea, La insurgencia en el Departamento del Norte, pp. 9-19.
76 Ibid., p. 49 and Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 2, p. 520.
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stretching from Pachuca and Tulancingo in the north, San Juan Teotihuacan,
Otumba and Texcoco in the south, and Zacatlan in the east. 77 Bustamante's duties
were again those of a flying detachment, coupled with the escort of silver convoys.
He worked on the roads from the mines in Real del Monte through Pachuca to the
capital and occasionally escorted mercantile convoys travelling between Veracruz
and Mexico City.78 He also took part in the principal attacks mounted by Barradas
against the insurgent strongholds in the Llanos. In August 1814, he participated in
the Royalist capture of Zacatlan which led to the flight of Carlos Maria de
Bustamante and the insurgent commander, Ignacio Rayon.79 In April 1815, he was
injured in the thigh during an encounter with the chief insurgent of the Llanos,
Osorno, at Nopaltepec. Barradas commended him for bravery in this action.
Despite being injured fairly early in the eight-hour confrontation, he refused to
leave the front-line until the battle was completed.t"
The Barradas' campaign in the Llanos did not make any real headway
throughout 1814 and 1815. The major achievement in capturing Zacatlan did not
last, as Osorno simply returned to the town once the Royalists had left. ~1
According to Calleja, the insurgents were 'acaso los mas exercitados del reino;'
worse still, they counted on strong public support and possessed a fine cavalry. ~2
As Virginia Guedea has shown, this was not entirely true. With the fall of Zacatlan
and the disintegration of Carlos Maria de Bustamante's administrative organisation,
the insurgents slipped into disarray. They were unable to consolidate their
supremacy over the Royalists because of a lack of discipline and their marked
preference for cavalry over infantry, of which they had next to nothing. By 1815,
they owed their strong position more to the weakness of the Royalist forces, who
77 Guedea, La insurgencia en el Departamento del Norte. pp. 188-119.
78 Hamnett, "Anastasio Bustamante y la guerra de la independencia," pp.108-1 09. AGN.
Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 120, f. 349. Bustamante to Manuel de la Concha. Jalapa, 10
December 1816.
79 Alaman, Historia de Mexico. vol. 4. pp. 184-186.
80 Ibid., p. 253. SDN: SC XI/III/I-235/1-31/00002. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante.
dated December 1817.
81 Guedea, La insurgencia en e/ Departamento del Norte., p. 197.
82 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 117. f. 298. Vice-Roy Calleja to Manuel de la Concha. 5
December 1815.
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lacked sufficient cavalry and men to employ the counterinsurgency techniques used
elsewhere. For the most part, they remained fortified within villages and churches
and concentrated upon defence rather than attack.83 Things came to a head on 27
November 1815 when the garrison of Apan, defended by a mere 140 men was
attacked by Osorno, Inclan, Serrano and Espinosa, the four principal leaders of the
insurgents in the Llanos. The garrison could do nothing but fortify itself in the
church and let Osorno and his men enter the town. The insurgents burnt all the
unprotected buildings and cut otfthe water supply. Only the persistent firing of the
Royalists in the church over the next week prevented them from taking the town.
Even so, much of the garrison and townsfolk perished from dehydration during the
attack.84 On 5 December, Osorno retired to the nearby hacienda of Ocotepec,
where troops led by Juan Rafols and Anastasio Bustamante forced him to retreat
. h id 85into t e countrysi e.
In the light of this new set-back, Calleja replaced Barradas with Manuel de
la Concha, who had just returned to Mexico City from his triumphant campaign
against Morelos. On 23 December, the day after the insurgent leader's execution,
Concha marched for Apan. His instructions from the Vice-Roy were very clear:
Dara V.S. principio sin la menor demora y con la actividad que
acostumbra a la persecuci6n de dichos rebeldes, buscandolos en sus
madrigueras y siguiendolos constantemente sin alzar la mano hasta
lograr su extermino 0 reducci6n [...] Haga V.S. castigos exemplares
que aterren y escarrnienten a los malvados, y quiteles V.S. cuantos
armas y caballos tengan, dejando a los que por gracia se les
conserve la vida, en estado de no poder continuar en la rebeli6n [... ]
Me prometo los mas felices resultados en la presente estaci6n; y
que desprendido V.S. de toda otra atenci6n dedicado unicamente a
perseguir y castigar las gavilla de ese territorio, lograremos su
esterminio y restablecimiento de la paz y el buen orden, para 10 cual
. VS l ti . 86se tomara .. e tiempo necesano.
R3 Guedea, La insurgencia en et Departamento del Norte, p. 213-214.
~4 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 4 p. 375.
85 Ibid., p. 376.
R6 AGN, Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 117, ff 298-299. Vice-Roy Calleja to Manuel de la
Concha, 5 December 1815.
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Concha took these instructions very seriously and implemented a ruthless strategy
which saw the Llanos cleared of insurgents within less than twelve months. In this
he was helped by the fact that the insurgents' organisation became more and more
chaotic now Morelos had been defeated. He also had many more troops at his
disposal than Barradas could have ever dreamed at: In April 1816, his new Flying
Division counted 1, 255 men, of which 135 were San Luis Dragoons.V These
troops were divided into smaller flying detachments under the command of himself,
Juan Rafols, Anastasio Bustamante and Rubin de Celis and dispersed throughout
the territory with orders to execute every insurgent captured, regardless of class or
condition. Alaman records that in the reports from the above officers, published in
the Gaceta del Gobierno de Mexico, it was common to read that they had taken
'veinte, treinta 0 mas prisioneros que fueron inmediatamente fusilados. ,88 This
ruthlessness was complemented by the simultaneous offer of the indulto to those
who would give themselves up, hand over their weapons and divulge any useful
information concerning the insurgents' activities to their captors.
The combination of these policies was extremely successful, as fear
prompted many insurgents to solicit an amnesty. These included Miguel Serrano,
one of the insurgent leaders, Joaquin Espinosa, his second-in-command, Anastasio
Torrejon, the second-m-command to another insurgent leader, Inclan, and even
Jose Mariano Vargas who had briefly replaced Serrano in command.T' The flood
of amnesties had two beneficial effects for the Royalists. In the first place, they
demoralised those who chose to remain fighting and severely depleted their
numbers, and secondly, they increased their own fighting power, as the amnestied
men were forced to join the ranks of their former enemies.l" The final blow to the
insurgents was Concha's decision to forbid the production and commerce of
pulque on pain of death. Apart from causing the cities of Mexico and Puebla huge
87 Ibid., vol. 119, f. 267. "Estado general de la Division Volante de los Llanos de Apan", signed
by Manuel de la Concha, 6 April 1816.
88 Alamein, Historia de Mexico, vol. 4, p. 397.
89 Ibid., p. 403. Bustamante, Cuadro historico, vol. 3, p. 351.
90 Guedea, La insurgencia en el Departamento del Norte, p. 221.
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problems, this move also effectively deprived the insurgents of the income they had
benefited from since 1810, and thus took away much of their power. 91 In the end,
those who refused to consider the indulto fled from the Llanos and Concha could
triumphally inform the new Vice-Roy, Juan Ruiz de Apodaca in December 1816
that 'ninguna gavilla ha quedado en este terreno. ,92 Concha would be rewarded
with the appointment of Colonel. Bustamante, for his part, was promoted to
Lieutenant -Co lonel.93
D: El Bajto (1817-1821)
The newly-promoted Lieutenant-Colonel Bustamante's next posting was to
the Bajio. Still commanding a detachment of cavalry from the San Luis Regiment,
he made up part of the army, commanded by Field-Marshal Pascual Lifian, which
had been organised by the Vice-Roy in response to the news of the arrival of the
former Spanish military hero, Francisco Javier Mina in New Spain. Mina had won
his reputation in Peninsular Spain during the Napoleonic invasion, but had fallen
from grace after the restoration of Ferdinand VII, when he led a failed coup in
favour of the 1812 Constitution of Cadiz. He fled first to France and then to
England, where he decided to take his fight against what he believed to be
Ferdinand's tyrannical government to New Spain. He left London in May 1816
with a group of 32 European officers. He called first at Galveston in the United
States, where his numbers were swelled by a number of former U.S. Army officers
94
and a band of 200 adventurers led by a German Colonel, the Count of Ruuth.
This expeditionary force disembarked at the mouth of the river, Soto de la Marina
(in the modem state of Tamaulipas) on 15 April, arriving in the nearby town of the
ql Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 4, p. 398.
oz AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 117, f. 321. Manuel de la Concha to Vice-Roy Apodaca,
Tepeapulco, 19 December 1816.
q~ Alaman, Historia de Mexico. vol. 4, p. 411. SON: SC XIIIII/I-235/1-31/00002. Service Record
for Anastasio Bustamante. December 1817. The promotion is dated 17 February 1817.
q4 Alaman, Historia de Mexico. vol. 4. pp. 549-552.
31
The War of Independence
same name seven days later. From there he marched south through the province of
San Luis Potosi, in the direction of Guanajuato, with the aim of uniting with the
principal insurgents of that area, Father Torres, the Ortiz family and Miguel
Borja.95 On 29 June, in the hacienda of San Juan de los Llanos, just outside Leon,
his troops engaged in battle with those of Colonel Cristobal Ordonez, the
Commandant-General of Guanajuato who had recently been appointed to replace
the disgraced Agustin de Iturbide. Mina won a resounding victory, capturing 220
prisoners and leaving around 300 of his enemies, including Colonel Ordonez, dead
on the battle field.96
In this state of affairs, with Guanajuato and Queretaro under threat, the
Vice-Roy, Juan Ruiz Apodaca, wrote to Pascual Lilian on 3 July, ordering him to
march forthwith to Queretaro and to take charge of the campaign against Mina.97
Anastasio Bustamante and his troops were originally intended to accompany him
to Queretaro, but later that month they were ordered to join the troops of
Brigadier Pedro Celestino Negrete in Guanajuato.I'' Here Bustamante, and what
Alaman describes as 'una fuerza considerable de caballeria' were ordered to keep a
close watch on Mina's movements in case he should try to capture the city of
Guanajuato.V Meanwhile, Mina had united with the insurgent leaders,
Encarnacion Ortiz and Miguel Borja, fortifying himself in the Fuerte de Sombrero,
positioned on a small hill just outside Leon. The Royalists began to besiege the
Fort on 1 August and fired their cannons constantly at the insurgents' defences for
a fortnight. This barrage of artillery had very little effect. Much more successful
was the tactic of cutting off the water-supply to the town. Every night Bustamante
and his Dragoons, helped by Lieutenant-Colonel Jose Cristobal Villasenor and a
unit of Sierra Gorda Dragoons, would surround the local stream, which ran past
95 Ibid., p. 571.
96 Ibid., p. 584.
97 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 487, ff 46-48. Vice-Roy Apodaca to Pascual de Linan, 3
July 1817.
98 Ibid., vol. 261, f. 261. Pedro Celestino Negrete to Lifian, Silao, 28 July 1817.
99 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 4, p. 594.
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the fort, and thus prevent the insurgents from gathering water. 100 In this they were
helped by the weather. For, although the rainy season was still in full swing, the
clouds resolutely refused to open over the insurgent fortifications. Very soon there
was no water at all, and very few provisions, inside the insurgents' camp. 101 In this
desperate situation, every day, many rebels, including a number of Mina's foreign
troops, tried to make their escape during the hours of darkness. In order to prevent
the escape of the foreigners, whom Lifian particularly wished to see captured, on
15 August he launched a new offensive against the town.102 His soldiers were,
however, repelled by the insurgent artillery and the stones thrown from the
barricades by the women. Unfortunately, many of the soldiers killed in the assault
fell into the ditches constructed as part of the fort's defence. It was too dangerous
for the Royalists to remove the corpses and soon the stench surrounding the
insurgent camp was intolerable. This merely hastened the inevitable. On the night
of 19 August, the insurgents abandoned the fort, only to be immediately attacked
by the Royalists:
Apenas la columna habia comenzado a bajar la barranca, cuando
por la indiscrecion de haber dejado que se adelantasen las mujeres y
los muchachos, fue descubierto por los realistas, comunicandose la
alarma a todo el campo en un instante [...] El fuego se rornpio en la
oscuridad; los gritos de las mujeres y de los nifios; los lamentos de
los heridos; la confusion que se introdujo tratando unos de volver al
fuerte, otros de pasar al otro lado de la barranca, formaban una
escena de horror, dificil de describir.103
The Dragoons of Bustamante and Villasenor were sent to pursue those insurgents
who did manage to escape. According to Alaman, of the hundreds of people in the
104fort, only fifty managed to escape.
lOO AGN: Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 489 tT. 66-68. Lifian to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Mesa de las
Tablas, 22 August 1817.
101 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 4, p. 602, 604.
102 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 489 f. 79. Linan to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Mesa de las
Tablas, 22 August 1817.
IO~ Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 4, p. 606-607.
104 Ibid .. p. 607.
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Unfortunately for the Royalists, Mina had left the fort some days before.
He headed for Penjamo and the Fort of Los Remedios, where Father Torres was
organising its defence. They were in little doubt that Lifian would soon direct his
attention towards this second insurgent stronghold. Therefore, they agreed to split
up. Torres would remain in Remedios to lead the defence, while Mina and a 900
strong cavalry, would patrol the surrounding land. In order to prevent a repeat of
the siege at Sombrero it was decided that Mina would take responsibility for
keeping the hacienda supplied with food, and would also try to prevent the
Royalist supply convoys from reaching their camps. As predicted, Lilian arrived at
Remedios on 27 August and began besieging the hacienda almost immediately.
Initially, Mina and Torres' plan worked well and the besieging army suffered from
a lack of food and other supplies. However, the two men quarrelled over how
finally to break the siege. Torres wanted Mina to lead an attack on Lifian outside
the fort, while Mina believed that it would be better to draw the Royalists off by
capturing Guanajuato. This disagreement led to their downfall. Torres instructed
his men not to obey Mina unless he led them against Lilian, and so when in
October, Mina decided to attack Guanajuato anyway, his depleted troops were
unable to capture the town.105 Lifian sent a force of 200 men from Remedios,
including Bustamante, Villasenor and their Dragoons, under the command of
Colonel Francisco Orrantia to pursue Mina, but did not lift the siege. This failure
to capture Guanajuato weakened Mina's position further. On 27 October he was
apprehended by Orrantia at seven in the evening in the Rancho de Venadito, near
Silao.106 Father Torres, meanwhile, continued to defend his position at Remedios.
He held out throughout November and December, despite repeated attacks by the
Royalists. Eventually, the insurgents began to run out of munitions and fresh food,
and, on I January 1818, had no choice but to flee the fort. Bustamante, who was at
105 Ibid., p. 616, 621-622.
106 Ibid., p.624 . AGN: Operaciones de de Guerra, vol. 489, f. 336. Francisco Orrantia to Linan,
Silao, 27 October 1817. Alarnan, Historia de Mexico, vol. 4. p. 625. Vice-Roy Apodaca was
named the Count ofVenadito in honour of this occurrence.
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this time in charge of patrolling the road between the fort, Penjamo and Casas
Blancas, sent his cavalry in pursuit of the fleeing insurgents, and once more, only a
few managed to escape. 107
Field-Marshal Lifian returned to Mexico City in January and was awarded
with the medal of the Gran Cruz de la Orden de Isabel la Catolica. Anastasio
Bustamante remained in the Bajio and was promoted to Colonel in February. lOR He
now operated under the orders of the new Commander-General of Guanajuato,
Colonel Antonio Linares. Linares, upon taking up his command in February 1818
set about reorganising the counterinsurgency struggle that had been interrupted by
Javier Mina's invasion.109 He divided his province into three areas: the north,
consisting of the territories of San Miguel, Dolores and San Felipe, which he
placed under the command of Colonel Orrantia; the south, consisting of the
territories surrounding the Valle de Santiago, stretching from Irapuato in the north,
through Penjamo to San Francisco Angamacutiro (now Angamacutiro de la
Union), to the Rio Grande and Purandiro in the south, which he placed under the
command of Bustamante; and the centre, consisting of the territories surrounding
Guanajuato, Salamanca and Celaya, which he was going to contro1.110 He chose
Bustamante as commander of the southern region because its geography demanded
a cavalry force that was able to pursue the insurgents over long distances.
Bustamante, as he pointed out to the Vice-Roy, was an ideal choice in this respect,
as he was an accredited and respected cavalry commander. III
Bustamante's strategy in the Valle de Santiago was based on the desire to
separate the rural population from the insurgents. He and his fellow officers
wanted to deprive the insurgents of local support in the form of food, weapons,
and above all, sanctuary. The two main features of this strategy were
107 Alaman, His/aria de Mexico. vol. 4. p. 633.
108 SDN: XIIIII/l-235/1-31/0000S. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante. December 1820.
His promotion is dated 26 February 1818.
109 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 477, f. 26. Antonio Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca. Valle
de Santiago, 22 February 1818.
110 Ibid., f. 23. Antonio Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Salamanca. 3 March 1818.
III Ibid., f. 69. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Salamanca, 7 March 1818.
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'organisation' and 'resettlement.' 'Organisation' was the fortification of any
settlement, usually including the building of a moat and barricades, in order to
protect it from insurgent raids or infiltration.I!2 Between 1818 and 1820, in the
Valle de Santiago, four villages, seven haciendas and three ranches were organised
in this way and were assigned a small garrison of troops to supervise the defence.
However, in the context of the haciendas, the most successful and widely-used
feature of this strategy was the creation of so-called Patriot Militias, or
'guardacampos' made up of labourers and other employees to patrol the fields to
protect the crops and buildings from insurgent raids. By 1820, 18 haciendas and 29
ranches were protected by this scheme.!!3 'Resettlement' involved the creation of
demarcation zones between the pacified 'organised' areas and the insurgent strong-
holds. Anyone captured in these zones was presumed to be a rebel and shot. This
policy received its name because the zone was usually created by the forcible
destruction of small hamlets and ranches found between the pacified and insurgent
areas. These populations were then forced to decamp to the pacified towns and
villages.i" In the Valle of Santiago, Bustamante went one step further. He decided
not simply to destroy settlements which lay in the demarcation zones, but also any
which, as he termed it, 'se oponian a la pacificacion y buen orden.' Or in other
words, those he suspected were allied to the insurgents.II5
'Organisation' and 'resettlement' had also been employed by Iturbide
during his time as Commander General ofGuanajuato. They owed their ideas to
Calleja's plan of 1811, which had asserted that the only way to counter the
insurgency was by devolving the responsibility for the protection of towns, villages
and haciendas to the local population, in order to allow the army to concentrate on
112 Brian R. Harnnett, "Royalist Counterinsurgency and the Continuity of Rebellion: Guanajuato
and Michoacan, 1813-1820," Hispanic American Review 62: I (1982), pp. 37-38.
I U AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 475, f. 193. "Provincia de Guanajuato. Demarcaci6n del
Valle de Santiago a cargo del senor coronel graduado D. Anastasio Bustamante." This document
is included in Appendix Two.
114 Hamnett, "Royalist Counterinsurgency, 1813-1820," pp. 38-39.
115 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 475, f. 193. "Provincia de Guanajuato. Demarcaci6n del
Valle de Santiago a cargo del senor coronel graduado D. Anastasio Bustamante."
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the persecution of the rebels in the countryside strongholds.i" In Bustamante's
case this meant that he and his troops could be constantly on the move, patrolling
the demarcation zones and following up and reported sightings of the insurgents. If
we look at the Diaries of Operations sent by Bustamante to Linares during 1818
and 1819 (included in Appendix One) we can see that Bustamante had no real
headquarters. He was continually riding between town, village and hacienda on the
look-out for signs of the insurgents. As had happened in the Llanos, insurgents
who were caught were generally executed at once, and their bodies displayed
prominently. For example, in July 1819 Bustamante captured the insurgent leaders
Andres Delgado, alias el Giro, 117 and Antonio Velasco, alias el Cuate, within the
space of a week.118 Bustamante ordered that Andres Delgado's head be cut off and
displayed in Salamanca.119 These patrols, or 'correrias,' had a slow, but
cumulative effect against the insurgents. As we can see by studying the Diaries of
Operations, Bustamante and his men gradually destroyed the power of the rebels
by continually raiding their hideouts when they were least expected, usually at
night. Surprised by the Royalists, the insurgents would flee, leaving behind their
horses and weapons. The troops would then give chase and usually capture half a
dozen insurgents, who would then be executed. This relentless persecution had
two effects. The first was to induce many rebels, including their leaders, to seek
the indulto, as they had in the Llanos. These men were then amalgamated into the
Royalist Army as Rural or Patriot Companies, and joined the persecution of their
former cornrades.120 Two of Bustamante's most prominent successes here were the
capture ofleaders Miguel Borja, who was granted the indulto in July 1819,121 and
116 The plan of Calleja is published by Bustamante. Campaiias del General D. Felix Maria
Calleja, pp. 118-122.
117 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 482, ff 345-348. Bustamante to Linares, Salamanca. 4
July 1819.
118 lbid., f. 278. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Celaya. 2 July 1819.
119 Ibid., ff 345-348. Bustamante to Linares. Salamanca, 4 July 1819.
120 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 4. p. 690.
121 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 483, f. 198.Certificate of Amnesty for Miguel Borja, dated
29 July 1819.
38
The War ofIndependence
Antonio Garcia, who was amnestied in January 1820.122 The second effect was
that it drained the insurgents of their three most important resources: men,
weapons and morale. This continual drain made the insurgents weaker and,
logically, easier to hunt, until by the summer of 1820 there were no real rebels of
any significance left. As Bustamante reported triumphantly to Linares in
September, the Valle de Santiago now enjoyed a 'tranquilidad publica de un modo
inalterable.,123
E: Problems for the Future?
Although Bustamante's success in the Valle de Santiago was mirrored by
his fellow officers in the Bajio, and by late 1820 the region was officially
pacified,124 the situation of the Royalist Army in Guanajuato was far from ideal.
The main problem, as it would be throughout the forthcoming independence
period, was the lack of money, weapons and uniforms. These shortages had been a
problem from the very moment of Bustamante's arrival. In October 1817, Pascual
de Lifian wrote to Vice-Roy Apodaca that the troops in Guanajuato suffered from
'la falta de toda cIase de auxilios' and that this shortage threatened the very
success of his ITIlsslon.125In December he reported that his troops were not
receiving their salaries, and as a result desertion was becoming very popular
amongst the rank and file. The problem, as Lifian went on to observe, was the poor
state of the provincial treasury in Guanajuato, which could not provide the
necessary money.126 Provincial treasuries, such as the one in Guanajuato, had been
given the responsibility of financing the troops stationed in its region by Calleja.
I22 Ibid .• vol. 478. f. 240. Bustamante to Linares, Rancho del Cerro Colorado. 27 January 1820.
m Ibid .. vol. 475. f. 193. "Provincia de Guanajuato. Demarcacion del Valle de Santiago a cargo
del senor coronel graduado D. Anastasio Bustamante."
124 Alaman, Historia de Mexico. vol. 4. p. 690.
125 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 489. f. 266. Pascual de Lifian to Vice-Roy Apodaca,
Campo en el Cerro de Bellaco, 6 October 1817.
126 Ibid .• ff 449-450. Linan to Vice-Roy Apodaca. Campo de el Cerro de Bellaco, 31 December
1817.
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Before his ascension to the vice-royalty the cost of supporting the Royalist Army
had been shared between the Royal Hacienda and the local authorities. After 1813,
the provincial ayuntamientos were expected to raise the necessary money through
taxation and special contributions imposed on the local inhabitants, and were given
no financial support from the viceregal governrnent.Y' However, Guanajuato, like
other areas of New Spain, had been financially ruined by the insurgency. Mines had
been destroyed, haciendas rendered useless by sackings, and their owners
bankrupted by the forced loans and increased taxes imposed upon them by a vice-
regal government that was itself sagging under huge debts. 12X As the Intendant and
other leading citizens of Guanajuato pointed out to the Vice-Roy in December
1816, the destitution of Guanajuato and its industry made financing the troops
garrisoned in the province by means of voluntary loans from the mine owners, the
usual source of income, impossible:
Agotados los arbitrios del vecindario y destruida su importante
mineria que era el patrimonio, el fondo radical de su subsistencia
politica y natural; ya no encuentra medios para conservar a las tropas
en los diversos puntos que necesita. Los generosos mineros, este
cuerpo interesantisimo de toda la Monarquia Espanola, despues de
haber sufrido radicalmente como se ha manifestado en divers as
manifestaciones, todo el peso de la guerra y todo el trastorno de la
revolucion, han hecho incalculables sacrificios a favor de la causa
publica y del Rey [...] Pero agobiados ya con tan crecidas
contribuciones, casi aniquilados sus fondos metalicos, y reducida ya
estos hombres ricos a 10 muy preciso para vivir y sostener sus
familias, han llegado por fin al grado de imposibilidad en la
continuacion de sus servicios.129
Even so, the garrisons had to be paid. Therefore, the maintenance of the Royalist
army in Guanajuato had to be met by existing methods of raising revenue, such as
m Juan Ortiz Escamilla. "Las elites novohispanos antes la guerra civil de 1810." Historia
Mexicana 46: 2 (1996), p. 349.
128 For a description of the financial problems faced by the vice-regal governmnent, see Hamnett,
Revolucion y contrarrevolucion, pp. 79-81.
11'> AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 640 (not paginated).Fernando Perez Maranon (Indendant
of Guanajuato), Mariano de Otero, Pedro Otero, Jose Antonio Carillo and others. to Vice-Roy
Apodaca, Guanajuato, 7 December 1816.
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the income from the tobacco monopoly and the alcabala. To supplement this, a
new system of tax collection and distribution was introduced in late 1814. In each
population a group of local dignitaries, including a representative of the cabildo
and the clergy, called a junta de arbitrios was set up. This junta had the
responsibility for raising the contributions necessary to finance their local garrison
and militia companies. These contribuciones militares, as they were called, were
raised in three main ways: the first by a sale tax applied to basic food items such as
maize, beans (frijoles), chile and butter; the second by a monthly levy on each
inhabitants' private wealth; and thirdly by charging a fee to those who wished to
id ... . !30avoi conscnption mto a patnot company.
However, between 1818 and 1819, the money raised by these taxes almost
never provided the funds necessary to meet the army's budget demands (see figure
1). The military treasury often faced a monthly deficit of up to two thousand pesos
and as a consequence, troops went without pay and rations. Some men in
Anastasio Bustamante's troops were even reduced to selling their swords in order
to buy food.!3! Other men became ill or simply deserted.132 Financial problems
also exaggerated the shortages of arms and uniforms suffered by the army in
Guanajuato. In 1818, Bustamante wrote to Linares that urgent measures needed to
be taken to remedy 'la desnudez de la tropa y la falta de armas' amongst his
men.!33 Linares himself also wrote to the Vice-Roy on more than one occasion
about this problem, pointing out that arms were scarce throughout the province
and complaining that other units, such as those commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Felipe Codallos, also found themselves in a state of near nudity because of a
shortage of uniforrns.134 This picture of misery was repeated across New Spain.
As a result, across the colony the counterinsurgency army faced a crisis of morale
130 Serrano. "Votes, contribuciones y milicias." pp. 107, 115.
131 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 478. f. 93. Bustamante to Linares. Irapuato, 8 May 1818.
132 Ibid .• vol. 480, f. 477 and vol. 480. f. 25. Bustamante to Linares, Salamanca, 6 April 1818 and
5 October 1818.
m Ibid .• vol. 477. f. 73. Bustamante to Linares. Salamanca. 3 March 1818.
134 Ibid .• vol. 478. f. 124 and vol. 477. f. 211. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca. Salamanca, 7 April
1818 and Celaya. 6 June 1818.
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Figure 1. Table comparing the monthly income and budget of the military treasury
in Guanajuato (1818-1819)
MONTH BUDGET INCOME SURPLUSI
(pesos/realesl (pesos/realesl DEFICIT
granos) granos) (pesos/realesl
granos)
July 1818 53,602/2/7 33,574/6/9 -20,027/31 10
August 1818 46,374/5/4 20,786/010 -25, 588 I 5 14
September 1818 40,95711 15 36,934/6/0 -4, 002 1 2 I 11
October 1818 43,128/4/11 42, 090 I 2 1 11 -1,038/2/0
November 1818 41,099/6/4 35, 86310 15 -5, 236 I 5 I 11
December 1818 42,016/6/6 33, 145 101 1 -8, 871 16 1 5
January 1819 42,016/6/6 33, 135/01 1 -8, 871 16/5
February 1819 42, 184/414 48,480 I 0 17 +6,295/4/3
March 1819 33,661 10/2 29, 315/0/3 -10, 345 I 7 I 11
April 1819 42, 703/61 1 46, 938/4/3 +4,224/6/2
July 1819 57,415/7/3 47,153/6/2 -10, 262 I 1 1 1
Sources: AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 473, f. 238, vol. 479, f. 357, vol.
480, if. 65-66, 149, vol. 481, f. 228, vol. 482, ff 3-5.
amongst its men. Feelings of anger, resentment and hopelessness convinced many
to desert. Others published anonymous papers and petitions in which they criticised
their officers and demanded better treatment.135
The financial crisis became much worse in 1820. Floods in Celaya and
Irapuato brought on by violent rainfall in the early summer dealt the shaky
IJS Archer. "The Counterinsurgency Army and the Ten Years' War," p. 105.
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economy in Guanajuato a heavy blow. A thousand properties in Irapuato were
invaded by the rising water; live-stock and crops were ruined; and inundations in
the mines of the area caused production to fall by 50 per cent in the following
months. Not surprisingly, tax returns from the a/cabala and the tobacco monopoly
declined significantly and in August Linares faced the unprecedented deficit of 15,
000 pesos in his military budget.)36 The problem was compounded by the political
reforms introduced by the newly re-established Constitution of Cadiz. The juntas
de arbitrios set up to oversee the payment of contribucioncs militarcs for the
upkeep of local urban and rural militias were dissolved, and their powers handed
over to the ayuntamientos. Almost without exception these bodies voted
unanimously to discontinue these taxes, and so, the military coffers in Guanajuato,
as elsewhere, were shorn of an important source of income.)37 By October,
Linares was moved to write a frank letter to the Vice-Roy, describing the state of
military affairs in the province:
La tesoreria militar no cuenta con numerario alguno y cada dia ira en
mayor decadencia, sea porque las Administraciones de Tabacos
tengan menores vent as, que hagan mas cortos enteros 0 por otras
causas que solo e1 tesorero D. Pascual Viderique puede asignarlas;
pues yo solo veo con dolor el triste result ado de que siempre hay
poca 0 ninguna existencia de reales para las complicadas atenciones
que me cercan, de modo que cuanto creia que con la paz de la
provincia me veia mas aliviado, he sufrido al contrario mayo res
privaciones, congojas y pesadumbres, segun tengo manifestado a la
di da i ifi ., d V E 138acre Ita a justi caClon e . . .
The financial shortages suffered by the troops in Guanajuato were now threatening
the success of the Royalist project. Linares tried to relieve the pressure on the
treasury by reducing his army, sending eight battalions away from the province, but
to no avail. He still faced a deficit of thirty thousand pesos in December. By 1821,
136 Christon I. Archer. "Where did al1 the Royalists go? New Light on the Military Collapse of
New Spain, 1810-1822," in Jaime E. Rodriguez O. The Mexican and the Mexican American
Experience in the Nineteenth Century (Tempe: Bilingual Press/Editorial Bilingue, 1989), p. 37.
m Ibid.
m AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 474 f. 165. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Celaya. 13
October 1820.
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the officers in the Bajio were extremely concerned about the effect the shortage of
money was having on their troops. Morale was at rock bottom, and as Bartolome
de la Pefia, the commander of the Frontier Company, positioned on the border with
San Luis, wrote to Linares on 20 February, four days before Agustin de Iturbide
proclaimed the Plan of Iguala: 'las munnuraciones insubordinadas de la tropa por
falta de sueldos' were cause for immense concern. 139
Even so, financial crises were not the only threat to the stability of the
Royalist Army. A far more dangerous problem than rank and file unrest was
represented by the Creole officers; men like Colonel Bustamante, who had been
transformed during the ten years of conflict from green young men, with no
knowledge of military matters, to responsible, capable officers to whom successes
such as the pacification of Los Llanos de Apan and Guanajuato were entirely due.
These men made up, in the words of Lorenzo de Zavala, 'las verdaderas columnas
del poder espafiol,' 140 without whom the colony could surely not have survived.
And by 1820, it was evident to the vice-regal government that this power could be
a very real threat to the future of the colony. Concerned by the opposition manifest
against the liberal Constitution of Cadiz, by those members of the government and
military elites who found its encouragement of mass participation in government
both threatening and alarming, the Vice-Roy sent an appeal to the Peninsula for the
dispatch of troops to come to his aid. He obviously had little trust in the Colonial
Army and its Creole officers.141 The question is, why?
The answer lies in the very creation and structure of the Royalist Army. It
had been created by Calleja and his fellow Peninsular officers in direct response to
Hidalgo's revolutionary movement, because in 1810 there was not an adequate
army in New Spain to deal with this problem. The colonial government had always
139 Ibid., vol. 475, f.359. Bartolome de la Pena to Linares, San Miguel el Grande, 20 February
1821.
140 Lorenzo de Zavala, Ensayo Historico de las Revoluciones de Mexico desde 1808 hasta 1830
(Mexico: Oficina Impresora de Hacienda, 1918), vol. I,p. 41.
141 Brian R. Hamnett, "Mexico's Royalist Coalition: the Response to Revolution," Journal of
Latin American Studies 12 (1980), p. 75.
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been reluctant to arm large numbers of the Creole population, and more reluctant
still to entrust them with positions of authority.142 The fear, reflected in all areas of
colonial government, was that if the Creoles were allowed too much authority and
power, they would soon realise how little they needed their colonial masters and
act accordingly. However, the insurgency changed all that. It became necessary to
do the unthinkable and arm the Creoles. The senility rife within the peninsular
officer class resident in New Spain meant it also was necessary to place the elite
Creoles, men such as Bustamante, Barragan and Armijo, in positions of authority;
although crucially, the highest positions were held by Peninsular Spaniards, such as
Calleja, Concha and Jose de la Cruz. Calleja recognised the threat lying dormant in
this new force, writing to the Vice-Roy Venegas on 29 January 1811 that most
Creoles were convinced of 'las ventajas que les resultarian de un gobierno
independiente.' He assured Venegas that had Hidalgo sought the support of the
Creoles, and not the mixed race plebe, his revolution would have been
unstoppablc.Y'' In other words, the motivating factor in enlisting Creole support in
the counterinsurgency army was the social dissolution threatened by Hidalgo's
rampaging hordes, rather than a desire to defend King and Colony. While social
dissolution remained a threat, the loyalty of the Creole troops seemed assured.
Most had no wish to see men of the classes and castes which made up the
insurgents take over the government of New Spain. As we have seen, for the
Creole officers, these men were the riff-raff of society, nothing but 'canalla.' As
Bustamante would later recall to Guillermo Prieto, for him, the insurgents fell into
two categories: 'impios y bandidos.' 144However, once this threat diminished, as it
did in 1820, when it appeared that the insurgent activity had been confined to the
modern day state of Guerrero, the loyalty of the Creole officers became
questionable.
142 See the chapter "El Dilema del gachupin." in Archer, El ejercito en el Mexico borbonico, pp.
23-58 for a description of the setting up of militia forces in Bourbon Mexico and the fears of the
Peninsular government and officials.
143Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 2, p. 210.
144 Guillermo Prieto, Memorias de mis tiempos (Mexico City: Editorial POTTua,1996), p.180.
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What made this all worse for the colonial government was that the Creole
army was now considerably more powerful than it had been in 1810. In the ten
years of warfare, many of these officers, like Bustamante, had earned considerable
promotions, moving from the rank of Lieutenant to that of Colonel. They were
occupying positions of considerable authority, no longer commanding a simple unit
or squadron, but now commanding various units and co-ordinating their activities
over wide areas. They also had attained a sense of identity, the corporate spirit that
would manifest itself so clearly in the post-independent period.145 In contrast, the
Spanish content of the Creole army was continually falling. Between 1812 and
1816, 12, 000 to 15, 000 soldiers had arrived in Mexico from Spain to aid the
counterinsurgency effort and to prevent the total domination of the army by the
Creoles. However, after 1816, no new Peninsular troops were sent,146 despite
repeated appeals by Vice-Roy Apodaca, and the natural wastage of injury, illness,
death and reassignment meant that the Spanish presence in the army fell rapidly. By
1820 there were few choices for Vice-Roy Apodaca in the matter of who was to
replace Gabriel Armijo as Commander General of Acapulco. He offered the
position to the Spanish Brigadier, Melchor Alvarez. But when he refused the
commission, the Vice-Roy found himself obliged to appoint a Creole, Agustin de
I bid 147tur 1 e.
What is more, after ten years of hard work, these men were for the most
part exhausted and frustrated. During these years, they had provided tireless
service to the crown. According to Linares, Bustamante, for example, was
'infatigable e intrepido,' 148and was deserving of the Cruz de Isabel for his valour
and service.149 This had not been without personal cost. The persecution of the
insurgents was an extremely stressful activity, involving as it frequently did a real
145 Archer, "The Royalist Army in New Spain." p. 76. According to Archer it was present from
1812.
146 Archer, "Where did all the Royalists go?" p. 36.
147 Hamnett, Revolucion y contrarrevolucionn, pp. 308-309.
148 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 478. fT. 37-38.Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca. lrapuato, 7
May 1818.
14') Ibid., vol. 479. ff. 143-144.Vice-Roy Apodaca to Linares. 21 July ISI8.
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threat to the soldier's life. ISO Bustamante, who had been injured on two occasions
in this time and who had suffered variously from fevers and kidney infections, lSI
was probably not an atypical case. Moreover, in the climate of poverty, they would
often have to dip into their own pockets, or even take out loans, to provide for
their troops.152 They suffered from shortages of weapons, uniforms and horses.
Their troop was constantly being depleted through desertion. And all for what
reward? If, like Bustamante, these officers had reached the rank of Colonel, there
was nowhere else to go. It was unlikely that any Creole would be promoted
further. Indeed, they often had to look on as officers transferred from Peninsular
Spain, often of lower rank, were given positions of power, such as Commander
Generalships and Intendancies, in preference to the Creoles.153
Finally, the reintroduction of the Constitution of Cadiz in 1820 sounded the
death knell in the hearts of many of the officers. The dissolution of the juntas de
arbitrios and the loss of the military contributions meant the end of rural and urban
militia protection for haciendas, villages and towns. Without them, the Royalist
supremacy over the insurgency could not be guaranteed and many feared their
regions would slip back into anarchy, as amnestied insurgents seized the chance to
return to their old ways of intimidation, robbery and destruction once the militias
ceased to function.154 As Peter Guardino notes, the social and economic problems
150 SON: SC XIIIIIIl-235/1-31/00005. Service Record for Anastasio Bustamante dated December
1820. Apart from his injuries, the most dangerous threat to Bustamante's life came in April 1818.
An insurgent chief, Vacilio Ramirez came to Bustamante's camp on the pretext of seeking an
amnesty. He drew the Colonel away from his troops and, calling upon three companions who had
been waiting in hiding, pulled out his knife in an attempt to kill him. According to his service
record, Bustamante saw the four of them off singlehandedly, driving his own knife into Ramirez's
skull. AGN: Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 478. ff. 67-68. Vice-Roy Apodaca to Linares. 26 May
1818. The Vice-Roy came to hear of this attack and wrote to Linares to order Bustamante to take
more care in the future when dealing with the insurgents face to face.
151 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 101 f. 128. 137. In February 1813 Bustamante fell from
his horse and injured his leg and arm. Ibid .. vol. 120. f. 249. In April 1815 he was injured in the
thigh during the capture of Zacatlan. Ibid .. vol. 480. f. 234. In December 1818 he was struck
down with a fever. Ibid., vol. 465. f. 16. In March 1820 he requested a license to remain in
Salamanca for an extended period to recover from an infection in his kidney and deteriorating
rroblems with his eyesight.
52 Archer, "The Counterinsurgency Army and the Ten Years War," p.105.
m Archer, "Where did all the Royalists go?" p. 30 and Jaime E. Rodriguez O. "La transicion de
colonia a nacion: Nueva Espana, 1820-1821." Historia Mexicana 43: 2 (1993). p. 305.
154 Rodriguez O. "La transicion de colonia a nacion," p. 279.
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that had caused the insurgents to rebel had not been resolved. The Royalist
programme of pacification had merely overwhelmed the insurgents with the use of
force. So, once this power was reduced, it could only be expected that the
insurgents renewed their campaigns. ISS The Constitution also clearly awarded
responsibility for provincial government to the provincial deputations, and
deprived local military commanders, such as Bustamante, of their customary
dominance over affairs. No longer could the local commander rule his area of
command as his personal kingdom, overriding all interests but his own in the name
of counterinsurgency.V'' Furthermore, for many of the Creole elite, amongst whom
there was a fair number of officers, the Constitution represented as great a threat
to social order as the insurgency had done. The military and ecclesiastical fueros,
which would be so jealously guarded in early independent Mexico, were
threatened. The Jesuits were once more ordered to leave Spanish dominions. The
freedom of the press brought with it a wave of pamphlets that ferociously attacked
Spain and the Spaniards, and advocated revolution and independence from the
Peninsula in the most strident terms.IS7 In short, it appeared that the achievements
of ten years of counterinsurgency were in danger.
By 1821, the Royalist Army in Mexico was ripe for rebellion. Harsh
conditions, the lack of uniforms, salaries, weapons and food had created discontent
amongst the ranks. Frustration, resentment and exhaustion had bred similar
155 Peter F. Guardino, Peasants, Politics and the Formation of Mexico's National State.
Guerrero. 1800-1857. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 75. He goes on to claim
that the idea that the insurgents had been defeated by 1820 'was an optimisitic assessment that
not even Royalist Commanders believed.' While this is undoubtedly true in Guerrero, where in
1820 the rebels were recovering their strength and were still involved in guerrilla warfare against
the Royalists, in Guanajuato this was not the case. All the weekly reports for the final months of
1820 sent by Commanders such as Bustamante to Linares, report that the situation in the area of
their jurisdiction 'continua tranquila' and that 'no ha occurido novedad.' See for example the
reports for December 1820, included in AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 474, ff 350-387.
Linares was infinitely more concerned about the financial crisis he was facing in 1820. He wrote
in October 1820 to the Vice-Roy, 'pues yo s610 veo con dolor el triste resultado de que siempre
hay poca 0 ninguna existencia de reales para las eomplieadas ateneiones que me cerean. de modo
que cuando creia que con la paz de la Provincia me veri a mas aliviado, he sufrido al contrario
mayores privaciones, congojas y pesadumbres.' Ibid., f. 165. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca,
Celaya, 13 October 1820.
156 Ibid., p. 277.
157Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 5, pp. 29-37.
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unhappiness within the officer class. The re-establishment of the Constitution of
Cadiz would bring this all to a head. For many officers, the reforms demanded by
the reintroduction of the Constitution threatened the success of the pacification of
New Spain, reopened the door to anarchy, and attacked many of the foundations
of traditional colonial society. They saw their ten years of hard work and sacrifices
in danger of disappearing quickly, and felt under threat. Their solution would be to
hijack the insurgents' call for independence, and to try to impose their authority
upon the rebels. In this way, the excuse for the insurgents' violence would be
removed, and the control of an independent Mexico would remain in the hands of
the Creole oligarchy.
F: The Significance of Bustamante's Military Career (1810-1821)
This study of Anastasio Bustamante's career in the Royalist Army leaves us
with two important points which must be carried forward in our examination of his
future life and career. The first is that his part in the counterinsurgency struggle
completely changed his life. Before 1810 he had dedicated himself to medicine,
joining Calleja's militia as a surgeon. In such a position, he would have entertained
no hopes of attaining high status or authority beyond the medical world. However,
in the ten years of the insurgency his expectations of life must have changed
considerably. He abandoned the pursuit of medicine, probably not consciously at
first, and became a professional soldier. By 1820, in his position as a highly-
regarded and respected Colonel, it is unlikely that he now entertained thoughts of
returning to his old career. The second point is that his experiences in the army
were probably extremely influential in forming the man he would become in
independent Mexico. Here he was taught to despise the insurgents, to regard them
as 'canalla' and to believe that it was 'un acto meritorio [... J exterminarlos.' 158 His
constant exposure to violence, bloodshed and death would have hardened his
158 Prieto, Memorias, p. 180.
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character and most likely left him with very little regard for human life. He was
also taught to distinguish between the two classes of insurgent, the elite Creole and
the vast majority of the plebe. He may have even learnt to regard the insurgency
struggle simply as an attempted social revolution of the class of the French
Revolution. Finally, he was educated in the exercise of authority. He learnt to
command, first a unit of men, his Guerrilla Squadron, and later a whole battalion,
in Guanajuato, and was able to co-ordinate the effort of many units in the
persecution of the insurgents. He probably also acquired a strong ambition,
illustrated in his swift climb through the ranks, and with it, a taste for power and
control. All of these things would influence his behaviour in the future. The doctor
from San Luis Potosi could never have envisaged becoming a leading military or
political figure in New Spain. The Colonel in Guanajuato in 1820, however, most
probably could.
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Chapter Two: The Shadow of Iturbide
Anastasio Bustamante is perhaps best remembered in Mexican history for
being the faithful friend and loyal lieutenant of Agustin de Iturbide. The reasons behind
this abiding memory are not entirely clear. It is true that Bustamante was one of the
few military officers who remained allied to Iturbide during 1823 and did not adhere
to the Plan of Casa Mata. Manuel Gomez Pedraza also remained loyal, but his name is
not continually associated with that of the erstwhile emperor in the annals of history. It
is correct that during Bustamante's presidency in 1839, the remains of Iturbide were
transferred from their tomb in Padilla and reburied in the Cathedral in Mexico City.
However, Bustamante did not arrange this move. It was Antonio Lopez de Santa
Anna who gave the necessary orders before his departure for Texas. I It is also a fact
that in his will Bustamante requested that his heart be removed from his body after
death and buried beside the remains of the former emperor? Nonetheless, he was not
a unique case. Manuel Mier y Teran also left a similar request in his suicide note of
1832: asking that his body be placed next to Iturbide's in his tomb in Padilla, with the
bones touching. He even went to the trouble of falling on his sword in the exact spot
where Iturbide was executed in 1824.3 In fact, it is most likely that we inherit our
perception of the close friendship between Iturbide and Bustamante from
contemporary writing of the period. For example, between 1823 and 1824, as fears
heightened that the fallen emperor might be organising a return to Mexico,
Bustamante's friendship with Iturbide was regularly discussed in order to prove the
accusation that he was an iturbidista. We are also influenced by the traditional
I Timothy E. Anna, The Mexican Empire of Iturbide (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska
Press, 1990), p. 13.
2 Archivo General de Notarias de la Ciudad de Mexico (henceforth referred to as AGNCM), Notaria:
Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2869, f. 8. "Testamento de D. Anastasio Bustamante, 1846," dated: 12
January 1846.
] Timothy E. Anna, Forging Mexico (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), p.
251.
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interpretation of events which took place in Jalisco during these same years, put
forward by writers such as Lucas Alaman and Carlos Maria de Bustamante, who claim
that Bustamante and Luis Quintanar were plotting to overthrow the Supreme
Executive Power and the newly-imposed federalist system in order to reimpose the
empire of Iturbide. Whether these sources have left us an entirely accurate idea of the
relationship between the two men, however, is a subject which needs to be discussed.
A: The Plan ofIguala (1821)
When and where Agustin de Iturbide and Anastasio Bustamante first met
remains a mystery. It could be that the two soldiers met in the early years of the
counterinsurgency when both served in the Army of Centre in Guanajuato and the
Bajio. Another member of this army, Manuel Gomez Pedraza, recounts that he first
met Iturbide in 1812, and, although he does not specify where, it makes sense to
assume that their acquaintance would have been made in a military context. 4 Certainly,
Carlos Maria de Bustamante dates the relationship between Bustamante and Iturbide
as beginning in Guanajuato at about that time.5 If they did not meet at this point they
had another opportunity in early 1816, when the Vice-Roy sent Iturbide and a division
of his men to the Llanos de Apan for a few weeks to aid Manuel de la Concha's efforts
against the insurgents." Wherever the two men actually met, it is clear that they had
the chance to form a firm friendship. The letters Bustamante addressed to Iturbide in
4 Manuel Gomez Pedraza, "Manifiesto que Manuel Gomez Pedraza, ciudadano de la republica de
Mexico, dedica a sus compatriotas, 0 sea, una resena de su vida publica," in Laura Solares Robles, La
obra politica de Manuel Gomez Pedraza, 1813-1851.(Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Instituto Matias
Romero/ Acervo hist6rico de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1999), p. 175.
5 Carlos Maria de Bustamante. Cuadro historico de la revolucion mexicana.(Mexico City: Fondo de
Cultura Economica/Instituto Helenico, 1985), vol. 5 .• p. 144.
6 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 119, f. 318. Vice-Roy Felix Maria Calleja to Manuel de la
Concha. 24 April 1816.
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1821 are full of effusive expressions of affections and friendship.I Even so, when
Iturbide left Mexico City in 1820 for the direction of Acapulco, he carried with him
introductory letters provided for him by Gomez Pedraza to various military
commanders who might be interested in his plans for the proclamation of
independence. These were addressed to Joaquin Parres, Jose Antonio Echavarri and
Anastasio Bustamante, amongst others. ' This suggests that the friendship professed by
the two men in their later correspondence may have been slightly superficial. For, if
Iturbide and Bustamante had been really close friends, there would have been no need
for such a letter of introduction from Pedraza.
Iturbide opened communication with Anastasio Bustamante in January 1821.
He sent one of his officers, Captain Francisco Quintanilla, to Valladolid and the Bajio
to meet with the Royalist officers in those areas (Luis Quintanar, Miguel Barragan and
Parres in Valladolid and Bustamante and Luis Cortazar in the Bajio) with letters from
Iturbide and copies of the proposed plan in order to sound out the prospects of their
support.I It is clear that Iturbide was confident of their support, as he wrote to Pedro
Celestino Negrete on the 25 January 1821 that: 'Parres, sargento mayor de Fie1es, es
7 For example: SDN: Archivo Historico (henceforth referred to as AH): XII481.3/1846/00001.
Anastasio Bustamante to Agustin de Iturbide, Hacienda de Pantoja, 6 February 1821. This is the first
letter sent by Bustamante to Iturbide. He declares his support for the plans for independence begins:
'Mi siempre amado jefe, amigo y dueiio de todo mi aprecio', It concludes, 'su mas apasionado subdito
y amigo que Ie ama de corazon'. Bustamante was in the habit of writing such profuse expressions of
affection in his personal letters. Interestingly, those which have survived from this period are
addressed to Calleja and Linares, both of whom were Bustamante's senior officers at the time. For
example: AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 101, f. 171. Bustamante to Calleja, Texcoco, I
December 1814.lbid., vol. 482, f 329. Bustamante to Linares, Pi las, 2 July 1819. The suspicion that
Bustamante was prone to ingratiating himself with his superiors cannot be ignored, especially if we
also consider a further letter Bustamante sent to Iturbide in July 1821. In this letter Bustamante
describes a meeting he has had with Iturbide's children and father: 'En la tarde de hoy, he tenido la
singular complacencia de ver al Sr. Joaquin, padre de V. y parte de su apreciable familia, con
inclusion de la amable Pepita, que con su atractivo y extraordinaria viveza, cautiva desde pequeiiita
los corazones. i.Que sera cuando grande? [Dios nos coja confesados! como dicen los rancheros [... ]
jOjala pudiera obsequiar a todos desde el mas grande hasta el mas chico, conforme merecen y como
exigen mis deseos!' SDN: AH XI/48 1.3/1 846/00087. Bustamante to Iturbide, Chapa de Mota, 13 July
1821.
8 Gomez Pedraza, "Manifiesto," p. 177.
9 Lucas Alaman Archive, in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at
Austin (henceforth referred to as LAA), no. 316b. Francisco Quintanilla to Lucas Alarnan, Celaya, 17
November 1850.
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un amigo decidido, y no dudo que Bustamante y Quintanar [... J se decidiran por la
razon, justicia y conveniencia.' 10 Iturbide's confidence was not misplaced, for on 6
February Bustamante wrote back to say that he would do 'cuanto este de mi parte y
permit en las circunstanicas [... J bien seguro de que deseo complacerle.' II However,
Bustamante was cautious enough on the subject of a possible armed rebellion to
indicate to Iturbide that the poor state of his eyesight would prevent him from taking
an active part in such an cndeavour.i/ The Colonel had suffered from a kidney
infection in 1820 and had made complaints about his problems with his sight before.i '
and it is possible that his plea of ill-health was not a convenient opt-out clause.
However, as the excuse of illness was rife amongst the officers in the army of
independent Mexico, it is difficult not to entertain the suspicion that Bustamante's
declaration of ill-health was his way of leaving himself the possibility of withdrawing
his support for Iturbide's project, should it suddenly become an obvious failure. On the
other hand, Alaman, in his Historia de Mexico, attributes Bustamante's hesitation to
support Iturbide completely, as more evidence of his indecisiveness.14 But, as we shall
see later, the evidence of his involvement in Iturbide's armed campaign and the manner
of his future career in politics suggests that caution, rather than real illness or
indecision, is the most satisfactory explanation.
There can be no doubt that Colonel Bustamante would have been in favour of
the principle of a rebellion against the viceroyalty and Spanish government. As we
have seen in the previous chapter, by 1821, the Royalist army in New Spain was
discontented and frustrated. Its soldiers had not been paid for months and lacked
uniforms and weapons. Its officers felt that their services and sacrifices for the
10 Bustamante, Cuadra historico, vol. 5, p. 140.
II SDN: AH XII481.3/1846/00001. Bustamante to Iturbide, Hacienda de Pantoja, 6 February 1821.
12 Ibid.
13 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 465, f. 16. Bustamante to Linares, Salamanca, 4 March 1820.
14 Lucas Alarnan, Historia de Mexico desde los prim eros movimientos que prepararon su
independencia en el aiio de 1808 hasta la epoca presente (Mexico City: Libros del Bachiller Sanson
Carillo, 1986), p. 95.
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counterinsurgency cause had gone unrecognised and unappreciated. With the
reintroduction of the Constitution of Cadiz, many officers saw their problems
confounded by the abolition of the junta de arbitrios and the contribuciones militares.
They believed that their severe lack of funds threatened the stability of the
counterinsurgency programme, and would encourage the huge numbers of amnestied
insurgents to return to their old ways of robbery and destruction. It is not
unreasonable to suggest that Bustamante shared the frustrations of his peers and was
opposed to many of the reforms introduced by the Constitution of Cadiz. Neither is it
far-fetched to suppose that Bustamante was in favour of some measure of autonomous
government for Mexico, since this sentiment was rife amongst the Creole elites of late
New Spanish society. Therefore, he would have most likely welcomed the Plan of
Iguala with open arms. This document offered remedies for many of the ills he felt
New Spain, and most importantly, he himself had suffered: the fuero militar would be
preserved and Spanish domination of governmental and military affairs would be
ended. IS
The Commander General of Guanajuato, Antonio Linares, remained in
complete ignorance of the plans being hatched under his nose. His weekly reports to
the Vice-Roy in the first two weeks in March, declared that peace and tranquillity
reigned in Guanajuato.l" Even once Iturbide proclaimed his plan in Iguala, Linares
seems not to have considered the rebellion a threat to his region: a stance which
earned him a stem rebuke from Apodaca.I7 However, he would quickly learn of his
mistake. After Iturbide's declaration of 24 February reached Guanajuato in early
15 The Plan of Iguala is included in Ibid., pp. 553-556. For an excellent discussion of the implications
of the Plan of Iguala, see Brian R. Hamnett, Revolucion y contrarrevolucion en Mexico y et Peru.
Liberalismo, realeza y separatismo. 1800-1824 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1986),
Pt 316-320.
AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 460, f 333, 350. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Guanajuato, 7,
13 March 1821,
17 Ibid., f. 345. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Guanajuato, 11 March 1821. The Vice-Roy's reply is in
the margin of this letter, dated 15 March.
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March, Bustamante and Luis Cortazar quickly got together and decided upon the
actions they would take to ensure their province's swift allegiance to Iturbide's cause.
On 16 March, Cortazar proclaimed Mexican independence in the village of Amoles,
marching to Salvatierra the next day to make a similar declaration. On 18 March,
Cortazar moved to the Valle de Santiago, where his troops met with those of
Bustamante, who had previously proclaimed his support for the Plan of Iguala in the
hacienda of Pantoja.18 They intended to march together upon Salamanca, where they
hoped to convince Colonel Linares to join their cause. Linares, however, learning of
their movements and intentions through a spy, fled in the middle of the night to
Celaya. The next day, 19 March, he wrote bitterly to the Vice-Roy that he could not
hope to contain the rebellion, as all the troops commanded by Bustamante and
Cortazar in the Bajio had remained loyal to their chiefs, while he had barely two
hundred men at his disposal. Moreover, it was obvious to him that 'los pueblos
generalrnente [estan] alucinados con que les viene un gran bien, [estan] todos a su
favor.,19 Later that day, Bustamante ordered Cortazar to march on Celaya with 150
men to try once more to win Linares over to the idea of independence with the
assurance that he would remain in control of the troops in Guanajuato. But Linares,
captured in his residence by Cortazar, once more refused to adhere to the plan.
Cortazar kept him under guard in his house, until Bustamante arrived on 21 March.
Bustamante, apparently annoyed at the harsh treatment Cortazar had given to Linares,
whom Alaman says he respected highly, held a private interview with him, and when it
became clear that Linares was not willing to consider his proposals, granted him a
18 Lafragua Collection in the Bibilioteca Nacional de Mexico, Fondo Reservado (henceforth referred
to as LAF), no. 450. "Oficio del Sr. D. Anastasio Bustamante, Coronel del Regimiento de Dragones
de San Luis, " in El Mejicano Independiente. 21 April 1821. Also see, Alaman, Historia de Mexico.
vol. 5, p. 95.
19 AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 460, f. 368. Linares to Vice-Roy Apodaca, Celaya, 19 March
1821.
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passport and escort to Queretaro.t" By now, the cause had virtually been won
throughout the province of Guanajuato. Salamanca declared the independence of
Mexico on 23 March. On the following day, Bustamante was treated to a rapturous
welcome on his arrival in the provincial capital, the city garrisons having adhered to
the Plan of Iguala some days before. From this base in the capital he assured the
adhesion of the other remaining towns in the province, such as San Miguel el Grande,
Leon, Irapuato and Silao.21 So, by 4 April he could declare to Iturbide that: 'se ha
proclamado la independencia en la capital y los demas pueblos de esta provincia sin
"2derramar una gota de sangre. ,-
Bustamante's victory in Guanajuato would be crucial for the success of
Iturbide's project. For as Alaman reminds us, by late March Iturbide's position in the
South was extremely precarious. Desertion had halved his total force; and in the light
of the eerie silence that had so far greeted the proclamation of the Plan of Iguala, his
new insurgent allies were understandably less than enthusiastic about his leadership. In
fact, he had already decided that it would be prudent to leave the South and set up his
base in a less hostile environment when the news reached him of the adhesion of Jose
Joaquin de Herrera, Vicente Filisola and Bustamante.23 Buoyed by this news, he
directed his remaining troops towards Guanajuato, where he met with Bustamante,
Cortazar and Joaquin Parres in the middle of April in the town of Acambaro. From
this base, Iturbide organised the siege of Vallado lid (the present day city of Morelia),
which led to the defection of its Commander General, Luis Quintanar, to the Army of
the Three Guarantees and the fall of that city to Iturbide. Most of the surrounding
20 "Oficio del Sr. D. Anastasio Bustamante, Coronel del Regimiento de Dragones de San Luis," and
Alaman, Historia de Mexico. vol. 5. pp. 95-96.
21 Alaman, Historia de Mexico. vol. 5. p. 96. Bustamante. Cuadro Historico, vol. 5. p. 145.
22 SDN: AH XII48 1.31I846/00003. Bustamante to Iturbide, Silao, 4 April 1821.
23 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 5, pp. 92-95.
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provinces of Vallado lid had already adhered to the Plan of Iguala and the surrender of
the capital merely provided the finishing touch.24
From Valladolid, the Army of the Three Guarantees marched upon Queretaro.
Bustamante's troops were positioned around San Juan del Rio with those of
Quintanar, forming a besieging army of over a thousand.25 The town surrendered on 7
June_26The position in San Juan was strategically very important for Iturbide's army,
being as it was on the road from Queretaro to Mexico City. From this base
Bustamante and Quintanar prevented Concha from reaching the besieged Queretaro
with reinforcements from the capital. Concha advanced as far as Tula and the troops
commanded by Bustamante and Quintanar waited for the chance of an open
encounter. In the meantime, they concentrated their efforts on trying to intercept the
silver convoys travelling from Zimapan to the capital. 27 This was a particular concern
as the proclamation of independence had meant no real financial advantage for the
Army of the Three Guarantees and salaries were still scarce.28 On 10 June Concha
retired from Tula and led his forces back to Mexico. Seizing their opportunity,
Bustamante and his men consolidated their position. They entered Zimapan on 15 June
and appropriated the ten thousand pesos contained in the town's treasury, much to the
relief of Bustamante, who was, by his own admission, desperate for money at this
point. 29 It was now possible to send new troops and money to reinforce the presence
of the Army of the Three Guarantees in Huichapan and Ixmiliquilpan. Almost
24 Juan Ortiz Escamilla, Guerra y gobierno. Los pueblos y la independencia de Mexico (Seville:
Instituto Mora/El Colegio de Mexico/Universidad Internacional de Andalucia/Universidad de Sevilla.
1997), p. 158.
25 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 5, p. 132.
26 SDN: AH XII481.3/1846/00032. Bustamante to Iturbide, Venta de San Juan del Rio, 7 June 1821.
27 Ibid., XII481.3/l846/00032-33. Bustamante to Irurbide, San Juan del Rio, 8 June 1821. Ibid.,
XII481.3/1846/00035-36. Bustamante to Iturbide, Arroyozarco, 9 June 1821. Alaman, Historia de
Mexico, vol. 5, p. 132.
28 Almost without exception, all Bustamante's reports to Iturbide refer to his shortage of money. For
example: SDN: AH XII481.3/l846/00025. Bustamante to Iturbide, Hacienda de Colorado. 28 May
1821: 'No puedo menos que manifestar a V. la necesidad que tenemos de dinero'. Ibid .•
XII481.3/1846/00035-36. Bustamante to Iturbide, Arroyozarco, 9 June 1821: 'Se hace indispensable
nos envie V. algun dinero a paso largo [... ] los pobres [soldados] no tienen que comer'.
29 lbid., XI/481.3/1846/00047. Bustamante to lturbide, Zimapan, 15 June 1821.
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immediately, Bustamante then returned to San Juan del Rio to participate in the siege
of Queretaro. Once this city had surrendered on 29 June, Bustamante and Quintanar
took charge of the troops who were to march south and begin the siege of Mexico
City. By 26 July he and his men had advanced as far as Cuautitlan, Tepotzotlan and
Tlalnepantla.Y Here they waited in vain for most of August for the Royalist troops to
leave their positions in Tacuba and Tacubaya, and engage them in battle. Finally, on
19 August the hoped for encounter took place in the village of Azcapulzalco, and was
.a bloody yet inconclusive affair. Both sides lost around 100 men, including, on the side
of the Three Guarantees, the ex-insurgent Encarnacion Ortiz, whose bravery in
attempting to rescue a lost cannon was noted by Bustamante in his report to
Iturbide.31 Although the Royalists did not surrender Azcapulzalco during the battle,
they left their positions in the town some days later. Bustamante and Quintanar duly
set up their headquarters there, where they were clearly visible to the inhabitants of
Mexico City.32 On 5 September they were joined in the village by Iturbide.33 From
here he organised the surrounding of Mexico City by the Army of the Three
Guarantees. The Marquis of Vivanco was appointed the chief ofthe Vanguard section,
covering the northern and eastern edges of the capital from Guadalupe to Texcoco
and Chalco. The Rearguard section, under the command of Luis Quintanar covered
the roads leading out of Mexico City to Michoacan. The centre, which covered the
remaining area, was given to Domingo Luaces, the former Commander General of
Queretaro. Bustamante was appointed as his second. However, he immediately took
on effectively leadership of this section due to Luaces' ongoing ill-health.34
30 Ibid., XII481.3/1846/00106. Bustamante to Iturbide, Cuautitlan, 20 July 1821. Ibid..
XII481.311846/00108. Bustamante to lturbide, Tepotzotlan, 25 July 1821.
31 Ibid., XII481.3/1846/00143-145. Bustamante to Iturbide, Santa Monica, 22 August 1821.
Bustamante, Cuadro historico, vol. 5, p. 275.
32 Bustamante, Cuadro historico, vol. 5, p. 284.
33 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 5, p. 175.
34 Ibid. p. 176.
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The battle at Azcapulzalco was the only violent encounter Bustamante would
have with the troops of the viceroyalty. From this point on he and his troops merely
waited while Iturbide and the newly-arrived Captain General Juan O'Donoju
negotiated the Treaties of Cordoba which finalised the details of Mexico's
independence from Spain. In fact, violence was conspicuous by its absence in the
campaigns of the Army of the Three Guarantees. As was the case in Guanajuato,
garrisons and towns for the most part welcomed Iturbide's forces with open arms. It
was obvious that the Plan of Iguala had widespread popular support. However,
Bustamante was well aware of how easy it would be for this support to fade away if
the Army were to misbehave, to indulge in murder, pillage or wanton destruction of
property, as the insurgents had done. The Plan of Iguala called for the respect of
people and property regardless of race,35 and Bustamante was determined that his
army should abide by this ideal at all times. Of course, this had been most important in
the early stages of his campaign, when the aims of the Plan of Iguala were not widely
known. The day before he entered Guanajuato he wrote to the ayuntamiento of that
city to assure them that his troops would observe 'el mayor orden y disciplina' at all
times and asked them to help him assure the peaceful nature of the proclamation in
independence in Guanajuato by 'exhortando al vecindario a la union con todas las
clases y principalmente con nuestros hermanos de Europa, cuyas vidas y propiedades
deberian ser para nosotros inviolables. ,36 On leaving Guanajuato, he wrote to ask the
Indendant ifhe, the ayuntamiento and the mining council would publish a certificate in
which they asserted the peaceful, orderly and honourable behaviour of his troops
throughout their occupation of the city.37 This these authorities dutifully did,
remarking in their statement:
35 "Plan of'Iguala," article 13. Included in Alaman, Historia de Mexico. vol. 5. p. 555.
36 Archivo Historico de Guanajuato (henceforth referred to as AHG. Ramo de Guerra. box 7.
document 380. Bustamante to the Very Illustrious Ayuntamiento of the City of Guanajuato, Hacienda
de Burros, 24 March 1821.
37 Ibid., doc. 387. Bustamante to Fernando Perez Mafianon, Guanajuato, I April 1821.
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El sr. colonel D. Anastasio Bustamante [...] observo en su conducta personal y
trato con las autoridades que gobiernan la mayor politica y moderacion [...]
Conserv6 la mayor union y fraternidad [con los vecinos particulares del
pueblo], especialmente con los Europeos, cuyas vidas, honor, quietud y
propiedad mantuvo ileso con particular cuidado, no menos que las de todos los
habitantes de esta poblacion, a quienes tampoco se advirtio que ofendieron en
10 mas minimo los soldados del expresado sf. Bustamante; y si por contrario se
les observ6 el mayor concedimiento en su trato social, sin que hast a ahora haya
llegado a saber dicha ilustre Corporacion que se excedieron embriagandose,
armado quimeras 0 insultado a alguno, ni con titulo de alojamiento, bagages ni
'1' 38otros auxuiares.
It is clear that Bustamante wanted to demonstrate to the rest of Guanajuato and New
Spain as a whole, that embracing the cause of independence did not also involve the
adoption of the manners and behaviour of the insurgents.
The maintenance of order and discipline cannot have been easy. Bustamante's
men were not just made up of Royalist soldiers, used to obeying the orders of their
commanding officer. Amnestied and still active insurgents also joined his force. He
also had to exercise his authority over these men, many of whom had characterised
their own struggles with robbery and destruction, and were probably none too happy
about accepting instructions from a former enemy. Moreover, his lack of money,
uniforms and weapons only made his life more difficult. He sent repeated pleas for
money and supplies to Iturbide, pointing out that if his economic situation did not
improve he feared his soldiers would desert, or turn to robbery and violence in order
to be able to eat.39 Even so, Bustamante seems to have successfully maintained his
authority throughout the campaigns of the Army of the Three Guarantees. This was
probably because he showed himself to be unprepared to tolerate ill-disciplined
behaviour from his men, and would quickly act upon complaints. In the middle of
38 Ibid .• doc. 288. Untitled. Sala Capitular de Guanajuato, 2 April 1821.
39 SDN: AH XI/48113/1846/00003. Bustamante to Iturbide, Silao, 4 April 182l. Ibid .•
XII48113/1846/00025. Bustamante to Iturbide. Hacienda de Colorado. 28 May 1821. Jbid ..
XII481/3/1846/00038. Bustamante to Iturbide, Hacienda de la Canada, 10 June 1821.
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June, after receiving several unfavourable reports about his officers in Huichapan, he
made a point of visiting the town personally in order to make his own enquiries. He
also wrote to Iturbide to arrange a meeting with him in order to discuss the situation
and its solution.40 He believed that the success of the Plan of Iguala relied heavily on
the general support of the people of Mexico, and quite rightly supposed that: 'abusos
y excesos [...] perjudican a nuestra opinion y al proyecto de la causa. ,41
B: Bustamante and Imperial Mexico (1821-1822)
The Army of the Three Guarantees entered Mexico City on 27 September
1821. Iturbide, whose birthday it was, was at the head of the procession. The Central
Division, commanded by Anastasio Bustamante, followed proudly, reinforced by the
Vanguard and the Rearguard Divisions, making up a mass of 14,000 men and 1, 200
officers. The troops marched triumphantly through streets decorated with 'una
multitud de co lgaduras, de famulas, cortinas y gallardetes' and lined with cheering
crowds, from Chapultepec, along the calle de San Francisco towards the National
Palace. Here, Iturbide dismounted and entered the Palace, which was also filled with
well-wishers, and where Juan O'Donoju greeted him. Both men went out onto the
balcony to watch the Army march past the Palace before going to hear a Te Deum in
the Cathedral. The next day, while the celebrations continued 'con sus repetidas vivas,
salvas e iluminaciones,' the Act of Independence was signed and the business of
. . d d M' b 42govemmg an m epen ent eXlCOwas egun.
Anastasio Bustamante was initially given an important role in the new
government of Mexico as he was named as one of the members of the Junta
40 Ibid., XII481.3/1846/00052. Bustamante to Iturbide, 17 June 1821.
41 Ibid.
42 LAF no. 395. Noticioso General, 1 October 1821. For other details see, Alaman, Historia de
Mexico, vol. 5, pp. 196-200.
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Provisional Gubernativa, the body set up by the Treaties of Cordoba to provide an
interim government for Mexico until a legislative power could be elected. It was also
to designate a regency to provide the executive power in the Empire until a monarch
could be found. This group held its first meeting on 22 September, in Tacubaya, in
which Bustamante was commissioned, along with Juan Horbegoso and Manuel de la
Sot a Riva, to make inquiries into what distinctions and rewards should be offered to
the army for its services for independence.Y On 25 September they met for the second
time to decide upon the powers and attributes that should be given to the Junta. It was
agreed that the Junta would have all the faculties awarded to the Cortes in the
Constitution of Cadiz, until a new Mexican Cortes could be convened. On that day,
Bustamante, Horbegoso and Sota Riva also presented their recommendations for the
rewards that should be given to the Army of the Three Guarantees. They suggested
that a new military order should be set up, named Imperial de la Aguila Mexicana, to
which officers could be appointed as recompense for their services. In the meantime,
medals should be struck to be handed out immediately to those deserving of
recognition.T The military order eventually became the Orden imperial de
Guadalupe, and Anastasio Bustamante was amongst those immediately awarded the
Great Cross of the Order in July 1822.45 On 28 September, the Junta met and
approved the Act of Independence, which was then signed by its members. Two days
later the Junta was divided into commissions to take charge of the various aspects of
government, such as Interior and Exterior Affairs, the Treasury and Justice and
Ecclesiastical Affairs. Bustamante was appointed to the War Commission with
43 Ibid., no. 1112. Soberana Junta Provisional Gubernativa, Diario de las sesiones de la soberana
junta provisional gubernativa del Imperio Mexicano, instalada segun previenen el Plan de lguala y
Tratados de la Villa de Cordoba (Mexico City: Imprenta Imperial de D. Alejandro Valdes, 1821). p.
3.
44 lbid., pp. 5-6.
45 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 5, p. 361
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Francisco Manuel Sanchez de Tagle and Sota de la Riva.46 However, on 23 October
Bustamante was appointed as Captain General of the Eastern and Western Internal
Provinces.47 This responsibility, although it did not require him to leave the capital,
took him away from the Junta and made him a continual absentee.48 Nevertheless,
according to the Diary of Sessions, he did attend the debates in November on the
subject of the rules which should be set up in order to organise the election of a
Constituent Congress, and is recorded as having supported Iturbide's request to be
allowed to address the Junta with his own proposals.V Unfortunately we do not know
what his opinions were of Iturbide's proposals, which called for the adoption of
corporate representation in Congress, 50 or whether he played any part in the final
drafting of the plan of convocation.f ' Also in November, he was present at the
discussions undertaken by the Junta on the subject of the restoration of the Jesuits and
Hospital Orders. According to Alaman, he supported the liberal arguments against the
idea of the reintroduction of these orders.52 His other interventions in the debates of
the Junta are few and far between, and it is probably accurate to say he did not playa
major part in the work of that body, which eventually was dissolved on 23 February to
make way for the new Constituent Congress.
46 Ibid., p. 16.
47 SDN: AH XII481.3/22. Circular. Dated 23 October 1821.
48 Alaman, Historia de Mexico. vol. 5. pp. 268-269.
49 Soberana Junta Provisional Gubernativa, Diario de las sesiones de la soberana junta provisional
ftubernative del Imperio Mexicano, p. 84. (8th November 1821).
o lturbide wanted Congress to be elected by special groups representing the professions of the
Mexican population, such as the ecclesiastics, miners, shopkeepers, merchants. labourers,
intellectuals and public employees. rather than by groups of electors designated according to their
parishes as required by the Constitution of Cadiz. Torcuato S. Di Tella, National Popular Politics in
Early Independent Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1996), pp. 102-104.
Bustamante was probably aware of these proposals in advance of Iturbide's request to address the
Junta. His support of lturbide's right to speak before the assembly could therefore imply his support
for the proposals themselves. Even so. there is no evidence in the Diary of Sessions to indicate
Bustamante's stance in the debate on the electoral procedure.
51 For a good discussion of the debates of the Junta on the subject of the convocation of the
Constituent Congress and the eventual decisions. see Anna, The Mexican Empire of Iturbide, pp. 50-
54.
52 Alaman, Historia de Mexico. vol. 5. p. 229.
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Bustamante's principal role under Iturbide's government was really as a military
commander. On 12 October 1821, he was promoted to Field-Marshal, a rank that was
later abolished, and has led authors, such as Carlos Maria de Bustamante and Lucas
Alaman, to refer to him as a General during this time. In fact, he remained a Field-
Marshal throughout the short period of Empire, refusing the commission of
Lieutenant-General offered to him by Iturbide in March 1823.53 He was finally
promoted in October 1823, by virtue of a decree which suppressed the rank of Field-
Marshal and automatically raised those of that rank to Generales de Division, the
highest rank in the Mexican Army.54 As Field-Marshal, he undertook various
commissions for the Imperial Government. As we have said, in October 1822, he was
appointed as Captain General of the Eastern and Western Internal Provinces. In
February 1823, he was awarded the Captain Generalship of the provinces of Mexico,
Valladolid, Guanajuato and Queretaro, replacing Manuel de la Sota Riva, who was
seriously ill.55 Luis Quintanar soon replaced Bustamante as commanding officer in
Mexico, Queretaro and Valladolid. But Guanajuato, with the addition of San Luis
Potosi and Zacatecas, remained under his control until the fall of the Empire. In his
capacity as Captain General of Mexico, Bustamante fought the last battle against the
Spaniards of the war of independence at Juchi (which is situated in the mountain range
between the Valley of Mexico and Cuautla, in the modern state of Morelos), on 3
April 1822. This encounter was to prevent the application of the plan hatched by Jose
Davila, the Spanish General who still held the castle of Ulua in Veracruz, to reunite
the remaining Peninsular soldiers in Veracruz and make a last stand for the colony.
53 SDN: se XIIIII/1-235/l-31/00081. Bustamante to the Minister of War, 16 March 1823.
Bustamante merely wished the promotion to be delayed until after the rebellion was over. He claimed
that the Empire's treasury could not support his promotion. However, once Iturbide had been exiled,
Bustamante reiterated his rejection of the promotion to the new regime. In this case, probably in
protest against recent events. lbid.. XIIIII/1-235/J-31/00092. Bustamante to the Minister of War, 7
April 1823.
54 LAF no. 425. "Decreta del24 de octubre de 1823."
55 SDN:AH XIIIII/I-235/1-31100029. Bustamante to Minister of War, 28 February 1822.
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The Spanish soldiers, who had been garrisoned in Texcoco and Cuemavaca since the
peaceful withdrawal of the Peninsular army from Mexico City, were ordered to meet
together in Juchi and begin from there their march for Jalapa. However, the Imperial
Government were made aware of the plan and sent Bustamante, with around 300
troops, to prevent this meeting. The two sides met each other outside Juchi, and after
a short encounter, the Spanish troops surrendered. Iturbide later described this action
to the committee of the regency in glowing terms, crediting Bustamante and his men
with the salvation of the Empire. He recommended the decoration of Bustamante with
the Great Cross of the newly formed Order of Guadalupe, the promotion of his
officers, and medals to be handed out to the soldiers involved.f" However, Alaman is
sceptical, believing that the Peninsular troops presented no special threat to the safety
of the Empire, as they were scattered throughout Mexico in small numbers, and were
for the most part suffering from great economic hardships. 57 Even so, the victory at
Juchi would be long remembered as a triumph of the Mexican Army over its Spanish
rivals, and Bustamante would be referred to for years to come as the Hero of Juchi.
In general, Anastasio Bustamante's job as Captain General was mainly
administrative. The provinces under his jurisdiction were controlled by Commander
Generals or Intendants, who submitted monthly reports on the state of their
provinces. 58 Bustamante remained in Mexico City, in attendance at the court of
Iturbide, during a large part of the Imperial period. In January 1823 he did make
preparations to visit the provinces under his command, but this was all curtailed by the
success of the Plan of Casa Mata.59 During the revolt of Brigadier Felipe de la Garza,
in the late summer of 1822, in Nuevo Santander (now the state of Tamaulipas), which
56Alaman, Historia de Mexico. vol. 5, pp. 312-131.
57 lbid., pp. 315-316.
58 For example: SDN: SC XIIIII.lI-235/1-31/00057. Brigadier Antonio Cordera [Commander General
of the Internal Western Provinces] to Bustamante, 19 October 1821.
59 Ibid., XI/III/I-235/1-31100062-63. Bustamante to the Imperial Government, Mexico City, 1
January 1823.
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was one of the provinces he commanded, his role was confined to the issuing of
proclamations condemning the uprising, and the organisation of the troops under
Brigadiers Gaspar Lopez and Jose Zenon Fernandez, who in effect put down the
rebellion.6o However, once Garza surrendered and was brought to Mexico City,
Bustamante did take a personal interest in the case. He persuaded Iturbide not to
execute Garza, but to allow him to continue in his position as Commander General of
Nuevo Santander.61 This perhaps was unfortunate, as it was Felipe de la Garza who
captured Iturbide on his return to Mexico in 1824. It might have been expected that
the Brigadier might have shown some gratitude for the pardon he received in 1822,
and consequently allow him to make an escape. Unfortunately for Iturbide, Garza was
not ready to treat the former emperor with the leniency which with he himself had
been treated.
Assessing the nature of Bustamante's relationship with Iturbide during this time
is difficult. He certainly was involved in the key events of the Imperial period. He is
accused by Vicente Rocafuerte of being part of the group of military officers who
masterminded Sergeant Pio Marcha's proclamation of Iturbide as Emperor on 18 May
1822.62 His signature is present on the document drawn up for Congress by the
principal officers and chiefs of the Mexican Army, including Pedro Celestino Negrete,
Jose Antonio Echavarri, Manuel de la Sota Riva, the Marquis de Vivanco and Luis
Quintanar, which supported the intentions of Pio Marcha, and which asked the
deputies to consider this proposition. In fact, he and Joaquin Parres were selected to
60 Gaceta Extraordinaria del Gobierno Imperial de Mexico, 20 October 1822.
61 SON: SC XIIIII/1-235/l-31/00196. Bustamante to Manuel Gomez Pedraza, Matamoros, 27 October
1828. Reservado. Felipe de la Garza to lturbide, Mexico City, 3 January 1823. INAH: c.A. T. 2. 10,
ff. 68-70. Also see, William Spence Robertson, Iturbide of Mexio (New York: Greenwood Press,
1968), pp. 209-211.
62 The conspirators, according to Rocafuerte were: Antonio Carrasco, Anastasio Bustamante, Epitacio
Sanchez, Pedro Otero, and the counts of San Pedro del Alamo and de la Cadena. Un verdadero
americano [Vicente Rocafuerte], Bosquejo ligerisimo de la revolucion de Mexico. desde el grito de
Iguala hasta la proclamacion imperial de Iturbide (Philadelphia: Imprenta de Teracrouet y Naroajeb,
1822), pp. 205-206.
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take the document in person to the Congress on that day.63 Bustamante, alongside his
fellow officers, Negrete and Quintanar, also took part in the meetings held on 16 and
17 October 1822, in which the future of the Constituent Congress was discussed.64
There is no record, however, of his participation in the dissolution of that body on 31
October, although in his diary Carlos Maria de Bustamante claims that the Field-
Marshal had offered himself for the task.65 It was Quintanar who was awarded this
dubious honour. In November, he accompanied the Emperor on his visit to Jalapa,
which had as its intention the removal of Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna from the
Command of Veracruz, and precipitated Santa Anna's rebellion against Iturbide.66
Moreover, he was certainly also the recipient of promotion and military decoration
from Iturbide. He was entrusted with the military command of huge swathes of the
new Empire. All of which goes to show that Iturbide must have trusted and respected
Bustamante. But, they do not set him apart from his peers, especially Quintanar,
Negrete and Echavarri, who were also participants in these same events and recipients
of similar honours. In fact, in comparison to the treatment Iturbide lavished upon
Echavarri, Bustamante's own successes fade into insignificance. Echavarri was
elevated from Captain to Field-Marshal, and then Brigadier General (compared to
Bustamante's modest promotion from Colonel to Field-Marshal); appointed as one of
Iturbide's aides-de-camp; and awarded the Great Cross of Guadalupe and the Captain
Generalship of Puebla, Veracruz and Oaxaca. Iturbide declared of him: '10 habia
tratado siempre como un hermano, 10 habia elevado de la nada en et orden politico, al
alto rango que ocupaba, le habia hecho confianzas como a un hijo mio. ,67
63 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 5, p. 343. Anna, The Mexican Empire of Iturbide, p. 64.
64 Anna, The Mexican Empire of lturbide, p. 112.
65 Carlos Maria de Bustamante, Diario Historico de Mexico (Mexico City: SEP/INAH, 1980), vol. 1,
p. 158. Entry for 23 February 1823.
66 SON: SC XIIIII/I-235/l-31/00051. Order of the Secretary of the Admiralty, 8 November 1822.
67 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 5, p. 407.
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In the end, what did show the depth of the friendship that existed between
Iturbide and Bustamante, and what finally separated Bustamante from the likes of
Negrete and Echavarri, was that unlike these men, Bustamante stood resolutely by
Iturbide throughout the crises of December 1822 and the early months of 1823. He
did not adhere to the Plan of Casa Mata. Instead, he remained with Iturbide in the
capital throughout the rebellion. On March 11, as the end drew in sight, he
accompanied the Emperor in his withdrawal from Mexico City to Tacubaya, where he
prevented anyone entering or leaving the village without a passport issued by
himself.68 After Iturbide's abdication he returned to the capital and wrote to the new
government to resign his commissions.T He would later request an extended license
to leave Mexico City for Ouanajuato.i" Why Bustamante did not adhere to the Plan of
Casa Mata is not clear. However, it is most likely that its aims and ambitions did not
attract him. If Lucas Alaman is to be believed, the plan was the handiwork of the
Scottish Rite of Masons, drawn up by Mariano Michelena and Miguel Ramos Arizpe,
both long-term opponents of monarchical government and enemies of Iturbide. These
men had seen their opportunity in the discontent with Iturbide present in the army,
demonstrated by the uprising of Santa Anna and Guadalupe Victoria in December
1822, and the sister rebellion of Nicolas Bravo and Vicente Guerrero in January. Their
plan was put into operation when Echavarri, Iturbide's trusted commander and a
recent convert to Free Masonry, was sent to Veracruz to besiege Santa Anna in
Veracruz later in January. Echavarri soon found himself in an impossible situation as
the siege of Veracruz deteriorated into a stalemate, and was quickly convinced by his
masonic allies that the Plan of Casa Mata provided the only honourable escape.i' The
68 Bustamante, Diario Historico, vol. 1 p. 191. Entry for 13 March 1823.
69 Bustamante to the Supreme Executive Power, Mexico City, 7 April 1823, in Gaceta del Gobierno
Supremo de Mexico. 24 April 1823.
70 SON: SC XIIIII/I-235/1-31/00107. Bustamante to the Supreme Executive Power. Mexico City, 3
July 1823.
71 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 5, pp. 408-413.
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Plan, issued by Echavarri on 1 February, called for the election of a fresh Congress but
made no attack upon Iturbide's position, although Nettie Lee Benson is convinced that
the overthrow of the Emperor was the Plan's unwritten aim.72 The Plan won support
throughout the army for three reasons. In the first place, masons and others opposed
to the idea of a monarchy recognised the plan as the best way of overthrowing
Iturbide. Secondly, those officers and men generally disgruntled with Iturbide's
performance as Emperor: men such as Nicolas Bravo and Santa Anna, who felt that
their careers were not progressing as they should, or those who had not received their
salary in months, were also ready to adhere to the plan. Thirdly, those who felt
Iturbide had acted unlawfully by closing the Congress in October, felt their concerns
were represented by the Plan and supported it accordingly. Bustamante most likely did
not share this frustration with Iturbide's government. Even if he did, he chose not to
act upon it and unlike Echavarri, decided not to betray his friend.
However, we must remember that Bustamante was not alone in his continuing
loyalty. Other important officers, such as Manuel de la Sota Riva, Jose Joaquin de
Herrera and Manuel Gomez Pedraza did not join the rebels either. The interesting
thing is that these men, who were also friends of Iturbide, would not be forever
remembered as his faithful allies. Herrera and Pedraza would eclipse their former
iturbidismo with their subsequent achievements, which would prove that friendship
with Iturbide did not necessarily mean they sympathised with centralism or monarchy.
Bustamante, on the other hand, would be forever linked with Iturbide, not because he
had been an outstanding or specially blessed friend, but because he appeared to take
his loyalty one step further and to plot for the Emperor's return.
72 Nettie Lee Benson. "The Plan of Casa Mata," Hispanic American Historical Review 25 (1945), pp.
48-49.
70
The Shadow of Iturhide
C: Bustamante and the State Congress of lalisco (1823)
Anastasio Bustamante was elected to the Constituent Congress of the newly-
formed state of lalisco in September 1823.73 In October, after receiving word of his
appointment from the Electoral Junta of lalisco, he wrote to the Minister of War to
inform him of his election, and of his decision to move to Guadalajara to take up this
post. He was currently in Salamanca to where he had retired after the abdication of
Iturbide.74 Why Bustamante was a candidate for the congressional elections in lalisco
is unknown. He himself declared that he was motivated by 'el natural amor del patrio
suelo donde vi la luz primera y recibi los principios de una educacion benefica.' 75
However, it is more likely that other considerations were in playas well. One might
have been that thejefe politico of Guadalajara and the soon to be provisional governor
of lalisco, was none other than Luis Quintanar, an old companion of Bustamante from
the counterinsurgency and the Army of the Three Guarantees. Both had been close
friends and supporters ofIturbide; and in the climate of hostility to the former emperor
in the months that followed his abdication, Quintanar may well have felt the need for
an ally in Guadalajara. Another reason might have been that Bustamante had many
friends in the provincial capital due to the years he had passed at school there. He
could have been encouraged to stand by some of these old companions of the
Seminary, such as Prisciliano Sanchez and Jose Justo Corro, who were themselves
also elected as members of the new Congress.I? Bustamante was also a well-known
face in Jalisco at that time. His profile had been high in the public consciousness since
73 "Lista de los diputados que han sido electos para diputados al Congreso Provincial de este Estado
[Jalisco]," Guadalajara, 8 September 1823. In Jose Maria Muria (ed.), El federalismo en Jalisco,
1823 (Mexico City: INAH. 1973). p. 51.
74 SDN: se XIII-235/1-31/00113. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Salamanca. II October 1823.
75 Ibid.
76 "Lista de los diputados que han sido electos para diputados al Congreso Provincial de este Estado
[Jalisco]. "
71
The Shadow of Iturbide
his participation in the Plan of Iguala in Guanajuato in 1821. It might be that his status
as a military hero made him a desirable choice for deputy.
Above all, Bustamante must have wanted to be involved with the politics and
government of Jalisco. But why? One explanation could be that Bustamante wanted to
become involved with those who opposed the Supreme Executive Power. From the
moment of Iturbide's abdication in March 1823, Jalisco had been a thorn in the side of
the Constituent Congress and Supreme Executive Power in Mexico City. It had
refused to accept the sovereignty or authority of the restored Congress; had decided
not to obey its orders; and had declared itself no longer willing to put up with 'el
despotismo del gobierno de la llamada metropoli de Mexico.' 77 The leaders of the
Supreme Executive Power: Negrete, Bravo and Guadalupe Victoria had also been the
leaders of the rebellion of Casa Mata which had engineered Iturbide's downfall. Bravo
and Victoria were also both former insurgents. It is not unlikely that Bustamante
harboured a deep resentment of these men and their new found power. Moreover,
many newspapers and pamphlet writers in Mexico City interpreted Jalisco's defiance as
iturbidismo and accused Jalisco of plotting for the return of the former emperor. It
was even said by some that Iturbide's wife and son were in Guadalajara waiting for his
return.78 In which case, Bustamante's decision to join the new Congress could then be
interpreted as a move to link himself to this iturbidista defiance of the government.
However, a closer examination of the events leading to the election of the Constituent
Congress of Jalisco suggests, these explanations do not tell the whole story. It seems
that the political reason for Bustamante's decision to take his place as a state deputy,
77 Provincial Diputation of Guadalajara to Lucas Alaman, Minister of Relations, Guadalajara, 30 May
1823, in Provincial Diputation of Guadalajara, Nuevas contestaciones del gobierno y de la diputacion
provincial de Guadalajara. sabre convocatoria par el congreso que debe constituir a la nacion y
sabre el sistema de gobierno representativo federado. (Puebla: Imprenta Nacional, 1823), p.3.
78 See for example, Que aguarde et nuevo Congreso la venida de Iturbide (Mexico City: Oficina
liberal a cargo del ciudadano Juan Cabrera, 1823). The pamphlet is anonymous and dated, 11
September 1823. It can be found in the Centro de Estudios de la Hist6ria de Mexico, CONDUMEX
(henceforth referred to as CONDUMEX).
72
The Shadow of Iturbide
may well be to do with his opposition to the Supreme Executive Power, and even his
personal hatred of the members, but it might not simply be motivated by a desire to
join plots to restore Iturbide. Instead, it could be that he wished to associate himself
with the struggle for federalism and independent government for the provinces, a fight
with which Jalisco was also very much associated.
For the province of Nueva Galicia, the antecedent of the state of Jalisco, their
adhesion to the Plan of Casa Mata, on 26 February, had been a defining moment.
Article nine of the plan had effectively given each of the adhering Provincial
Deputations the administrative control over the government of their province, and in
so doing, pronounced them independent of the control of central government in
Mexico City.79 In supporting this plan the Provincial Deputation of Guadalajara and
its jefe politico, Luis Quintanar, therefore made a definitive break with government in
Mexico City. This was clearly illustrated in a declaration made by the Provincial
Deputation two weeks later, on 12 March. In this document the members the
Deputation refer to Nueva Galicia as 'el Estado libre de Jalisco' for the first time.
They unequivocally state their rejection of a centrally governed Imperial Mexico, and
recommend that it should instead become a 'confederaci6n de provincias,
estableciendose en cada una un gobierno, popular representativo.' Within this
confederacy, they believed that the former capital of the empire should be reduced to
being 'simplemente [la] capital de la provincia de Mexico. ,80 Originally, the central
government being renounced in Guadalajara was Iturbide and his Junta Instituyente.
However, once Congress was re-established and Iturbide resigned, the Supreme
79 "Plan of Cas a Mata", 1 February 1823. Article 9: 'En el interim contesta el Supremo Gobierno de
10 acordado por el Ejercito, la Diputacion Provincial de esta provincia sera la que delibere en la parte
administrativa, si aquella resolucion fuese de acuerdo con su opinion.' In Berta Ulloa and Joel
Hernandez Santiago (eds.), Planes en la nacion mexicana. (Mexico City: LIII Sen ado de la
Republica/El Colegio de Mexico, 1987), vol. 1, p .. 228.
80 Provincial Deputation of Guadalajara, "La Diputacion Provincial de Guadalajara a los pueblos de
Nueva Galicia," (Guadalajara: Imprenta del Urbano Sanroman, 12 March 1823), in Muria (ed.), El
federalismo en Jalisco, pp. 34-36.
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Executive Power and the restored Constituent Congress took up that mantle. Who
constituted the government in Mexico City was not important to the Provincial
Deputation in Guadalajara, as far as it was concerned, it could adopt whatever form of
government suited it best. But what was crucial was that it did not attempt to uphold
'un derecho de dorninacion universal sobre las provincias. ,SI As Prisciliano Sanchez, a
deputy in Mexico at that time, and later, deputy in Guadalajara and governor of
Jalisco, would outline in his own proposal for the federal constitution, what Jalisco
was searching for was a nation made up of states which had full internal authority and
sovereignty in their own territory. These states would be joined in a pact of unity, and
would be administered by a central authority. However, crucially each state would be
equal in the pact. No province, even Mexico, would have more authority and influence
over the pact or the federal congress, than any other.82
Jalisco was by no means the only province to adopt this point of view as a
result of its adherence to the Plan of Casa Mata. Nettie Lee Benson has shown that in
the six weeks following the proclamation of this plan, it won universal acceptance
throughout the provinces. Each Provincial Deputation took control of the legislative
functions of provincial government, while the jefe politico assumed the reins of the
executive power. From this point on, the provinces were run independently of central
government, only obeying its orders if they were first approved by their local
authorities.f'' This did not mean, however, that the provinces wished to become
independent nation states any more than Jalisco did. In fact, the adhesion of the
provinces to the Plan was quickly followed by their attempts to organise a central
81 Ibid., p. 35.
82 Prisciliano Sanchez, "Proyecto de contrato de asociaci6n para la republica de los Estados Unidos de
Anahuac, formulado por un ciudadano del estado de Jalisco en el afio de 1823 Y sometido a los
estados," in Secreta ria de Gobernacion, Leyes fundamentales de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y
planes revolucinarios que han influido en la organizacion politica de la republica(Mexico City:
Imprenta de la Secretaria de Gobernacion, 1923), pp. 68-90.
83 Nettie Lee Benson, La diputacion provincial y elfederalismo mexicano (Mexico City: El Colegio
de Mexico/UNAM, 1994), pp. 137, 148-149 and 191.
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government which would link the separate provinces to each other in some form of
federation. In the weeks following the proclamation of the Plan, the deputations of
Michoacan, Queretaro, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosi appointed commissioners
who were intended to meet with each other to discuss the creation of a national
government composed of representatives of all the provinces. The Deputation in
Puebla offered its capital as a meeting place, and sent an invitation to all the provincial
deputations of the Empire to select commissioners, and to send them to their city.84
When this group of commissioners from Guadalajara, Michoacan, Oaxaca, Zacatecas,
Guanajuato, Queretaro and San Luis Potosi, did meet in the first weeks in April, after
the abdication of Iturbide, they quickly decided that the national representation that
they wished for was not the restored Congress. Instead they wanted a new Congress,
elected upon different criteria, which could proceed to draw up a constitution for the
new federated state of Mexico that their provinces now envisagedf
The problem that quickly blew up between provinces and central government
was based on this rejection of the authority of the re-established Congress. On 12
April a commission set up by the deputies to decide whether the convocation of a new
Congress was necessary, recommended that the old legislature should remain in power
until a constitution was written. A debate on the subject of new elections could then
take place, it continued, to decide if the ratification of the constitution should be
undertaken by a fresh Congress.f" Pleas from the provinces were ignored. In Jalisco,
this behaviour on the part of the Congress was interpreted as its attempt to derail the
federalist plans of the provinces and to set up instead a copy of Iturbide's centralist
empire under a different name. In March, after Iturbide had agreed to restore the
Congress, the Provincial Deputation of Guadalajara had warned that if it was not
84 Ibid., pp. 137-8.
85 Anna, Forging Mexico. p. l l J,
86 Benson, La diputacion provincial, p. 157.
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replaced by a new Congress, elected specifically to organise a federalist constitution,
this body would attempt to dominate the provinces:
al despotismo de uno solo va a suceder el despotismo de muchos, vais a
tener tantos tiranos, tantos despotas, tantos absolutos, tantos Iturbides,
di d 87cuantos son vuestros iputa os.
Now it appeared that their darkest fears had been realised. The jefe politico, Luis
Quintanar, wrote to the Secretary of Relations, Lucas Alaman, on 12 May that:
la opinion manifestada vehemente entusiasmo por el comun de esta
Provincia [Guadalajara] en favor del sistema de Republica federada [...]
esta en oposicion con los deseos que el actual Congreso ha demostrado
88hasta hoy.
In a proclamation addressed to the people of Jalisco the next day he was more specific
and claimed that Congress was intent on establishing 'una republica central' in Mexico
against the wishes of the provinces.89 In response, the Deputation decided to take
things into its own hands. After a meeting with Quintanar and the ayuntamiento in
Guadalajara on 12 May, it issued a joint statement declaring that they would no longer
obey Congress or the Supreme Executive Power, nor would it send its taxes to the
capital. It appointed the Deputation as the highest authority in the province and
resolved to send copies of their declaration to all other provinces in Mexico
'excitandolas al establecimiento de una federacion general. ,90 On 16 June, the
Deputation went one step further and published a new manifesto which declared the
87 Provincial Deputation of Guadalajara, "La diputaci6n provincial de Guadalajara a los pueblos de
Nueva Galicia," (12 March 1823), in Muria (ed.), Elfederalismo en Jalisco, p. 35.
88 Luis Quintanar to Lucas Alaman, 12 May 1823, in ibid .. p.40.
89 Luis Quintanar, "Proclama del Sr. Quintanar a los habitantes de Nueva Galicia sobre la separacion
del congreso mexicano," (Mexico City: Oficina Liberal a cargo del ciudadano Juan Cabrera, 1823), in
ibid., p. 41.
90 "Resolucion de la Provincia de Guadalajara y sucesos ocurridos en la misma," (Guadalajara, 14
May 1823), in ibid., p. 38.
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former province of Nueva Galicia to be 'el estado libre de Jalisco.' This new state
would be 'libre, independiente y soberano de si mismo y no reconocera otras
relaciones con los demas estados 0 pro vincias que las de fraternidad y
confederacion. ,91 Jalisco was by no means the only province to take matters into its
own hands. On 20 May, a provisional junta in Yucatan arranged for elections to be
held in the province for a provincial congress. On 1 June, Oaxaca declared its
complete separation from the government in Mexico City and set up a provisional
junta to take control of government. On 9 June, the province of Chiapas declared
itself independent from both Guatemala and Mexico. On 18 June, the provincial
deputation of Zacatecas announced it would not obey the Constituent Congress in
Mexico City any longer and announced a provisional plan of government to rule the
province. On 12 July it announced the convocation of elections for the congress of the
'estado libre de Zacatecas.' The provinces of the Eastern Interior, Queretaro, and
Veracruz all published manifestos demanding that federalism be adopted as the
framework for the government ofMexico.92
In the capital, such moves on the part of the provinces were not well
understood. Basically, Congress did not accept that its authority could be bypassed or
ignored. It still regarded itself, as it had done from its very inception in 1822, as the
sole representative of Mexican national sovereignty, and the only legislative power in
the land.93 Therefore, the majority in Congress and the Supreme Executive Power
viewed the provinces' actions as separatism and rebellion, and were concerned that
Mexico might disintegrate into a large number of smaller nations if the rot was
allowed to continue. Moreover, leading members of the government, like Lucas
Alaman, Negrete and Bravo were leading proponents of a centralist system, and must
91 Untitled printed document. (Guadalajara: Imprenta del ciudadano Urbano San Roman, 16 June
1823). In the British Library.
92 Anna, Forging Mexico, pp. 118-119.
93 Sessions of the first day of deliberations at the Constituent Congress, in which the deputies
announced these as their attributes, are included in the Gaceta Imperial de Mexico, 2 March 1822.
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have particularly disliked the dawning realisation that any hope of introducing such a
system was impossible. The Plan of Casa Mata had already ensured that federalism
was the only option for the new Mexican Republic. Now the actions of the provinces
were effectively forcing its hand. On 16 May, a committee of deputies led by Father
Servando Teresa de Mier, produced a proposal for a federalist constitution. On 17
June, the Constituent Congress passed an act of convocation for a new Congress, to
take up office on 31 October.94 Even so, the government in Mexico City was not
ready to relinquish its claim on power. The Supreme Executive Power, in a manifesto
it drafted in June, but did not publish, made their position clear. The adoption of
federalism, it argued, had to first to be agreed centrally by Congress. Only once power
had been devolved from the centre to the provinces, could they move to take full
control of their regional governments. In the meantime, it warned, the Supreme
Executive Power would actively conserve the unity of the provinces.95
However, it must be pointed out and constantly borne in mind throughout this
discussion, that despite these apparent concessions, it was clear that Congress and the
government had little intention of allowing a federal system to be imposed upon
Mexico in which the government in the capital would be no more than another
provincial authority. As Father Mier later admitted, his proposed constitution was
centralist in all but name.96 It allowed each province to have its own regional
congress, but invested it with no real power. For example, central government was to
appoint the army officers and treasury employees who would work in each province,
'sin consulta 0 propuesta' with the provincial government itself.97 The Provincial
94 Ibid., p. 121.
95 "El Supreme Poder Executivo a la Nacion," quoted in Anna, Forging Mexico. p.131.
96 Speech of Father Mier to Congress on 11 December 1823. in Carlos Maria de Bustamante.
Continuacion del Cuadro Historico. Historia del emperador Agustin de Iturbide y establecimiento de
la republica popular federal (Mexico City: Instituto Cultural Helenico/Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica.
1985), p. 202.
97 Servando Teresa de Mier, "Plan de la constituci6n politica de la naci6n mexicana," in Jose Maria
Bocanegra, Memorias para la historia de Mexico independiente, /822-/846 (Mexico City: Instituto
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Deputation of Guadalajara considered it to be 'no [...] mas que un plan de gobierno
central, mucho mas ominoso y opresor para la provincias que el que rige en el dia. ,9H
In order to ensure that its version of federalism was imposed upon Mexico, the
central government took direct action against the people and provinces who opposed
them. On 12 June 1823, Alaman wrote to Luis Quintanar, the jefe politico of
Guadalajara, that he was being replaced by Jose Joaquin de Herrera and that Herrera
had already begun his march upon Jalisco. Herrera was soon forced to return to
Mexico City, however, when the provincial deputation refused to accept him as their
new governor. In a letter they sent to Alaman, the Deputation explained that they had
no confidence in Herrera, as since his arrival he had done nothing but 'sembrar [..] la
desunion y desorden' in the army and government. They also added that in the light of
their declaration of sovereignty, the matter of appointing internal political figures was
a job for themselves rather than central govemment.Y Frustrated in this effort, the
government resolved to do better next time, and on 5 July sent an army under the
command of Nicolas Bravo to bring the rebellious province to heel. In the face of
Bravo's impending arrival, Jalisco entered into swift negotiation with its neighbour,
Zacatecas, who was also under threat from Bravo, as it also had resolved not to
submit to the authority of the Supreme Executive Power and Congress. The two states
organised an army of militia-men and regular soldiers to defend themselves. In the face
of this opposition, the government troops did not venture further than Irapuato (in
Guanajuato) in their march against Jalisco. Instead, commissioners representing the
two states and Bravo met in Lagos to discuss the situation. These negotiations
Cultural Helenico/Instituto Nacional de Estudios Hist6ricos de la Revolucion Mexicana/Fondo de
Cultura Economica, 1986), vol. I, pp. 250-256.
98 Pedro Velez to Alaman, Guadalajara, 24 June 1823, in Provincial Deputation of Guadalajara,
Contestaciones del gobierno de Mexico con el de esta capital de Guadalajara y su diputacion
provincial sobre la acta de esta corporacion del 5 del presente junio, y nombramiento del sr.
brigadier D. Jose de Herrera parajefe politico (Guadalajara: Imprenta de San Roman, 1823), p. II.
In the British Library.
99 Ibid. pp. 5-12.
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dragged on throughout August, gridlocked on the question of state autonomy. The
states argued that it was their right to elect a congress, and to veto orders and laws
emanating from Mexico City that either were unfriendly to their states, were contrary
to the federalism both had adopted, or which concerned the internal functioning of the
state (government appointments, etc.). Otherwise, they were happy to recognise the
authority of central government. Bravo steadfastly refused to concede any ground to
the commissioners, and rejected the states' claims to rights, merely stating that the
Deputations in lalisco and Zacatecas were required to obey all laws emanating from
Mexico City as it was the superior power. The states would be able to elect a
provincial congress once legislation allowing this devolution of power was authorised
by the General Congress. In the end, a proposal was drawn up by the commissioners
ofboth sides which reflected the demands of the states, and although Bravo refused to
sign it, it was sent to central government for approval. The Congress appointed a
. . id h I b deci . h d 100commission to consi er t e proposa ut no ecision was ever reac e .
Despite this second failure, the government in Mexico City did not abandon its
efforts to destroy the state government in lalisco. The troops sent with General Bravo
remained in Celaya under the command of his second, General Negrete, as a constant
threat to the authorities in Guadalajara, until the summer of 1824 when they would
once more be led against Jalisco. From here Negrete embarked upon a secondary
scheme, designed to undermine the power and authority of Quintanar and the
provincial deputation in Guadalajara, by destroying the territorial unity of laIisco.
Colonel Anastasio Brizuela was sent to the district of Colima, on the Pacific coast,
where he organised in conjunction with Negrete the secession of Colima from Jalisco.
The district tried originally to join with Michoacan, But, when their application was
rejected by the authorities in Michoacan, Colima became a region directly
administered by central government. A similar attempt was made by Negrete to
100 Benson, La diputacion provincial, pp.187-190.
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encourage the neighbouring district of Tepic to follow Colima's lead. However, the
military commander of the district, Luis Correa, showed himself to be unfavourable to
Negrete's schemes and this project was abandoned. Undeterred, he began negotiations
with the ayuntamiento of Zapotlan el Grande, a district to the south of Guadalajara in
September. However, the military commander of the district, Javier Pacheco,
maintained Quintanar informed of all that was occurring. Any hopes Negrete had of
convincing the ayuntamiento to consent to a separation from Jalisco were quashed
when Quintanar sent the newly-arrived Anastasio Bustamante to Zapotlan, in late
October, with a small force to preserve the union of that district to Jalisco.IOI
By September 1823, when the new State Congress of Jalisco convened for the
first time, that state's position as one of the leading proponents of federalism was
clear. Anastasio Bustamante would have been aware of this when he accepted his
nomination as a State Deputy. It seems likely, moreover, that Bustamante's decision
indicated his support for the federalist cause. Yet Bustamante had been one of the die-
hard supporters of Iturbide's centralist Empire only a few months earlier. What had
brought about this change of heart? The usual explanation is that Bustamante cynically
joined the federalists in Jalisco in order to exploit their opposition to the government
of Mexico City. However, this argument is far from satisfactory. In the first place,
Bustamante's conversion to federalism appears to have been a defining moment in his
political life. As will be argued in later chapters, he remained a federalist for the rest of
his life. Secondly, in the light of the events of the summer of 1823, it is extremely
difficult to accept the idea that Bustamante's candidacy for the new State Congress
would have been considered by the provincial deputation of Jalisco and its supporters,
if they had believed that his true aim was to conspire towards the reintroduction of
Iturbide's centralist empire. What appears most likely is that Bustamante was ready to
101 Jose Maria Muria (ed.), Historia de Jalisco. (Guadalajara: Gobiemo de Jalisco, 1981), vol. 2, pp.
448-449.
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support the idea of a centralist government in Mexico while Iturbide was Emperor,
and while he himself played an important role in government. However, once
Iturbide's enemies took charge and Bustamante found himself isolated from the seat of
power, he became attracted to the idea of federalism. He may have even become
convinced that federalism was the best form of government for a country the size of
Mexico. He could, of course, still have conserved his allegiance to Iturbide. Even a
federalist government would require a leader. Why could this not be Emperor
Agustin?
Even so, the possibility remains that, after the abdication of Iturbide,
Bustamante had lost his monarchist sympathies. It is interesting to note that, in
contrast to the accusations of 1824, the government in Mexico City did not accuse
Quintanar or the provincial deputation of Jalisco of iturbidismo to justify its decision
to send troops to the state. Pamphlets such as the anonymous Que aguarde el nuevo
congreso la venida de lturbide, published in September 1823, or that written by one
styling himself, El Liberal Moderado: Contra el seiior Quintanar y la atrevida junta
de Guadalajara, certainly claimed that the real aim of the rebellious government in
Jalisco was the return of Iturbide,102 but it does not appear that they were taken
seriously by the central government. Even Lucas Alaman and Negrete, who in 1824
would lead the accusations against Quintanar and Bustamante, did not give the stories
of the ex-emperor's return much credence. In a letter to Quintanar himself, Alaman
dismissed the rumours of Iturbide's arrival in the United States as complete falsehood,
and declared they were:
un medio aproposito para subdividir la opinion en facciones, alarmar a
los habitantes para que se despedacen entre si, 0 introducir la anarquia
102 Que aguarde el nuevo congreso la venida de lturbide (Mexico City: Oficina liberal a cargo del
ciudadano Juan Cabrera, 1823). In CONDUMEX. El Liberal Moderado, Contra el senor Quintanar y
la atrevida junta de Guadalajara.(Mexico City: Imprenta de Dona Herculana del Villar y socios,
1823). In the British Library.
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mas desastroza [sic], recogiendo despues el fruto de tan grosera
. 103tmpostura.
Negrete, for his parte, also in a letter to Quintanar, described the rumours of Iturbide
and his return as 'una fabula inventada por los que quieren el desorden y la guerra
civil.,104 Only after events of the following June in Guadalajara, would it become
acceptable to claim that the federalists in Jalisco had been hoodwinked by Quintanar
and Bustamante to support their dastardly schemes for the restoration of Iturbide. All
this leads to the suspicion that the friendship enjoyed between Quintanar and Iturbide
was not regarded as a threat by the Supreme Executive Power and the Constituent
Congress. The threat was Jalisco's challenge to the authority of Mexico City and its
championing of a brand of federalism that central government regarded as dangerous
separatism.
0: The Conspiracy of the Calle de Celaya and the Downfall of Quintanar and
Bustamante
The State Congress of Jalisco was inaugurated on 14 September. On 2
October, Anastasio Bustamante was appointed to the committees set up by the
deputies to discuss matters concerning the departments of war and domestic affairs
('gobernaci6n,).105 This would be his official position in Guadalajara until he was
appointed as Commander General of the state by Quintanar in March 1824.106
However, he spent the months of November, December and January in the district of
Zapotlan el Grande, protecting the region from any invasion by General Negrete. In
103 Gaceta del Gobierno Supremo de Mexico. 26 July 1823. Lucas Alaman to Luis Quintanar, 23 July
1823.
104 El Sol. 20 August 1823. Pedro Celestino Negrete to Quintanar, Queretaro. 25 July 1823.
105 "Comisiones del Congreso Provincial," in Muria (ed.), El federalismo en Jalisco, p. 54.
106 Anastasio Bustamante, "El general Bustamante a sus compafieros de armas," in El Iris de Jalisco,
8 March 1824.
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his position as Commander General of the military in Jalisco, he became involved in a
conspiracy to overthrow the existing government and restore Iturbide to the throne. In
June 1824, after the plot had been discovered, troops led by Nicolas Bravo entered
Guadalajara and arrested Bustamante. He was later marched to Acapulco, from where
it was intended that he would be shipped to exile in Guayaquil, Ecuador. At least, this
is the official version of events left to us by contemporary historians, such as Lucas
Alaman and Carlos Maria de Bustamante, both of whom were leading figures in the
government in Mexico City during this time. What actually happened in Jalisco
between the months of January and June 1824, is not so clear-cut. For, while there is
no doubt that conspiracies against the central government existed, and that
Bustamante and his colleague, Luis Quintanar, were involved in them, it is by no
means certain that their aim was to restore Iturbide to the throne. Instead, it appears
that they were merely the product of the continuing battle waged in Jalisco in defence
offederalism, against what appeared to be the desire of the Supreme Executive Power
to impose centralism upon Mexico.
Jalisco's relationship with the central government in Mexico City had not
improved after the confrontation in Lagos, despite the convocation and election of a
new Federal Assembly in October. The state legislature of Jalisco continued to make
the demands of its predecessor, the Provincial Deputation, for the adoption of a
system of confederacy in which each state had complete autonomy of authority within
the area of its jurisdiction. In contrast, the government in Mexico City carried on with
its project to allow only limited sovereignty for the states, in order to ensure that real
power remained centralised. The Acta Constitutiva, published in January 1824, as a
blueprint for the coming constitution, illustrated this point perfectly. This document
began by announcing in its sixth article that the states would be 'independientes, libres
y soberanos,' but then went on in the following 30 clauses to set certain limits upon
this sovereignty. A commission, appointed by the Congress in Jalisco to examine the
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document, declared it to render 'nominal la soberania de los estados.' The opposition
of the commission to the Act was based upon two major points. The first was the
prospective representation each state should have in the General Congress of the
Union. The Act declared that representation should be based upon the population of
each state. The Jalisco commission believed this was unfair, as population was not
equally distributed throughout the states, and some, most notably the central states of
Puebla and Mexico, would have an undue influence over proceedings in Congress.
Instead, it suggested that each state be allowed between three and five deputies in the
federal congress, and that in votes, each state should be entitled to one vote each. It
also proposed that the federal congress should take up office in Queretaro rather than
Mexico City. The second point concerned the granting of certain powers to the
General Congress and executive which the commission believed to correspond only to
the states. They principally opposed article 13, which in its first clause, granted the
General Congress the power 'para conservar la paz y el orden publico en el interior de
la federacion'; in the ninth clause gave congress the right to 'establecer las
contribuciones necesarias a cubrir los gastos generales de la republica'; in its twelfth,
awarded it the power to 'reconocer la deuda publica de la nacion y sefialar medios de
consolidarlo'; and in the sixteenth clause, gave the congress the ability to appoint all
military commissions throughout the federation. The commission argued that the
conservation of tranquillity within each state, including the appointment of military
commanders of local troops, was a purely internal matter that did not concern central
government. It also pointed out that state sovereignty also meant that, while it was
undeniable that taxation had to be rendered to central government, each state should
be allotted a sum of money to contribute, and then allowed to organise the tax system
which best suited them.107 However, despite the objections expressed by its
107 "Acta Constitutiva de 31 de enero de 1824, " in Secretaria de Gobernacion (ed.), Leyes
fundamentales de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, pp. 113-116. Also "Dictamen de la comision de
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commission, the state Congress of Jalisco eventually resolved to accept the Act on 4
February. This was not done without protest, and the preamble to the act of
recognition pointedly remarked that Congress trusted that the matters raised by its
commission would be addressed when the constitution itself was drawn up. 108
The Acta Constitutiva was therefore, not the framework for the federal
constitution ideally imagined by the Congress in Jalisco.I09 Fears still existed that
central government secretly wished to impose centralism on the unwilling states. Much
hostility to Mexico City was directed against the members of the Supreme Executive
Power, now composed of Mariano Michelena, Miguel Dominguez (who acted as
replacements for the absent Guadalupe Victoria and General Negrete) and General
Bravo, whom the Congress believed had been instrumental in the attacks made upon
the territory of Jalisco in 1823. On 27 February 1824, Anastasio Bustamante wrote to
Valentin Gomez Farias, a deputy for Zacatecas in the Federal Congress in the capital,
on the matter, declaring that discontent and distrust towards the Power was so
widespread in the state that he feared general unrest would break out if the
membership was not entirely replaced. 110 On 10 March, the Congress addressed its
own appeal to the Federal Assembly, calling for the replacement of Mariano
Michelena and General Negrete.111 Gomez Farias, in combination with his fellow
deputies from Zacatecas and Jalisco, proposed to the Assembly that the Power should
be completely replaced by men who had given clear and definite proof of their
adhesion to the federalist cause. The implication was of course that they did not
Constituci6n del Congreso del Estado sobre el Acta Constitutiva," (3 December 1823), in Muria (ed.),
El federalismo de Jalisco, pp. 61-65.
108 Congress of Jalisco, "Dictamen aprobado por el Congreso del Estado sobre la admision y
ftublicaci6n del Acta Constitutiva de la Nacion," (4 February 1824), in ibid., pp. 67-68.
09 It did however grant more autonomy to the states than the Federal Constitution, which was
eventually drawn up in 1824. For a discussion of the differences between the Constitution and the
Acta, see Timothy E. Anna, "Inventing Mexico: Provincehood and Nationhood after Independence,"
Bulletin of Latin American Reseach 15: 1 (1996), pp. 13-16,
110 VGF A no. 93. Bustamante to Gomez Farias, Guadalajara, 27 February 1824. Reservado.
III Congress of Jalisco, "Representacion que dirige el Congreso de Jalisco a la Asemblea General de
la Federacion," in El Sol. 10 March 1824.
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believe that the current members had demonstrated such commitment. The outcome of
the debate on their proposal was not wholly satisfactory, as the majority of the
deputies rejected the demands for a complete renovation of the power, and decided
only to accept the resignation previously offered by Michelena, but make no attacks
on the other members.112 Moreover, the disappearance of Michelena left General
Bravo, who was widely believed to a committed supporter of centralism, as the
dominant force in the Supreme Executive Power.
In Jalisco, in the meantime, another issue also began to cause unhappiness with
the government in Mexico City. This was the situation of native Spaniards in Mexico.
In the months following Iturbide's abdication, a sense of resentment and distrust had
built up in the state against the dominance of these Europeans in employment,
especially in government and military positions. Perhaps this had something to do with
General Negrete's place on the Supreme Executive Power, and his actions in Jalisco in
the summer and autumn of 1823. Or more likely, it had been brought about by the
achievement of independence. Now the old masters had been dispensed with in
government, many felt it was time their old privileges of employment and wealth,
previously enjoyed by Peninsular Spaniards, should now only be available to
Mexicans. In December 1823 and January 1824, the state legislature approved a
measure in which the resignations of Spaniards in all public offices would be
encouraged, and arms held by them confiscated.l13 In February, Anastasio Bustamante
told Gomez Farias that the general will in Jalisco was that all Spaniards should be
removed from their employment nation-wide.114 He himself refused to appoint a
Spaniard, Jose Narvaez, as military commander of Tepic, simply because of his
112 David M. Quinlan. "Issues and Factions in the Constituent Congress, 1823-1824," in Jaime E.
Rodriguez O. (ed.), Mexico in the Age of Democratic Revolutions, 1750-J850 (Boulder and London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 192.
113 El Sol, 13 January 1824. State Congress of Jalisco to Luis Quintanar, 19 December 1823. 1
January 1824.
114 VGFA no. 93. Bustamante to Gomez Farias. Guadalajara. 27 February 1824. Reservado.
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origins. I IS Colonel Manuel de la Pefia y del Rio noted a similar sentiment amongst his
friends during a visit to Guadalajara in April, writing to the Marquis of Vivanco, that
one had told him that: 'los europeos son mis acervos enemigos' and that he wished
that they all would be removed from their offices and their wealth confiscated.116 Both
Bustamante and de la Pefia warned central government that rebellion and unrest could
follow if the problem of the gachupines was not dealt with.
Again, Jalisco was not the only state causing problems for central government.
Nor were its complaints unique. In December 1823, the deputation of Puebla declared
itself to be the state congress and elected a three-man executive. It announced that it
would recognise central government, but that it would take measures to defend its
sovereignty if this guarantee was not included in the Acta Constitutiva. In response,
troops were sent under Manuel Gomez Pedraza and Vicente Guerrero. The new
authorities were dissolved and Pedraza left as head of government. Once the Act came
into force in January, elections were permitted for the convocation of a state
congress.117 In Cuautla, Lieutenant-Colonel Hernandez and the troops garrisoned in
the town began a rebellion in favour of the dismissal of the Spaniards and their
eventual expulsion. This was quelled by Vicente Guerrrero.118 In the hills of Puebla,
the ex-insurgent, Vicente Gomez, also renewed his activities against the Spanish.119
The most threatening occurrence of all happened in Mexico City itself, where on 23
January 1824, the military commander of the troops in the capital, General Jose
Lobato, led his men in a pronunciamiento. Lobato's plan, along with that of his
115 Bustamante to Quintanar, Guadalajara, 13 April 1824. In Manuel Mier y Teran and Lucas
Alaman, Discursos pronunciados por los Exmos. sres. ministros de Relaciones y de Guerra. en las
sesion del dia 8 de junio, del Congreso General de la Federacion Mexicana, (Mexico City: Imprenta
del Supremo Gobiemo, en Palacio, 1824), p. 16. In CONDUMEX.
116 SON: AH XII481.3/305100102-103. Manuel de la Pefia y del Rio, "Exposicion que el ciudadano
colonel Manuel de la Pena y del Rio, comandante accidental del bata1l6n de infanteria numero II,
hace al Exmo sr. gefe del Estado Mayor," Queretaro. 27 April 1824.
117 Anna, Forging Mexico. pp. 159-160.
118 Alarnan, Historia de Mexico. vol. 5, p. 448.
119 Bocanegra, Memorias para la historia de Mexico, vol. 1. p. 291.
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second, General Jose Stavoli, echoed perfectly the opinions rife in Jalisco. Lobato
accused the executive of having attempted to suffocate the provinces' attempts to
introduce federalism. He and Stavoli called for the immediate renovation of the
Supreme Executive Power, the removal of all Spaniards, and all those 'americanos
poco adictos al sistema de la libertad' from their offices and employment.' 120 The
unrest in the capital was quickly dealt with and the two leaders removed from their
commissions; even so, it surely demonstrated to the executive that opposition to its
actions were not confined to the states.
Jalisco's position may not have been unique, but it was by far the most vocal,
and without doubt, successful, opponent of the central government. It had already
resisted one attempt at military intervention, and showed every sign of continuing its
resistance until its demands were met. Part of the reason for this was the presence of
Luis Quintanar as provisional governor, who inspired confidence and support
throughout the state:
Asi por ejemplo, sus comunicados, que siempre incluian expresiones
tales como 'federacion 0 muerte' eran recibidos con una fe muy
sintomatica de la progresiva confianza en el futuro de la entidad.
Todavia mas, para ganarse la adhesion de las mayorias, que se
mostraban confusas e inactivas sin entender con exactitud el trastorno
de los sucesos, concedio un sin fin de libertades como las de portar
armas y de reunirse sin taxativas. Un testigo presencial posteriormente
explicaria como de la noche a la manana se habia convertido en 'amigo
de que todo et mundo se divierta, que no haya castigos y que todos sean
manejados con la dulzura que se manejan las monjas por su abadesas.
(El Sol, 18 de julio de 1823). Su figura alcanzo tal vigor que los
jaliscienses, seducidos por el optirnismo de los potentados,
pronunciaban su nombre con respeto y admiracion, y repetidamente le
ratificaban el apoyo de infinidad de pueblos cuyas autoridades estaban
') 121con e.
120 Jose M. Lobato. "Pronunciamiento por el plan de Lobato, el 23 de enero de 1824." and.
"Documento relativo al pronunciamiento del General Lobato, el 24 de enero de 1824." in Secretaria
de Gobemaci6n (ed.), Leyes fundamentales de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, pp. 112-113.
121 Muria (ed.). Historia de Jalisco • vol. 2, p. 444.
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Another explanation for the continued defiance of the government, was the success
that Jalisco had enjoyed in its endeavours since 1823. There can be no doubt that their
lead in declaring themselves an independent state, and setting up a state legislature and
executive, had forced the hand of central government. Father Mier's plan of centralised
government with nominal and restricted powers to the provinces had to be abandoned
in favour of the Acta Constitutiva which recognised the autonomy of the states. It was
now perfectly possible that this Act could also be modified when it was transformed
into the constitution to take into account the criticism expressed by the legislature in
Jalisco. All in all, the state and its leader represented a constant danger for the
centralists in Mexico City, and it was clear that something must be done to address
this menace.
The strength of the threat that Jalisco posed to the Executive Power, now
dominated by the centralist General Bravo, in the early spring of 1824, is apparent
from the actions he then undertook. The first was the proposal presented to the
National Congress by a small committee of deputies, apparently aided by Manuel Mier
y Teran and Francisco Arrillaga, the ministers of War and the Treasury and members
of the Scottish Rite of Masons, of whom Nicolas Bravo was Grand Master.122 This
scheme suggested the replacement of the three-person Supreme Executive with a
single entity, a Supreme Director, who would control the executive until the
implementation of the new constitution. This Director would be chosen by the
Supreme Executive Power from amongst its current members. Clearly the obvious
choice would be Bravo. He would have all the power of the executive as detailed in
the Acta Constitutiva, plus special authority to take personal command of the army, if
necessary; to make all military and governmental appointments; and to veto any
legislation passed by the National or State Assemblies. Also ominously for Jalisco, the
power of the Director would also include the ability to 'emplear a los oficiales del
122 Ibid., p. 193.
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ejercito que hayan sido nombrados gobernadores de los estados 0 diputados.' In other
words, he would be able to reassign Quintanar and Bustamante away from Jalisco,
should he so choose.123 The proposal amounted to the creation of a dictator, and was,
as Father Mier admitted in a letter to a friend, designed especially to derail the
federalist project.124 It was also clearly a direct attack upon Jalisco, where the news of
the project was greeted with great dismay and not a small amount of fearful
anticipation.125 The local newspaper, El Iris de Jalisco, described the project as an
attempt to transform Mexico into a military dictatorship, which governing by 'un
sistema de terror' would soon strike 'el golpe mortal a la federacion.' It was clear that
the newspaper feared that once the proposal was implemented, troops might once
b . hei 126more e sent agamst t err state.
The concerns of El Iris were well justified. For on 17 May 1824, a month after
the proposal was approved by the National Congress, Nicolas Bravo marched once
more from Mexico City at the head of a substantial force in the direction of
Guadalajara.127 The state once more rallied to its defences, and troops led by
Bustamante and Quintanar forced Bravo into negotiations. In these talks, Bravo
agreed to ensure that the central government observed the Acta Constitutiva, and
promised to enter into no reprisals against those who had opposed his march upon
Guadalajara.128 However, he did not keep his promise. On 17 June, six days after
signing the agreement he entered that city in the early hours of the morning and
123 The proposal is included in El Iris de Jalisco, 23 April 1R24.
124 'We are [engaged] in the great question of centralizing the government, because the coach of
sovereign federation cannot roll [... ] Everything will go to the devil if the remedy proposed by the
committee is not adopted.' Mier to Cantu, Mexico, 17 April 1824. In Jose Servando Teresa de Mier
Noreiga y Guerra, Antologia del pansamiento politico americano: Fray Servando Teresa de Mier,
(Mexico City: lmprenta Universitaria, 1945), p. 36. Quoted and translated by Quinlan, "Issues and
Factions," p. 193.
125 Carlos Maria de Bustamante, Diario Historico de Mexico (Mexico City: SEP/INAH, 1981), vol.
2, p. 58. Entry for 30 April 1824.
126 El Iris de Jalisco, 23 April 1824.
127 SON: AH XI/481.3/305100141. Agreement and orders of the Supreme Executive Power, dated 17
May 1824.
128 Ibid., XII481.3/306/00032. "Articulos aprobados por el general en jefe del ejercito de
operaciones," II June 1824. El Iris de Jalisco, 16 June 1824.
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arrested Bustamante and Quintanar as they slept. The generals were then sent to
Colima, en route to Acapulco, from where they were to be transported to Guayaquil,
for immediate exile.129 A few of their supporters, including the editor of the
newspaper, El Iris de Jalisco, Jose Maria Valdes, escaped to the port ofTepic, where
they fortified their position in defence against Bravo. This resistance was short-lived,
and Bravo's troops soon put down their rebellion and shot the principal leaders.130
Troops would remain in the capital of Jalisco until January 1825, while government of
the state was placed in the hands of General Francisco Moctezuma, who had arrived
from Mexico City with the invading army.l3l In contrast with the previous year's
intervention, Bravo's mission in Guadalajara attracted very little condemnation or
protest from other staunchly pro-federalist states, or federalists in the General
Congress. The government of Zacatecas wrote to Bravo to demand explanations, but
made no attempt to come to the aid of its neighbour as it had done in 1823.132 Bravo's
mission in 1823 had evidently no other aim but to delay the implementation of
federalist government in Jalisco and other states, despite the protestations of the
executive to the contrary. However, in 1824, this new mission's aims were not so easy
to see, for a new consideration had been brought into the limelight. This was the
accusation that the state of Jalisco, under the direction of two old friends of Iturbide,
was using the mask of upholding and defending federalism to hide its true aim: the
restoration of the ex-emperor to the throne.
The fear that Iturbide, who had left his exile in Italy for London in January
1824, was planning a return to Mexico, had already been shown to be an invaluable
propaganda weapon in the debate upon the subject of a single executive. As David M.
129 Ibid., XII481.3/308/00025. Nicolas Bravo to the Minister of War, Guadalajara, 18 June 1824.
130 Bustamante Diario Historico, vol. 2 pp. 88-89, 93, 100. Entries for 24 June, and 1, 21 and 27 July
1824. Lorenzo de Zavala, Ensayo historico de las revoluciones de Mexico desde 1808 hasta J 830
(Mexico City: Oficina Impresora de Hacienda, Departamento Editorial, 1918), vol. 1, p. 210.
131 Muria (ed.), Historia de Jaliseo, vol. 2, p. 455.
132 SDN: AH XII481.3/306/00043-44. Government of the Free Federated State of Zacatecas to Bravo,
15 June 1824.
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Quinlan has noted in his study of the Constituent Congress of 1823 and 1824, a similar
proposal had been twice rejected by the deputies in January 1824. But in the vote on
21 April, the measure was accepted by 46 votes to 39. Certainly, the proposal was
slightly amended to change the title to the less dictatorial 'presidente provisional,' who
would be elected by congress, and to remove the right of veto; but the essence of the
idea of a powerful single executive remained. It was clear that the federalist deputies
clearly understood that the proposal made a mockery of the Acta Constitutiva and
jeopardised the future of the federalist system. However, it is also clear that in the
debates, which took place in March and April, many deputies were convinced that this
was a necessary evil to prevent the loss of the republican project completely. The
measures creating a single executive were presented as the best method of defence
against the anti-government and pro-Iturbide conspiracies that were said to abound,
especially in Jalisco. As Zavala pointed out, the federalist deputies were faced with the
difficult question: 'i,Quienes eran mas ternibles entre los iturbidistas y los
centralistas?,133 In the end, it appeared that a significant number of federalists decided
that the former group presented a greater threat, and these deputies voted with the
centralists, making them the majority by the small margin of seven votes. Significantly,
in that summer, once the perception of the threat of iturbidismo had been lifted, the
proposal lost its support in Congress, and was never implemented. 134
Even so, confusion arose because iturbidismo was not the only crime of which
Bustamante and Quintanar were accused. According to the explanations provided by
Manuel Mier y Teran, the Minister of War, and Lucas Alaman, to the General
Congress on 8 June 1824, the Supreme Executive Power had agreed to send Nicolas
Bravo to Jalisco with orders to depose Quintanar and Bustamante, for three main
reasons: 1) the continued disobedience demonstrated by both men towards orders
m Zavala. Historia de las revoluciones de Mexico. vol. 1. p. 206.
1.'4 Quinlan. "Issues and Factions," pp. 193-194.
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emanating from the central government; 2) the information that they had gathered
which showed the men were plotting to declare Jalisco's independence from the
Mexican Union; and 3) because they also had evidence to show that Quintanar and
Bustamante were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the current government in
favour of restoring Iturbide to the throne. Neither minister lacked evidence to support
his claims. It was clear from the correspondence quoted by Teran that Bustamante had
repeatedly refused to replace the military commander of Tepic, Eduardo Garcia, who
also happened to be the nephew (by marriage) of Iturbide, with the choice of Ministry
of War, Jose Narvaez.135 He had resisted sending a cavalry corps, which had deserted
in Guadalajara the year before, but had now been amnestied, to rejoin the rest of its
regiment in Orizaba.136 Moreover, he had given employment to the Baron of
Rosemberg, another friend of Iturbide, who had been sentenced to banishment from
the Republic. When ordered to arrest him, he delayed relaying the order and in so
doing, allowed the Baron to escape.137 Letters were quoted from unnamed sources
that described the streets in Guadalajara as being covered with signs reading 'Viva
Agustin I,' and others that warned that the principal leaders in Guadalajara and the
army were plotting a rebellion in favour of Iturbide. 138 A further communication from
the military commander of Colima, Anastasio Brizuela, on 5 May, in which he
included the testimony of a fleeing resident of Guadalajara, claimed that a few nights
beforehand, Bustamante had attempted to proclaim the independence of Jalisco from
Mexico. He had only been prevented by the opposition put forward in the local
barracks by Colonel Jose Antonio Mozo.139 Alaman, for his part, read to the Congress
I35 Alaman and Mier y Teran, Discursos pronunciados por los Exmos. sres. ministros de Relacioncs y
de Guerra. en las sesion del dia 8 de junio, del Congreso General de la Federacion Mexicana, pp.
15-17.
U6 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
137 Ibid., p. 8. SON: AH XII481.3/30S/00022, Also Bustamante to the Minister of War, Guadalajara,
24 March 1824. Ibid., XII481.3/30S/00024. Anastasio Brizuela to Negrete, 4 April. 1824.
138 Alaman and Mier y Teran, Discursos pronunciados pOI' los Exmos. sres. ministros de Relaciones y
de Guerra. en las sesion del dia 8 de junio, del Congreso General de la Federacion Mexicana, p. 20.
13<) Ibid., pp. 23-24.
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a plan discovered in the Calle de Celaya on 12 May. This plan was signed by
Quintanar and called for the destitution of all Europeans from their employment, and
the restoration of Iturbide to Mexico, 'con ellugar que la naci6n quiera darle.' This,
he explained, was to make it appear that the rebellion was not simply in favour of
Iturbide.140 He also referred to a speech given in the state legislature of Jalisco on 7
April, in which a deputy had given voice to rumours that Luis Quintanar and
Anastasio Bustamante were plotting a rebellion in favour of Iturbide, and that the
troops who were garrisoned in Guadalajara were ready to second their expected
. . 141pronunciamiento.
None of these accusations against Bustamante and Quintanar would have been
new to the deputies. As we have seen, from the very inception of the state of Jalisco,
pamphlet writers and rumour-mongers had interpreted the state's defiance of Mexico
City as a plot to restore Iturbide to the throne. These rumours had become more
widespread after the failure of the plan of Lobato and the introduction of the idea of a
single executive. The newspaper of the Scottish Rite of Masons, El Sol, began to
publish regular editorials accusing the state legislature and governor of conspiracy for
the return of Iturbide.142 Letters purporting to be from concerned residents in
Guadalajara detailed the shocking openness of this plotting, were also published by the
newspaper.143 El Iris de Jalisco was condemned for expressing pro-lturbide
sentiments, and its editor was accused of being a leading member of the conspiracy.
144 It was declared by this newspaper that Iturbide had left England, en route to the
United States, from where he was planning to head for Guadalajara, via Guatemala or
140 Lucas Alaman, "Discurso pronunicado por el Exmo. sr. ministro de Relaciones, en la sesion del
dias 8 de junio del Congreso General de la Federacion Mexicana," in Lucas Alaman. Ohms de Lucas
Alaman: Documentos Diversos (lneditos y muy raros) (Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1945), vol. 2, pp.
559, 563-564.
141 Ibid., p. 567.
142 El Sol, 19 April 1824
143 Ibid., 19 May 1824.
144 Ibid., 17 April 1824.
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Panama.145 On 18 April it published the speech of one of the deputies of the Congress
of Jalisco, referred to above, which reported rumours that Bustamante, Quintanar and
other officers, were in secret communication with Iturbide in London, and that they
were plotting to restore him to the throne.146 El Sol even reported Bustamante's failed
attempt at a pronunciamiento in favour of complete independence from Mexico, also
included in the ministers' evidence.147 The deputies might have dismissed all these
newspaper stories as simple gossip and unsubstantiated rumour. However, the
presentations by both Mier y Teran and Alarnan brought substance to these reports
and most likely quelled any concerns that they may have had over any hidden motives
behind yet another armed intervention by the government in Jalisco.
Yet the explanations offered by Teran and Alaman for their decision to send
Bravo to Jalisco are far from convincing. In the first place, one cannot escape from the
inherent contradiction of their accusations against Bustamante and Quintanar. In one
breath they are accused of plotting to declare Jalisco independent from the Mexican
Union, while in another, they are said to be also conspiring to restore Iturbide to the
throne. Did the ministers mean to imply that the two officers wished to see Iturbide
return simply as emperor of Jalisco? Of course, the most logical explanation must be
that they feared that if Jalisco became independent, and Iturbide was welcomed back
there as leader, a re-conquest of the rest of Mexico might follow. Or, it could be that
they believed that Bustamante and Quintanar would prefer to establish an independent
Jalisco, should their plans to restore Iturbide fail. Even so, these possibilities are not
mentioned, or even hinted at, in either speech. In the second place, the evidence
presented as proof of plots of iturbidismo or separatism, are highly suspicious. The
original correspondence of the unnamed sources quoted by Teran, can be found in the
145 Ibid., 13 March 1824.
146 "Discurso que dirigio al congreso del estado de Jalisco uno de sus diputados," (7 April 1824), in El
Sol, 18 April 1824.
147 Ibid.,12 May 1824.
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archives of the Secretary of Defence in Mexico City. The three letters which are
mentioned are written by General Negrete, Colonel Anastasio Brizuela and Colonel
Manuel de la Pefia y del Rio. As we know, General Negrete and Anastasio Brizuela
had been sent to Jalisco with Bravo in 1823, and had played important roles in
organising the separation of the district of Colima from Jalisco. In his speech, Teran
claimed that he did not reveal the names of his correspondents as these were, as he
phrased it 'bajo el poder de los facciosos' and he did not want to expose them to
danger.148 Neither Brizuela nor Negrete were in Jalisco, and Colonel de la Pefia had
addressed his letter to the government from Queretaro.149 It is more likely that Teran
did not want his listeners to know he was presenting evidence gathered from such
narrow sources. His listeners may have also suspected the trustworthiness of Negrete
and Brizuela, knowing as they did their close relationship with the government.
Moreover, Colonel de la Pefia's letter does not say that he heard plots in favour of
Iturbide, rather that the people he met were discontented with the central government
and with the employment enjoyed by the Spanish. He merely surmises from their
expressions of discontent that 'se deseaban renovar los estragos del afio diez' and that
'se trataba de una revolucion la que siendo transcendental a toda la nacion mexican a
viniese a redundar a favor de su idolo, lturbide.'150
But most intriguing is the idea of Quintanar's plan. According to Alaman, this
was discovered in a raid on a house in the Calle de Celaya, on 12 May 1824. Along
with this plan, various other documents were also found, one of which also
148 Alaman and Mier y Teran. Discursos pronunciados por los Exmos. sres. ministros de Relaciones y
de Guerra. en las sesion del dla 8 de junio, del Congreso General de la Federacion Mexicana, p. 9.
149 SON: AH XII481.3/305/00102-103. Manuel de la Peiia y del Rio. Exposicion que el ciudadano
coronel. eomandante accidental del batallon de infanteria numero 11. hace al Exmo. sr. jefe del
Estado Mayor. (Queretaro. 27 ApriI1824).
150 Ibid. Also, Alaman and Mier y Teran, Discursos pronunciados pOl' los Exmos. sres. ministros de
Relaciones y de Guerra. en las sesion del dia 8 de junio, del Congreso General de la Federacion
Mexicana, p. 20.
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compromised Bustamante in the conspiracy. lSI This plan does not call for the
restoration of Iturbide to the imperial throne, but to Mexico, albeit in a position
agreed upon by the people. It could be interpreted, as Alaman suggests, as a ruse to
hide Quintanar's true objectives. It also might be interpreted as a reaction to the
declaration by General Congress in April, that Iturbide would be outside the law if he
returned to Mexican soil, or in other words, he would be executed. Even so, in the
event, they appear to be a plan that only saw the light of day in the investigations of
the prosecution. There is no original document, only copies. It is another plan, also
found amongst the papers of those arrested in the Calle de Celaya, which is eventually
proclaimed by those who fled Guadalajara, to Tepic, on Bravo's entry. This plan,
called for three main things: I) the complete renovation of the Supreme Executive
Power; 2) the suspension of the measures to introduce a single executive; and 3) the
removal of all Spaniards from their civil, military and political positions.152 A different
version of the same plan, also found in Celaya, declares that once the pronunciamicnto
has been accepted, its leaders will proceed to convene a new Congress which will
reform the Acta Constitutiva and draw up the constitution.153 The states would then
elect a president and a senate to oversee operations. Alarnan refers to both plans in
passing in his speech, but does not mention their contents or include it in his dossier of
documents.154 This is hardly surprising. The sentiments expressed in these documents
151 SDN: AH XII481.3/302/00037. Francisco Santoya to Antonio Garcia, 1 May 1824. It reads:
•Amado amigo: he dicho a V. en mi anterior que Jalisco ha mandado comisionados para todas las
provincias con el objeto de combinar el plan que ya signifique a V. en mi antecedente, contraido a la
restituci6n de lturbide al suelo mexicano, bajo la investidura que la nacion estime por conveniente.
No dudo que V. estara mas empapado en la materia que yo, y que el ciudadano general habria
impuesto desde aquel estado todo 10 conducente a este fin, como es el mas interesado, y que esta del
todo comprometido para tal empresa.' This is a copy, I was unable to find any original.
152 Ibid., XII48 1.3/302/001 52."Extracto de la ultima causa de conspiracion descubierta en est a capital
en la noche del doce de mayo ultimo. " And, ibid., XII481.3/306/00048-49. "Plan del Sr. Eduardo
Garcia en el cuartel de Tepic," Cuartel de Tepic, 18 June 1824.
153 Ibid., XII481.3/302/00 151. "Extracto de la ultima causa de conspiracion descubierta en esta capital
en la noche del doce de mayo ultimo."
154 Lucas Alaman, "Discurso pronunicado por el Exmo. sr. ministro de Relaciones. en la sesion del
dias 8 de junio del Congreso General de la Federacion Mexicana." p. 559.
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do not support the accusations that the conspirators in the Calle de Celaya, or their
associates in Guadalajara were plotting the secession of Jalisco or the restoration of
Iturbide. Instead, they demonstrate the frustration with the Supreme Executive Power
and its attempts to minimise the autonomy of the states, that had been evident in
Jalisco since 1823.
What the papers discovered in the Calle de Celaya do show, however, is that in
1824 there were definite plans afoot in the capital and the states which had designs
against the Supreme Government in Mexico City. Correspondence to and from many
different states was discovered, although it appears the conspirators were most
prominently linked with another cadre of rebels in the city of Guadalajara. After the
raid on the Calle de Celaya, those who were not arrested, like the leader Miguel Borja
and fellow conspirator, Captain Vicente Gonzalez, headed for the safety of Jalisco.155
Evidence given by witnesses after the fall of Jalisco to Bravo's army describes a group
of eight or nine officers meeting regularly in each others' houses to plot against the
central government. These included Bustamante's secretary, Colonel Jose Maria
Castaneda, Guadalupe Ballestero, who was in charge of delivering the post for both
Bustamante, Quintanar and the editor of El Iris, Jose Antonio Valdes. Others were
leading members of Bustamante's army in Guadalajara, such as Lieutenant-Colonels
Eduardo Garcia and Manuel Andrade.156 Andrade also happened to be the son of Jose
Antonio Andrade, another well-known friend of Iturbide, who had also been
implicated in an iturbidista plot in October 1823.157 According to one witness,
Antonio Ferrer, the aim of the conspirators was 'atentar contra el gobierno
establecido, valiendose la voz de independencia de este estado de Mexico, y despues
ISS AGN: Archivo de Guerra, vol. 402, expo 4280, f 99. "El Capitan O. Vicente Gonzalez sobre que
se le devuelva su empleo por comprendido en la amnistia."
156 SON: AH XII481.3/306/00 112-138. Plaza de Guadalajara, "Informacion secreta sobre los
acontecimientos revolucionarios de este Estado."
157 lbid., XII481.3/301l00081."Copia de la lista que presento el subteniente de Infanteria no. 4 O.
Luis Olazabal de los individuos que habian de cooperar a la conspiracion de la noche del 2 del
presente mes [October]."
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proclamar a Agustin 1.,158 Another provided their plan, which proposed the immediate
proclamation of Iturbide as emperor and the expatriation of all Spaniards.159 It was
alleged that Bustamante was a close collaborator in these schemes and had worked
hard to promote the plan within Jalisco and the neighbouring states.160
Once Bustamante and Quintanar had been arrested, and Guadalajara found
itself under military occupation, the state legislature published a manifesto in which it
asserted that the authorities had always been ignorant of any plans held by the two
generals in favour of Iturbide. Instead, they had believed that Bravo's mission in
Jalisco was:
obra de los enemigos de la federacion, que pintando a este estado
sumido en una desoladora anarquia, habia tendido diestramente los
lazos a las autoridades para hacerles coayudar con las mas sanas
intenciones a sus fines siniestros de centralizar la administracion
gubemativa de los estados en un solo punto, dejandolos para ignominia
el nombre sobcraoos."!
They claim that they supported the resistance mounted by the two men, and called up
the militias to fight Bravo's army, 'solo para resistir fuerza con fuerza, y para defender
la libertad y soberania del estado que consideraba amenzada.' 162 The legislature was
not alone in its suspicions. According to Zavala 'aun el seno mismo del congreso
general' it was suspected that the real motivation of Bravo's march was to crush the
federalist spirit of Jalisco.163 He implies that Bustamante and Quintanar successfully
158 Ibid., XI/481.3/306/00126.Testimony of Antonio Ferrer. in "Informacion secreta sobre los
acontecimientos revolucionarios de este Estado."
15<> Ibid .• XII481.3/306/00131.Testimony of Francisco Granderos de Medina. in "Informacion secreta
sobre los acontecimientos revolucionarios de este Estado."
160 Ibid., XIJ48I.3/307/00096.Testimony of Francisco Granderos de Medina. in "Informacion
reservada sobre acontecimientos sediciosos. proyectando realizar la proclamaci6n de D. Agustin de
Iturbide por emperador de esta America."
161 Congress of Jalisco, Manifiesto que el Congresos Constituyente del Estado Libre de Jalisco dirige
a sus habitantes (Guadalajara: Imprenta del ciudadano San Roman, 1824), p. 4.
162 Ibid.
163 Zavala, Historia de las revoluciones de Mexico, vol. I, p. 207.
100
The Shadow of Iturbide
deceived the federalists in lalisco and elsewhere, presenting themselves as the
defenders of federalism, in order to drum up support for their plans to restore Iturbide.
Undoubtedly, this is a sensible explanation, for otherwise we would have to accept
that the state Congress of lalisco, the ayuntamiento, and its leading members were all
also iturbidistas. As we have seen in our previous discussions, this would be to fly in
the face of all other evidence to the contrary. This would also account for the
existence of two separate plans amongst the papers of those arrested in the Calle de
Celaya. Quintanar's plan would have had to be top secret, whilst the other provided
the necessary camouflage. It would explain why a committed anti-iturbidista, like
Guadalupe Victoria, was also discovered to have been communicating with the leaders
of the conspiracy in Mexico City. 1M Or, why pro-federalists on the run from the
conditions in Mexico City, like writer Pablo Villavicencio, should head to Guadalajara
c. . 165lor protection.
If this is the case, Bustamante, Quintanar and their fellow conspirators must
have had to work extremely hard to disguise their true ambitions. Their positions as
known friends of the ex-emperor, and the rumours that constantly surrounded their
actions can only have made their allies suspicious. Yet they appear to have succeeded
in deceiving them all. This must have been most difficult after the undisclosed deputy
made his speech in the state Congress on 7 April 1824, in which he brought to the
attention of the legislature the stories circulating of Bustamante's and Quintanar's
secret communications with Iturbide, and their plots to restore him to the throne. In
response, Bustamante published a manifesto denying all the charges and claiming to be
164 SDN: AH XII481.3/302/00025-26. Guadalupe Victoria to Miguel Borja, 13 March 1824.
165 Villavicencio's arrest had been ordered by the Executive, due to the inflammatory pamphlets he
had been producing. Bustamante, Diario Historico, vol. 2, p. 47. Entry for 29 March 1824. AGN:
Archivo de Guerra. vol. 408, Exp. 4280, f. 114. Declaration of Pablo Villavicenio.
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'eternamente acervo enemigo de los monarquistas, sea cual fuese su procedencia.' 166
Luis Quintanar informed the Congress, in response to their enquiries that:
aunque se ha victoriado a dicho sr. Iturbide, he podido averiguar que esto ha
sido por alguna corta reunion de gente plebeya y holgazana, mas que sin
embargo se ha conservado ileso el orden y tranquilidad publica a beneficio de
que el sr. comandante general [Bustamante] proveia noticia de los citados
acontecirnientos, reunio a los jefes de los cuerpos y les recargo la vigilencia
sobre la conducta de sus subordinados, para que en todo cuanto sostuvieran el
orden.167
He also published a manifesto addressed to the inhabitants of Jalisco, in which he
denounced all publications in favour of Iturbide as the work of the Spanish
government, who wished to cause anarchy in Mexico to facilitate their re-conquest. 168
The legislature in Jalisco appeared to accept these explanations quite easily. On 30
April, it wrote to the Minister of War, Mier y Teran, that any disturbances that had
taken place in Guadalajara in favour of Iturbide were not of any significance. 169 On 28
May, after learning that Bravo had begun his march on their capital, they were more
specific, dismissing the accusations of iturbidismo, as 'enteramente falsas.' 170
The one thing that undermines this interpretation that the iturbidistas In
Guadalajara were deceiving their federalist allies is the plan of Tepic. This plan was
proclaimed by Eduardo Garcia, Iturbide's nephew-in-law. It was announced after
Bravo's entry into Guadalajara and all the accusations of iturbidismo had been made
by the government. But this, as we have seen, was not Quintanar's plan, for the
166 LAF no. 257. Anastasio Bustamante, Noticias de Guadalajara y manifiesto del general
Bustamante (Mexico City: Oficina de Mariano Ontiveros, 1824), pp. 3-4.
167 SDN: AH XII481.3/305/00070. Quintanar to the Secretaries of the Congress of the Free State of
Jalisco, Guadalajara, 8 April 1824.
168 Manifiesto of Luis Quintanar, dated 23 April 1824, published in El Sol, 6 May 1824.
169 SDN: AH XII481.3/305/00063-64. The Secretaries of the Free State of Jalisco (Prisciliano Sanchez
and Jose Esteban Arechiga) to Mier y Teran, Guadalajara, 30 April 1824.
170 LAF no. 416. Congress of Jalisco, Ocurrencias interesantes. Sobre reclamaciones del Congreso
de Jalisco, hechas por sus diputados en la sesion publica de 28 de mayo de 1824 (Mexico City:
Impreso en la liberal de Moreno Hermanos, 1824), p. 2.
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restoration of Iturbide to Mexico, nor the plan to restore him to the throne, but rather
the federalist plan which called for the renovation of the Supreme Executive Power,
and the suspension of the measures to introduce a single executive. This is puzzling,
for surely after the arrests of Bustamante and Quintanar, the advantages of concealing
the true aims of the rebellion were now non-existent. Could it be that there had been
no pretence? Were the charges of Alaman and Teran merely inventions to excuse their
direct attack on federalism in Mexico and Jalisco? After all, when charges were
eventually brought against Bustamante by the Executive Power, and submitted to the
Commander of Acapulco, Juan Alvarez, no specific accusation that Bustamante was
plotting to restore Iturbide was made. He is simply charged with disobedience and
plotting the secession of Jalisco from the Mexican Union. If the Executive was in
possession of incontrovertible evidence that Bustamante was guilty of conspiring in
favour ofIturbide, it can only be expected that it would have included this charge.!7!
The evidence gathered after the entry of Bravo into Guadalajara is not completely
reliable. Francisco Grandero and Antonio Ferrer, the main informants, admitted that
they had infiltrated the conspiracy in Jalisco as spies for Colonel Jose Antonio Mozo,
the same officer who was appointed as judge and prosecutor in the investigation.l72
Colonel Mozo had been the commander of the garrison in Guadalajara, but had
resigned, according to his later testimony, after foiling Bustamante's attempt to
implement his revolutionary plan on 3 May. !73 At the time, he explained to General
Manuel Gual, his commanding officer, that he had resigned because of rumours that he
himself had been organising a rebellion amongst his men. !74However, it could also be
171 SDN: AH XI/481.3/306/00IS8-160. Minister of War to Juan Alvarez, II September 1824.
172 Ibid., XI/481.3/306/00 131. "Informacion secreta sobre los acontecimientos revolucionarios de este
Estado." Testimony of Francisco Granderos de Medina. Ibid., XII481.3/306/00127. Testimony of
Antonio Ferrer.
m Ibid., 481.3/307/00088-89. "Informacion reservada sobre acontecimientos sediciosos, proyectando
realizar la proclamacion de D. Agustin de Iturbide por emperador de esta America." Testimony of
Jose Antonio Mozo.
174 Ibid., XII481.3/30S/000117-122. Mozo to General Manuel Gual, Inspector General of the National
Artillery Corps, Guadalajara, 8 May 1824.
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that the rebels were determined to oppose Bravo at any cost, and still believed that the
only way to ensure any support from the other states was to proclaim the federalist
plan and claim that the charges of iturbidismo were only invention?
It is unlikely that we will ever know what actually happened in Guadalajara in
the first six months of 1824. However, in the light of our present discussions, we can
make a number of assertions to aid our comprehension of the situation. The first is
that Bravo's march upon Guadalajara in May 1824 was not motivated only by the
suspicion that Bustamante and Quintanar were plotting a rebellion in favour of
Iturbide. Undoubtedly, the Supreme Executive also wished to neutralise the power
Jalisco exercised over the policies of central government. It wanted to ensure that the
new constitution would not create a confederated union of sovereign states, but rather
a federal union of provinces, whose affairs could be directly controlled from Mexico
City. The second point is that the evidence presented by Alaman and Teran to the
General Congress on 8 June did not amount to conclusive proof of Quintanar and
Bustamante's involvement in any conspiracy to restore Iturbide to the throne. It is
unlikely that the executive was ever in possession of such evidence, for otherwise it is
inconceivable that they would not have included this accusation in the charges finally
brought against Bustamante. Thirdly, the documents discovered at the Calle de
Celaya, and the evidence given by witnesses in Jalisco, clearly demonstrate that a
rebellion against the Supreme Government was definitely being planned in the spring
of 1824. The proclamation of the Plan of Tepic illustrates that these conspirators were
in communication with each other. Whether this conspiracy's true aim was the
restoration of Iturbide is unclear, since three plans were discovered. The only one of
these plans to be proclaimed however, was not the one in favour of Iturbide, but the
one which called for the renovation of the Supreme Executive Power and the
suspension of the introduction ofa single executive, or Supreme Director.
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Finally, it must be pointed out that federalism and iturbidismo did not have to
be mutually incompatible concepts. It is not too much to imagine that some of the
iturbidistas, like Bustamante and Quintanar, who were heavily involved in the
government of a strongly federalist state, may have come to believe that a union of
sovereign states was the best solution to solve the difficulties of governing such a
large and diverse country such as Mexico. That they may also have believed that
Iturbide would have been the ideal choice as the head of this union, whether as
emperor or in another position, is also not improbable. In that case, perhaps the most
satisfactory way to explain the mystery of 1824 could be to suggest that the rebellion
that was plotted in the Calle de Celaya and in Guadalajara. was designed as a
compromise. On the one hand, it guaranteed the future of a federal Mexico. and on the
other allowed for the exiled Iturbide to return home 'en ellugar que la naci6n quiera
darle.' Perhaps as emperor or president. or even in a less exalted position. So, maybe
we do not have to decide whether Bustamante was an iturbidista or a federalist. It
might just be that he was both.
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Chapter Three: The Footsteps to Power (1825-1829)
The last six months of 1824 left Anastasio Bustamante at an extremely low
ebb. After his arrest in Guadalajara, he was marched via Colima, to the nearby port of
Navidad. Here, he boarded the brig 'Morelos' on 13 August, which conducted him to
the fortress of Acapulco. I He was kept in the fortress for five months, in the custody
of the Military Commander, Juan Alvarez. During this time he was charged with
conspiring against the government, and of plotting the secession of Jalisco from the
Mexican Union.2 It appears the case never reached a military tribunal. These were
difficult months for the General. The hot and humid climate was extremely unpleasant
for one so accustomed to the drier atmosphere of Jalisco and the Bajio, and he feared
for his health.3 He had not been paid since his arrest, and in September complained to
Alvarez that he found himself 'reducido a la escasez de 10 preciso para sobrevivir.,4
Had anyone told him during these months of captivity that he would become Vice-
President of the Republic within the next five years, it is unlikely that he would have
believed them.
Yet things would quickly change. In December 1824, President Guadalupe
Victoria introduced an amnesty for all those accused of political crimes. On 5 January
1825, it was judged that Bustamante should be included in this pardon' and a
fortnight later, he was released from Acapulco." In the following year, Bustamante
was appointed as the Commander General of the Eastern Interior Provinces, and in
1828, was named as a candidate for the forthcoming Presidential elections. In January
ISDN: AH XII4S1.3/308/00101. Anastasio Brizuela to the Minister of War, Colima, 19 August IR24.
2 Ibid., XI/306/00158-160. Minister of War to Juan Alvarez, II September 1824.
3 Ibid., XII4S1.3/30S/00077. Anastasio Bustamante to the Supreme Executive Power, Colima, 10 July
1824.
4 Ibid., XII4S1.3/30S/00 175. Bustamante to Alvarez, Acapulco, 20 September 1824.
5 Ibid.. XII4S1.3/307/00228-230. Assessor's Report on the Behaviour of Anastasio Bustamante and
Luis Quintanar, Mexico City, 5 January 1825.
I> Ibid.. XII48 1.3/307/0021 3. Nicolas de Casio to the Minister of War, Mexico City, 25 January 1825.
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1829, he was elected Vice-President by the General Congress, and later that year, after
leading a successful pronunciamiento against the President, Vicente Guerrero. he
became the acting Head of State. One of the explanations for Bustamante's quick rise
to power was his involvement in the yorkino Masonic lodge. He was chosen and
promoted as a Presidential candidate for this faction. He finished the elections in third
place, but was elected as Vice-President after a yorkino revolt ousted the winning
candidate, Manuel Gomez Pedraza in December 1828. His greatest success, however,
was achieved precisely by turning against his yorkino allies, and by leading a rebellion
which toppled Guerrero.
General Bustamante's behaviour between 1825 and 1829 seems puzzling. Why
would such a man, who fought against the insurgents and their challenge to social
order, join a faction which associated itself with the lower classes and ensured that its
candidates assumed the Presidency through a popular revolt which culminated in the
riot of the Parian Market? Why, after becoming Vice-President, did he tum away from
the yorkinos, if he owed to them his success? Why did he ally himself with his former
enemies, Lucas Alaman and Nicolas Bravo, in order to overthrow Guerrero?
Contemporaries, such as Jose Maria Luis Mora, ascribe this contradictory behaviour
to pure ambition. This chapter will attempt to show that more complex motives
directed the General's actions in the four years in question. It will also demonstrate
that, when analysed closely, the behaviour classed above as contradictory, was in fact
nothing of the kind. General Bustamante acted just as one would expect of a former
Royalist, and a former supporter of Iturbide, to behave in the situations in which he
found himself.
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A: Commander General of the Eastern Interior Provinces (1826-1829)
Anastasio Bustamante left Acapulco in January 1825 and returned to Mexico
City. The ascension of Guadalupe Victoria to the Presidency had brought a new
climate to politics in the capital. His long-time friend, Manuel Gomez Pedraza, now
occupied Manuel Mier y Teran's position in the Ministry of War. Lucas Alaman would
also be soon replaced by Sebastian Camacho. Despite this, Bustamante was not
welcomed back to the capital with open arms. Nicolas Bravo occupied the Vice-
Presidency, and according to Gomez Pedraza, he hated Bustamante with a passion.
Gomez Pedraza sought to find some employment for the General by using his
influence with the President. 7 Even so, the level of Bustamante's unpopularity meant
choices were limited. Eventually, it was proposed to Congress in February that he be
sent as the Plenipotentiary Minister for Colombia.8 It was clear he was not wanted in
the capital. Mariano Michelena was sent to England as the Plenipotentiary in 1824,
after the Plan of Lobato had made it clear that his position on the Supreme Executive
Power was untenable. Juan de Dios Canedo would be appointed as the minister to the
South American Republics by Bustamante's government after it became clear he was a
powerful enemy of his regime.9 However, the Senate refused to sanction Bustamante's
appointment as Plenipotentiary, IO and he was finally appointed as the Commander
General of the distant Eastern Internal Provinces (Texas, Coahuila, Tamaulipas and
7 Manuel G6mez Pedraza, "Manifiesto que Manuel Gomez Pedraza, ciudadano de la republica de
Mexico, dedica a sus compatriotas, 0 sea, una resefia de su vida publica," in Laura Solares Robles
(ed.), La obra politica de Manuel Gomez Pedraza. 1813-1851 (Mexico City: Institute Mora!lnstituto
Matias Romero! Acervo Historico Diplomatico de la Secreta ria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1999), p.
232.
8 Archivo Historico de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (henceforth referred to as AHSRE), L-
E-1798, f. 131. Lucas Alaman to Bustamante, Ministry of Relations, I March 1825.
o Jaime E. Rodriguez 0., El nacimiento de Hispanoamerica. Vicente Rocafucrte y el
hispanoamericanismo, 1808-1832 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1980), p. 276.
10 AHSRE: L-E-1798. f.144. Francisco de Dios Rodriguez and Manuel Posado, Secretaries of the
Senate, to the Minister of Relations. 23 March 1825.
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Nuevo Leon), in June 1826. II In the meantime, he presided over the Junta Patriotica
of 1825. This Junta was set up to organise and raise funds for the independence
celebrations of 16 September. Carlos Maria de Bustamante was predictably outraged
at such an appointment, although it appears that he found the day itself quite
• c. 12satisfactory.
Bustamante marched north in August or September 1826 and remained in the
Eastern Provinces until he was nominated Vice-President in early 1829. During his
posting, he suppressed the attempt of John Dunn Hunter to declare Texas'
independence from Mexico in late 1826,13 and played host to Manuel Mier y Teran's
inspection of Texas in 1828. It appears that the General was well-regarded in the area
of his command. Mier y Teran commented in a letter to Guadalupe Victoria that
Bustamante's presence in Texas was beneficial as he was a man the foreigners there
respected.i" In the Presidential elections of 1828, all the states under his command
(Coahuila and Texas, Tamaulipas, and Nuevo Leon) voted in his favour. IS The
General's time in the Eastern Provinces, most especially in Texas, must have been very
instructive. He cannot have failed to see, as Mier y Teran did during his inspection,
that Texas was a fertile and important area capable of producing great quantities of
maize, beans and sugar for domestic and foreign markets. He must also have been
aware of the danger that the United States presented to a Mexican Texas, and it is
likely that he concurred with Mier y Teran's opinion that immigration from the US.
should be discouraged, if not forbidden. Mexican and European settlers should be sent
II SDN: SC XIIIII/I-235/1-31/00138. Manuel Gomez Pedraza to Bustamante. Ministry of War. 21
June 1826.
12 Carlos Maria de Bustamante, Diario Historico (Mexico City: INAH. 1982). vol. 3. pp. 118. 124-
127. Entries for 30 August and 16 September 1825.
13 Henry George Ward, Mexico en 1827 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1995), p. 646.
14 Manuel Mier y Teran to Guadalupe Victoria. Bexar, 28 March 1828. In Jack Jackson (ed.), Texas
by Teran. The Diary kept by General Manuel Mier y Teran on his 1828lnspectiol1 ofTexas (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2000), p. 38.
15 Jose Maria Bocanegra, Memorias para la historia de Mexico independiente. 1822-1846 (Mexico
City: Instituto Cultural Helenico/lnstituto Nacional de Estudios Historicos de la Revolucion
Mexicana/Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1986). vol. 1, p. 505-506.
109
The Footsteps to Power
to Texas instead, and the province protected by an increased number of garrisons.
Certainly, once Bustamante assumed the role of Head of State in 1830, most of the
measures proposed by Mier y Teran in his post-inspection report, as necessary to
prevent the loss of Texas to the United States, were adopted and implemented by his
government.i"
B: Bustamante and the yorkinos
According to Manuel Gomez Pedraza, Anastasio Bustamante joined the
Masonic Rite of York during his time in Mexico City between 1825 and 1826. When
he marched to Coahuila and Texas, he was invested with the necessary authority to
establish and promote new lodges in the territories under his command.i He was
apparently a dedicated member of the yorkino brotherhood. Jose Maria Tornel
remarks that Bustamante behaved 'con sorprendente ardor' in the Eastern Provinces,
treating his mission to spread yorkino lodges as if it were 'una especie de deber
religioso.,18 Why Bustamante joined the yorkinos is not clear. However, it was
undoubtedly a natural step for him to take. The Rite of York had been set up in late
1825 in direct opposition to the dominance of the Scottish Rite in Mexican politics.
The escoceses represented the elites of the new Republic. Their membership was
composed mainly of rich Creoles and Spaniards, and its politics were perceived to be
those of centralism and to some extent, Bourbonism (in favour of a Bourbon monarch
for Mexico). Nicolas Bravo was the Grand Master, a known centralist and a member
of the landed classes. Some of his fellow members had been monarchists and
Bourbonists during Iturbide's time in power. Others, like Melchor Muzquiz, Miguel
16 Jackson (ed.) Texas by Teran, pp. 180-181.
17 Gomez Pedraza, "Manifiesto," p. 232.
18 Jose Maria Tornel y Mendivil, Breve reseiia de los acontecimientos mas notables de la nacion
mexicana (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios de la Revolucion Mexicana, 19R5), p. 312.
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Barragan and Jose Antonio Facio, were high-ranking army officers, and had been
closely associated with the former colony. The escoceses had played a leading role in
the overthrow of Iturbide, and through strong representation on the Supreme
Executive Power (through Bravo and Pedro Celestino Negrete) had controlled central
government between 1823 and 1824. During this time, as we saw in the previous
chapter, their centralist tendencies had clashed violently with the emerging federalism
of the states. The Rite of York, in contrast, seemed to emerge as the home of all those
opposed to the escoceses and their dominance. The federalists, led by such men as
Miguel Ramos Arizpe and Lorenzo de Zavala, played an important part in the
establishment of the rite; while their erstwhile allies of the previous year, the
iturbidistas, also became mernbers.i" The leading lights of the rite were undoubtedly
members of the same elite as those of the escoceses, but the general composition of
the yorkinos was more varied. Zavala described the membership as being formed by
'rnuchos eclesiasticos seculares y regulares, [...] gobernadores, diputados y senadores,
ciudadanos, en fin de todos oficios y condiciones. ,20 The British Minister, Henry
George Ward, for his part, classed these citizens as mostly 'halfway subalterns, petty
advocates [and] clerks.' His successor, Richard Packenham, noted that the yorkinos
were rife in the army, Almost every regiment had a lodge, and the majority of non-
commissioned officers were yorkinos/" What these members had in common was the
desire to use their alliance with the rite to further their career prospects. After all,
influential men such as President Victoria's secretary: Jose Maria Tornel, Minister of
Justice: Ramos Arizpe and Minister of Finance: Jose Ignacio Esteva, made up the
19 Lucas Alaman, Historia de Mexico desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon su
independencia en el aiio de 1808 hasta la epoca presente (Mexico City: Libros del Bachiller Sanson
Carrasco, 1986), vol. 5. p. 474. Old iturbidistas who joined the yorkinos were: Anastasio Bustamante.
Zenon Fernandez, Joaquin Parres and Juan Andrade. See Lorenzo de Zavala. Ensayo historico de las
revoluciones de Mexico (Mexico City: Oficina Impresora de Hacienda. 1918). vol. 1, p. 261.
20 Zavala, Ensayo historico . vol. 1, p. 261.
21 Ward to Canning, 22 October 1826. Packenham to Vaughan. l3 January 1829. Both quoted in
Stanley C. Green, The Mexican Republic: The First Decade. 1823-1832 (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1987), p. 90.
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leadership of the order.22 As Zavala recalled, in the banquets and other meetings, 'se
confundian y mezclaban indistintamente todas clases de ciudadanos.' allowing 'los
pretendientes de empleos un facil acceso a los que los distribuian. ,23 The hunger for
power and position prevalent amongst its members made the only discernible policy of
the yorkinos the drive to replace the escoces dominance in government with their
own. Various members, such as Zavala and Jose Maria Alpuche, may have held radical
views, and been in favour of the redistribution of church property and other such
policies.t" But, as Michael Costeloe pointed out, the wide-ranging membership of the
yorkinos made it impossible for the rite to support any constant social or economic
1·· 25po teres.
Therefore, Bustamante would have felt inclined towards the yorkinos for a
number of reasons. In common with other supporters of Iturbide, he probably wished
to be involved in the opposition to the Scottish Rite. Leading members of the
escoceses, such as Nicolas Bravo and Pedro Celestino Negrete, had led the rebellion
against Iturbide m 1823; organised the legislation that led to the ex-emperor's
execution; and in 1824 had organised Bustamante's arrest and five-month
imprisonment in Acapulco. Secondly, as we saw in the previous chapter, the General's
activities in Guadalajara had already brought him into contact, even alliance, with
many of the federalist activists who now belonged to the rite. He may even have been
a convinced federalist himself. Either way, it is likely he had many friends and contacts
in the new lodge. Finally, as we have seen above, in 1825 the General did not appear
to be hugely popular in government circles. He may have thought that an alliance with
the yorkinos. whose Grand Master was Jose Ignacio Esteva, could help to improve his
22 Michael P. Costeloe, La primera republica federal de Mexico (1824-1835). Un estudio de los
partidos politicos en el Mexico independiente (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1975), p.
SR.
~, Zavala, Ensayo historico, vol. 1, p. 261.
24 For a discussion of the opinions of Zavala at this time, see Will Fowler, Mexico in (he Age oj
Proposals. 1821-1853 (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 199R), pp. 171-1 R9.
25 Costeloe, La primera republica federal. p. SR.
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standing in the capital. In no way did his membership of the rite imply that he shared
the radical opinions of other masons. The yorkinos in 1825 and 1826 were an
umbrella organisation for opponents of the escoceses. The faction was entirely lacking
in political hegemony, a fact obvious later once the escoccses were routed. Without a
common enemy the yorkinos disintegrated into a multitude of various mutually hostile
factions.26 Above all, it must be remembered that Bustamante passed the years
between 1827 and 1829 outside the capital. He can never have been closely involved
in the leadership of the rite in Mexico City, nor with the activities of the yorkinos in
the main political sphere.
c: The Presidential Elections of 1828
To understand why General Bustamante was chosen as the second yorkino
candidate in the 1828 Presidential elections, it is first necessary to appreciate the
political climate in which they took place. When Bustamante joined the yorkinos, the
lodge's declared aim was to destroy the dominance of power enjoyed by the escoceses
in public offices. By 1828, this objective had been achieved. Their candidates had won
a sweeping majority in the 1826 congressional elections.27 Remaining escoceses had
been successfully discredited by a newspaper campaign led by the two yorkino
newspapers, El Aguila Mexicana and El Correo de la Federacion Mexicana, which
had been successful in portraying their opposition to the expulsion of the Spaniards, as
proof of their wish to impose a despotic Bourbon monarchy upon Mexico_2s Finally,
the last bastion of escoces power in the executive had been neutralised with the arrest
of Nicolas Bravo in January 1828, after his involvement in the Plan of Montano. This
rebellion of leading escoceses and novenarios, a splinter group of the Scottish Rite,
26 Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals, p. 49.
27 Costeloe, La primera republica federal, p. 81.
28 Fowler, Mexico in the Age ofProposals, p. 51.
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called for the abolition of secret societies, the renovation of the cabinet and the
expulsion of the U.S. minister, Joel R. Poinsett, from Mexico. It was unfortunately
timed immediately to follow the passing of the Spanish expulsion laws in Congress. In
the eyes of the pro-yorkino newspapers and the public at large, it clearly demonstrated
the Bourbonism of the escoceses. The suppression of this uprising, and the
prosecution of Bravo and his fellow conspirators, marked the complete destruction of
the Scottish Rite as a political force.29
The Rite of York now enjoyed almost absolute power in politics and public
life. Its members held all key positions and controlled power in central government
and the states. Yet the price for this success was high. The relentless persecution of
individual escoceses within the pro-yorkino press had alienated a large number of
members from the rite. Many felt that the aggressive tactics employed by the yorkinos
undermined the stability of the government, and had pushed their enemies to resort to
armed rebellion to oppose them. They feared that other revolutions could only result if
these persecutions continued. Others were unhappy with the populist policies, such as
the Spanish expulsion laws, pursued by the yorkinos in government. The yorkinos
began to be associated with the radicalism of leaders such as Zavala and its
heterogeneous appeal began to fade. The split developing within the rite became
evident in the congressional debates over the punishment that should be meted out
upon the rebels of Tulancingo in April. Here, two directly opposing positions
emerged. The first, proposed by the radicals, called for the execution of Bravo and his
colleagues. The second, championed by Tomei and other more moderate yorkinos,
proposed an amnesty for all those convicted. The execution of the rebels was a step
too far in the persecution of the escoceses in TomeI's eyes. It merely stirred up more
hatred and animosity and would only invite the remaining escoceses to organise
29 tu«. pp. 50-51.
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another rebellion.3D The debate finally agreed on a compromise: the exile of those
involved, but did not reconcile TomeI with the rest of the faction. Bitter in-fighting
would develop over the coming months, played out in public in the capital's
newspapers and pamphlets. TomeI had Zavala's friend, Lissautte, expelled from
Mexico for writing strong attacks on the Church and the Minister of Justice, Ramos
Arizpe. He also suspended a yorkino, Luis Lozano, from his position on the secretariat
of the Federal District. Zavala and his colleagues responded with a summer-long
campaign of publications against TomeI, accusing him of betraying the yorkinos; of
introducing tyrannical and corrupt rule in the Federal District; and of creating his own
private army in the shape of a local militia to aid his despotic designs. Finally, by
exploiting the potential for criticism inherent in TomeI's decision to allow the theatres
to remain open during a religious festival, they succeeded in ensuring TomeI's
. 31suspension as governor.
Meanwhile, other yorkinos had decided to leave the rite altogether. Many of
these men, such as Ramos Arizpe, formed a new group with former members of the
escoceses, and politicians such as Valentin Gomez Farias and Francisco Garcia, who
had not joined either rite. This group called themselves los imparciales, and argued for
the abolition of secret societies in politics. They argued that political parties were
necessarily divisive, and led to violence and governmental instability.32 The yorkinos
responded by conspiring against Ramos Arizpe and ensuring he was replaced as
Minister of Justice. Its newspapers led the attack, launching bitter personal attacks
upon Arizpe and claiming that the imparciales were merely the new disguise of the
escoceses, not a separate group as they claimed.33 In this way, 1828 saw the Rite of
York disintegrate into bitter divisions. In one comer existed the radicals who had
10 Will Fowler. Tornel and Santa Anna. The Writer and the Caudillo. Mexico /795-1853 (Westport,
Connecticut and London: Westport Press. 2000). pp. 82-83.
] I Ibid .. pp. 84-90.
]1 Costeloe, La primera republica federal. pp. 157-159.
]1 Ibid.. pp. 160-163.
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proposed the execution of the rebels of Tulancingo, and who supported Zavala's
radical policies of anti-clericalism and land reform. In another was a more moderate
group, who appeared to want the rite to abandon its aggressive extremism and
opposed the execution of Bravo and his fellow conspirators. Openly opposed to both
factions were the imparciales, who now proposed the abolition of secret societies and
called for the elimination of the influence of Masonic Rites in government.
In this poisonous atmosphere the nominations for the Presidential elections
took place. The yorkinos originally proposed only the popular hero, Vicente Guerrero,
as candidate, confident that their dominant position would ensure a complete victory.
However, their campaign soon ran into trouble. Guerrero was a former insurgent and
a mixed-race Mexican of poor education, and while undoubtedly extremely popular
with the masses, was regarded by many of the elite with distrust. This was partly
because many feared that Guerrero, who was generally regarded as being quite naive,
would become the puppet of the more intellectual Alpuche and Zavala, and be pushed
into forming a radical administration that would be damaging to their power and
positions.f" Zavala had already demonstrated his radicalism as Governor of Mexico. In
March 1827 he expropriated the Church properties of the missionaries in the
Philippines and distributed it among local families. In 1828 he introduced a tax upon
absentee landlords, with which he aimed to buy land for immediate distribution to the
poor.35 However, the elites' dislike of Guerrero was also partly to do with his colour,
lack of education and low social position. As Zavala later observed:
Los generales con las excepciones que veremos; los coroneles, los
eclesiasticos mas notables, los grandes propietarios, todos los rcstos del
partido vencido en Tulancingo; por ultimo, las personas que con
pretensiones de cultura y de civilizaci6n abominaban la presidcncia de
un hombre que ni era blanco, ni podia alternar en los circulos de la bella
sociedad con el desembarazo y naturalidad que dan la educaci6n y cl
34 Ibid., pp. 168-169.
35 Fowler, Mexico in the Age ofProposals. pp.181-183.
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habito; las senoras de una cierta clase, que no podian tolerar ni ver, sin
despecho y envidia, ocupar un lugar distinguido entre ellos a una
familia de color mas oscuro, todo en fin, todo el resto de las antiguas
preocupaciones y repugnacias por una clases de gentes oprimida y
despreciada, junta a que el candidato no podia suplir las faltas que se le
notaban con la elevacion el genio, la energia de caracter ni alguna de
esas cualidades brillantes que cubren los defectos, formo contra la
eleccion de Guerrero un partido formidable entre la nueva aristocracia
. 36mexicana.
In other words, Guerrero's candidacy presented the yorkinos as the taction of the
masses, or worse still, the disaffected former insurgents. His success threatened to
bring attacks upon elite privileges and power, to attack the Church and destroy the
political status quo. He was not a candidate that the landed-classes, many members of
the upper clergy or the high-ranking officer class, were prepared to support.
Consequently, Guerrero was certainly not a candidate who could be trusted to unite
the yorkinos under one banner once more. He was obviously the choice of the radical
faction of the rite, and many members were reluctant to tolerate his selection.
In contrast, the man running in opposition to Guerrero, Manuel Gomez
Pedraza, offered all that Guerrero could not. He was a member of the oligarchy: a
land-owning Creole, with a wealthy background and privileged education. He had
fought on the Royalist side during the insurgency and had been a friend and supporter
of Iturbide. He presented no threat to elite privileges or social stability. He had a
strong reputation in government after four years as Minister of War, he held a position
of authority over the army, and most importantly had never joined either Masonic sect.
For those weary with the bitter fighting between yorkinos and escoceses, he appeared
to be a neutral candidate.V Gomez Pedraza, therefore, could count on wide-ranging
support. In the context of the continuing political in-fighting, his candidacy was
assured the backing of the yorkinos' enemies: the remnants of the defeated escoceses
.l() Zavala. Ensayo historico, vol. 2. p. 52 .
.17 Costeloe, La primera republica federal. p. 170.
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and the imparciales. He also attracted those dissatisfied with the nomination of
Guerrero from the yorkino faction. Finally, he also offered a palatable alternative to
General Guerrero for the rich elites. With this weight of support, he was evidently
going to be a dangerous and powerful opponent.
In the light of Gomez Pedraza's nomination, the leaders of the Rite of York
embarked upon the search for a candidate for Vice-President. The names of Lorenzo
de Zavala and Jose Ignacio Esteva were brought forward, and both would eventually
stand for election. However, the candidate who finally won the support of General
Guerrero and other senior members was Anastasio Bustamante. Jose Maria Tornel,
who first suggested this choice, explained their decision thus:
El gobemador TomeI, quien concurria como orador, deseoso de avenir
a los disidentes y de buscar una solucion a las dificultades que se
amontonaban, propuso que se eligiera a un tercero, y este fue el general
de division D. Anastasio Bustamante. Una gran mayoria de los cofrades
se decidio por este pensamiento improvisado, y no le falto razon.
Bustamante era en el pais una notabilidad, por haber sido del numero
de los mas importantes cooperadores del Sr. Iturbide en la empresa de
independencia, por su victoria en Juchitepec, por haber proclamado la
federacion en Jalisco, y por haberse mantenido leal en la desgracia al
caudillo de Iguala. Entre los yorkinos gozaba de priviligiada
reputacion, porque habia propagado su secta en todos los Estados de
su mando militar, con sorprendente ardor, que habia convertido en una
especie de deber religioso. Unidos al mando Guerrero y Bustamante,
se enlazaban los intereses de los hombres de las dos revoluciones, v se
evitaba un choquefuturo, para el cual nofaltaban provocaciones/"
TomeI's suggestion was partly a response to the alarming divisions that had emerged
amongst the Rite of York. It was a clear attempt to win back the support of those
yorkinos who felt alienated by the radical, populist overtones of Guerrero's campaign.
As shown by the above quotation, he believed that General Bustamante represented
the Creole oligarchy, the elites who had fought with the Spanish against the threat of
38 Tornel, Breve reseiia, p. 312. My italics.
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social dissolution threatened by the insurgency. His candidacy should therefore have
the effect of watering down the threat of radicalism perceived in Guerrero. In a wider
context, the choice of Bustamante, must have also been designed to undermine the rest
of the coalition supporting Gomez Pedraza's campaign. Obviously, the votes of the
former escoceses were far beyond reach, but the support of those who had no Masonic
sympathies was not. It can be no coincidence that the yorkinos chose a character so
similar to Gomez Pedraza as a candidate. A man who united almost exactly the same
qualities of birth, education and position. A man who had played no part in the
political squabbles and machinations of the previous years and was untainted by
adverse press campaigns. The aim must surely have been to use Bustamante to attract
votes away from Gomez Pedraza, and to hope, rather as modern political parties do,
that this vote for a third candidate would undermine the possible majority of their
opponent. Finally, as can be ascertained from the final sentence of the above
quotation, Tornel could see that a violent confrontation between the radicals and their
popular support, and the traditionalists and their Creole elite sympathisers, was clearly
on the cards. As we saw above, he believed that the rebellion in Tulancingo was a
prelude for things to come if the radicals did not moderate their demands and policies.
Thus, he hoped that the presence of Bustamante in the executive would provide the
necessary moderating influence and prevent this clash from ever having to take place.
Why Bustamante accepted the nomination is not so easy to pinpoint, as very
little evidence exists on the subject. His motivations, and even his candidacy, are of
little importance to those contemporaries who write about the period. However,
looking at his life to date, we know that the General must have had some political
ambition. He had served Iturbide on the Junta Provisional Gubernativa in 1821 and
1822, and had been elected to the State Congress of Jalisco in 1823. After his
imprisonment in 1824 he had not been prepared to disappear quietly from the scene on
his release. Instead he had gone to Mexico City and immediately become involved in
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the new political force in the capital, the yorkinos. Moreover, our study of his military
career has shown us that the General also had personal ambitions. He had been
educated in the ways of command and control in the previous eighteen years, and it is
not inconceivable that he might have wished to practice this skill at the highest level.
From available evidence, we can also speculate that Bustamante shared the view of
TomeI and other more moderate yorkinos that the rite's political campaign was
becoming too extreme. It is likely that he supported the anti-Spanish campaigns, as he
had been one of the first to express opposition to the employment of Peninsulars in
Guadalajara. He probably had no quarrel with the persecution of the escoceses either,
as he himself had been attacked by this rite in previous years. But whether he would
have supported the execution of Bravo and his fellow conspirators, who included old
friends such as Miguel Barragan, is unknown, but unlikely. His experiences of the
insurgency had taught him class solidarity, and although his regime would later go on
to execute Vicente Guerrero, Bustamante himself, as we shall see, proved to be an
opponent of such revenge punishments. He was also an extremely unlikely supporter
of Zavala's radical politics. After all, he had spent ten years fighting to preserve the
oligarchy of the elites from the onslaught of the insurgents. These years had instead
taught him to despise the masses, and he can only have regarded Zavala's call for their
participation in politics with a wary eye. All in all, he may have considered himself in
the same light as Tomei did: a moderate figure, who could calm the impending storm,
and prevent scenes like those in Tulancingo from being repeated. However, all this can
never be more than speculation. Bustamante had remained in the Eastern Provinces
throughout 1827 and 1828 and it is impossible to tell how well-informed he was on
the subject of political intrigue in Mexico City. It is quite possible that personal
political ambition was sufficient to motivate him to stand for the Vice-Presidency.
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D: The Reluctant Vice-President (1829)
Unfortunately, events did not go according to plan for the yorkinos. In the
elections of September 1828, Bustamante gained six votes (Sonora, Coahuila, Nuevo
Leon, Chihuahua and San Luis Potosi); his running partner, Vicente Guerrero,
received nine; and their rival Gomez Pedraza emerged the victor with eleven/" This
result was unacceptable to many radical yorkinos, and they quickly took matters into
their own hands. The rebellion against Gomez Pedraza's election began as a
pronunciarniento declared by Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna in Perote later in
September. He did not enjoy immediate success and was forced to retreat to Oaxaca.
However, some weeks later, on 30 November, matters came to a head when Zavala
and General Jose Maria Lobato revolted in the capital barracks of La Acordada in
favour of Santa Anna's plan, and began firing on the National Palace. Three days of
gunfire followed; until on 3 December, Gomez Pedraza tled Mexico City tor
Guadalajara. Here, on 27 December, he announced he would make no claims on the
Presidency, and in the New Year departed Mexico for voluntary exile in Europe. Upon
hearing of Gomez Pedraza's flight, a mob of beggars, escaped prisoners, soldiers and
other members of the capital's underclass, sacked the Parian, a market just outside the
National Palace and the cathedral, in support of the rebels. In this state of affairs,
President Victoria had no choice but to accede to the rebels' demands and accept the
inevitable. So, when Congress was reconvened in January 1829, the votes for Gomez
Pedraza were declared invalid, and Guerrero named as the new victor. Bustamante's
six votes made him the candidate in second place, and he became the choice tor Vice-
President.
39 Bocanegra, Memorias para la historia de Mexico, vol. 1, pp. 505-506.
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By his own account, Bustamante was reluctant to take up this nomination. He
later claimed that he tried to tum down the offer, but when his refusal was rebuffed,
found himself obliged to accept the position in 'una ciega deferencia a la voluntad de
los pueblos. ,40 However, since this claim was made in 1832, in a manifesto that
amounts to nothing less than the justification for his rebellion against Guerrero, it must
of course be taken with a pinch of salt. After all, this attempt to avoid the Vice-
Presidency does not appear to be mentioned by anyone else, and his explanation for his
reticence is based upon the doubtful claim that he considered the position to be
'superior a mis luces y merecimientos.' This surely was false modesty. If he really
believed this, why would he have consented to run for election in the first place? Yet it
is not difficult to believe that Bustamante may not have wished to take up office in
1829. He had not approved of Santa Anna's pronunciamiento, and was unlikely to
have given his support to the actions of Zavala and Lobato. He wrote a personal letter
to Gomez Pedraza at the end of October 1828, expressing his disgust at the behaviour
of 'el perverso Santa Anna,' and assuring the Minister of War of his support.I' Their
correspondence continued after Gomez Pedraza left Mexico City, and Bustamante
offered the defeated man 'repetidos testimonios de amistad. ,42 According to Laura
Solares Robles, Bustamante also accompanied Gomez Pedraza to Tampico de
Tamaulipas from where he departed for his exile in March 1829.43 It is hardly likely
that Gomez Pedraza would have consented to this if he felt that Bustamante had
conspired against him.
40 Anastasio Bustamante, Manifiesto del vice-presidente en ejercicio del poder ejecutivo Cl la
magnifica nacion mexicana (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila, dirigida por Jose Ximeno, calle de
Medinas, num. 6, 1832), p. 4. In CONDUMEX.
41 SDN: SC XI/III/I-235/1-31/00196. Bustamante to Gomez Pedraza, Matamoros, 27 October lR28.
Reservado,
42 Pedraza, "Manifiesto," p. 229.
43 Laura Solares Robles, Una revolucion pacifica: Biografia political de Manuel Gomez Pedraza.
1789-1851 (Mexico City: Instituto Moral Acervo Historico Diplomatico de la Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores/Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes del Gobierno del Estado de Queretaro, )996).
p.85.
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Finally, he can only have been shocked and disgusted by news of the Parian
riot, an event he would later describe as 'Ia catastrofe horrorosa y sangrienta' that he
would like to wipe 'de los anales del mundo, y hacer que su memoria no llegara a las
generaciones que nos suceden. ,44 Even in Tamaulipas, he was probably aware of the
rumours that the yorkinos were those who had incited the population to riot, and that
Lorenzo de Zavala, General Lobato and Vicente Guerrero had been leading
participants, urging the populace on in their destructive frenzy. The sight of the lower
classes rampaging through the shops and the stalls of the foreign (mainly Spanish)
traders on 4 December would have almost certainly been recounted to him. As would
the fact that the events in the Parian signalled the beginning of a period of lawlessness
in Mexico City itself in which, according to Francisco Ibar, hombres de bien were
afraid to walk the streets which were ruled by victorious soldiers and rioters. Carlos
Maria de Bustamante also recounts that in the days after the riot looting and violence
continued, and reports that the disorder was so bad that shopkeepers and bakers did
not open their shops, making food scarce.45 The news could have made him fear,
along with much of the capital's elite, that 'estuviese a punto de producirse una
revoluci6n a gran escala 0 de surgir, un ejercito de tipo del de Hidalgo. ,46 The yorkino
press's interpretation of events as a social revolution, and the demonstration of public
opinion in favour of Guerrero, would only have confirmed this impression.V Thus, as
an old Royalist, who had fought the insurgents under the banner of protecting social
order, the General cannot have relished the prospect of entering the executive on the
back of such chaotic circumstances.
44 Anastasio Bustamante. Manifiesto que el vice-presidente dirige a la nacion (Mexico City:
Imprenta a cargo del ciudadano Tomas Uribe y Alcalde. calle de Jesus, nurnero 2. 1830). p. 2. In the
British Library.
45 Silvia Arrom, "Popular Politics in Mexico City: The Parian Riot. 1828," Hispanic American
Historical Review 68:2 (1988), p. 256. This article provides a detailed description of the riot,
contemporary impressions and a discussion of its causes and effects.
46 Costeloe, La primera republica federal. p. 214.
47 Ibid .• p.215.
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Despite any misgivings Anastasio Bustamante might have had, he accepted the
Vice-Presidency without too much fuss. Perhaps he did feel it was his duty to fill the
position Congress allocated to him. Or perhaps he believed, as Tornel had hoped, that
his presence could provide a moderating influence on Guerrero's administration. What
is clear is that the riot at the Parian Market marked the end of his relationship with the
yorkinos. Almost from the very moment of his return to Mexico City, Bustamante
became involved in a faction which was opposed to Guerrero's regime.l" Alaman
states that this group came into existence after the events of La Acordada and the
Parian.49 However, it is clear that its origins were in the coalition of ex-escoceses,
imparciales and the privileged elites that had supported Manuel Gomez Pedraza's
candidacy for President. Costeloe describes the membership of the new taction, which
became to be known as the moderados, or hombres de bien, as 'algunos altos clerigos,
oficiales del ejercito, altos funcionarios del gobierno, antiguos escoceses y otros que
habian apoyado a Gomez Pedraza en las elecciones; en general, toda la c1ase
propietaria y muchas familias con parentesco espafiol, ,50 Their coalition simply
became stronger and more numerous in the wake of Guerrero's assumption of the
Presidency. As Luis G. Cuevas commented, the horror of the events of December
1828 made the various factions forget their differences, and come together in
opposition to Guerrero.I' For these hombres de bien, Guerrero's rise to power upon
the strength of the sacking of the Parian market threatened the very bases of
civilisation. As the yorkino press seemed to confirm, it marked a social revolution in
which the wishes of the majority superseded the desires of the elite. Alaman, who was
without doubt also part of this moderate group, commented that it appeared that the
48 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 5, p. 487.
49 Lucas Alarnan, "Examen imparcial de la administracion del general vice-presidente D. Anastasio
Bustamante. Con observaciones generales sabre el estado presente de la republica y consecuencias
que este debe producir," in Obras de D. Lucas Alaman. Documentos diversos (Ineditos y muy raros)
(Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1946), vol. 3, p. 242.
50 Costeloe, La primera republica federal, p. 233.
51 Luis G. Cuevas, Porvenir de Mexico (Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1954), p. 313.
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yorkinos were influenced by the French revolution and wished to destroy the power
and wealth of the hombres de bien in the name ofliberty and equality:
Desde esta epoca [December 1828] empezaron a efectar llamarse [the
yorkinos] el partido del pueblo, distinguiendose con este nombre de
todos aquellos a quienes dieron cl de aristocratas, voz que en nuestra,
como en la francesa, significa hombres religiosos, de honor, de
propiedad, de educacion y de virtudes, a quienes se trataba de despojar
de sus bienes, de privar de todo influjo en los negocios publicos, y por
ultimo de desterrar y destruir, que es en 10 que consiste segun los
principios de los jacobinos la libertad y la igualdad.52
The administration of Guerrero would do little to calm the fears of these
property-owning elites. Instead, events in 1829 would only convince them that Mexico
was on 'la cima de un horroroso precipicio,' staring down at the imminent ruin of the
Republic.i'' One of the principal causes of this belief was the terrible financial state of
the country, under which neither the military nor the civil servants were being paid.
The treasury suffered from a deficit of over 3, 000, 000 pesos, and the government's
inability to meet foreign debt payments since 1827 meant it could no longer seek
financial support abroad. 54 The Treasury's attempts to resolve these problems and to
prepare for the threatened Spanish invasion did not help the situation, as the series of
taxes introduced on property and business, the forced loan of $ 300, 000 imposed on
the states and the pay-cuts introduced on the wages of governors and military officers
affected the hombres de bien the most. What is more, they also seemed to prove the
radicalism or jacobinismo of the Finance Minister, Lorenzo de Zavala55. Another
52 Lucas Alarnan, "Defensa del ex-ministro de relaciones D. Lucas Alaman, en la causa formada
contra el y contra los ex-ministros de guerra y justicia del vicepresidente D. Anastasio Bustamante,
con unas noticas preliminares que dan idea del origen de esta. Escrita por el mismo ex-rninistro quien
la dirige a la nacion," in Obras de D. Lucas Alaman. Documentos diversos, vol. 3, p. 45.
53 Francisco Ibar, Muerte polltica de la republica mexicana 0 cuadro historico-critico de los sucesos
politicos acaecidos en la republica desde el 4 de diciembre de 1828. hasta el 25 de agosto de 1829
(Mexico City: Imprenta de la calle de Jesus numero 2, a cargo del C. Tomas Uribe y Alcalde, 1829),
No.5, p. 5, (l4 April 1829).
54 Costeloe, La primera republicafederal, pp. 231-2.
55 Ibid., p. 235.
125
The Footsteps to Power
preoccupation was Guerrero's adoption of extraordinary powers in August during the
Spanish attack on Tampico. This was viewed by many as the final stage of the
demagogues' usurpation of power. The restrictions Guerrero placed upon the freedom
of the press and the arrest of his virulent critic Francisco Ibar,56 allowed his enemies to
accuse him of being a dictator, having set himself up as 'un soberano absoluto' and
having 'dado rienda suelta a sus deseos. ,57 Or, as Jose Antonio Facio would later put
it, of using 'el mismo sistema de violencia y corrupcion con que se habia
entronizado. ,58 For those in the military, the state of the troops was worrying:
La administracion de Guerrero habia desbaratado el ejercito, arruinado
la disciplina, perdido todos los cuerpos, 0 por la incapacidad de los
jefes, 0 por la fuerza de ejemplo, el tesoro estaba exhausto; las rentas
empefiadas; los oficiales sin sueldo; los soldados sin camisa, sin
. 59zapatos, sin pan.
Such was the state of the army, that when the Reserve Army was set up, its financial
needs all had to be met by General Bustamante, its commanding officer.60 More
generally, concerns could be also found in the disintegrating unity of the Republic. By
September 1829, the state of Jalisco, independently of the government, was trying to
organise a confederation of states with Michoacan, Guanajuato and San Luis Potosi
allegedly in order to protect their independence if the Spanish invasion was successful,
although some believed it was to protect their sovereignty in case of the fall of
Guerrero's govemment." The subsequent revolt in Yucatan in favour of centralism
appeared to confirm these worries, and as the revolt soon spread to Tabasco, it
56 El Sol. 4 September 1829.
57 Bustamante. Manifiesto que el vice-presidente de la Republica Mexicanu dirige a la nacion, p. ')
5S Jose Antonio Facio. Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio, y sobre la causa
intentada contra los cuatro ministros del excelentisimo senor vice-presidente D. Anastasio
Bustamante, presenta a los mexicanos el general ex-ministro de la guerra y marina, D. Jose Antonio
Facio (Paris: Imprenta de Moqueo y Compafiia, calle de la Harpe, numero 90, 1835), p. 107. In the
British Library.
59 Ibid., p. 121.
eo Ibid., p. 109.
61 Costeloe, La prim era republicafederal, p. 239.
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seemed clear that the Republic was 'amenzada de una combustion general que la
conduzca hast a el punto de perder la unidad nacional. ,62
E: The Plan of Jalapa (1829)
Anastasio Bustamante's association with the moderados quickly led to the
formation of a conspiracy to overthrow Guerrero. The plans for this venture were
centred around the Reserve Army. This Army had been officially set up in response to
the Spanish invasion of Tampico on 27 July, and was intended to establish its
headquarters in Huamantla. From here it was foreseen that the 3, 000 troops allocated
to the Army would be able to move quickly to the defence of any point on the coast of
Veracruz, should it be attacked. According to Facio, this initiative did not come from
the government or the executive, but from a group of army generals. These generals
were apparently not overly concerned about the Spanish threat, but wanted to use the
opportunity which the invasion provided to establish a nucleus of force that could
eventually be deployed against Guerrero:
Esta medida [the formation of the Reserve Army] propuesta entre
otras, [...J tenia por objecto el concentrar un nurnero de fuerzas, que
mas tarde sirviese de apoyo de los estados, pues descontentos con la
opresion, y exasperados con el abuso de las facultades extraordinarias
que concedio el congreso al presidente, ansiaban el momento de
sacudir el yugo, y de que se volviera a la constitucion y a la Republica
el vigor que le habia arrebatado la administracion de Guerrero.63
Facio does not name the Generals who were behind the plans for a Reserve Army, but
we can be fairly certain that Bustamante, who was chosen as the leader of this force,
62 Lucas Alaman, "Memoria de la secretaria de estado y del despacho de relaciones interiores y
exteriores, leida por el secretario del ramo en la Camara de Diputados el dia 12 de febrero de 1830, y
en la de Sen adores el dia 13 del mismo." in Obras de D. Lucas Alamein: Documentos diversos , vol. 2
, p. 182.
63 Facio, Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio, p. 108.
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Melchor Muzquiz, who was the second-in-command, and Facio, who became
Bustamante's secretary, were closely involved. Later events also suggest that Luis
Quintanar and Santa Anna may also have been aware of the circumstances surrounding
the proposal. In terms of the conspiracy that would be organised within the Reserve
Army, there is a general consensus amongst contemporary observers that Jose Antonio
Facio, rather than Bustamante was the likely architect. Lucas Alaman remarks that
Facio had to have been the real leader, as Bustamante 'no era capaz de nada. ,64
Zavala interprets the rebellion as a repeat of events at Tulancingo, and concludes that
Facio, having played a hidden role in the previous revolt, was now 'el principal
director' in Jalapa.65 While we shall never know for certain, it seems much more likely
that the trio of officers who controlled the Reserve Army collaborated to organise the
conspiracy. Facio may have provided the driving force, but the involvement of
Muzquiz and above all, Bustamante, would have been essential. It is also likely that
these officers had allies outside the Reserve Army. Other leading officers, such as
Santa Anna, Miguel Barragan and Nicolas Bravo, were also a visible presence in
Jalapa. Even Luis Quintanar, a long-time friend of Bustamante, who led the coup in
Mexico City which deposed the Guerrero administration before the arrival of the
General in the capital, must have also been involved in some small way in the
organisation.
The defeat of the Spaniards in Tampico, and their withdrawal from Mexican
waters in September, quickly put an end to the fiction that the Reserve Army was
purely a defensive force. Bustamante transferred his headquarters from Huamantla to
Jalapa without consulting with Guerrero, and it was rumoured in the press that a
revolt was being planned.f" Suspicions were directed firstly at Santa Anna, who had
64 Lucas Alaman, "Autobiografia de Lucas Alaman," in Obras de D. Lucas Alamein: Documentos
diversos, vol. 4, p. 251.
65 Zavala, Ensayo historico de las revoluciones de Mexico, vol. 2, p. 173.
66 Facio, Memoria que sabre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio, p. 109.
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abruptly left Tampico in September in the wake of his famous victory, and headed to
Jalapa for a meeting with Bustamante.67 The result of this meeting appears to be a
letter written by Santa Anna to Guerrrero, in which he demanded that the President
entirely replace his cabinet with men of his own choosing. The British Charge
d'Affaires, Richard Packenham, was of the opinion that if Guerrero did not heed the
demands of Santa Anna, 'the military characters assembled in Jalapa' would impose
these reforms by force.68 By November, the rumours spread by the pro-Guerrero
newspapers and pamphlets suggested that Santa Anna and Bustamante did not simply
wish to renew Guerrero's cabinet, but that they were instead plotting to overthrow the
President in order to impose a centralist form of government on the Republic.l'" News
of the arrival of the newly pardoned Nicolas Bravo and Miguel Barragan in Jalapa on
I November only added fuel to these suspicions.J'' Santa Anna and Bustamante
published a joint denial of any intentions to lead a revolt to change the form of
government, but it was clear that no one really believed them.7l This is hardly
surprising, for as Facio readily admits, preparations for rebellion were already
underway by this time. Contacts had been made in various states and plans laid.72 In
recognition of the threat the Reserve Army posed to his government, Guerrero tried
on more than one occasion to have the force disbanded. Finally, at the end of
November, he sent a cavalry force to Jalapa, and later issued its commander with
instructions to dissolve the Annyand hand over the control of the fortress of Perote to
General Vicente Filisola. These instructions were never fulfilled because the
67 Richard Packenham to the Earl of Aberdeen. 30 September 1829. Foreign Office Papers in the
Public Record Office (henceforth referred to as FO) no. 50/55. p. 203.
68 Packenham to Aberdeen. 30 October 1829. FO no. 50/55. p. 287.
69 Zavala. Ensayo historico de las revoluciones de Mexico. vol. 2. p. 166. El Sol, 10 November 1829
includes a letter signed by Los Olfatistas, which details and refutes the rumours about Santa Anna
and Bustamante.
70 El Sol. 10 November 1829.
71 Anastasio Bustamante and Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. "Los Generales que subscriben a sus
conciudadanos," in Lorenzo de Zavala. Obras de Lorenzo de Zavala (Mexico City: Pornia, 1969). pp.
599-600. The manifesto is dated 31 October 1829 in Jalapa.
ti Facio, Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio, p. 110.
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conspirators, having been informed of the plans of the government, decided to initiate
their rebellion beforehand. Thus, on 4 December 1829, on the anniversary of the
Parian riot, the troops of the Reserve Army proclaimed the Plan of Jalapa and called
upon Generals Santa Anna and Bustamante to take control of their revolt73
According to Luis G. Cuevas, General Bustamante had initially been extremely
unwilling to conspire against Guerrero. He feared that the Plan of Jalapa would
'manchar su nombre y dar mal ejemplo a la fuerza armada.' 74 Facio notes that, on the
day, the General 'no queria dar el grito' and instead vacated the garrison, leaving his
second, Muzquiz, to proclaim it in his absence.75 It is obvious that he had some moral
qualms about turning against Guerrero: 'el rnismo que 10 habia honrado con su
confianza.Y" Yet in the end he was able to set these aside and accept the leadership of
the rebellion. Jose Maria Luis Mora believed that Bustamante was driven by an
overwhelming ambition for power:
Bustamante, se decian, es hombre de honor, y si bien puede cambiar de
partido y separarse de sus arnigos para aliarse con los que hasta aqui
han sido sus contrarios, no elegira dar este paso que solo justifica la
conviccion, una circunstancia, en la que no podria dar ser explicado tal
cambio, sino por el deseo de la posesion del poder.77
D Ibid., pp. 110-111. Facio writes that Lorenzo de Zavala, who was on his way to Veracruz and
ultimately Yucatan, where he was to negotiate with the rebels in Merida, was the courier of the secret
instructions handed to the commander in Jalapa. The conspirators were made suspicious of his
conduct and resolved to investigate. One of their number took Zavala out for a meal, and persuaded
him to divulge the purpose of his sojourn in Jalapa. The implication is clearly that Zavala was plied
with alcohol to loosen his tongue.
74 Cuevas, Porvenir de Mexico, p. 336.
75 Facio, Memoria que sabre los sucesos de/ tiempo de SII ministerio, pp. 110-111, and Enrique
Olavarria y Ferrari, "Mexico independiente, 1821-1855," in Vicente Riva Palacio (ed.), Mexico
atraves de los siglos (Mexico City: Ballesca y Compafiia, 1888-1889), vol. 4, p. 219.
76 Cuevas, Porvenir de Mexico, p. 336.
77 Jose Maria Luis Mora, "Revista politica de las diversas administraciones que la republica mexicana
ha ten ida hasta 1837," in Lilian Briseno Senosiain. Laura Solares Robles and Laura Suarez de la
Torre, Obras Completas: Jose Maria Luis Mora (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Consejo Nacional para
la CuItura y los Artes, 1986), p. 303.
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While Mora may be right to some extent, what this chapter aims to show is that
Bustamante's decision to lead a revolt against his former Masonic brothers was
motivated by much more than this. The call in the Plan of Jalapa for the re-
establishment of the rule of constitutional order was made precisely because the
conspirators, including Bustamante, felt that Guerrero's administration had been
responsible for the loss of this order in the eight months it had been in government. As
we saw above, to many of the privileged elite, the hombres de bien ,the landed classes,
the upper clergy and the high-ranking army officers, the rebellion of La Acordada and
the assumption of Guerrero to the Presidency, had been nothing less than a social
revolution that now threatened to engulf Mexico. Bustamante believed that 'la
conservacion del orden publico y el orden de las autoridades que gobiernan con
arreglo a la ley son los mas sagrados deberes del ciudadano militar.' 7H In his eyes, and
in the opinion of many who supported him, since the army was the guardian of the
Republic's order and stability and it had to act ifit felt these were under threat:
Por cuanto la sociedad esta proximo a disolverse, expuesta a que la
despedece la anarquia, para venir en ultimo result ado a ser presa por un
despota cualquiera, los militares que no pueden permanecer insensibles
a la suerte de sus semejantes y de la patria y que ven el origen de los
males que han producido, el descontento en la inobservancia de las
leyes, en los abusos de la administracion y en la desconfianza publica
que justamente han merecido algunos agentes del poder, se creen
constituidos en la sagrada obligacion de contribuir por su parte que se
ponga en practica los medios de salvacion y proteger y dar impluso a la
opinion general que ha manifestado de un modo muy preciso el origen
de los males y la naturaleza del remedio.i"
78 Anastasio Bustamante to Felipe Andrade, Guadalajara, 6 April 1R24., in Congress of Jalisco,
Manifiesto del Congreso Constituyente de Jalisco Cl sus habitantes (Guadalajara: Imprenta de; C.
Urbano San Roman, 1824), p. 6. In the British Library.
79 "The Plan of Jalapa." In Berta Ulloa and Joel Hernandez Santiago (eds.), Planes en la Nacion
Mexicana (Mexico City: Senado de la Republica/El Colegio de Mexico, 19R7.), vol. I, p. 227. My
italics.
131
The Footsteps to Power
Thus it was his duty to lead the crusade which would 'restaurar el orden y borrar las
impresiones siniestras que habia causado el4 de diciembre de 1828. .xn As TomeI, who
met him in Jalapa after the proclamation of the plan, recorded, it was clear that
Bustamante believed himself to have been called 'para dirigir la maquina abandonada
del estado.'81 The General, therefore, most likely concluded that the honour of his
mission justified the dishonour of his actions, and resolved to accept the leadership of
the rebellion. In contrast, Santa Anna, who found himself in the same dilemma, came
to a different conclusion, and resolved to remain loyal to Guerrero.
The quick success of the Plan of Jalapa demonstrated that the conspirators had
laid their plans well. Before the end of December the garrisons in Queretaro, Puebla,
San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato, Oaxaca and Tlaxcala had adhered to the plan.82 On 23
December, after Guerrero had departed to face the rebels, a small coup was quietly
effected in Mexico City by Luis Quintanar, Lucas Alaman and the Governor of the
Federal District, Jose Ignacio Esteva. They captured the National Palace and forced
the interim President, Jose Maria Bocanegra, to step down. A provisional government,
headed by Alaman and Quintanar, was set up in his stead. The next day, possible
opponents to the new order, such as Lorenzo de Zavala and Manuel Crecencio Rejon,
were arrested and imprisoned.Y The revolution was now as good as over, and
Guerrero on hearing the news, decided to abandon the struggle. He fled in the
company of a select band of supporters for his home in the Tierra Caliente.
Meanwhile, Santa Anna, who had marched from Veracruz to confront Bustamante,
found himself quickly deserted in Perote. He had no choice but to return home. So, in
this way, the march of Bustamante's Reserve Army upon Mexico City met with no
sn Cuevas. Porvenir de Mexico. p. 336.
81 Jose Maria Tornel, Manifiesto del C. Jose Maria Tomei, 1833 (Mexico City: n.p .. 1R33). p. 6.
M2 El Sol, 15.22.24.26,29 December 1829.
83 El Sol. 24 December 1829.
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resistance. He entered the capital on 31 December and immediately took up the reins
of government.
E: Bustamante and the yorkinos (1825-1829): An Overview
The yorkinos that Anastasio Bustamante joined in 1826 were not the same
faction which came to power after the rebellion of La Acordada. In 1826, Bustamante
joined a coalition of men opposed to the political hegemony of the Scottish Rite of
Masons. The aim of this coalition was to depose the escocescs from their positions of
power and replace them with their own members. Bustamante's natural opposition to
the Scottish Rite, his federalism, and his political ambition made the yorkinos an
obvious faction to support. However, during the years Bustamante spent in the
Eastern Provinces, the demands of the yorkinos began to radicalise. The rite became
obsessed with the complete destruction of its enemies. This radicalisation alienated
many of the yorkino membership, including Bustamante, and caused a schism to
develop during the Presidential elections of 1828. The radical yorkinos now became
associated with the candidacy of Vicente Guerrero; with the Governor of the State of
Mexico, Lorenzo de Zavala; and with Zavala's anti-clerical and land reform policies.
Many of the more moderates left the rite altogether to join the anti-Masonic
imparciales, or simply to support the alternative Presidential candidate, Manuel
Gomez Pedraza. In an attempt to heal the breach that was emerging, Jose Maria
TomeI persuaded the yorkino leadership to accept Anastasio Bustamante as their
candidate for Vice-President. Bustamante was perceived to be a more moderate
yorkino. A former Royalist soldier and supporter of Iturbide, he was considered to be
no threat to the privileged classes. What Bustamante thought about his nomination is
not clear. He remained in the Eastern Provinces for the duration of the Presidential
campaign and elections, and we do not know how well informed he was of news from
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the capital. However, we do know that his support of the yorkino cause did not extend
to adhering to Santa Anna's rebellion, which suggests that he sympathised more with
the moderate side of the faction than the radical one.
Yet Bustamante consented to become Vice-President on the strength of this
rebellion, and upon its riotous aftermath in the Parian Market. He asserts that he
reluctantly undertook the position out of a sense of duty, and although we cannot rule
out the possibility that this explanation was concocted later to soothe a guilty
conscience, his later actions lend some credibility to his claims. For, almost
immediately upon his return to the capital, Bustamante began to distance himself from
the yorkinos, who were now indelibly connected in his mind and the public imagination
with the radicalism of Zavala and the terrible scenes of the sacking of the Parian, He
joined a group, later named the moderados or hombres de bien, made up of ex-
escoceses, imparciales, leading clergymen and army officers and property owners.
Consequently he became involved in the establishment of the Reserve Army, in which
the Plan of Jalapa was designed, and plans laid for a rebellion against Guerrero.
Bustamante's decision to tum against his old allies, the yorkinos, and to conspire with
those who had been his enemies, most conspicuously Nicolas Bravo, has been
interpreted as a demonstration of his overwhelming ambition for power. However, it
seems more likely that Bustamante was driven by a desire to rescue the Republic from
the chaos which he perceived it to be in. As an old Royalist, he may have seen his
situation to be similar to that which it was in 1810. In 1829, as then, the very fabric of
social stability was under threat. In 1829, again as in 1810, it was the duty of the
military to protect this social order and maintain the status quo. The Plan of Jalapa
with its call for the return to the rule of law and the constitution, intended that the
Reserve Army would do just that.
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Chapter Four: The First Administration (1830-1832)
Before proceeding with any study of the years 1830-1832, it is important that
we understand the aims and ambitions of the government brought to office through the
Plan of Jalapa. According to the Plan itself there was only one intention: the drive to
see the re-establishment in the Republic of 'el orden constitutucional con la exact a
observancia de las leyes fundament ales. ,1 The rallying cry of the Reserve Army,
'Constitucion y leyes,' neatly reinforced the message. However, it is not clear from the
Plan what exactly is meant by constitutional order or exact obedience to the law. For,
on the one hand it proclaims 'la mas ciega obediencia a los supremos poderes' and
pledges its continuing support for the federal pact and respect for the sovereignty of
the states? While on the other, it calls for the removal of'todos aquellos funcionarios
contra quienes se ha explicado la opinion general. ,3 Clearly this is not something that
could be sanctioned by the provisions of the Constitution of 1824, nor does it
demonstrate any respect for the supreme powers in operation at that time. In fact, it
could be argued that the very act of revolt expressly contravened the declared purpose
of the rebels. The manifesto published by General Anastasio Bustamante upon taking
up office as acting Head of State in January 1830, does not help to clear the confusion.
In this manifesto he condemns the government of Vicente Guerrero as
unconstitutional. He points out that his predecessor came to power through the
scandalous events of La Acordada, rather than through the September elections.
However, tellingly he declares that 'el ejercito de reserva nunca intentara reponer
acontecimientos de aquel orden, ni retroceder hasta los sucesos de aquella fecha.,4 In
I "The Plan of Jalapa", article two in El Telegrafo Potosiense, 22 December 1829.
2 Ibid., articles one and five.
3 Ibid., article four.
4 Anastasio Bustamante, Manifesto que el vice-presidente de la republica mexicana dirige a la
nacion (Mexico City: Imprenta a cargo del ciudadano Tomas Uribe y Alcalde, calle de Jesus, numero
2, 1830), p. 2. The pamphlet is dated 4 January 1830 and can be found in the British Library.
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other words, although Bustamante's revolt was expressly organised to restore the rule
of the constitution, he was not prepared to allow the results of the 1828 election to
stand and call for the return of the constitutionally elected president: Manuel Gomez
Pedraza.
In fact, the rebels' call for the re-introduction of constitutional order and
respect for the law can only be understood if we remember the make-up of the
coalition that supported the Plan and ensured that it became a success. As we noted in
the previous chapter, opposition to Vicente Guerrero and his government was rife
amongst the privileged classes of society: the property owners, the senior clergy and
military officers and the more important civil servants. The Plan was devised by a
group of military generals, led by Anastasio Bustamante, Jose Antonio Facio and
Melchor Muzquiz, and was brought to power in Mexico City through the combined
efforts of Luis Quintanar and Lucas Alaman, These men feared that Guerrero's
government was that of the sancullotes and jacobinos, who wished to usurp the
power of the hombres de bien and destroy their wealth. They were horrified by the
disintegrating state of the Republic: the political infighting, the prevalence of
pronunciamientos and rebellions, the financial insolvency and the terrible state of the
army. In their minds, the principal cause of this chaos was the influence of the secret
societies in politics. As the Registro Oficial, the official newspaper of the Bustamante
regime, declared on 25 March 1830:
El origen de nuestros males es este funesto espiritu de partido, esta
obstinacion, este deseo de venganza que apoya 10 que reprueba el buen
juicio, 10 que es detestable en todo orden social y 10 que no puede
conciliarse ni con la moral publica ni con la moral privada. Sostener las
facciones directa 0 indirectamente es declarar la guerra a la nacion, cs
apresurar la epoca de su aniquilamiento.i
5 El Registro Oficial, 25 March 1830.
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They believed that the intrigues and rivalries of the Masonic rites had created an
unruly political climate, which had allowed groups of unscrupulous men, like the
radical yorkinos, to seize power. The coalition that supported the Plan of Jalapa
claimed that their movement represented the general will. Their ascension to
government seemed to herald, in the words of Alaman, 'el momento de ver extinguir
los partidos. ,6 As far as they were concerned, a return to constitutional order meant
the creation of a government which could operate without the pernicious influence of
these societies and, in which 'los principios administrativos del ejecutivo, no estan a la
merced de las pasiones 0 de caprichos versatiles. ,7 In order tor this to be achieved the
administration promised that the destruction of the societies would be 'un objecto
primario' of its government. 8 In practice, of course, this really meant allowing the new
order to persecute its yorkino opponents merely for their membership of the rite. After
all, the Rite of York was the only visible secret society left in Mexico by 1829.
The government brought to power by the Plan of Jalapa aimed not only to
solve the cause of Mexico's chaos, but also to bring order to the chaos itself They
believed that if a strong, stable government were to be established, peace and
prosperity would naturally follow. Bustamante's administration employed three main
strategies to realise this. The first was to protect and strengthen the position of the
two main institutional allies of the Plan of Jalapa: the Church and the army. The
second was the drive to strengthen the position of the executive in relation to the
Federal Congress. The terms of the Federal Constitution, as Lucas Alaman observed,
(, Lucas Alaman, "Defensa del ex-ministro de relaciones D. Lucas Alaman en la causa formada contra
el y contra los ex ministros de guerra y justicia del vicepresidente D. Anastasio Bustamante. con unas
noticias preliminares que dan idea de origen de esta. Escrita por eI mismo ex ministro quien la dirige
a la nacion," in Lucas Alaman, Obras completas de D. Lucas Alaman: Documcntos divcrsos
(ineditos y muy raros) (Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1945), vol. 3, p. 45.
7 El Registro Oficial, 23 January 1830.
H Lucas Alaman, "Memoria de la secreta ria de estado y del despacho de relaciones interiores y
exteriores, leida por el secreta rio del ramo en la Camara de Diputados el dia 12 de febrero de I1BO Y
en la de Senadores el dia 13 del mismo." in Alaman, Obras completus: Documentos diversos, vol. I,
p. 183.
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established a weak executive more or less subordinate to the more powerful legislative
body." It gave the President mostly decorative duties, such as ensuring the publication
of the laws and statues, convoking Congress and declaring war. He was also allowed
to propose legislation and to choose his own cabinet. However, it was the Federal
Congress that decided whether the President's proposals should be accepted,
determined taxation and its investment, as well as appointing public employees.l" This
meant that the executive had to rely upon sufficient support in Congress to organise an
effective government. To strengthen this position, Bustamante's government would
use a mixture of coercion and intimidation to ensure that the representatives in the
Federal Congress could not oppose its initiatives.
Finally, the administration also realised that peaceful government could not be
achieved if the radical yorkinos of the previous government were allowed to remain in
control of the federal and state government. In their eyes, this faction did not care for
order, but searched only for the self advancement of its members. II It was abundantly
clear that the old supporters of Guerrero were likely to be hostile to all the new
regime's policies. For the new government, the re-establishment of constitutional order
was dependent upon removing these radicals from positions of power and influence,
and replacing them with people who could be relied upon to support the new order.
9 Lucas Alaman, "Examen imparcial de la administracion del general vicepresidente D. Anastasio
Bustamante con observaciones generales sobre el estado presente de la republica y consecuencias que
este debe producir," in Alaman, Obras completas: Documentos diversos, vol. 3, p. 261.
10 "La Constituci6n de 4 octubre de 1824," in Secretaria de Gobernacion, Leves fundamentales de los
Estados Unidos Mexicanos y planes revolucionarios que han influido en laOorgunizacion politica de
la republica (Mexico City: Imprenta de la Secretaria de Gobernacion, 1923). See especially "De las
prerrogativas del presidente y vicepresidente," and "De las atribuciones y restricciones de sus
facultades." pp. 125-126, and "De las facultades del Congreso General," pp. 121-122.
II Alaman, "Defensa del ex ministro de relaciones," p. 45. He describes the radical yorkinos of 1829
thus: 'con 10 que ese partido vino a reducirse a solo aquellos que no poseyendo nada aspiran a todo, y
siempre estan dispuestos a nuevas inquietudes porque miran la autoridad de que por cualquier medio
pretenden apoderarse no solo como su unico modo de vivir, sino como un arbitrio de enriquecer a
costa de la nacion, mediante las continuas rapifias y despilfarros que se han visto siempre que el
gobierno ha caido en sus manos. '
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These allies were to be the property owning hombres de bien, whose very wealth and
status guaranteed their support 'por el orden, por la tranquilidad y por la quietud.' 12
This chapter aims to examine how successfully Anastasio Bustamante's
government implemented this vision of constitutional order. The first part will discuss
the manner in which his regime attempted to impose its authority upon the State and
Federal legislatures. The focus of the second part will be the regime's political
programme and its relationship with the army and the Church. The third part will look
at how the administration dealt with its opponents. The final sections will move on to
analyse the reasons for the regime's eventual defeat at the hands of Antonio Lopez de
Santa Anna.
A: Establishing Order in Government
As soon as General Bustamante entered Mexico City on 3 I December he
assumed the role of acting Head of State. However, his position was not legally
defensible. After all, he had just overthrown the incumbent President by way of an
armed rebellion. Therefore, the new government's first action had to be the
legitimisation of his authority. This was achieved through the passing of two laws in
Congress. The first judged the Plan of Jalapa to have been just, effectively sanctioning
the rebellion.13 The second declared General Guerrero to be impeded
{'imposibilitado'} from exercising the executive power.l" According to article 75 of
the Federal Constitution, this made his Vice-President his legitimate replacement. IS It
12 El Registro Oticial, 26 March 1830.
13 Manuel Dublan and Jose Maria Lozano, Legislacion mexicana () coleccion completa de las
disposiciones expedidas desde la independencia de la Republica (Mexico City: Imprenta del
Comercio, a cargo de Dublan y Lozano, hijos, calle de Cordobanes, nurnero 8, 1876), vol. 2, p. 215.
Law dated 14 January 1830.
14 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 223.Law dated 4 February 1830.
15 "La Constitucion de 1824," in Secretaria de Gobernacion (ed.), Leyesfundamcntales de los Estados
Unidos, p. 123. Perhaps as a result of these laws General Bustamante did not assume the title of
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had originally been proposed that the second law declare Guerrero 'imposibilitado
moralmente para gobemar la Republica,' or in other words pronounce him mad in
order to conform more clearly with article 75, which specifies that the Vice-President
can only take up the functions of his President should he be morally or physically
incapacitated. However, the committee appointed by Congress to discuss the issue
recommended that the word 'moral' be suppressed in the bill. This was mainly due to
the intervention of one of the committee members, Andres Quintana Roo, a long-term
supporter of General Guerrero. He pointed out quite forcibly in his report that the aim
of the law was simply to 'adoptar una medida que sirva como titulo a la legimitidad
del actual gobiemo' and to prevent the General returning to power. Therefore, he
argued, it would be counter-productive to declare him insane, as this would
undoubtedly offend the General's honour and make him more likely to take up a
hostile position against the new government. 16 This was an important consideration, as
Guerrero had recently written to Congress to express his willingness to abide by their
decision in the matter of his dispute with Bustamante.17 If the new regime was to
continue unopposed, it would not be wise to upset General Guerrero.
It might seem surprising that a Congress elected for the most part m the
elections of 1828, in which the yorkinos were the predominant force, would be party
to this legal manoeuvring to replace Guerrero with Bustamante. However, it must be
remembered that while the Chamber of Deputies was made up with a significant
number of opponents to the new order, it was even able defiantly to elect the radical
yorkino, Father Jose Maria Alpuche as its President in January 1830, the majority of
senators supported the Plan of Jalapa. This meant that the dictates of the Chamber of
President. In all official documents he is refered to as the Vice-President. Consequently. he will be
refered as the Vice-President for the purposes of this study.
16 "Dictamen de la comision de la Camara de Diputados, sobre el acuerdo del Sen ado, relativo a
declarar al general Guerrero imposibilitado moralmente para gobernar la Republica," and "Voto
rarticular del senor Quintana Roo," in El Atleta, 31 January 1830.
7 "Exposicion del general Guerrero a las Cameras de la Union," in El Atleta. 18 January 1830.
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Deputies could be overridden by a vote in the Senate. As Alaman points out in his
Historia de Mexico, any bill that was rejected by the deputies could still be presented
to the Senate. If the proposal gained a two-thirds majority in its favour here, it could
then be returned to the deputies. This bill could only be prevented from becoming law
if the deputies voted against it by the same margin of two thirds.18 Moreover, the
regime was not adverse to intimidating the deputies. According to Lorenzo de Zavala,
the early deliberations of the Chamber were often marred by the interventions of
soldiers and officers who would crowd into the galleries and attempt to influence the
deputies to vote in favour of the government with threats and insults. Many of the
deputies began to stay away from the Chamber, thus contributing to the
disenfranchisement of that body.19 Other outspoken deputy opponents of the
government, such as Alpuche and Anastasio Zerecero, obligingly became involved in
plots to overthrow the government. This led to their arrest and exile far away from the
Chamber by June 1830.20 Later in the year, in August, the Military Commander of
Mexico, Felipe Codallos, and the capital's garrison issued a petition to Congress to
unseat the remaining dissident deputies and senators in accordance with the fourth
article of the Plan of Jalapa." This petition was not successful, but it clearly
IX Lucas Alaman, Historia de Mexico desde los primeros movtmtentos que prepuraron su
independencia en el aho de/808 hasta la epoca presente (Mexico City: Libros del Bachiller Sanson
Carillo, 1986), vol. 5, p. 489.
19 Lorenzo de Zavala, Ensayo historico de las revoluciones de Mexico desde 1808 hastu ]830
(Mexico City: Impresora de Hacienda, 1918). vol. 2, p. 211.
20 Father Alpuche made the mistake of writing to General Manuel Mier y Teran in January 1830.
inviting him to lead a conspiracy against the government. Mier y Teran found the proposal
'repugnante' and immediately informed the government. He was arrested in March and condemned
to five years exile in June. El Registro Oficial, 8 March and 9 June 1830. The letters of Alpuche and
reply of Mier y Teran are included in El Sol, 12 March IIBO. Zerecero was accused of plotting with a
number of army officers including General Figueroa, Colonels Pinzon and Ordiera and his brother,
Lieutenant Manuel Zerecero, to assasinate the Vice-President and issue a pronunciamiento in Mexico
City in favour of Guerrero. He was also sentenced to five years exile. His brother was sentenced to
death. El Registro Oficial, 25 March, 22 and 23 June 1830. The execution did not take place.
however, mainly due to the intervention of the Vice-President. Its significance will be discussed later
in the chapter.
21 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 254. The deputies on the list were: Jose Manuel Herrera. Jose Maria Bocanegra,
Ignacio Basadre, Fernando del Valle, Juan Pablo Bermudez, Manuel Palomino, Pedro Maria Anaya,
Jose Antonio Ulloa, Jose Matias Quintana, Andres Quintana Roo, Jose Maria Moreno, Jose Maria
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demonstrated that the new regime wished to ensure that the Congress would not act
independently, but would rather follow the wishes of the executive. Those members
who were still inclined to express their opposition to the government became few and
far between and found themselves in danger of serious reprisals. In February 1831, one
such senator, Antonio Pacheco Leal, was attacked in the street by thirty officers after
supporting a discussion begun in the Chamber of Deputies by Juan de Dios Canedo,
which questioned Bustamante's legitimacy and suggested that Manuel Gomez Pedraza
was the only constitutional President. Canedo, fearing for his own safety, accepted a
position as a minister to South America and conveniently disappeared from the
political scene.22 In November of the same year Manuel Crescencio Rejon, who had
recently begun publishing a newspaper which opposed the regime was attacked by a
group of soldiers as he left the Senate.23 In such a climate of intimidation it is little
wonder that Congress, by and large, did the regime's bidding with little fuss.
Yet it is clear from the behaviour of the new government in the opening
months of its rule, that Bustamante and his cabinet did not believe that controlling the
federal government would be enough to secure their hold on power. It would also be
necessary to ensure that their authority would not encounter opposition in the states
either. This was a pressing matter in the first three months of 1830, as it appeared that
a coalition of states, led by Guanajuato and San Luis Potosi, were organising
themselves in order to defy, if not rebel against Bustamante. In 1829, the two states
had proposed the setting up of a league of states to defend federalism from the threat
they perceived in Yucatan and from the Reserve Army. In January, they issued a joint
declaration proclaiming that should the institutions of federalism be attacked, they
Salvatierra, Manuel Garcia Tato, Antonio Escudero, Manuel Lopez de la Plata, Joaquin Bazo, Pedro
Garmendia, Manuel Ordaz and Vicente Guido de Guido. The senators were: Manuel Crescencio
Rejon, Juan Nepomuceno Acosta and Agustin Viesca.
22 Timothy E. Anna, Forging Mexico (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), p.
235.
23 Carlos Maria Bustamante. Diario Historico, entry for 3 November 1831.
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would unite in their defence. They called on other states to join them. By February it
seemed that seven states were ready to join this coalition.24 In order to avoid this
perceived threat of rebellion the answer was simple: replace all those legislatures and
governors who might conceivably oppose the regime. As these legislatures, rather like
the General Congress, had been elected at the height of the yorkinos' power, potential
allies were the exception rather than the rule. As Michael Costeloe has explained, the
manner in which the legislatures were replaced was simple. Using article four of the
Plan of Jalapa as his point of reference, the Minister of Relations Alaman, set about
persuading the garrison, local ayuntamiento, or any other official body of state
government to issue a complaint against either the legislature, the governor or both. A
petition would then be sent to the National Congress asking that these legislatures be
removed and new elections called.25 This petition would be approved by Congress
and, in this way, the potential rebel states were tamed. New elections held in
September 1830, resulted in the appointment of men who were, in Costeloe's words,
'todos hombres de bien, con los mismos intereses que las c1ases dirigentes de la
capital: ,26 even if their political allegiances were not so similar. In this fashion the
legislatures and governors were replaced in Jalisco, Michoacan, Queretaro, Durango,
Tamaulipas, Tabasco, Oaxaca, Puebla, Veracruz, Chiapas and Mexico.27
This intervention on the part of the federal government in the affairs of the
states has long been interpreted as a covert attack on the federal system. Much is made
of the fact that Bustamante's cabinet was made up of ministers who were notorious for
their centralist views. Espinosa had spoken in Congress in favour of the centralisation
of civil authority. Mangino had expressed his reservations on the subject of state
24 Michael P. Costeloe, La primera republica federal de Mexico: /824-/835. Un estudio de los
partidos politicos en el Mexico independiente (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1975). p.
260.
2S Ibid .. p. 257.
26 Ibid., p. 281.
27 lbid., pp. 258-261. Coste1oe provides descriptions of how the legislatures were overthrown in
Mexico, Puebla, Oaxaca and Michoacan,
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sovereignty while a member of the committee commissioned to write the constitution
in 1824.28 As we saw in Chapter Two, Alaman had been perceived as an advocate of
centralism in 1823. Jesus Reyes Heroles maintains that although Bustamante's
administration made no direct attack upon the federalist system, its policies proved it
to be a centralist government.29 Timothy Anna observes that Alaman was acutely
aware that any direct attack upon federalism would provoke huge opposition within
the Republic, as federalism was by now too deeply entrenched in individual interest
and loyalty throughout the country. He claims that Alaman chose instead to return to
the policy of 1823, suggested (as we noted in Chapter Two) by Servando Teresa de
Mier, which allowed limited federalism with a strong and powerful central
government.i'' However, we must be wary of accepting these opinions uncritically.
For, as Josefina Vazquez points out, the charges of centralism against Bustamante's
administration originate in the criticisms of its contemporary opponents. In her view,
all that Alaman did 'fue aprovechar al maximo las leyes para manipular un cambio de
autoridades. ,31 This was certainly an affront to the sovereignty of the states, and
induced many to fear that federalism was in danger, but whether it constituted the
erection of a secret centralist republic is questionable.
The key question in the debate appears to be: why did the central government
wish to replace so many legislatures? Why did it expect that these state congresses
would oppose its authority? The answer to this is provided by Costeloe, who observes
that the states attacked by the provisions of the Plan of Jalapa were those 'en que
ocupaban cargos representantes de la baja democracia 0 radicales. ,32 If we remember
our definition of the meaning of constitutional order, the answers to our questions are
clear. The state legislatures represented the continuation of the rule of the radical
28 Ibid., p. 252.
29 Jesus Reyes Heroles, El liberalismo mexicano (Mexico City: UNAM, 1958), vol. 2, p. 156.
30 Anna, Forging Mexico, pp. 230-231.
31 Josefina Zoraida Vazquez, "Iglesia, ejercito y centralismo," Historia Mexicana 39: 1 (1989), p. 214.
32 Costeloe, La primera republica federal. pp. 280-281.
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yorkinos, and the threat of the power of the lower classes. They were the enemy just
as clearly as Guerrero had been. Confirmation of this theory comes when we look at
the electoral reform introduced by Alaman to try to ensure that these representatives
of low democracy were not re-elected. In his Memoria of 1830, Alaman laid out his
argument for change. The current system of elections, he claimed, led to chaos and
disorder. He condemned the practise employed by the secret societies of distributing
lists, printed with the names of their candidates to the voter, for him to use as his
ballot paper. This led to a situation, he complained, in which 'resultan elegidos, no los
que han obtenido mas sufragios, sino aqueUos, en cuyo favor, el artificio y a veces la
violencia ha hecho repartir mas !istas.' He also lamented that no checks were provided
for within the electoral system to identify the voter, which meant it was simple for the
same individual to vote on numerous occasions. Such lax procedures, he argued,
alienated 'todos los hombres de juicio' and excluded them from the electoral process.
As a result, he concluded, the elections were hijacked by those least qualified, leading
to the election of 'hombres que no dependen de la sociedad por ningun lazo, y que no
poseyendo nada, por este mismo propenden a aspirar a todo. ,33 Or in other words,
those he would alternatively describe as yorkinos and jacobinos, and accuse of seeking
power merely to enrich themselves and destroy the hombres de bien.34
A new system was clearly needed in order to rectify the situation. Accordingly,
new legislation was passed in July 1830 to reduce suffrage and regularise proceedings
in the Federal District and territories, the only areas under the direct control of the
central government. The electoral system would now work in two stages of primary
and secondary elections. The primary elections were conducted in small voting
districts of between 400 and 800 inhabitants. In these elections a representative or
'elector' was chosen to represent his district in the secondary elections. This elector
33 Alaman, "Memoria ... 1830," pp. 184-185.
34 Alaman, "Defensa del ex-ministro de relaciones D. Lucas Alaman," p. 45.
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cast his vote on behalf of his district in this ballot. To be eligible to vote in the primary
elections the individual had to be a Mexican citizen who had resided in his district for
at least a year. To prevent voters being able to vote on multiple occasions, it was now
a requirement for the voter to possess a ballot paper in advance. The practice of
accepting lists of candidates from the voter to indicate his preferences was suppressed.
In the primary elections, everyone now had to give their votes orally. In the secondary
elections, voting was to be secret. All those eligible to vote had to be 21 years old, 18
if married, and had to practice 'algun oficio 0 industria honorable.' Those wishing to
stand as electors would have to meet the same criteria, although the minimum age was
raised to 25.35 Of course, the government could not legally oblige the rest of the states
to imitate these reforms. Even so, if we consider the political climate now dominant in
the states whose legislatures had been dismissed, it is not surprising that many did
introduce similar legislation. In Veracruz, a voter was required to possess property to
the minimum value of 800 pesos, or earn at least 150 pesos from gainful employment.
Those belonging to secret societies were barred from suffrage.i" In Puebla it was
proposed that those wishing to stand for election should hold property valued to at
least 8, 000 pesos or earn 1,000 pesos annually.37 These reforms appeared to have the
desired effect. For in the elections to replace the dismissed legislatures, those elected
were for the most part hombres de bien and property-owners. In Puebla, those elected
included: two army officers; two clerics; four merchants; a surgeon; two lawyers; a
tithe-collector; a civil servant; a pharmacist and one scribe. In the state of Mexico they
included: five lawyers, five clerics, a mine owner and a Colonel. 3X
Looked at in this way, it appears that the motive behind the forced removals of
the eleven state legislatures was not the centralisation of power to Mexico City, or the
35 Dublan and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, vol. 2, pp. 270-275. Law dated 12 July uno.
36 El Registro Oficial, 24 May 1830.
37 El Sol, 23 September 1830.
38 Costeloe, La primera republica federal, p. 284.
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further empowerment of the executive. The dismissals were part of the general plan to
neutralise potential opposition to the new regime, to destroy the power ofthe yorkinos
and to ensure that the privileged classes remained in control country-wide. Their
actions show that they did not consider the concept of federalism to be dangerous, as
no attempts were made to reform the constitution to reduce state power, it was
federalism in the hands of the plebe which threatened the stability of the Republic.
Replacing the legislatures meant there was no need to attack federalism or practise
secret centralism. Federalism could be acceptable provided that the right people were
in charge. As long as the disorder created by previous governments could be rectified
under the present system, there was simply no point in causing the inevitable political
turmoil or civil war by forcing a change. As Alaman argued in 1833:
Ciertamente que la masa general de la poblacion no aspira a una
mudanza, cuando el orden actual se halla bien; si cl encuentra seguridad
para su persona y bienes el ciudadano pacifico; confianza en sus giros
el capitalist a, y exactitud en sus pagas el empleado y el rnilitar, no
puede prestarseles atractivo ninguno hacia una mudanza, el cual no
solo no nos adelanterian nada, sino por el contrario aventurarian el bien
de que hecho estan disfrutando en medio de las vicisitudes
consiguientes a un trastorno general. No sera menester demostrar que
todas estas condiciones se encontraban bajo el gobierno cuyos
rniembros son hoy objetos de cruel persecucion [in the prosecution of
Alaman, Mangino and Facio in 1833].39
Even so, if Bustamante's government was not conspiring to rule the nation
centrally, why did its opponents consistently accuse him and the cabinet of centralism?
The answer perhaps lies in the bitter political rivalry that had developed in Mexico
since independence and the language that had begun to be used by each side to define
themselves and each other. Centralism and federalism had existed as opposing
concepts since the abdication of Iturbide in 1823. Centralists were associated with the
39 Alaman, "Defensa del ex-ministro de relaciones," pp. 155-156.
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politicians and elite in Mexico City, the Supreme Executive Power and the Scottish
Rite of Masons. Federalists were associated with the states and with the iturbidistas,
who opposed central government as it was composed of those who had engineered
Iturbide's downfall. After the proclamation of the Federal Constitution the two groups
remained a feature of political life. The Rite of York became the self-proclaimed home
of the federalists, while the Scottish Rite remained the haven for many of those who
had been supporters of a centralist system, such as its Grand Master, Nicolas Bravo.
In the battle for power which developed between the two rites in the late 1820s, the
yorkinos were able to exploit this fact to their own advantage. Its press regularly
attacked the Scottish Rite with a range of accusations designed to characterise them as
unpatriotic and treacherous. It was said that the escoceses were opposed to the
constitution and still wished to introduce centralism. The Scottish Rite was also
accused of plotting to return the country to the Spanish or impose a Bourbon monarch
on the nation. The yorkino press firmly presented their members as the patriotic
defenders of federalism, striving for the Republic's best interests in everything they did.
By 1829, the Scottish Rite had ceased to exist as a political force. The
yorkinos were now reduced to their radical core and were opposed by a coalition of
forces, made up of many groups, including ex-escoceses and ex-yorkinos. However,
crucially for those remaining in the yorkino camp, the rhetoric employed against the
enemy remained the same. Pamphlets published during December 1829 accuse
Bustamante and his fellow rebels of many of the crimes attributed to the escocescs in
the past; of intending to impose centralism and dictatorship by force and, of plotting
the return of Iturbide's son as monarch. They reiterate the claim that the yorkinos are
the only real defenders of federalism.4o These accusations were usually based on the
40 See for example: La culebrina del ejercito de reserva (Mexico City: Imprenta de la testamentaria
de Ontiveros, dirigida por el C. Jose Uribe y Alcade, 1829); and Pablo Villavicencio, El general
Bustamante no quiere a ningun tunante (Puebla: Reimpreso en la Oficina Nacional a cargo del
ciudadano Mariano Palacios, 1829). Both in CONDUMEX.
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fact that the Plan of Jalapa was supported by forrner escoccses, such as Jose Antonio
Facio, Nicolas Bravo and Miguel Barragan. This strategy remained the same during
Bustamante's administration. In the War of the South in 1830, Guerrero and Juan
Alvarez clearly identified their struggle against Bustamante as the defence of
federalism, and in their calls to arms, accused his government of conspiring to
introduce centralism in order to impose a European tyrant as monarch or hand the
country back to the control of Spain.41 This proved to be an effective tactic, for as
Peter Guardino has pointed out, it played on the worst fears of the provincial elites,
for whom the memory of the dissolved legislatures was still clear." It would prove an
even more successful strategy in 1832 to rally support for Santa Anna's rebellion in the
provinces. Here 'proofs' of the government's commitment to centralism were cited,
such as the administration's continual reluctance to send troops to suppress the
centralist rebellion in Yucatan, which had begun before the Plan of Jalapa was
proclaimed in 1829. It seems that centralism was the big bogeyman with which to
characterise the government and win support for the opposition, just as the fear of the
jacobinos and the French Revolution was used by the architects of the Plan of Jalapa
to justify their behaviour and keep the support of their peers. In looking at the
accusations of both sides we must assume that both factions employed more or less
the same measures of truth, falsehood and exaggeration in their attacks on each other.
c: The Political Programme: Putting an End to Chaos?
The political programme followed by the Bustamante administration was
clearly designed to introduce much needed stability to the Mexican Republic. Their
policies concentrated upon three main areas of concern: the state of the economy, the
41 Peter F. Guardino. Peasants, Politics and the Formation of Mexico's National State. Guerrero.
1800-1857 (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1996). p. 134.
42 Ibid .• p. 135.
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army, and the Church, and as Fowler has noted, constituted 'the imposition of the first
traditionalist proposal of the hombres de bien. ,43
The national treasury was in a pitiful state. Quite clearly the economy had
failed to recover from the damage inflicted by the ten years of insurgency. Neither the
mining nor the tobacco industry were operating successfully. In 1824 a Congress
finance committee had predicted that revenue from the tobacco monopoly would
produce around $2, 500, 000 annually. The truth was that in the next five years
income did not exceed $1, 212, 462.44 The cotton industry still operated at an artisan
level and could not compete with cheaper foreign imports. The previous
administration's attempt to solve some of this problem by prohibiting the import of
cheap foreign cloth had been unsuccessful. Prohibiting imports of cheap cloth did not
help to make domestic cotton cheaper; nor did it ensure a protected market, as foreign
cloth was easily smuggled into the country.45
In order to bring the economy out of the doldrums, the government (or more
precisely, the cabinet ministers Alaman and Mangino) tried to stimulate industry and
encourage domestic investment and enterprise by creating a public loan company,
named the Banco de Avio. The ministers introduced this scheme to Congress in the
summer of 1830. The bank would provide loans to new companies who wished to
become involved in industries such as mining, textile production or ironworks, to aid
in the establishment of factories. It would also sell machines to these new industries
below market prices. In order to finance the Bank the prohibition on the import of
cheap foreign cotton would be lifted and 20 per cent of a new import duty would be
channelled into its coffers.46 The idea was to encourage the setting up of new factories
43 Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals, pp. 56-57.
44 Barbara Tenenbaum, Mexico en fa epoca de los agiotistas (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura
Economica, 1985),p. 55.
45 Robert A. Potash, El Banco de Avio en Mexico. Elfomento de fa industria. 1821-1846 (Mexico
City/Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1959), pp. 55-56.
46 Potash, El Banco de Avio, p. 76.
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throughout the Republic by private investors, and in this way begin the modernisation
of industry. The proposal became law in October and the first loans were allocated in
December. On the surface the project appears to have been quite successful at
regenerating interest in investing in industry. In its report of 1831, the Bank reported
that 14 new companies had been established in the Republic.T' However, as Robert
Potash points out, this new enthusiasm was not simply due to the promise of aid from
the Bank. State governors were encouraged, if not pressured, by Alaman, to find
investors in their own states to set up companies. In Guanajuato, three companies
were set up by the governor in Celaya, San Miguel and Leon. In these districts, the
local jefe politico was charged with visiting potential investors to persuade them to
buy shares in the companies.f In Mexico City, Alaman himself oversaw the creation
of the Campania Industrial Mexicana, which began with capital of more than $30,
000.49 The Church also took a significant role in setting up other companies. Groups
of clerics bought shares or donated money to new enterprise. Some even sat on boards
of management. Others encouraged their parishioners to invest in new companies from
the pulpit.50 The limit of the Bank's success in simulating private industry can also be
measured in the funds it allocated. Both its major loans between 1831 and 1832 were
made to companies whose directors had personal connections with the board of the
Bank. A silk factory in Guanajuato, run by Domingo Lazo de la Vega, a friend of
Alaman, was awarded $6, 450 in 1830 and $12, 940 in 1832.51 The Director of the
Bank acted as guarantor of a loan worth $12, 000, granted to an iron smelting factory
in Cuautla, in 1832.52 Even so, whether the new companies were the product of rising
economic confidence or government pressure, by the end of 1831 it appeared that new
47 Mexico City, Tlalnepantla, Tlaxcala, Puebla, San Andres Tuxtla, Queretaro, Morelia, Leon, San
Miguel de Allende, Celaya, San Luis Potosi, Chihuahua, Parral and Cuencame, lbid., p. 96.
48 Ibid., p. 97.
49 Ibid., pp. 95-96.
50 Ibid., p. 98.
51 Ibid., p. 105, 107.
52 Ibid.
151
The First Administration (1830-1832)
industries were at last beginning to establish itself in Mexico. In Puebla and Tlalpan
construction had begun on textile factories. In Celaya and Queretaro land had been set
aside for construction. Machinery for the cotton factory in Tlalpan and the wool
factory in Queretaro had also been unloaded in Veracruz and was ready for
transport. 53 Yet all would be put in jeopardy the following year by the civil war. The
Bank's source of income was cut off when Santa Anna took control of Veracruz and
Tampico. The imported machinery was trapped in Veracruz and much was left to go
rusty on the docks where it had arrived. Thus, despite its promising beginnings and an
overall investment of $478, 000 by the end of 1832, the Bank could not boast of one
busi h . ducti 54smess t at was m pro ction.
However, in the final report of his administration, written before the financial
effects of the civil war could be counted, Mangino was able to offer a rosy picture of
the success of the administration's financial strategy. According to the figures he
provided, it was possible to see that import revenues had increased from $4, 815, 418
in 1830, to $8, 287, 082 in 1831; and that, as a consequence, the overall federal
revenue from tax and duties had risen from $12, 200, 020 in 1830 to $17, 256, 882 in
1831. He could also speak of having a small surplus in his budget for the following
year.55 Part of this success may have been due to the increase in domestic tax on
foreign goods of five per cent made in 1830, and to the Minister's vow to ensure larger
revenues by organising the collection and distribution of tax more efficientlyr'" but
some must indicate a discernible growth in the economy. These claims would be
contested once the Bustamante administration had been overthrown. Barbara
Tenenbaum observes that despite the financial success claimed by Mangino and later,
Alaman, their government was forced to take out loans with the agiotistas, private
53 Ibid., p. 112.
54 Ibid.. pp. 114-115.
55 Costeloe, La primera republica, p. 304.
56 Tenenbaum, Mexico en la epoca de los agiostas, p. 57.
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gentlemen and companies who lent money usually at ruinous rates of interest,
amounting to $2, 356, 997 in 1831 and $3, 734 566 in 1832. A report commissioned
in 1833 for the new government suggested that the outgoing administration had left
debt amounting to $11, 224, 567.57 However, we must not forget that the civil war of
1832 proved catastrophic for the government's handling of the economy. Santa Anna
seized the port of Veracruz in January 1832 and immediately took control of the
custom house, effectively depriving the federal government of its revenue during the
coming year. The port and customs house of Tampico also fell into rebel hands that
March. With a major portion of its income gone and its costs rising due to the war, the
administration had to finance its operations with other means. One solution was to
take out the loans mentioned above. Others were to propose the sale of the Fondo
Piadoso de Cal(fornias;58 to increase the alcabala between three and four per cent;59
and to introduce new emergency taxes on a variety of items such as carriages and
stagecoaches, shops and cafes, as well as windows and balconies in Mexico City.60
Quite clearly, we cannot judge the success or failure of the Bustamante
administration's economic policy simply by contrasting the financial situation of 1833
with that of 1832. We must content ourselves instead by observing that before the civil
war the Banco de Avio had brought new hope to the Mexican economy. That this
new hope would have led to enduring financial stability, without the occurrence of the
civil war can never be known.
The greatest beneficiary of the Increase in government revenue during the
Bustamante administration, was, without a doubt, the army. In the financial year of
July 1831 to July 1832, a colossal $10, 450, 251 was allocated from government
revenue to be spent on the military. This was the greatest amount ever granted since
57 Ibid., p. 60.
58 Dublan and Lozano. Legislacion mexicana, vol. 2, p. 456. Proposal dated 29 November 1832.
59 Ibid .• p. 454. Decree dated 15 November 1832.
60 Ibid., pp. 454, 469. Decrees dated 23 November 1832 and 11 December 1832.
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independence.l" The size of the military budget reflects the importance attached to the
army by the administration. This was a typical concern of governments with a
traditionalist leaning. The more radical federalist governments tended to pay much
more attention to the civil militias, whom the traditionalists generally regarded with
suspicion, as these were usually made up of the lower classes and answered directly to
each state government, rather than to the executive.62 The army also had an important
place in Mexican society and politics. It is obvious from even a cursory glance at the
progress of independent Mexico from 1821 to 1830, that elite army officers dominated
the political scene. All those occupying the Presidency or Vice-Presidency had been
Generals. Their approval or disapproval of political developments was highly
significant, as the disaffected were liable to revolt against the sitting government, as
had been seen in Veracruz (1822), Otumba (1827) and Jalapa (1829). While Josefina
Vazquez has quite rightly pointed out that these pronunciamientos were only
successful in the context of general discontent within the Republic, especially if they
were led by civilian initiatives, it must not be forgotten that the army was the visible
power broker.63 It represented the constant threat of revolt, and, for that reason, it
was important to keep it happy. This was not an easy thing to do, as the army was far
from being a monolithic organisation with any definite ideology.l" Its support had to
be won not with policies, but with money. As a consequence of this, and because of
the political influence wielded by many officers in key positions, the largest percentage
of the government's budget always went on the military in the early national period.
Even so, the general condition of the army in 1830 was terrible. The failure of
previous governments to pay the wages of the soldiers regularly led to a lack of
discipline and desertion, through which a great number of uniforms and much
61 Tenenbaum, Mexico en la epoca de los agiostas, pp. 59, 61.
b2 Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals, pp. 57-58.
b1 Josefina Zoraida Vazquez, "Political Plans and Collaboration Between Civilians and the Military,
1821-1846," Bulletin of Latin American Research 15:1 (1996), p. 19
64 Vazquez, "Iglesia, ejercito y centralismo," pp. 212-213.
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equipment was lost. The practice of pressing mostly Indians and criminals into service,
and rounding up numbers with beggars and drunkards from the street meant that, in
the words of Jose Antonio Facio, the army was composed of 'unos cuadros de gente
annada sin disciplina ni moralidad y carecian muchos de elIos de vestuario, armas y
caballos. ,65
For an administration that wished to install a strong, stable government, the
rectification of this situation was of utmost importance. In the first place, it was crucial
to have a contented army to prevent more unwanted rebellions and to aid the
government with its attempts to maintain public order. As a popular refrain of the time
puts it: 'Cuando los sueldos se pagan, las revoluciones se apagan. ,66 Thus, the
administration used its increased investment to ensure wages were paid regularly and
that the troops were provided with uniforms and weapons. Great effort was made to
increase discipline and morale amongst the ranks.67 Promotions, medals and pensions
were handed out after the end of the War of the South and the success at Tolome in
1832. In February and March 1831, nine officers were promoted to the rank of
General de Brigada, the second highest rank in the Mexican Army, and 26 to the rank
ofCoione1.68 After the victory at Tolome, the troops received a weeks' double pay and
65 Jose Antonio Facio, Memoria del secretario de estado y del despacho de la guerra. presentada a
las camaras el dia 24 de enero de 1831 (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila, dirigida por Jose
Ximeno, calle de Medinas, numero 6, 1831), p. 5. For a description of life in the army in early
independent Mexico, see Ruth R Olivera and Liliane Crete, Life in Mexico under Santa Anna, /822-
1855 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1991). pp. 159-179. Also. Costeloe, La primera
republica federal. pp. 229-230. and Stanley C. Green. The Mexican Republic: The First Decade,
/823-/832 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987). pp. 183-186.
66 Donald F. Stevens. Origins of Instability in Early Republican Mexico (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1991). p. 10.
67 Facio. Memoria ... 1831, p. 5.
68 Generales de Brigada: Nicolas Catalan. Jose Antonio Facio. Felipe Codallos, Pedro Valdes.
Antonio Mozo, Ignacio Inclan, Juan Amador, Juan Jose Andrade. Pedro Otero,
Colonels: Manuel Gil Perez. Antonio Gaona, Rafael Borja, Jose de las Piedras. Victores Manero,
Lino Jose Alcorta. Juan Maria de Azcararte, Joaquin Reyes, Toman Ilanes, Jose Cayetano Montoya.
Jose Ignacio de Garza Falcon. Jose Maria Mangino. Francisco Novoa, Antonio Castro. Joaquin
Ramirez y Sesma, Jose Maria Malo. Fernando Franco. Josquin Correa. Cirilo Gomez Anaya. Jose
Mariano Guerra Manzanares. Ramon Morales. Gabriel Duran. Mariano Arista, Antonio Villaurrita.
El Sol. 13. 15 February. 27 March 1831.
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a medal, while all sergeants and corporals were immediately promoted one rank.69 All
their efforts were quite successful, for in the event of the civil war in 1832, very few
army units adhered to Santa Anna's plan. In fact, his campaign to overthrow
Bustamante was only possible with the help of the state militias.7o We assume that the
Minister of War, Facio, was responsible for the increase in investment in the army
during the Bustamante administration. However, we must not discount the possibility
of some participation by the Vice-President. As we have commented in earlier
chapters, General Bustamante had always shown great concern for the discipline and
well-being of the troops under his command. Neither can we overlook the fact that
Bustamante was a widely respected figure within the army by 1830. He had been one
of those chosen to lead the Plan of Jalapa precisely because of his standing. It may
well have been the officers' respect for him, as well as their gratitude for their
improved financial position, that prevented many from joining Santa Anna in 1832.
The loyalty and discipline of the army were not the only concern for
Bustamante's administration. For. like many modem authoritarian powers, the
government recognised the intrinsic value of appearance, and knew that it was
essential that the military looked good. Rather like Mussolini's trains, it would be a
show case for the success of its regime. One indication of this is the interest taken by
the administration in the appearance of its officers. In June 1830 a circular was issued,
which berated the troops and officials for duties dressed in civilian clothes; for wearing
a civilian rounded hat on the occasions that uniforms were worn; and for failing to
wear their proper emblems of rank on their uniforms. They were ordered forthwith to
end these practices, and to dress for duty in a way that reflected 'el brillo de la gloriosa
carrera de las armas.' Generals were also told to wear the sashes that denoted their
rank at all times, even when not in uniform 'para que se les respete y tengan las
69 Dublan and Lozano. Legislacion mexicana, vol. 2, p. 413. Law dated 15 March 1832.
70 Vazquez, "Iglesia, ejercito y centralismo," p. 215.
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consideraciones que merecen por sus empleos.' 71 In August 1831, completely new
uniforms for Generals of all ranks were commissioned in time for the annual
celebrations of 16 September.72 However, the most obvious indication of the
administration's desire to impress is demonstrated by the concentration of their efforts
on a small number of regiments. After all, a great change in the general state of the
army could not be effected, or be commented on, simply in the space of a year. It was
necessary therefore, to create model regiments through which to convince observers
that the Mexican army had somehow been turned around. The most noticed regiments
were the First and Second Cavalry, commanded by Gabriel Duran and Mariano Arista,
both great friends of the Vice-President.73 Carlos Maria de Bustamante noted,
scandalised, in his diary after a military parade in 1831, that the horses' harnesses of
the Third Regiment were made of pure silver.74 A foreign observer commented that
both forces: 'en hombres, en caballos, en aparato militar, competian con los mejores
cuerpos de Europa.' 75 It is probable that this concern for appearance originated from
the Minister of War. Facio had spent his adolescence in Spain in the Royal Spanish
Guards 76 and it was rumoured that, as a result, he was obsessed with the importance
of uniforms and military power. The regiments of Duran and Arista were said to be his
id d i 77pn e an JOY.
71 Dublan and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, vol. 2, pp. 267-268. Circular of the Ministry of War,
dated 30 June 1830.
72 Ibid., p. 390. Circular dated 10 August 1831.
73 Correspondence of Mariano Arista in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, Univerity
of Texas at Austin (henceforth referred to as CMA) folder 8. Mariano Arista to Miguel Barriero,
Mexico City 30 May 1832. 'Duran y yo somos entusiastas como V. sabe por la persona de nuestro
gran amigo el general Bustamante y estoy seguro que moriremos antes que abandonar a este sin igual
amigo.' Bustamante would stand as padrino for Arista's wedding in 1838, see SDN: SC XlIlll/l-
321101.
74 Bustamante, Diario historico, entry for 2 June 1831.
75 LAF no. 338. Un espafiol, Dos aiios en Mexico. 0 memorias criticas sabre los principales SIIC£'S()S
de la Republica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos desde la invasion de Barradas hasta la
declaracion del Puerto de Tampico contra el gobierno del general Bustamante. Escrito pOI' un
espahol (Valencia: Imprenta de Cabrerizo, 1838), p. 41.
76 SDN: SC XI/Ill/ 2-815/00013. Service Record for Jose Antonio Facio, Facio was born in the city of
Veracruz in 1792, he spent between 1809 and 1824 in Spain.
77 Un espafiol, Dos aiios en Mexico, p. 41.
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At the same time as the Bustamante administration worked to strengthen the
regular army, it also made every effort to weaken the states' civil militias and to reduce
their numbers significantly. The reasoning for this, provided by Alaman in his
ministerial report of 1830, was that large civil militias were damaging to local
economies, because a call to arms removed most of the working population from any
given village.78 This economic argument was also used by Facio, who, in his own
ministerial report, noted that a great saving could be made from the public purse if the
militias were to stand down.79 However, it is obvious that this is not the only reason
the administration wished to weaken the militias. Two other concerns are also clear
from Alaman's discussion of the subject. The first is that the militias were composed of
undesirable members of society.80 They represented the arming of the rabble,
something which a traditionalist government dedicated to the introduction of
constitutional order could not accept. The second is that the militias were open to
abuse by those who considered them 'como ejercitos particulares de los Estados.' This
might lead the militias to be involved in conflicts with neighbouring states or even the
federal government. 81 In other words, unlike the regular army which was directly
administrated by the executive, the militias were the domain of the states and could be
used to oppose central government. This, as we know from our previous discussions,
was not acceptable to Bustamante or his cabinet. Therefore, the government decided
to move, not simply to reduce numbers, but to change its composition and duties; and
in so doing, remove much of its potential power. Alaman proposed that the militias
should be organised, as they had been in Bourbon Mexico, into Urban Battalions and
Rural Companies. The former were to keep the peace in towns and villages, and the
78 Alaman, "Memoria ... 1830," pp. 191-192.
79 Jose Antonio Facio, Memoria del secretario de estado y del despacho de la guerra. prescntada a
las camaras el 16 de marzo de 1830 (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila, dirigida por Jose Ximeno,
calle de las Medinas, numero 6, 1830), p. I. In the British Library.
80 Alarnan, "Memoria ... 1830," p. 192.
81 Ibid., pp. 194-195.
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latter would patrol roads and haciendas for the same purpose. These militias should be
recruited solely from the propertied classes, he asserted, as they were the people most
interested in preserving public order. In order to be prepared for any foreign attack he
suggested that a small number of men in each of the states be allowed to form reserve
companies, which could be called on only in time of need. The current militias were to
be suppressed.Y Of course, these ideas could only be implemented in the Federal
District and Territories. However, the fall in the numbers of civil militia from the 22,
084 men recorded as holding arms in 1830,83 to 5, 509 in 183384 indicates that most
of the other states undertook measures to reduce their forces drastically. Even so, we
must be careful before assuming that these attacks on the civil militias originated solely
in the Plan of Jalapa. As Fowler has pointed out, they represented the continuation of
the moderate liberal policies of Guadalupe Victoria's government, whose ministers had
also worked to strengthen the regular army and reduce the militia.85
The welfare of the Church was as important as that of the army tor the
Bustamante administration. This was mostly due to the fact that it was undoubtedly
the most powerful institution in Mexican society. This power was mainly built on
wealth and influence. The Church was one of the most important property owners in
the Republic and probably owned half of Mexico's national wealth. It also held great
influence over the population in political as well as religious matters.f" Thus, it was
important to win the support of the church. It could be a useful source of funds in
these financially difficult times, and its vocal support could perhaps help maintain the
authority of the administration. However, the Church was also an important symbol of
82 Ibid., pp. 192-193.
83 Facio, Memoria ... 1830. p. 8.
84 Jose Joaquin Parres, Memoria del secretario de estado y del despacho de la guerra, presentuda 1I
las camaras el dia 26 de abril de 1833. (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila, dirigida por Jose Ximeno,
calle de Medinas, numero 6. 1833), p. 1. In the British Library.
85 Fowler. Mexico in the Age of Proposals, p. 58.
86 Anne Staples. La iglesia en la primera republica federal, 1824-1835 (Mexico City: SepSetentas,
1976),p.15.
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a traditional society and values, a symbol of Hispanic culture. The promotion of its
well-being was an important defence against the rise of radicalism and the protection
of the status quo. Finally, like the army and the economy, the Church seemed
threatened by the weakness of its organisation in 1830. Independence from Spain had
caused grave problems for the clergy. The King of Spain had exercised the right of
patronage, or the appointment of all ecclesiastical positions during the Colony. This
practice abruptly ended with the declaration of independence and the problem of who
should then properly operate the patronage had to be faced.87 This problem was
compounded by the Pope's refusal to recognise Mexico as an independent country,
which of course meant that, at least in theory, the Spanish crown should still control
Mexican appointrnents.Y Nine years after independence the implications of these
problems were to become clear. There were now no serving bishops left in Mexico, as
all previous incumbents had died or, being against independence, had returned to
Spain. The latter were most problematic, as in the eyes of the Pope, the dioceses were
not officially vacant. 89 In the cathedral chapters of 1830, out of a possible 185
prebendaries available, only 74 were filled.9o Even at the level of parishes shortages
were also keenly felt. In Michoacan, for example, only 27 out of 115 parishes had their
own permanent priest. In Mexico, only 30 out of 245 parishes were served by a
permanent priest. It was clear that efforts had to be made to fill the vacant positions,
even if the thorny problem of the right of patronage could not be resolved.I'
Two attempts were made to strengthen the organisation of the Church through
the appointment of senior clerics by Bustamante's administration. The first was a
policy inherited from Vicente Guerrero's government. In September, taking advantage
87 Ibid .• p. 37.
88 Ibid .• p. 18.
89 Ibid .. p. 76.
90 Michael Costeloe, Church and State in Independent Mexico. A Study of the Patronage Debate
(London: Royal Historical Society. 1978). p. 120.
91 Staples. La iglesia en la primera republicafederal, p. 26.
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of his extraordinary powers, President Guerrero had ordered the chapter of each
diocese to submit a list of candidates for their vacant bishopric. It was intended that
the government would then choose candidates from these lists to submit to the Pope
later through the Mexican emissary, Francisco Pablo Vazquez. In this way, his
administration bypassed the still ongoing discussions on the subject of patronage, and
instead laid out its claim through the use of precedent. When Bustamante came to
power in 1830 this process was reaching completion, and his government was able to
take advantage of the legislation introduced by Guerrero to choose its approved
candidates for presentation by Vazquez. These proposals were submitted in March
1830, and in the following year, after much negotiation, were approved by the Pope,
even though the Vatican still refused to recognise Mexico's independence. Even so,
the appointments were undoubtedly an achievement for the Mexican Church as they
provided its hierarchy with clear leadership. Three days of celebrations were organised
in May 1831 when news of the Pope's decision reached Mexico. 92
Complementing this move to fill the vacant sees, Bustamante's administration
also introduced legislation to allow the appointment of prebendaries and canons in the
Cathedral chapters and in this way, tried to restore the second level of Church
hierarchy to working order. Again, this policy was designed to side-step the patronage
debate. In 1830 it was proposed in Congress that until the patronage issue was
resolved, the chapters themselves should be authorised to fill their vacant positions. In
May 1831 a law was passed which authorised the bishops, with the support of their
chapters, to appoint prebends, canons and other chapter dignitaries. In each state the
governor was given power of veto, and in the Metropolitan District, this power was
granted to the President. This legislation resulted in the occupation of vacancies in the
<)2 Ibid., pp. 76-82. Costeloe, Church and State in Independent Mexico, pp. II R-120. The
appointments were: Juan Cayetano Portugal as Bishop of Michoacan, Francisco Vazquez as Bishop of
Puebla, Jose Miguel Gordoa y Barrios as Bishop of Guadalajara, Antonio Zubiria y Escalante as
Bishop of Durango, Luis Garcia Guillen as Bishop of Chiapas and Jose Maria de Jesus Belaunzaran y
Urena as Bishop of Nuevo Leon.
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cathedrals of Mexico, Guadalajara, Michoacan, Puebla, Chiapas and Oaxaca.
However, this solution to the pressing problem of empty cathedral chapters was not
universally popular. Opponents in Congress believed that the measures effectively
abandoned the government's claim to the national right of'patronage.f
In fact, the debates surrounding the law concerning the appointment to the
cathedral chapters demonstrate the power the Church had in Congress, and the
strength of the support it received from Bustamante's government. Various
amendments proposed by deputies opposed to the bill, designed to protect the national
right of patronage, were blocked in the Chamber by the clerical vote, which
constituted around half of the deputies in attendance. A move to prevent the clerics
voting in this matter, proposed by Juan de Dios Canedo, on the grounds that they had
a personal interest in the law, was rejected. When some thirteen disillusioned deputies
tried to leave the Chamber during a debate, they found the door blocked by soldiers.94
The high number of clerics present in Congress in these debates in spring 1831 was a
result of the new election laws introduced in the previous year and put into action in
the Congressional elections of 1830. The success of the law governing the
appointments of canons and prebends indicated that this increased representation had
also brought increased power. Even so, we must be wary of assuming that the clergy,
anymore than the army, formed a monolithic group and that its increased presence in
Congress necessarily meant it presented an unassailable coalition. As Anne Staples has
pointed out: 'Ia iglesia no presento un frente unido ni una actuacion uniforme [ ...] y
sus miembros no obraron todos juntos.' In Congress, as in other walks of life, 'los
sacerdotes elegidos como diputados [...] actuaban casi siempre de acuerdo con sus
. . I ,95convicciones persona cs.
9] Staples, La iglesia en la primera republica federal. pp. 62-67. Costeloe, Church and State in
Independent Mexico. pp. 120-124.
94 Costeloe, Church and State in Independent Mexico, pp. 123-124.
95 Staples, La iglesia en la primera republica federal, p.162. Also see, Anne Staples, "Clerics as
Politicians: Church, State and Political Power in Independent Mexico," in Jaime Rodriguez O. (ed.),
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We must also be wary of arguing that Bustamante's regime deliberately set out
to strengthen the Church's political position. After all, the electoral reform was
designed to promote the election of property-holders to Congress, not specifically
clergymen. The law on prebendaries and canons was an interim measure, made
necessary by the fact that, despite nine years of discussions, the question of who
should exercise the right of patronage was still undecided. The Bustamante
administration had not abandoned all claim to this right, but had, in fact, made the
selection of which clerics should be proposed as bishops before the Pope. It seems
more likely that the Bustamante administration was concerned to court favour with the
Church, especially with the hierarchy, through both measures. The administration's
support of the Church, must have almost certainly come at a price: its political and
financial support. The Vice-President was not adverse to writing to the cathedral
chapters to ask for a loan or advance payment of the Church's tithe revenue.I" The
Minster of Justice, Espinosa addressed a circular to all diocesan governors in 1830,
asking them to use their influence and resources to promote the government's
achievements in introducing peace and order to Mexico. In the same year he wrote to
the metropolitan chapter to demand that a priest who had preached against the
government be demoted.97 Finally, seen in terms of the regime's general policies, it
could be argued that, given the almost non-existent state of the Church's
organisational framework in 1830, the administration could not perceive it as anything
other than another victim of the chaos infecting Mexican society. As the proponents
of constitutional order, they would be obliged to rectify the situation.
Mexico in the Age of Democratic Revolutions. 1750-1850 (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1994), pp. 223-241.
96 Staples, La iglesia en la prim era republicafederal, p. 124.
97 Costeloe, Church and State in Independent Mexico, p 42.
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D: Dealing with the Opposition
Bustamante's administration faced senous opposition from the many
supporters of Vicente Guerrero in Mexico City and the states from its very inception.
In January 1830, the Chamber of Deputies was composed of a majority of supporters
of the previous government. In defiance of the new order, they elected the radical,
Jose Maria Alpuche e Infante, as President of their chamber. Two newspapers: E/
At/eta and, Lorenzo de Zavala's journal, El Correo de la Federacion Mcxicana,
provided the printed medium for other voices of dissent in the capital. In the states,
opposition to the new government was most evident in the south of the states of
Mexico and Michoacan (modem day Guerrero). It was originally begun by the
deposed governor of Michoacan, Jose Salgado and the former Commander General of
the state, Jose Codallos. Both men were removed from office by the provisions of
article four of the Plan of Jalapa. Mariano Michelena, a supporter of the Plan, had led
the garrison of the state capital in rebellion against the governor, and persuaded the
city's ayuntamiento to press the federal government for Salgado's removal. In response
the governor and his Commander General gathered an army in Zamora. The
government sent troops under Antonio Garcia and General Armijo to subdue the
rebels, and after several weeks of fighting, succeeded in capturing Salgado, who was
taken to Mexico City and sentenced to death. Codallos escaped. On 10 March he
issued a plan which called for the re-establishment of the deposed legislatures, the end
to oppression and for Congress to decide who was the legitimate president. 9R On 13
March, El Registro Oficial reported that Guerrero had left his voluntary retirement in
Tixtla accompanied by Francisco Victoria and the escort that had travelled with him
from Mexico City. His objective was apparently a reunion with Codallos and his
98 Costeloe, La primera republicafederal, p. 261-261.
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supporters.Y He was quickly joined by Juan Alvarez, and soon the revolt spread
throughout the South.
For Bustamante's administration, dealing with the uprising in the South and
opposition in Mexico City was part of its crusade against the radical yorkinos and their
Jacobina sympathies. Facio claimed that 'la rebelion del sur fue la continuaci6n del
motin de la Acordada.,loo Alaman described the War of the South as having 'el
caracter de las invasiones que hacian los pueblos barbaros del Norte sobre la provincia
romana.,101 For good measure, both men accused Guerrero of deliberately attempting
to incite a caste war in order to further his cause.102 Their response to the uprising
was to send troops, first under the command of Jose Gabriel Armijo and later, Nicolas
Bravo. These engaged in a bloody guerrilla war for approximately a year, without any
major success. The yorkinos were seen as criminals by the government and their
supporters. They had incited the terrible riot of the Parian market, in which, as El
Registro Oficial reminded its readers in April 1830: 'hizo correr en abundancia la
sangre mexicana y se ataco y destruyo la propiedad de un modo inmoralmente atroz y
escandaloso.' 103 According to this newspaper, and others which supported the
government, the yorkinos had continued their evil ways in government, but now it was
time that they were punished. El Sol declared on 13 January 1830:
Dos frutos espera la nacion de su accion restauradora de las leyes: el
legal castigo de los criminales que se han gozado en sus padecimientos,
y verlos reducidos a la dicha imposibilidad de repetir sus atentados. 104
99 El Registro Oficial, 13 March 1830.
100 Jose Antonio Facio, Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio y sobre la causa
intentada contra los cuatro ministros del excelentismo senor vice-presidente D, Anastasio
Bustamante, presenta a los mexicanos el general ex-ministro de guerra y marina, Don Jose Antonio
Facio (Paris: Imprenta de Moquet y Compania, calle de la Harpe, no. 90, 1835), p. 116.
101 Alaman, "Memoria ... 1831." p. 259.
102 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, vol. 5, p. 490. Facio, Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de
su ministerio, p. 72.
IO~ El Registro Oficial, 12 April 1830.
104 El Sol, 13 January 1830.
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In the eyes of those who thought like Francisco Ibar, this wish was not 'una negra
venganza' but rather 'eljusto castigo [...] que reclama la vindicta publica. ,105
However, it is clear that the Bustamante administration did not feel able to
undertake the persecution of the yorkinos simply as retribution for the events of 1828.
The three main men considered to be the architects of the riot were not immediately
arrested. Guerrero was allowed to return to his hacienda in Tixtla without
interference, the Chamber of Deputies was allowed to elect Father Alpuche e Infante
and Zavala was left to continue the production of El Correo. It was necessary for the
restorers of 'Constitucion y Leyes' that their enemies were proved to be acting in a
manner which merited their detention. Of course, as we noted above, Father Alpuche e
Infante obliged the government in January by writing to General Teran to urge him to
rebel against Bustamante. He was later exiled. Guerrero similarly aided the
administration by deciding to join the rebellion in the South. Another rebellion planned
in Mexico City by deputy Anastasio Zerecero, which apparently proposed the
assassination of the Vice-President, provided the necessary material for his arrest and
exile. I 06 Even so, not all the government's enemies were so obliging, and alternative
methods had to be employed. According to Zavala, the Minister of War, Facio, made
two attempts to incriminate him in falsified plots against the government. On one
occasion he was invited to join a rebellion by an old acquaintance, who later confessed
to be working for the Minister. In the second, a letter apparently signed by Zavala was
'discovered' in a doorway, and presented to the Vice-President. The letter was
addressed to the governor of Zacatecas, Francisco Garcia and proposed rebellion. The
signature proved to have been produced using a stamp Zavala had employed to sign
105 Francisco Ibar, Regeneracion politica de la republica mexicana 0 cuadro historico-critico de los
sucesos politicos acaecidos en ella desde el 23 de diciembre de 1829 hasta e/ 19 de [unio de 1830
(Mexico City: Imprenta de la calle cerrado de Jesus, numero 1, a cargo del ciudadadano Tomas Uribe
y Alcalde, 1830), vol. 2, no. 2, 30 December 1829, pp. 5-6.
106 E/ Registro Oficial, 25 March, 23 June 1830.
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lottery tickets when he was Minister of Hacienda. Zavala resolved to leave Mexico as
a result. 107
The exile of figures like Alpuche, Zerecero and Zavala was not the retribution
that many of the supporters of the Plan of Jalapa had expected. Carlos Maria de
Bustamante considered that the government showed 'inconsiderada clemencia.' lOR
Francisco Ibar complained that the Vice President showed 'apatia y lenidad' by not
executing these men and, that he risked allowing them to repeat 'sus proyectos de
destruccion' in the near future.109 Most outrage surrounded the case of Lieutenant
Mariano Zerecero, who had been arrested, court-martialled and sentenced to death for
his involvement in his brother, Anastasio's, plans for rebellion. Zerecero's sentence was
suspended in the final hours before the planned execution by the Vice-President. He
ordered that a proposal that his sentence be commuted to ten years' exile be put before
Congress.IIO The newspaper, El Sol expressed its opinion that Zerecero should have
been shot as sentenced without any interferences from the government. III Ibar
launched a series of attacks on Bustamante in his periodical, accusing him of being a
traitor to the cause of Jalapa and betraying the trust of those who had supported
him.112 Both he and Carlos Maria Bustamante believed that the Vice-President had
been unduly influenced by his compadre, Colonel Manuel Barrera, who was opposed
to this execution, into taking this action.))3 Bustamante pointed out that the Vice-
President had appointed Barrera's son to review Zerecero's sentence, and it had been
107 Zavala, Ensayo historico, vol. 2, pp. 232-233.
108 La Voz de la Patria, 3 November 1830. Bustamante was the editor of this publication.
10C) Ibar, Regeneracion politica, vol. 3, no. 3,3 July 1830, p. 6.
110 El Registro Oficial, 29 May 1830.
III El Sol, 4 June 1830.
112 Ibar, Regeneracion politica, vol. 2, no. 50, 19 June 1830, vol. 3, no. I and 3, 23 June, 3 July 1830.
113 Ibid., vol. 2, p.3. To illustrate this point Ibar writes: 'Bustamante se ha dejado dominar por su
compadre Barrera, y segun los principios que se notan, con el tiempo sera el quien rija los destinos de
la republica. El entra en cl palacio gritando y usando de su caracter despotico, como si estuviera en
su casa, y aun se ha dicho que estando en junta de ministros ha tenido et atrevimiento de introducirse
en donde esta, gritando a su compadre, de manera que alguno de los ministros ha tenido que salirse
incomodo, [... ] El sr. vice-presidente Ie debe favores y no se le podra negar, como no pudo evitar el
que se infringiera las leyes por un yorkino sedicioso [Zerecero].' His italics.
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the result of this review that the sentence had been commuted. He also complained
that Barrera and the Minister of Justice, Espinosa, who was ultimately responsible for
Zerecero's sentence, were also well known friends; and that it was rumoured that
Barrera had convinced the Vice-President to appoint him to that position.i" In his
newspaper, La Voz de la Patria, Carlos Maria de Bustamante published an exposition
he had addressed to the government, in which he called for Zerecero to be executed as
originally sentenced and for Espinosa to be removed as Minister of Justice. I IS The
problem was, as the British Minister Richard Pakenham observed in August, that the
punishment the supporters of the Plan of Jalapa wanted to see meted out in
accordance with the promise of the government to enforce strong constitutional order,
was only being applied to those men who enjoyed no privileges in societyi" For, as
he concludes:
The fate of these obscure and friendless individuals, when contrasted
with the impunity enjoyed by culprits of higher rank who have
possessed the means of averting the vengeance of the law, must I
should think, fail to make that satisfactory impression which is the
object of a vigorous and inflexible enforcement of the law. 117
Perhaps as a result of criticism of the regime's perceived leniency towards the
privileged, in his speech to the opening of the extraordinary sessions of Congress in
June 1830, the Vice-President assured the representatives that his government had
abandoned 'los medios de la lenidad' and was now employing 'providencias fuertes y
el uso de las armas' to ensure that order and tranquillity were restored to the
114 La Voz de la Patria, 2 June 1830.
115 Ibid., 5 June 1830.
I Ii> On 18 August 1830, three soldiers implicated in a plot to assasinate the Vice-President, Manuel
Bello, Jose Echeverria and Damian Najera were executed. Zavala, Ensayo historico, vol. 2, pp. 255,
258. FO no. 50/61, p.176. Richard Packenham to the Earl of Aberdeen, Mexico City 30 August 1830.
Pakenham describes them as a sargeant and two lieutenants, and states that these executions as the
only ones that have been thus far carried out by the government.
117 Ibid.
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Republic. ,118 Signs of this new approach began to be seen by the end of the summer.
In September, Francisco Victoria, the brother of the former President, and Juan
Nepomuceno Rosains, a noted hero of the insurgency, were shot in Puebla after being
arrested for plotting a rebellion in favour of Guerrero.lll) Neither their own positions
nor those of their friends and relations were able to save them. In November, Colonels
Joaquin Garate and Jose Marquez were shot in San Luis Potosi, again accused of
plotting rebellion. 120 It appears that the regime had heeded its critics.
This move towards 'providencias fuertes' can also be seen in the Bustamante
regime's treatment of the press. In early 1830, new measures were introduced,
tightening the law which dealt with material deemed to be libellous. One measure was
a decree which allowed judges to impose fines upon those producing such material. In
May 1830, this new power was used with success against the opposition newspaper,
El Atleta. Its editors were fined the sum of3, 000 pesos and, being unable to make the
payment, had their printing presses confiscated.Y' By 1831 however, the government
had begun to supplement these fines with violent intimidation. Andres Quintana Roo
began to publish a newspaper, El Federalista, in January. This regularly branded the
government illegitimate and accused it of employing terror tactics against its
opponents. In February, his offices were visited by a group of military officers, who
threatened to destroy his presses. Quintana Roo was not present at the time, so the
soldiers proceeded to visit his house. It was clear they intended to assault the deputy.
He was saved by the quickwittedness of his wife, the insurgent heroine, Leona
118 "Discurso del general Bustamante en la apertura de las sesiones extraordinarias del Congreso
General, el 28 de junio de 1830," in Los presidentes de Mexico antes de III Nacion, 1821-1984
(Mexico City: LII Legislatura de la Camara de Diputados, 1985), vol. I, p. III.
119 Zavala. Ensayo historico, vol. 2, p. 254.
120 Ibid., p. 276.
121 Ibid., pp. 233-234. Costeloe, La primera republicafederal, p. 269. Costeloe points out that Zavala
originally claimed the fine to be of between 8,000 and 9, 000 pesos in a publication of 1830 entitled:
Juicio imparcial sobre los acontecimientos de Mexico en 1828 y 1829. This was changed to 3, 000 in
the Ensayo, written a number of years later. Whether the passing of years had made him forget the
true sum, or be less liable to exageration, we can never know.
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Vicario, who told the soldiers her husband was not in.I22 Similarly, in November, a
group of soldiers attacked the printing presses of the newspaper El Tribuno del
Pueblo Mexicano. The editor, Manuel Crescencio Rejon, was attacked in the street by
h Id' 123t e same so iers.
The most famous victim of this new policy of ruthlessness was, of course,
Vicente Guerrero. Guerrero had been involved in the guerrilla war in the South against
the government troops led by Nicolas Bravo and Jose Gabriel Armijo, with his allies
Alvarez, Codallos, Gordiano Guzman and Jose Salgado (who escaped from prison in
August 1830), since March 1830. By December, it was clear the war had reached an
impasse. The rebels were in a strong position on the coast and it seemed unlikely that
the government could defeat them but, the rebels had few allies outside the South and
were effectively isolated.124 This stalemate was famously broken by the intervention of
an Italian ship's captain Francisco Picaluga, who tricked Guerrero into boarding his
ship in Acapulco in January 1831 and imprisoned him. He then sailed for Oaxaca
where he surrendered his prisoner to the government authorities. From here Guerrero
was taken to Cuilapa where he was court-martialled and shot on 14 February. Without
Guerrero as a figurehead for the rebellion, the War in the South came to an end.
Alvarez negotiated peace and amnesties for his followers with Bravo. Only Codallos
1"5refused to accept an amnesty. He was later caught and shot. -
The capture of Guerrero appears to have been organised by the Minister of
War, Jose Antonio Facio. In 1833, during the prosecution of Bustamante's cabinet by
Congress, it was alleged that just before Picaluga kidnapped Guerrero, he had visited
Mexico City where, in a meeting with Facio, had promised to deliver up the rebel
122 Anna, Forging Mexico, pp. 234-235. Jaime E. Rodriguez 0., "Oposicion a Bustamante," Historia
Mexicana 20:2 (1970), pp. 208-209.
123 Rejon was chased through the streets by soldiers brandishing unsheathed sabres. He escaped by
climbing into a carriage. Bustamante, Diario historico, entries for 26, 29 October, 3 November 1831.
124 Guardino, Peasants, Politics and the Formation of Mexico's National State, p. 135.
125 Ibid.
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general for $50, 000.126 In his published defence to the vanous charges brought
against him in the trial, Facio denied this, and claimed instead that Picaluga had merely
offered to sell his ship to the government.127 However, Carlos Maria de Bustamante
notes in his diary, on 2 February 1831, that Facio boasted to him that such a deal to
capture Guerrero had been struck with the Italian in December 1830. He claims that
Facio had informed the cabinet of his arrangement with Picaluga shortly afterwards,
but that the response of his fellow ministers had been disbelief and laughter.12K This
story seems credible, for Picaluga did not hand his boat to the Mexican government,
yet he was paid the promised $50, 000. Colonel Gabriel Duran was dispatched to
Oaxaca with the money almost as soon as news reached the capital of Guerrero's
129capture.
The circumstances surrounding the execution of Guerrero are not so
straightforward. General Jose Antonio Mejia, in his statement for the trial of 1833,
asserted that the fate of Guerrero was decided in a cabinet meeting. He claimed to
have seen letters written by Bustamante to General Santa Anna and Colonel Pedro
Landero, in which the Vice-President explained the matter had been resolved by a
vote. According to Mejia, three votes had been in favour of execution and only one
against. The implication was that Bustamante, in these circumstances, did not need to
vote.130 Jose Maria Lafragua claimed in 1854 that Jose Maria TomeI had confided to
him the confession made to him by Alaman on his deathbed. Alaman declared that the
cabinet had voted thus: Bustamante, Espinosa and Facio for death, and Alaman and
126 "Acusacion del sr. general D. Juan Alvarez," and "Acusacion del sr. diputado D. Jose Antonio
Barragan," in Camara de Diputados, Proceso instructivoformado porla seccion del Gran Jurado de
la Camara de Diputados del Congreso General. en averiguacion de los delitos de que fueron
acusados los ex-ministros D. Lucas Alamaan, D. Rafael Mangino. D. Jose Antonio Facio y D. Jose
Ignacio Espinosa (Mexico City: Impreso por Ignacio Cumplido, calle de Zuleta, numero 14. 1833),
rg 1-5: In CON~UMEX. . '"
- Facio, Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su mtmsteno, p. 33.
128 Bustamante, Diario historico, entry for 2 February 1831.
129 Ibid., entry for 1 February 1831.
110 "Declaracion del sr. general Jose Maria Mejia," in ibid., p. 29.
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Mangino for exile. Lafragua asserts that he searched for evidence of this at the
Ministry of War, and found the relevant documents had been destroyed.Y' However,
at the time, in their responses to the charges, all four ministers denied that any such
cabinet meeting took place. Facio, Alaman and Mangino insist that the Vice-President
approached them personally with a scheme to commute any death sentence to exile.132
Espinosa denied all knowledge of any matter on the subject.133 The letters written by
Bustamante to Santa Anna and Landero do not clear up the matter. In the letter to
Landero of9 February 1831, Bustamante wrote:
Habia acordado en una junta de ministros una iniciativa pidiendo que
[Guerrero] viviese en pais extranjero con una asignacion que se
consideraba bastante para una comoda subsistencia, con prohibicion de
volver a pisar el territorio mexicano, pero habiendo observado que la
opinion dentro y fuera de las camaras se manifestaba en contra de esta
did .. , 134me I a, se ormtio este paso.
Or, in other words, that it was opposition from Congress that dissuaded the cabinet
from exiling Guerrero. Yet later in a letter to Santa Anna of 24 February, he changed
his mind and blamed the cabinet for persuading him not to introduce his initiative to
Congress:
Deseaba con empefio salvarle la vida, y acorde en junta de ministros
una iniciativa a las camaras pidiendo que saliera de la republica, pero la
opinion contraria que manifesto la mayo ria de sus miembros, cuando se
1 . . , 1 . 1 fu d di 135es msmuo en 0 particu ar, e causa e que se suspen lese.
131 Enrique Olavarria y Ferrari, "Mexico independiente, 1821-1855," in Vicente Riva Palacio (ed.),
Mexico atraves de los siglos. (Mexico City: Ballesca y Compafiia, 1888-1889),. vol. 4, p. 276-278,
Anna, Forging Mexico, p. 244.
132 Facio, Memoria que sabre los sucesos de sus ministrerio, p. 86, Alamein, "Defensa del ex-ministro
de relaciones," pp. 92-93 and "Contestacion del sr. Mangino," in Camara de Diputados, PJ'{)CCSO
instructivo, p. 57.
m "Contestacion del sr. Espinosa a los cargos," in ibid ... p. 60.
134 Bustamante to Pedro Landero, Mexico City, 9 February 183, in Olavarria y Ferrari. "Mexico
independiente," p. 278, footnote 1.
135 Bustamante to Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, 24 February 1831, in ibid, p. 279.
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Finally, a year later, in a letter to the Grand Jury of Congress during the trial of his
cabinet, he claimed that the above letter had been written incorrectly by his secretary:
Aunque en la carta citada se habla de junta de ministros, fue una
equivocacion de mi secretario privado, porque no la hubo en realidad, y
solo les hable en 10 particular separadamente sobre la iniciativa que yo
mismo redacte y mande al secretario de la Guerra para que la
presentase; pero que no tuvo efecto por los motivos que se expres an en
1· 136a rrusma carta.
What is apparent in these letters, is that Bustamante personally did not want to
see Guerrero executed. In fact, he himself was responsible for drawing up an initiative
for Congress which proposed his exile. This tallies with the evidence of Alaman, Facio
and Mangino, and also with that of Carlos Maria Bustamante, who in his diary reports
on 2 February of rumours that the administration was to present a bill to Congress
calling for Guerrero's exile to Lioma with a pension of 2, 000 pesos. On 5 February,
he reports that 'el vice-presidente no quiere que se Ie hable de fusilarlo [Guerrero], y
muestra el mayor empefio en libertarIo.' 137 What is also clear, is that the mood in
Mexico City amongst those who generally supported the government was not in
favour of this measure. Congress rejected a measure brought forward by deputy
Mariano Brasco to suspend all executions (including Guerrero's) until the amnesty law
currently under discussion was passed.138 CarIos Maria de Bustamante's own response
to the rumour that Guerrero may he sent to Lioma is unequivocal: 'Esto es muy
alarmante [...] si se indultase, su regreso seria seguro como el de Iturhide.' 139 Richard
Pakenham noted that Guerrero's eventual execution caused 'little sensation,' which
was surprising considering how popular he had been.140 Obviously, a certain kind of
IJ6 Bustamante to the Grand Jury, 1May 1833, in ibid.
1.17 Bustamante. Diario historico, entries for 2 and 5 February 1831.
IJ8 Ibid., entry for 4 February 1831.
IJ9 Ibid., entry for 2 February 1831.
140 FO no. 50/65, p. 176. Pakenham to Viscount Paimerston, Mexico City, 1 March 1831.
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opinion on the subject of the General was dominant at that time. However, whether
Bustamante was persuaded not to go ahead with his initiative because of the
opposition manifested by his cabinet, or by that present in Congress, or even because
he came to the conclusion that the safest way to deal with the threat of Guerrero was
execution, will never be known.
E: The hombres de bien and the New Opposition.
Anastasio Bustamante's speech to the opening of Congress of I January 1832,
set forth the achievements of its government:
En ningun periodo de nuestra existencia politica habiamos tenido tan
justo motivo de felicitarnos mutuamente por los progresos de la
republica como el presente. [...] Mientras que mucho del antiguo y
nuevo mundo se hallan despedazados por guerras sangrientas,
amagadas por turbaciones 0 devastadas por epidemias asoladoras, la
Providencia, volviendo sus miradas paternas hacia estos estados, antes
afligidos por semejantes calamidades, ha conservado en ellos la paz
interior, sin la cual todos los demas bienes son ilusorios, ha calmado las
rivalidades y el furor de los partidos, ha dirigido el espiritu de partido
hacia empresas utiles y beneficas y ha afianzado sobre estos cimientos
la prosperidad futura de la naci6n.141
In his eyes, or more properly those of Alaman, who no doubt penned the speech, the
aims of the Plan of Jalapa had been reached. Constitutional order had been re-
established in the Republic and prosperity was growing. However, the Vice-President
had spoken too soon. The very next day, a new plan would be issued in Veracruz by
Colonel Pedro Landero and adopted soon after by Santa Anna, which would lead to
the most sanguinary civil war in the history of Mexico's early national period. As
141 Anastasio Bustamante, "El general Bustamante en la apertura de las sesiones ordinarias del
Congreso General, el I de enero de 1832," in Los presidentes de Mexico antes de la nacion, vol. 1,
p. 124.
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events were about to prove, not everyone shared Alaman's assessment of the success
of the Plan ofJalapa.
In fact, by the end of 1831, a great deal of opposition to Bustamante's
government was apparent. The radical yorkinos and supporters of Guerrero,
represented in Congress by Andres Quintana Roo, were still a force to be reckoned
with. The administration's attempts to silence them through violence and intimidation
had merely strengthened their resolve. More dangerous to the government was the rise
of new opposition amongst its former supporters. It appears that many hombres de
bien were not happy with the manner in which the government had sought to
introduce its version of constitutional order. Some of this dissatisfaction was provoked
by the violence employed by the regime against its enemies. For example, in November
1830, the general and former escoces, Miguel Barragan, published a pamphlet in
which he warned that the War of the South could only degenerate into a terrible civil
war. He believed it was important to resolve the contlict as soon as possible. He did
not support the military campaign in the South and instead advocated initiating
negotiations with the rebels.142 Carlos Maria de Bustamante, for his part, did not
oppose the war, or even the execution of Guerrero. His quarrel was with the attacks
made upon the freedom of the press by the Bustamante regime, and the violence
h denuti d 143S own to ep ties an senators. -
However, the majority of the opposition from the hombres de bien, derived
from their dislike of the administration's political programme. They believed that the
government was dominated by military and ecclesiastical interests and feared that this
dominance would inevitably lead to the loss of the individuals rights, and the creation
of a dictatorship. 144 According to Jose Maria Luis Mora, himself a leading dissident by
142 LAF no. 395. Miguel Barragan. Exposicion del general Barragan al Soberano Congreso
(Guadalajara: Imprenta del ciudadano Ignacio Brambila. 1!BO).
14~ Bustamante, Diario Historico, entries for 9 and 10 October. 1 and 11 November 1831.
144 Costeloe, La primera republicafederal, pp. 318-320.
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1831, this new opposition was widespread. It included important figures in the
Congress, such as Miguel Santa Maria and Jose Maria Cabrera; and others in the
states, such as Sebastian Camacho, the governor of Veracruz, Melchor Muzquiz, the
governor of the state of Mexico and Anastasio Canedo, the governor of Jalisco. Mora
termed these opponents, 'el partido del progreso' and later, 'la oposicion legal,' to
distinguish them from that of the former yorkinos.145 As we shall see, this new
opposition, which was formed among men who had originally supported Bustamante
and the Plan of Jalapa, was destined to play an extremely important role in the
eventual collapse of Bustamante's administration.
F: The Civil War of 1832.
The Plan of Veracruz, declared on 2 January 1832, had one proclaimed aim. It
called upon the Vice-President to dismiss his cabinet, 'a quien la opinion publica acusa
de protector del centralismo y tolerador de los atentados cometidos contra la libertad
civil y los derechos individuales.' 146 It was undoubtedly the work of Santa Anna, who
lost no time in reinforcing his message in two letters to the Vice-President on 4
January. He suggested that the new cabinet be composed of Sebastian Camacho, the
current governor of Veracruz as Minister of Relations; Melchor Muzquiz, governor of
the state of Mexico, as Minister of War; Francisco Garcia, the governor of Zacatecas,
as Minister of Finance; and Valentin Gomez Farias as Minister of Justice.147 His plan
145 Jose Maria Luis Mora, "Revista politica de las diversas administraciones que la republica ha
tenido hasta 1837," in Lilian Briseno Senosiain, Laura Solares Robles and Laura Suarez de la Torre
(ed.), Obras comp/etas de Jose Maria Luis Mora, vol. 2, pp. 325-328.
146 "Acta y Plan de Veracruz sobre remocion del ministerio," in Berta Ulluo and Joel Hernandez
Santiago (eds.), Planes en la nacion mexicana.{Mexico City: Senado de la Republica/El Colegio de
Mexico, 1987), vol. 2, p. 73.
147 Mariano Riva Palacio Archive in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of
Texas at Austin (henceforth referred to as MRPA) nos. 202,203. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna to
Anastasio Bustamante, Veracruz, 4 January 1832. The first letter enclosed the plan. The second
contained his suggestions for the new members of the cabinet.
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did not call for armed revolt, but it seemed quite clear that, should his demands not be
met, this would be the unavoidable consequence. His accusations against Bustamante's
cabinet were nothing new. As we have seen, charges of centralism had been levelled
against the supporters of the Plan of Jalapa since 1829. From late 1830, great outrage
had also been witnessed at the government's ruthless treatment of its opponents, most
especially in the cases of Vicente Guerrero, Juan Nepomuceno Rosains and Francisco
Victoria. So, why did Santa Anna choose to stage a rebellion in January 1832? The
answer is threefold. In the first place, as Fowler has pointed out, it coincided with the
return of Jose Maria TomeI from the United States in December 1831 and a visit
TomeI made to Santa Anna just two weeks before the plan was announced. Santa
Anna might have been considering an uprising for sometime, but he needed the
diplomatic skills of someone like TomeI to organise a rebellion successfully. Tornel
had been appointed as a Plenipotentiary Minister to the U.S. government by Guerrero
in 1829 and the demise of the President left him in an unfortunate position. The
Bustamante administration had confirmed his appointment, but had appeared to regard
his posting as a neat way of keeping TomeI in political exile. Another minister was
sent to the United States and all government business was undertaken through him.
Tornel retained his title, but was not rewarded with any salary or responsibility. Not
unnaturally he retained a grudge against Bustamante and his ministers, one that was
further compounded by the execution of Guerrero, who had been a close friend.14S
Secondly, the timing of the Plan of Veracruz seemed designed to capitalise on
one of the worse scandals of the Bustamante administration. On 24 November 1831,
the Commander General of Jalisco, Ignacio lnclan arrested a printer, Juan Brambila,
for printing a pamphlet which he claimed defamed his character.l''" He ordered
148 Will Fowler, Tomei and Santa Anna. The Writer and the Caudillo. 1795-1853 (Westport,
Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp. 125-126.
149 The pamphlet accused the General of having seduced a married woman, Guadalupe Calder6n. It
was also said that the General behaved in a cowardly way when later challenged to a duel by the
woman's husband. He accepted the challenge, but appeared at the chosen place of encounter
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Brambila to disclose the author of the pamphlet, and when the printer refused, took
the decision to shoot him. The sentence was due to be carried out within three hours,
but after intervention by the Bishop of Guadalajara and the State Governor, Anastasio
Canedo, the Commander General, was persuaded not to go ahead with the
punishment. This did not mark the end of the problem, however. In his
correspondence with the Governor of Jalisco, Inclan had accused him of sedition and
treachery and in the light of this attitude, the Governor came to regard his treatment of
Brambila as an example of the hostile climate of militarism which existed within his
state. He called the state legislature to remove itself from Guadalajara for its own
safety and convened an emergency meeting in Lagos. Here the legislature decided that
Inclan's behaviour was an attack upon the current federal system of government and
elected to send a representative to Mexico City to call for Inclan's dismissal and his
punishment. In this they were supported by the legislatures of Zacatecas, Tamaulipas,
San Luis Potosi and Guanajuato, who also sent similar petitions to the federal
government in December. Zacatecas even offered a safe haven from the threat of
Inclan to the legislature of Jalisco. The deputies, however, decided to remain in exile
from Guadalajara within the state boundaries, in Lagos. On receiving news of the
disturbance in Jalisco, the government took immediate action. On 1 December, Cirilo
Gomez Anaya was ordered to march to Jalisco to remove Inclan, investigate the
circumstances of the Brambila case and dispatch Inclan to the capital. Meanwhile
rumours circulated that lnclan was plotting to resist Anaya. A pamphlet published in
Mexico City printed the text of a plan, supposedly drawn up by Inclan, which called
for a strengthening of the presence of the army in the states. It was alleged that this
plan was the precursor to another, whose intention would be to proclaim
surounded by armed men. Un espanol, Dos aiios en Mexico. p. 114. Bustamante. Diario historico,
entry for 3 December 1831.
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centralism.150 These accusations were further fuelled by the rumours that had been
circulating in Guadalajara and Mexico City since October, which asserted that the
garrison of the state capital was involved in a military plot to issue a pronunciamiento
in favour of centralism.I51 These rumours appeared to be unfounded when Gomez
Anaya arrived in Guadalajara on 24 December, and assumed the military command
with no opposition from Inchin.152 Even so, the Inclan scandal did not disappear; for it
soon became clear that the federal government was not about to prosecute the former
Commander General. Facio claimed that this was because no existing legislature
provided for the prosecution of a Commander General. The states and others who had
called for Inclan's dismissal and punishment, believed the government was simply
protecting Inclan and tacitly condoning his actions. For opponents of Bustamante, the
episode quickly became symbolic for all that was wrong with the government. As
Costeloe rightly points out, the events provided them with 'un material
propagandistico ideal para sus acusaciones de tirania contra el Gobierno y los militares
que 10 respaldaban.' 153 What is more important they also provided the ideal
background for the proclamation against the government. As the government
representatives who held negotiations with the rebels in January 1832 noted, the
events in Jalisco made up one of the most important justifications for the
. . 154pronunciamiento,
150 Jose Antonio Facio. Exposicion dirigida a las camaras del Congreso General por el secreta rio de
estado y del despacho de Guerra y Marina ace rca de lo~ acontecimientos del estado de Jalisco en
noviember del aiio pasado (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila. dirigida por Jose Ximeno, calle de
Medinas, numero 6. 1832). pp. 1-5. 11-18. In the British Library. Frank N. Sarnponaro, 'The
Political Role of the Army, 1821-1848" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. State University of New
York at Stony Brook. 1974). pp. 144-147.
151 Bustamante, Diario historico, entries for 22,28 October. 9 November lR31.
152 Facio. Exposicion dirigida a las camaras, pp. 5-6.
153 Costeloe, La primera republicafederal, p. 323.
154 El Sol. 30 January 1832. Bernardo Couto and Vicente Segura to the Governor of Veracruz. 25
January 1832. They describe the main themes of the rebels thus: 'Se hizo merito de la impunidad en
que han visto los que en Yucatan destruyeron el gobiemo existente: de la tibiesa [sic] con que a su
juicio se ha procedido en el castigo del atentado del general lnclan en Jalisco: de conatos dirigidos a
estinguir la libertad de la presa: y por ultimo, de las demasias cometidas en las personas de algunos
miembros del Congreso General.' Vice-Governor of Veracruz to the Minister of War. 25 January
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Thirdly, the timing of the Plan of Veracruz may also have been influenced by
the fact that 1832 was the year designated for the new Presidential elections. It has
been suggested on more than one occasion that Santa Anna coveted the Presidential
position in 1832 and used the Plan of Veracruz as a base from which to win support
for his candidacy. ISS The possible nominations for this position were already being
discussed at the end of 1831, and it was already clear that the two most important
candidates were Santa Anna and Mier y Teran. Santa Anna's support was based in
Veracruz and with the old supporters of Vicente Guerrero: the yorkinos and
radicals.156 Mier y Teran was the candidate of Jose Maria Luis Mora and many of the
hombres de bien, who formed 'el partido de progreso.' Mier y Teran like Santa Anna
was an ideal choice for candidate. Both were popular figures in the army and neither
were tarnished by association with the current regime. Mier y Teran had spent the last
two years in Texas, while Santa Anna had passed the same time in retirement in his
hacienda. Between the two, it seemed like Mier y Teran held the upper hand. Mora
had convinced him to enter into dialogue with Valentin Gomez Farias and Francisco
Garcia in Zacatecas, both influential figures throughout the states as dogged defenders
of federalism and opponents of Church and army privilege. In this correspondence,
Mier y Teran gave guarantees that once in office he would favour the gradual abolition
of both military and ecclesiastical fueros and the removal of federal army garrisons in
the state capitals.157 Santa Anna, however, found his support amongst the states
legislatures, which had been elected after the Alaman reforms of 1830, confined to his
own state of Veracruz. Thus, it may well be that he wished to capitalise on the
unpopularity of the cabinet in the states following the Inclan affair with the Plan of
1832. His view on the arguments presented by the rebels to justify their rebellion was: 'todos se
reducen a inculpar al actual ministerio de tendencia hacia el centralismo, para 10 cual se citaron como
testimonios de conviccion los sucesos de Yucatan y Jalisco y algunos de los excesos que se han
cometido en la capital. '
155 Costeloe, La primera republica federal. p. 329.
156 Ibid., p. 321.
157 Robert F. Florestedt. "Mora contra Bustamante," Historia Mexicana 12:1 (1962), p.35.
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Veracruz.IS8 His suggestions to Bustamante that he replace his cabinet with Camacho,
Muzquiz, Gomez Farias and Garcia, all important figures in the opposition from the
states, do seem to indicate that he wished to court their support.159 He might have
believed that a success in influencing Bustamante to change his cabinet might ensure
this support. Or possibly, that a success in overthrowing the administration
completely, in time for the presidential election, would surely guarantee it.
The administration's response to the Plan of Veracruz appeared initially
conciliatory. All members of the cabinet offered their resignation on 10 January.160 At
the same time, the Vice-President sent a group of three negotiators from Mexico City
to Jalapa to discuss the rebel demands with Santa Anna.161 However, it was soon clear
that Bustamante was not prepared to be dictated to by Santa Anna. On 11 January, the
Vice-President refused to accept the resignations of his ministers.l'" A few days later,
Facio left Mexico City bound for Puebla and Jalapa. According to the Rcgistro
Oficial, his mission was to oversee military preparations being made for an active
suppression of the revolt, under the supervision of General Calderon.163 While in
Jalapa, according to a letter published in El Fenix de la Libertad, Facio also attempted
to diffuse the situation by organising a counter strike against Santa Anna from within
Veracruz. He wrote to Jose Maria Flores, the commander of the Castle of Ulua, on 25
January, on behalf of the government. In this letter, he offered Flores a promotion and
158 Costeloe, La prim era republicafederal., p. 329.
15<) MRPA no. 203. Santa Anna to Bustamante, 4 January 1832. Frank N. Samponaro, "La alianza de
Santa Anna y los federalistas, 1832-1834. Su formacion y desintegracion," Historia Mexicana 30:3
(1981), p. 361. Samponaro suggests that Santa Anna proposed Garcia and Gomez Farias in order to
win their support for the armed rebellion he was planning. This may well be true, but it is interesting
to note that all the men suggested, bar Gomez Farias, were currently state governors. This implies
Santa Anna was interested in gaining the support of other states, not just Zacatecas.
160 El Sol. 12 January 1832. Alaman, Espinosa, Facio and Mangino to Bustamante, Mexico City. 10
January 1832.
161 Costeloe, La primera republica federal. p. 330. The men were: Bernardo Couto, Vicente Segura
and Manuel Maria Perez.
162 El Sol. 12 January 1832. Jose Cacho to the Ministers of Relations, War. Finance and Justice, II
January 1832.
Ib.~El Registro Oficial, 11 January 1832. Also quoted in Costeloe, La primera republica federal. p.
330.
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a payment of $25, 000, if he would announce a pronunciamiento in favour of the
government from the castle.l64 Flores refused this offer and, in his response, allied
himself firmly with Santa Anna.165
In the light of the administration's refusal to acquiesce to the demands of Santa
Anna, despite having also received separate petitions from Zacatecas and Jalisco which
also called for a change in the cabinet.i'" the pronunciamiento at Veracruz quickly
turned into an armed rebellion. The government troops organised by Calderon
marched upon Veracruz in February. On 3 March, Santa Anna's men and those of the
government, met in Tolome, just outside Veracruz. Santa Anna was completely
defeated. He lost almost 80 dead and at least another 500 as prisoners.167 He retreated
to Veracruz, where his defence now numbered little more than 200. The government
was now in a position to end the rebellion for good. However, they failed to take
advantage of Santa Anna's crippling weakness. No new assault was made upon
Veracruz. Instead, Calderon remained in Tolome until 20 March, caring for his
fr M· IllSwounded and waiting for supplies and reinforcements om eXlCO. In the
meantime, Santa Anna was able to recover his strength and enlist new soldiers. By 16
March, he was already able to boast to Francisco Garcia that he could now count on
over 2, 000 men.169 When Calderon did attack Veracruz on 24 March his advantage
was non-existent, and his assault quickly descended into an interminable siege. After a
month, no progress had been made and the rains, along with the inevitable illnesses
164 El Fenix de la Libertad, 4 February 1832. Facio to Jose Maria Flores. Jalapa. 25 January 1102.
quoted in Camara de Diputados. Proceso instructivo, pp. 54-55.
165 Flores to Facio, Ulua, 31 January 1832 .• in Castigo de la traicion (Mexico City: Imprenta de las
Escalerillas, a cargo de Agustin Guiol, 1832). In CONDUMEX.
166 Congreso de Jalisco, La legislatura de Jalisco pide la remocion del ministerio, (Mexico City:
Imprenta de Escalerillas, a cargo del ciudadano Agustin Guiol 1832). The petition of Zacatecas is
contained in El Fenix de la Libertad, 1 February 1832, quoted in Costeloe, La primera republica
federal. p. 332.
167 Costeloe, La primera republica federal. p. 333.
168 Un espafiol. Dos anos en Mexico. pp. ISO-lSI. FO no. 50172, p. 35. Pakenham to Palmerston. 2
~rrFiI183.2. G . Ar hi . h N . L B L' A . C II . U' . francisco arcia c rve m teethe ee enson atm mencan 0 ecnon, ruversity 0
Texas at Austin (henceforth referred to as FGA) folder 36. no.3. Santa Anna to Garcia, Veracruz 16
March 1832.
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were fast approaching.i" By 13 May, Calderon was forced to retire and march his
troops, of whom at least half had become ill, back to Jalapa. He was replaced by
Facio, who marched from Mexico City in May after his second resignation, with 500
171men.
While Santa Anna was licking his wounds in Veracruz, support was growing
for his rebellion. On 10 March in Tampico, the garrison of the port issued a
pronunciamiento in favour of Santa Anna. This move was supported by their
commander, General Esteban Moctezuma. Now, both Atlantic sea ports were in the
hands of the rebels. In April, a new twist appeared. In Lerma, a pronunciamiento was
announced by Ignacio Inclan, who had recently escaped from prison. 172 This declared
that Manuel Gomez Pedraza was the only legitimate president of Mexico. The real
architects of this plan were Francisco Garcia and Valentin Gomez Farias, with whom
Inclan had been in correspondence since escaping from prison. However, their idea
was not new. Ever since Bustamante took up the reins of government, there had been
those who had upheld Gomez Pedraza's claim on the Presidency, believing that this
would solve the constitutional problem created by Bustamante having overthrown
Guerrero, who had in tum more or less overthrown Gomez Pedraza in 1828. In March
1830, Vicente Rocafuerte told the Minister of Finance that the return of Gomez
Pedraza was the only way to bring peace and order back to Mexico 173 Ex-yorkinos
and radicals like Andres Quintana Roo and Juan de Dios Canedo had also adopted the
idea, as it provided the most legitimate, and therefore, most effective way of attacking
170 FO no. 50/72, p. 74. Pakenham to Palmerston, 26 April 1832.
171 Ibid. p. 143. Pakenham to Palmerston, 9 June 1832.
172 On 27 March a law was introduced outlining exactly what the procedure should be to prosecute a
Commandant General. Dublan and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, vol. 2, p. 416. Law dated March
27th 1832. It seemed that Inclan was about to be prosecuted for his behaviour in Guadalajara. It is
difficult not to agree with El Portalero, a correspondent to the newspaper La Verdad Desnuda in
1833, who believed the publication of the law and most likely resentment against the Bustamante
r~~ime .were the moti~es for Inclan 's adhe~i~n to the rebe~s. La Ver1~d Desn.uda, 15 May 1833.
. Jaime E. Rodriguez 0., El nacimiento de Hispanoamerica. Vicente Rocafuerte y el
hispanoamericanismo, 1808-1832 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1980), p. 216.
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the government. 174In January 1831, Canedo delivered a speech to the Chamber in
which he declared that, in accordance with the election results of 1828, Manuel
Gomez Pedraza was the only legitimate President. He was supported in Congress by
Quintana Roo and Pacheco Leal. 175
In fact, plans may have been in existence since 1830 to bring Gomez Pedraza
back to Mexico. 176Certainly, the administration did not want the former Minister of
War to return to Mexico from France. When Gomez Pedraza wrote to the Vice-
President in March 1830, expressing his desire to return, Bustamante replied, asking
him to reconsider his decision. He protested that his presence might cause general
unrest, in which 'aun los amigos de usted se pondrian en movimiento, y la guerra civil
que hoy esta reducida a una parte del sur, se genera lizaria en toda la republica.' 177
Costeloe suggests that Gomez Pedraza may have known of plots in his favour, and
chose to return for that reason. 178 Gomez Pedraza, of course, does not admit to this.
His explanation is that he wished to return home to the bosom of his family and lead a
quiet life in the country.179 However, whatever the reason, when he did arrive in
Veracruz, he was refused permission to land. The administration offered him the
position of Plenipotentiary Minister in France or Colombia to soften the terms of this
new exile, but Gomez Pedraza refused these offers and took up residence in New
174 Andres Quintana Roo, Acusacion presentada en la Camara de Diputados el 2 de diciembre de
1830, contra el Ministro de la Guerra (Mexico City: Oficina del ciudadano Alejandro Valdes a cargo
de Jose Maria Gallegos, 1830). In the British Library.
175 Rodriguez O. "Oposicion a Bustamante," p. 206.
176 Costeloe, La primera republica federal, p. 313.
177 Anastasio Bustamante to Manuel Gomez Pedraza, Mexico City, 29 August UBO, in "Manifiesto
que Manuel Gomez Pedraza, ciudadano de la republica de Mexico, dedica a sus compafieros, 0 sea
una reseiia de su vida publica," in Laura Solares Robles (ed.), La obra polltica de Manuel Gomez
Pedraza, 1813-1851 (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/ Instituto Matias Romero/ Acervo Historico
Diplornatico de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1999). p. 243. Gomez Pedraza curiously did
not receive this letter until his arrival in New Orleans. It did not leave Veracruz until 13 October.
despite having been apparently written in August. It appears that the letter was either held up. or that
it was written in October and dated 30 August, perhaps to make it seem to the recipient that the Vice-
President had tried to avoid the unpleasant situation in Veracruz.
178 Costeloe, La primera republica federal, pp. 313-134.
179 "Manifiesto," p. 231.
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Orleans instead.180 In the months following this episode, there were more rumours of
plans in favour of Gomez Pedraza's presidency. In February 1831, Ignacio Inclan
wrote to Alaman from Morelia, stating that a party in favour of Gomez Pedraza
existed within the state, and that he had been asked to join.181 In the same month,
Carlos Maria de Bustamante recorded in his diary that Jose Ramon Malo had informed
Facio that such a plot also existed in Toluca.182 By the end of 1831, a definite cadre of
opposition had been assembled against the Bustamante government in favour of
Gomez Pedraza, in Mexico City. The leaders of this group were Quintana Roo and
Rejon. Other members included Vicente Rocafuerte, Mariano Riva Palacio (Guerrero's
son-in-law), Juan Rodriguez Puebla and Antonio Pacheco Leal. According to Mora,
once the Plan of Veracruz was declared, this group allied itself to the armed struggle.
Gomez Farias and Garcia were in communication with Quintana Roo's group
in Mexico City. However, unlike Quintana Roo and his group, they still had not
decided to align themselves with Santa Anna. Their decision to arrange Inclan's
pronunciamiento suggests that they may have wished to change the direction of the
rebellion. Frank Samponaro suggests that neither man trusted Santa Anna and wished
to prevent him take up the presidency should Bustamante be defeated.183 This plan
made it clear that they had different objectives to those of Santa Anna. Even so, it
appears that Gomez Farias and Garcia were keeping their options open. They may
have begun discussing their possible support for Santa Anna, but at the same time they
continued their negotiations with Mier y Teran and Mora. These men and their allies
amongst the hombres de bien did not wish to see Santa Anna's rebellion overthrow
180 Ibid,. p. 232. For a description of Gomez Pedraza's exile in France. return to Veracruz and new
exile in New Orleans, see Laura Solares Robles, Una revolucion pacifica. Biografia politica de
Manuel Gomez Pedraza, 1789-1851 (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Acervo Historico Diplomatico de la
Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores/Consejo Estatal para la Cultura y las Artes del Gobierno del
Estado de Queretaro, 1996), pp. 85-97.
181 Ignacio Inclan to Alaman, 20 February 1831. quoted in Costeloe, La prim era republicafederal. p.
315.
182 Bustamante, Diario historico. Entry for 17 February 1831.
183 Samponaro, "Santa Anna y los federalistas," pp. 362-363.
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Bustamante, as they knew this would lead to his elevation to the Presidency. Instead,
their aim was to have Bustamante replaced democratically in the September
elections.I84 Thus, Mier y Teran had taken up arms for the government in April and
fought the rebels in Tampico. General Melchor Muzquiz, another member of this
group, also fought for the government in Lerma against Inclan.
Therefore, the government's position by May 1832 was difficult. Calderon had
been forced to abandon the siege at Veracruz, leaving Santa Anna's rebellion very
much in tact. 600 soldiers were left behind under General Rincon to defend the Puente
Nacional and prevent Santa Anna advancing, but these men were quickly forced to
retreat to Jalapa by the rebels.I85 In Tampico, Mier y Teran had been defeated by
Moctezuma. Worryingly for the government, his colours as a potential opponent now
were revealed since in the wake of his defeat, he called for the dismissal of the
cabinet.I86 Although Inclan's rebellion in Lerma had been quickly extinguished by
Muzquiz, the General also demonstrated his membership of the opposition, following
up his victory by also asking for the replacement of Bustamante's ministers. 187 Perhaps
as a result of the pressure applied from both Generals, whose support was
undoubtedly necessary if Santa Anna was to be defeated, Alaman, Facio and Espinosa
offered their resignations once more. On 17 May, Bustamante announced to the
Chamber of Deputies that he had resolved to accept their requestsl88 This move did
not bring an end to the administration's problems, however. The Vice-President was
unable to find men willing to fill the three cabinet posts and they would remain empty
until August. He asked Sebastian Camacho to be the Minister of Relations, Jose Maria
Calderon, the Minister of War and Jose Maria Bocanegra, the Minister of Justice. All
184 Mora, "Revista politica," p. 338,345-348. Robert F. Florstedt, "Mora contra Bustmante," Historia
Mexicana 12: 1 (1962), pp. 42-44.
185 Costeloe, La primera republica federal. p. 334.
186 Mora, "Revista politica," p. 345.
187 Melchor Muzquiz Conducta del General Muzquiz en los acontecimientos de Toluca (Mexico City:
Imprenta del Gobierno, a cargo del ciudadano Juan Matute, 1832).
188 Costeloe, La primera republica, pp. 335-336.
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refused.189 It was clear that he was in an extremely isolated position, with the survival
of his administration reliant on the tacit support of 'Ia oposicion legal.' Bustamante
even offered Mora a position in the cabinet. But he declared that nothing in the world
would induce him to serve under Bustamante. The dismissal of the cabinet did not
imply a change of political direction by the Vice-President, in his opinion. It was
merely a tactic 'para endonnecer a la oposicion.' 190 The weakness of Bustamante's
Vice-Presidency became even more apparent in July, when a motion was placed before
the Council of Government proposing that he be declared 'morally unfit' to govern.l "
Santa Anna, in Veracruz, was also somewhat isolated. He may have succeeded
in forcing Calderon and his men to retreat to Jalapa, but his rebellion was still confined
to Veracruz and Tampico. Moreover, the reason for his rebellion was now non-
existent. Had he only revolted to ensure the terms of the Plan of Veracruz were met, it
might be expected that he would return home satisfied. Quite clearly, Santa Anna, had
other intentions. It may be, as Costeloe suggests, that he realised he had not won
sufficient support to ensure his victory in the upcoming Presidential elections. Or that
he did not believe that the elections held under the current regime could be trusted. Or
that he was simply determined to see Bustamante removed from power. We cannot be
sure. However, Santa Anna now began to change his demands. In negotiations with
Sebastian Camacho, who was acting as the government's representative in Veracruz,
he now demanded that Gomez Pedraza return to the Presidency; that the ex-cabinet
ministers be brought to trial; and he and his troops be granted amnesty. When these
demands were refused, he announced a new plan on 5 July which proclaimed Gomez
Pedraza as the only legitimate President.192 This new demand was undoubtedly
189 Rodriguez 0., "Oposicion a Bustamante," p. 226.
190 Mora to Teran, Mexico City. 29 June 1832. Mora, "Revista politica," pp. 347-348.
191 Bustamante, Diario historico, entry for 16 July 1832, quoted in Vazquez. "Political Plans and
Collaboration," p. 27.
192 "Acta de la guamicion de Veracruz y la fortaleza de Ulua reiterando el Plan de Veracruz y
desconociendo el gobierno de Bustamante," in Ulluo and Hernandez Santiago (eds.), Planes en la
nacion mexicana, vol. 2, p. 129.
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designed to appeal to Garcia and Gomez Farias in Zacatecas and in so doing, end
Santa Anna's isolation.
The new plan quickly had the desired effect. On 15 July, Zacatecas published a
decree in which Gomez Pedraza was recognised as the legitimate President and
Bustamante was condemned as an usurper. Garcia also promised that 6, 000 militia
troops were prepared to defend this assertion. 193His decision may have been a direct
result of Santa Anna's new proposal, but it was also influenced by the suicide ofMier y
Teran. His death meant that a peaceful way to remove Bustamante now appeared
unlikely.194 The adhesion of Zacatecas to Santa Anna's cause opened the floodgates.
Three days later, the state of Jalisco also issued a decree in favour of Gomez
Pedraza.195 In Durango, Lieutenant Colonel Jose Urrea, issued a plan supporting
Santa Anna.l96 In the South, Guerrero's old allies, Juan Alvarez and Gordiano
Guzman added their voices of rebellion.197 Esteban Moctezuma advanced from
Tampico to San Luis Potosi and on his arrival the ayuntamiento issued an act
.. G' Pedraza as Presid 198recogrusmg omez e raza as resi ent.
The escalation of the rebellion saved Bustamante from his isolation in Mexico
City. On 3 August he asked for permission to leave the executive and head the army
against the rebels himself. This was granted and Melchor Muzquiz was appointed as
interim President. Bustamante was appointed as head of the army to march upon
Zacatecas and San Luis Potosi, while Facio, who was still in Jalapa at this point, was
charged with defeating Santa Anna in Veracruz. As Frank Samponaro points out, their
193 "Decreto en que el estado de Zacatecas reconoce como presidente legitimo a don Manuel Gomez
Pedraza," in ibid., vol. 2, p. 131.
194 Mora, "Revista politica," p. 351.
195 Jose Maria Bocanegra, Memorias para la historia de Mexico independiente, 1822-1846 (Mexico
City: Instituto Cultural Helenico/Instituto Nacional de Estudios de la Revoluci6n Mexicana/Fondo de
Cultura Economica, 1987), vol. 2, p. 219.
196 Costeloe, La primera republica, p. 339.
197 Anna, Forging Mexico, p. 249.
198 Bocanegra, Memorias, vol. 2, pp. 214-125. "Acta de San Luis Potosi," in Ulluo and Santiago
(eds.), Planes en la nacion mexicana., vol. 2, p. 139.
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position in the late summer of 1832 was far from hopeless. The government could still
count on the support of Luis Quintanar, Mariano Arista, Gabriel Duran, Juan Amador,
and Luis Cortazar, all high-ranking officials and each commanding large armies, The
problem as ever, would be economic. The rebel control of the Veracruz and Tampico
customs houses made it difficult to finance his campaign and unpaid bills and soldiers
could only spell trouble in the long run.199 Bustamante marched North on 17 August,
with 1, 580 men. He quickly enjoyed success over Moctezuma in San Luis Potosi on
18 September. The battle of Gallinero, just outside San Miguel de Allende, left the
rebels with between 800 and 1000 dead and 600 prisoners.2oo The following day he
presented his resignation as Vice-President to the Chamber of Deputies. This appears
a strange reaction to have in the wake of his military victory. He explains that he had
not wished to resign earlier, lest he be considered a coward.201 In reality it marked the
fait accompli of his decision to leave the government in the hands of Muzquiz. The
interim President, and the cabinet he subsequently appointed, was associated with the
opposition put forward by hombres de bien such as Mora to Bustamante's regime.
This opposition was now in command, and his return to the executive was now
extremely unlikely. At this point he did not really fear military defeat. In fact, his
subsequent capture of San Luis Potosi could have marked the beginning of the end of
the rebellion. However, Facio had been unable to prevent Santa Anna from advancing
from Veracruz. On 29 September, he met the rebels in battle near Puebla, in San
Agustin Palmar and was comprehensively defeated. Rumours in the capital even
alleged Facio had been killed in the encounter.202 Puebla was now undefended.203
199 Samponaro, 'The Political Role of the Army," pp. 182-183.
200 Bocanegra, Memorias, vol. 2, p. 299. El Sol. 28 September 1832.
201 El Sol, 29 September 1832. Bustamante to the Secretary of the Chamber of Deputies, Dolores de
Hidalgo, 19 September 1832.
202 "Detalle de la derrota del ejercito ministerial en San Agustin Palmar por el intrepido general
Antonio LOpez de Santa Anna," in Alcance al numero 54 de la Columna (Mexico City: Imprenta de
las Escalerillas, a cargos del ciudadano Agustin Guiol, 1832). The article claims that 355 of Facio's
men were killed.
203 Bocanegra, Memorias, vol. 2, pp. 303-305.
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Santa Anna's troops entered Puebla on 3 October. From here they presented a
dangerous threat to Mexico City. President Muzquiz began negotiations with Santa
Anna on the subject of surrender. On 7 October, Muzquiz suggested that a solution to
the conflict could be achieved if Santa Anna were to recognise Bustamante's and his
own resignation from the executive. An interim president could then be elected by the
states to serve until April 1833. He also proposed 'un completo olvido de los
acontecimientos pasados' for both sides.204 On 10 October, Santa Anna replied to
Muzquiz. He refused to accept the Interim President's terms on the grounds that he
and his men were being treated as rebels, and that any acceptance of Muzquiz's or
Bustamante resignation amounted to a recognition of their government's legitimacy.
He reaffirmed his support for Manuel Gomez Pedraza and rejected any call of an
amnesty.20S On 17 October, the government declared Mexico to be in a state of siege.
The next day, troops marched from Puebla in the direction of Mexico. On hearing the
news of Santa Anna's advance, Bustamante marched south from San Luis Potosi. As
he approached the capital, Santa Anna withdrew to Puebla to await a confrontation.
Their troops finally met just outside Puebla, in the Rancho de Posadas on 6 December,
in a battle filled with 'la muerte, el espanto y el horror,' in the words of one
pamphletist,206 and, 'tan empefiada y sangrienta como 10 fue la del Gallinero'
according to Jose Maria Bocanegra.207 Both sides withdrew from the battlefield
without achieving a definitive victory (although both would claim it)208 and the
position seemed to be at a stalemate.
204 Melchor Muzquiz to Santa Anna, Mexico City, 7 October 1832. in Primera carta dirigida par el
exmo. sr. D. Melchor Miaquiz a S.E. el general Iibertador, sobre las negociaciones de la paz, y
contestacion presentada par conducto de los comisionados (Puebla: Imprenta de la calle de
Carniceria, bajo la direcci6n de P.P. Carillo, (832), pp. 1-2. In CONDUMEX.
20S Santa Anna to Muzquiz, Puebla, 10 October 1832, in ibid., pp. 2-3.
206 Toma de Puebla y glorias de la patria (Mexico City: n.p., 1832). In the British Library.
207 Bocanegra, Memorias, vol. 2, p. 316.
208 Bocanegra claimed victory for the santanistas . Bocanegra, Memorias, vol. 2 p. 317, while the
author of Toma de Puebla y glorias de la patria would claim it for Bustamante.
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The next day both sides continued to fire upon each other from their respective
positions. Bustamante was camped in the Cerro de San Juan and Santa Anna in Puebla
with the newly-arrived Gomez Pedraza.209 However, according to the rumour
recorded by Carlos Maria de Bustamante, this stalemate was broken by a 'una carta
amistosa' sent to Gomez Pedraza by Bustamante's second-in-command, Luis
Cortazar. He suggested that both sides be allowed to transfer their wounded to a
nearby hospital and this opened the channels of communication. A meeting between
the representatives of both sides was eventually arranged, in which Gomez Pedraza
presented his plan for peace.210 In signing this Bustamante agreed to recognise Gomez
Pedraza as legitimate president and to support a general amnesty for all political
crimes committed since September 1828. This was a significant concession on the part
of Santa Anna, who had earlier refused to accept Muzquiz's surrender on such a
condition as a general amnesty.211 This first agreement was rejected by Congress as
unconstitutional and unacceptable. Therefore, a new treaty had to be drawn up at the
Hacienda of Zavaleta. This treaty altered the unacceptable nature of the first, by
providing for new elections to replace the national Congress and the state legislatures
and proposed that presidential elections be held on I March, with Gomez Pedraza
acting as president until this point. It also promised that the army would safeguard the
Constitution and the republican system of government. The article dealing with the
212general amnesty was untouched.
209 Carlos Maria Bustamante, Invasion de Mexico por D. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. Scgunda
Parte (Mexico City: Imprenta del ciudadano Alejandro Valdes, a cargo de Jose Maria Gallegos,
1832), pp. 25-7. In CONDUMEX. Also see: Archivo Historico del Instituto Nacional de
Antropologia e Historia (henceforth referred to as INAH), Coleccion Bustamante V. 6 1832, 164.
Diario de las operaciones del E.S.D. Anastasio Bustamante. desde e/ 22 de noviembre de 1832 basta
el I I de diciembre de 1832. dated 19th December 1823.
210 Bustamante Invasion de Mexico por D. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. Segunda Parte. p. 27 and
Diario de operaciones. LAF 39. Al publico (Puebla: Imprenta del C. Jose Maria Campos. 1832).
contains Manuel Gomez Pedraza's plan.
211 Primera carta dirigida por el excmo. sr. D. Melchior Muzquiz (I S.E. el general libertador, sabre
negociaciones de paz. y contestacion presentada por conducta de los comisionados , p.3.
212 Costeloe, La primera republica. p.346
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This concession suggests that the victory of Santa Anna over Bustamante was
not as complete as some historians would have us believe. Bustamante had for the
most part been entirely successful in his confrontations with the rebels until this point;
his decisive action in returning to face Santa Anna from San Luis Potosi was not the
action of a man who believed that defeat was either imminent or inevitable. The British
Minister, Pakenham, declared that he was surprised that Bustamante had agreed to
negotiate a treaty with Santa Anna, as 'since the arrival of Bustamante, Santa Anna
has been constantly obliged to give way. ,213 Moreover, the attitude of Congress,
which refused to sanction the first peace treaty drawn up between Bustamante and
Santa Anna, is inconceivable unless we believe that body was not convinced the fight
was yet over either. There is also the suggestion that his troops did not think this
either, for Carlos Maria de Bustamante notes that in signing both treaties his namesake
disappointed many of his generals (two of whom would play an important part in the
peace negotiations) and supporters. According to Carlos Maria de Bustamante, there
was a general feeling of disgust amongst the officers and men 'porque entendian
haberse capitulado con el enemigo.'214 He darkly hints that 'los agentes y sordidos
maniobradores' are to blame for the whole affair and generously refrains from
condemning General Bustamante from succumbing to their blandishments.t'< Who
these agents are is not clear, but it is certainly not too far fetched to suggest that Luis
Cortazar, the composer of the 'carta amistosa,' which initiated the peace negotiations,
may have been one of their number. There had been rumours that Cortazar had been
about to desert Bustamante in November.216 More damningly, he himself had written
to Gomez Farias in July, declaring that if Zacatecas was successful in spreading the
213 FO no. 50173, p. 225. Pakenham to Palmerston, 13 December 1832.
214 Bustamante, La invasion de Mexico por D. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. Segunda Parte. p. 27
and Diario de Operaciones.
215 Bustamante, La invasion de Mexico por D. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. Segunda Parte. p.27
216 VGFA no. 84.Vicente Romero to Valentin Gomez Farias, 8 November 1832,
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rebellion, 'rogare al cielo que proteja su causa. ,21 7 In which case, two possible
explanations for Bustamante's surrender are feasible. The first is that in the face of the
threat of desertion by Cortazar, his second-in-command, Bustamante decided that the
war could not continue and that he should surrender. This is unlikely as Cortazar was
appointed as one of Bustamante's commissioners to negotiate with Santa Anna, but
not impossible. The second is that Cortazar had been long in sympathy with the rebels
and managed to convince Bustamante in the light of the stalemate faced on 7
December that the only way to break it was through negotiation. In his position as
commissioner he then adopted an extremely conciliatory attitude to the rebels drawing
up a treaty that Congress would find unacceptable.
Although the terms of the peace treaty with Bustamante were more
conciliatory than Santa Anna had originally intended, it cannot be said that Bustamante
ultimately gained any advantage. The net result of the Treaty of Zavaleta was the
election of Santa Anna as President, and Valentin Gomez Farias as Vice-President in
1833. Once in office neither man abided by the terms of the agreement. Almost
immediately a process was begun to prosecute Alaman, Facio, Espinosa and Mangino
for their 'criminal' actions between 1830 and 1832. Only the latter was later acquitted.
In June 1833, the infamous ley del caso, which expelled Bustamante, his cabinet
colleagues and the majority of his former allies from the country, was approved. Even
though it appears that Gomez Farias, rather than Santa Anna, sanctioned this law, it
seems that Santa Anna did want Bustamante to be exiled. In June 1833, immediately
prior to the publication of the law of expulsion, he attempted to appoint Bustamante
to an extraordinary mission to Colombia.218 Santa Anna's desire to rid himself of
Bustamante may have originated in the hostility of the previous year, but it also might
have something to do with the rebellion led by Generals Escalada, Arista and Duran in
217 VGFA no. 69. Luis Cortazar to Gomez Farias, Celaya 18 July 1832.
218 AHSRE, L-E-1798 (III), f. 150. Ministry of Relations to the Secretary of the Senate, 21 June 1833.
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May and June 1833. Santa Anna was taken prisoner by the rebels on 6 June in
Tenango, in the state of Mexico. They requested him to lead their rebellion against
Gomez Farias' proposals to abolish military and ecclesiasticaljueros, and proposed to
proclaim him Supreme Dictator_219From the capital, Bustamante offered to negotiate
with Arista and Duran and, on 10 June marched out in search of Santa Anna.220 The
President escaped of his own accord the same day and made his way to Puebla. It
seems likely that Santa Anna should believe that Bustamante had been in league with
the rebels and so wish to organise his rapid departure from Mexico. After all, Duran
and Arista were well-known friends and supporters of the ex-Vice-President, and their
rebellion promoted the privileges of the Church and the military, two institutions
closely linked to his former administration.
G: The Failure of the Plan of Jalapa and the Role of Bustamante as Vice-President.
The Bustamante administration came to power in 1830 with clear objectives.
Its supporters believed that the instability suffered by the Republic since independence
had been the fault of political infighting and the rise of the influence of the radical
yorkinos, along with their plebeian supporters, to power. It aimed to destroy this
influence, and place the property-holding hombres de bien in control. Bustamante's
government also wished to resolve the chaos they saw around them in the public
treasury, army and the Church. It hoped that by building strong institutions and a
reliable economy, Mexico could become a peaceful and prosperous country. In so
doing, it revealed itself to be traditionalist, but not centralist in its leanings. In the
event, the administration established by the Plan of Jalapa was unable to reach its
219 LAP 395. Geronimo Cardona, Relacion de 10 ocurrido al exmo. sr. presidente de la republica
desde su salida de la ciudad federal, hasta su entrada en esta, pur el teniente coronel Geronimo
Cardona (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila: 1833).
220 Jose Ramon Malo, Diario de los sucesos notables, 1832-1853 (Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1948),
vol. 1, p. 69.
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objectives. The electoral reforms and the dismissal of a number of state legislatures
brought many hombres de bien to power, but they did not guarantee their support.
Many of these men disliked the emphasis the administration placed on strengthening
the army and the Church. They believed that Bustamante's administration ultimately
wanted to introduce some form of military dictatorship to the Republic. Some were
horrified by the executions of Vicente Guerrero, Francisco Victoria and Juan
Nepomuceno Rosains, and the brutal way the government tried to suppress opposition
newspapers. The Plan of Jalapa had been successful because the coalition supporting
it, made up of the senior clergy and military with the ex-escoces and ex-yorkino
hombres de bien, was stronger than the radical yorkinos, who opposed it. But once
Bustamante lost the support of the hombres de bien, his government could not
survive. This was amply proved in the summer of 1832. Pressure from men such as
Mier y Teran, rather than Santa Anna's rebellion forced the resignation of the cabinet.
Hostility from what Mora calls 'la oposicion legal,' made up of himself and figures
such as Melchor Muzquiz and Francisco Fagoaga, probably ensured that Bustamante
himself also left office. Bustamante's departure from Mexico City marked the end of
his administration. Even if he had defeated Santa Anna in December it is unlikely that
his resignation would have been revoked. He and his cabinet had simply made
themselves too unpopular.
What should we make of Bustamante as Vice-President? It has been widely
recognised that the intellectual power of Bustamante's regime was Lucas Alaman,
Stanley C. Green points out that Alaman was the author of all Bustamante's speeches
from June 1830221 and Alaman himself declares that Bustamante often availed upon
him to aid him with the composition of official documents.222 Quite simply,
221 Green, The Mexican Republic, p. 191 and 274, footnote 6. He quotes from a printed copy of
Bustamante's address to Congress, found in the Salvador Noreiga Archives, and marking the
beginning of the extraordinary sessions of the summer of 1830: 'This one and all the following I
wrote. Lucas Alaman, '
222 Lucas Alarnan, "Defensa del ex-ministro de relaciones D. Lucas Alaman," pp. 92-93.
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Bustamante does not appear to have had a voice during his administration. His
participation in his government remains, for the most part, shadowy and unknown.
The only occasions in which Bustamante seems to have a discernible role in
government are in the trials of Manuel Zerecero and Vicente Guerrero. In each case,
Bustamante's decision to interfere or not in the judicial process is crucial to the
eventual fate of the two men. Why should he choose to save Zerecero rather than
Guerrero? A number of explanations are possible. In the first place, the circumstances
surrounding to the prosecution of the two men were extremely different. Bustamante
commuted the sentence of death passed on Zerecero in May 1830, in the early months
of his rule. Between January and May, his administration had not executed any army
officers or other political opponents from amongst the elite. Without exception these
political enemies had been exiled. The decision to commute Zerecero's sentence
provoked an outcry amongst government supporters and Bustamante subsequently
promised to employ stronger measures against those who rebelled against his regime,
whatever their class. Guerrero was captured and court-martialled in January 1831. By
this point, the government had already executed Guadalupe Victoria's brother,
Francisco. So, in some way, it could be argued Guerrero was a victim of this new
policy of severe punishment. Secondly, in the case of Zerecero, Bustamante was under
pressure from his compadre, Manuel Barrera, and his Minister of Justice, Espinosa, to
commute his sentence. Both these men held positions of great influence with
Bustamante. Guerrero, on the other hand, had very few people to argue his case in
Mexico City. In fact, the mood in the capital appeared to favour his execution.
Moreover, the Minister of War, Facio had conspired to arrest Guerrero, most likely
with the intent of having him executed and can only have been pressuring the Vice-
President to abandon his plans to organise his exile. Finally, we cannot discount the
fact that Manuel Zerecero was a member of the Mexico City elite (his brother was the
deputy Anastasio Zerecero), and that Vicente Guerrero was a mulatto and clearly a
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member of the lower echelons of society. Throughout his career, Bustamante would
show a reluctance to sanction the executions of fellow hombres de bien, even if they
rebelled against him. He was, however, always willing to execute lower class
insurgents and rebels. Therefore, it seems likely that all these factors had a role in
Bustamante's decisions on the fate of the two men.
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Chapter Five: The Second Administration (1837-
1841)
Anastasio Bustamante left Mexico in the summer of 1833 bound for France.
He spent the following three years in Paris, where it appears he dedicated himself to
the pursuit of various 'tareas cientificas [...] en el Ateneo Real, en el Instituto
Historico yen el de Estadistica Universal.' Unlike many of the politicians and military
officers expelled by the ley del caso, he did not return to Mexico after the law was
repealed in 1835. Instead, he petitioned the government for a year's leave of absence
to permit him to complete his studies and to travel in Europe and the United States. I
Through his legal representative in Mexico, his compadre Manuel Barrera,
Bustamante ensured that he be paid half his designated wage as a General de Division
for this year. At the same time, he attempted to secure the payment of back-pay he
claimed he was entitled to, dating from the application of the ley del caso in June 1833
to August 1835, when his leave of absence was granted.' This request was denied.3 As
his year's leave drew to a close, Bustamante was summoned back to Mexico by the
Ministry of War. In July 1836 he was informed that, due to the difficult situation
currently facing the Republic, his presence and military services were immediately
. d 4requrre .
The difficult situation in question, was of course, the secessionist rebellion in
Texas. The President, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, had been captured by the rebels
in May 1836 and, without him, the campaign against the colonists was struggling.
I SON: SC XIIIII/I-3111-235/00226-00227. Minister of Relations to the Minister of War. Mexico
City, 6 August 1835. This quotes Bustamante's communication to the Mexican representative in
France. dated 20 May 1835.
2 Ibid .• XIIIII/I-31/1-235/00238. Manuel Barrera to the Treasury General of the Republic. Mexico
City. 18 February 1836.
) Ibid .• XIIIII/J-3J/I-235/00243-244. Jose Govantes to Barrera. Treasury General. 12 March 1836.
4 Ibid .• XIIIII/l-31/l-235/00231. Minister of War to Anastasio Bustamante. Mexico City. 30 July
1836.
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General Bustamante had spent the years between 1826 and 1829 in Texas and was not
an unlikely choice as the new Commander in Chief for the campaign. Yet, although
Bustamante was appointed to this position upon his return to Mexico in December
1836, he would never take up the commission.' His name would instead be put
forward as a candidate for the Presidential elections of March 1837, where he was
elected by a large majority in Congress and the Departments. The timing of these
events strongly suggests that Bustamante's re-emergence upon the political scene was
not accidental. In fact, it is difficult not to agree with Enrique Olavarria y Ferrari, that
the problems in Texas were a mere pretext to bring Bustamante back into the
country.I' The General's name was being mentioned as a potential candidate long
before he arrived in Veracruz. In September, El Cosmopolita printed rumours that
Bustamante had been summoned home to take up the Presidency.i In November,
Bernardo Couto wrote to Jose Maria Luis Mora expressing the opinion that General
Bustamante would most likely win the Presidential elections the following year, if he
were only to return to Mexico in time.8 At the same time efforts were visible in the
press to rehabilitate his image, which had been considerably tarnished by the memories
of the repression employed by his previous administration. La Lima de Vulcano
printed a spirited defence of the General's term as Vice-President in October,
exonerating Bustamante from any part in Vicente Guerrero's execution and praising
his administration's ecclesiastical and economic record.9
5 Jose Maria Bocanegra, Memorias para la historia de Mexico independiente, 1822-1846 (Mexico
City: Instituto Cultural Helenico/Instituto Nacional de Estudios de la Revoluci6n Mexicana/Fondo de
Cultura Economica, 1987), vol. 2, p. 654. FO no. 50/100, pp. 230-231. Richard Pakenham to
Viscount Palmerston, Mexico City, 21 December 1836.
6 Enrique Olavarria y Ferrari, "Mexico independiente, 1821-1855," in Vicente Riva Palacio (ed.),
Mexico atraves los siglos (Mexico City: Ballesca y Compafiia, 1888-1889). vol. 4, p. 380.
7 El Cosmopolita, 21 September 1836. quoted in Michael P. Costeoe, The Central Republic in
Mexico. 1835-1846. Hombres de bien in the Age of Santa Anna (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), p. 116.
s Bernardo Couto to Jose Maria Luis Mora. 17 November 1836. in ibid., pp. 116-117.
'I La Lima de Vulcano, 27 October 1836. quoted in Olavarria y Ferrari, "Mexico independiente." p.
380.
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The proponents of Bustamante's candidacy were his old allies from his Vice-
Presidency: the hombres de bien, together with the upper representatives of the
Church and army. These groups had been profoundly alienated by the radical policies
followed by Vice-President Valentin Gomez Farias' administration between 1833 and
1834, which had attacked military and ecclesiastical fueros and attempted the
expropriation of Church property. United against the common foe, they had used their
influence with the President, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, to remove Gomez Farias
in 1834 and undo his reforms. By this time, a significant number of the hombres de
bien had become disillusioned with the federal system, which had not brought the
peace or prosperity hoped for in 1824. They began to suggest that a new constitution
was necessary to introduce order and calm to government, the economy and public
life. The mood for change was reflected in the Congressional elections of 1834, in
which a majority of representatives in favour of a centralist system of government
were elected.l" In 1835 support for the replacement of the federalist constitution with
a centralist alternative seemed to have become widespread. After pronunciamientos in
Orizaba and Toluca were issued in favour of this change in May, 400 other plans were
declared from all corners of the Republic adhering to their cause. 19 were issued
opposing centralism. 11 As a result, in 1836 a new centralist constitution was unveiled.
This was named the Siete Leyes, in recognition of the seven parts of its construction.
The architects of this new magna carta undoubtedly assumed that the first
president elected under the new system would be Santa Anna. As Reynaldo Sordo
Cedeno comments, the transformation of the constitution would have been impossible
without his support. The santanistas had formed part of the coalition of hombres de
10 Reynaldo Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista (Mexico City: El Colegio
de Mexico/lnstituto Technologico Autonomo de Mexico, 1993), p.12!. His calculations show that 60
percent of congressmen were centralists, opposing a representation of 20 per cent for the federalists
and five percent for the santanistas. For further details of the Congress of IR35-183 7, see Sordo
Cedeno's exhaustive statistical analysis, pp. 107-137.
II Will Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood
Press, 1998), p. 68. For a list of these plans and pronunciamientos, see pp. 282-283.
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bien who had backed the move towards centralism.v However, the President's defeat
and capture at San Jacinto brought an abrupt end to Santa Anna's popularity and
prestige. Faced with the forthcoming Presidential elections of March 1837, the
centralists needed a new candidate to represent their interests. Moreover, they needed
someone who carried the same weight of influence in the army and general prestige
within their ranks and amongst the hombres de bien, as Santa Anna had done. To be a
success, the new constitution would need a strong and influential president to nurture
the fledgling state through its early years. It would need someone prepared to defend
and protect it from the attacks it would undoubtedly receive from the federalists.
It was for that reason that many, like Jose Ramon Malo, the nephew of
Agustin de Iturbide, focused their attentions on Anastasio Bustamante. Malo wrote to
him in France, urging him to return on various occasions in May and June 1836.13 It is
highly likely that his letters were supplemented with further appeals from other
hombres de bien, friends and former allies of the exiled General.14 As Michael
Costeloe has pointed out, General Bustamante 'was in several ways the ideal candidate
to represent the interests of the Church, the army and the hombres de bien. ,15 His
previous administration was remembered as having followed policies entirely
favourable to all three groups. During his time in office the power of the radicals and
sanscullotes had been curtailed; the economy had been well looked after; and the
abuses of the freedom of the press had been severely dealt with. Bustamante's
government was also remembered for its autocratic tendencies; for the
uncompromising stand it had appeared to take towards rebels and rebellions; and for
its dominance of the federal and state legislatures. Therefore, for the architects of the
12 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, pp. 252-253.
Ll Jose Ramon Malo, Diario de sucesos notables, /832-/853 (Mexico City: Editorial Patria, 194R),
vol. 1, p. 144. He writes: 'En fines de mayo yen distintas fechas de junio escribi varias cartas al
general Bustamante para que, dejando Paris, venga al socorro de la patria. '
14 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 253. Olavarria y Ferrari,
"Mexico independiente," p. 380.
15 Costeloe, The Central Republic in Mexico, p. 116.
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Siete Leyes, who wished to create a strong centralised government, with a system that
tried to exclude the dangerous sanscullotes, by giving the vote only to the property
owners and professionals.i" the example of Bustamante's Vice-Presidency was, as
Carlos Maria de Bustamante put it, 'inmejorable.' 17 Moreover, his regime had been
seen to have a centralist orientation and many assumed Bustamante was a centralist
sympathiser.
It seems more than likely that the centralists arranged General Bustamante's
return to Mexico and stage managed his election. They, and their supporters, believed
he was the right choice to lead their crusade to bring strong, peaceful and prosperous
government to the Republic through the medium of the Siete Leyes. Great hope and
anticipation surrounded his assumption of the Presidency in April. The President of
Congress, Juan Manuel de Elizalde, summed up this feeling in his response to
Bustamante's inaugural address to Congress on 19 April:
A las reflexiones lugubres, al porvenir espantoso, ha sucedido una
esperanza lisonjera de ver restablecida la paz, precursora de todos los
bienes: ella restituira el orden en los diversos ramos que la fatal
agitacion politica habia reducido al estado mas deplorable. Desparecera
la miseria, origen fecundo de todos los males. Se aseguraran los
derechos del ciudadano con la vigilancia del Gobierno e inflexibilidad
de la justicia rectamente administrada; y sofocados generosamente los
resentirnientos se reuniran en un punto los deseos de los mexicanos,
resonando por todas partes la voz uniforme de independencia y ley. [... J
Respetable Magistrado, [...J la patria tiene sus ojos fijos en vos:
16 Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals, p. 65. Fowler points out that, although the qualification
for suffrage set out in article seven of the First Law of the constitution was an income of 100 pesos,
which was not a huge sum for the period and allowed almost all males to vote, article 10 imposed
severe limits upon this qualification. Servants, the illiterate, the unemployed, and those considered
'idle' or engaged in a dishonest profession were excluded from the right of suffrage. Equally, those
who were allowed to stand as candidates were restricted by an economic qualification. To be a local
councillor an income of 500 pesos was required, to be a member of a Departmental junta or a deputy,
1, 500 pesos was needed, to be a governor, 2000 pesos, and a senator, 2, 500. The full text of the 1836
Constitution can be found in: Secretaria de Gobernacion, Leyesfundamentales de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos y planes revolucionarios que han influido en la organizacion politico de la republica
(Mexico City: Imprenta de la Secretaria de Gobernacion, 1923), pp. 180-201.
17 Carlos Maria de Bustamante, Continuacion del cuadro historico de la revolucion mexicana: El
gabinete mexicano durante et segundo periodo de la administracion del exmo. senor D. Anastasio
Bustamante (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica/Instituto Helenico, 1985), vol. I, p. I.
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realizad pues, sus esperanzas, restituidle su gloria y decoro tan vilmente
ultrajados, siempre por las sendas de la justicia y el honor; y haceos
digno del justo reconocimiento de los que han puesto en vuestras
I d . d ., 18manos os estmos e esta gran nacion.
These opinions were also shared by foreign observers in Mexico. Richard Pakenham,
the British Plenipotentiary Minister, regarded the election of Bustamante as 'the last
remaining chance for the salvation of this country.' He recognised that the new
President faced 'an arduous task' ahead of him, but believed 'with some confidence'
that his government would bring about an early improvement in public affairs.19 The
newspaper, El Abeja of New Orleans, commented that Bustamante was 'tan propio
para la guerra como para la administracion' and was undoubtedly 'muy propio para
mudar el aspecto de los negocios y reponer a Mexico en el puesto de donde 10 habia
hecho descender la criminal ambicion de un hombre [Santa Anna] que no ha
perdonado medio alguno para sumergir la republica mexicana en la anarquia. ,20
This hope was short-lived, as Bustamante would ultimately fail to live up to the
expectations of those who welcomed his election. His administration did not mark the
beginning of a period of stability for Mexico and it certainly did not bring about the
desired economic recovery. In fact, the years of his government were peppered with a
series of foreign and domestic crises, which served to undermine Bustamante's
authority and to convince many of his erst-while supporters that he was far from the
ideal candidate for the Presidency. By 1841, the year in which his government was
overthrown, it seemed that most observers regarded Bustamante as a weak and
indecisive leader, whose inability to impose himself upon his government had served to
push Mexico further into chaos. This chapter seeks to explore how this image of
IS "Contestacion del Presidente del Congreso, D. Juan Manuel Elizalde, al discurso del general
Bustamante, del 19 de april de 1837," in Los presidentes de Mexico antes de la nacion, 1821-1984
(Mexico City: LII Legislatura de la Camara de Diputados, 1985), vol. 1., p. 171.
19 FO no. 50/106, pp. 107, 117. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 3 and 25 April 1837.
20 El Abeja, 9 May 1837. quoted in El Imparcial, 7 July 1837.
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Bustamante was created. It will look at the various crises that faced his administration
in detail, and study Bustamante's responses to each. In the first section, the events
surrounding Manuel Gomez Pedraza's attempt to overthrow the Siete Leyes in 1838
will be examined. The discussion will focus upon Bustamante's relationship with
Gomez Pedraza and the President's involvement in his plans. The second section will
investigate the causes and effect of the French blockade of Mexico's Atlantic ports
between 1838 and 1839. It will study Bustamante's role in the resolution of this crisis
and consider whether the criticisms directed at him by his contemporaries over his
handling of the situation are entirely justified. The third section will discuss the
federalist rebellions organised by Jose Urrea between 1838 and 1840. It will
concentrate upon how the suppression of these revolts reflected upon the leadership of
Bustamante. The fourth section will analyse the constitutional crises which were
provoked by the apparent failure of the Siete Leyes to bring stable and orderly
government to the Republic. Finally, the fifth section will assess the causes of
Bustamante's extreme unpopularity in 1841 and will explain how his government was
eventually overthrown.
A: Bustamante and the Federalists 0837-1838)
The centralists soon realised that they had made a grave mistake in choosing
Anastasio Bustamante as their President. From his first day in office it was clear that,
far from being an ardent supporter of the new constitution, the General regarded the
Siete Leyes with some distrust. In his speech upon taking office on 19 April 1837,
Bustamante qualified his Presidential oath thus:
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He ofrecido, senores, el mas solemne y delicado voto que mis labios
pudieran proferir: voto que sera cumplido, cuanto me 10 permitan cl
h I .. 21onor y a conctencia.
The implication that he was not prepared to follow the 1836 charter to the letter was
plain and not missed by those listening.22 If'Olavarria y Ferrari is to be believed, in the
weeks that followed, Bustamante made his opposition to the Siete Leyes even clearer.
According to the writer, 'no oculto su disgusto [...] dejando entender que con los
principios y sistema proclamados por los constituyentes de 1836 no era facil mantener
sin sumergirse la nave del Estado. ,23 As we shall see later in this chapter, the
President's quarrel with the charter lay in the division of power between the executive,
legislative and the new intermediary, the Supreme Conservative Power (SPC). For the
moment we shall simply note that the new constitution, following the precedent of
1824, had created an executive with extremely limited power. Nothing could be done
without the approval of Congress and subsequently, the support of the Sf'C. Perhaps
as a result of Bustamante's widely known disapproval of his weak position, rumours
circulated throughout 1837 that the President was planning to establish a dictatorship.
Olavarria y Ferrari reports of one such rumour in April.24 In October, the newspaper,
Ellmparcial, reported that 'hacia tiempo que se notaba cierto empefio en propagar la
noticia de que se trataba de elegir un dictador.' It claimed that much speculation had
surrounded the celebrations of 27 September in which 'se hicieron correr la necia
hablilla de que aquel dia y en aquellas circunstancias iba a ser proclamado un
21 "El general Bustamante al prestar el juramento constitucional, en 19 de abril de 1837," in Los
presidentes de la nacion antes la nacion, vol. I, p. 169. My italics.
22 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. I, p. 2. Bustamante reports: 'estas palabras misteriosas
dieron no poco que pensar a algunos diputados, pues a nadie exigiamos que jurarse obrar contra su
honor y conciencia. Esta es (dijeron algunos) una verdadera restriccion mental yel tiempo descubrira
el concepto que encierra. '
23 Olavarria y Ferrari, "Mexico independiente." p. 405.
24 Jbid.
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dictador. ,25 In November, Carlos Maria de Bustamante noted that Bustamante was
being encouraged by some in his military entourage to set himself up as a dictator.f"
Even so, these rumours would come to nought. The most obvious indication of
the President's unhappiness with the 1836 Constitution was his close relationship to
the moderate federalists and most especially his old friend, Manuel Gomez Pedraza.
Quite soon it was clear that Bustamante was plotting with him to overthrow the new
constitution and replace it with a modified federal one. We do not know when
Bustamante and Gomez Pedraza's involvement began, or whether their relationship
was one of friendship or simply business. After all, Gomez Pedraza had felt deeply
betrayed by Bustamante after the events of 1830 and had joined Santa Anna's rebellion
against the former Vice-President in 1832. But we must assume that at some point in
the intervening years they had reached some kind of understanding. It might seem
strange that men who were apparently political enemies could be reconciled in this
way. However, such an eventuality was not without precedent. While in exile in Paris,
Bustamante appears to have been able to strike up a friendship with Lorenzo de
Zavala, despite the fact that Zavala had been one the fiercest critics of Bustamante's
Vice-Presidency.v' Valentin Gomez Farias would also be able to swallow his distrust
of Santa Anna in order to enter into an alliance with the caudillo in 1846 to organise
the overthrow of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga. The former example seems to
demonstrate how friendship was able to overcome political differences. The second
shows how personal and political animosities could be laid aside in political alliances, if
there were sufficient benefits for both parties. In terms of Bustamante and Gomez
25 El Imparcial. 3 October 1837.
26 Bustamante. El gabinete mexicano, vol. 1. p. 42.
27 Jorge Flores D. (ed.), "Lorenzo de Zavala y su mision diplomatica en Francia. lR34-1835." in
Manuel Gonzalez Ramirez (ed.). Obras de Lorenzo de Zavala: Viaje a los Estados Unidos del Norte
de America; Noticias sobre la vida y escritos de Zavala (pOI'Justo Sierro O'Reilly); La cuestion de
Texas; Memorias (Mexico City: Porrua, 1976). p. xxxvii. Joaquin Moreno. "Diario de un escribiente
de la legacion," in ibid .. pp. 418-419.
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Pedraza's new alliance, the circumstances would appear to suggest that the latter
example of mutual convenience was in play, rather than simple friendship.
The first sign of the new relationship between Bustamante and Gomez Pedraza
can be seen in the final three months of 1837. Carlos Maria de Bustamante reports that
in October, the President was seen to 'tener frecuentes sesiones con Gomez Pedraza,'
and would meet with him at night in 'cierta casa particular. ,28 On 10 October, Juan,
one of Valentin Gomez Farias' regular correspondents, wrote to him in New Orleans
assuring the exile that Bustamante was poised to appoint Gomez Pedraza as a member
of his cabinet. Once he was a member, Juan alleged, 'se destruira cuanto existe, y sera
convocada una Asamblea Nacional.' This new Congress would oversee the re-
introduction of the federalist system.29 This belief would appear to be widespread.
Carlos Maria de Bustamante, Jose Ramon Malo and the American envoy in Mexico,
William Jones, all note that Bustamante was rumoured to be about to place Gomez
Pedraza in his cabinet.30 When, on 13 October, Bustamante's existing cabinet: Manuel
de la Pefia y Pefia, Luis Gonzaga Cuevas, Mariano Michelena and Joaquin Lebrija all
submitted their resignations.I' many took it as a sign that President Bustamante was
about to initiate a change to the constitution. According to Carlos Maria de
Bustamante, 'el hecho de haber hecho la renuncia simultaneamente hizo sospechar que
se ocultaba algun misterio de iniquidad, cuyo velo se rasgo: descubriose que
Bustamante protegia a los facciosos y trataba de restablecer la federacion. ,32
Bustamante's interest in Gomez Pedraza's federalist proposals, generally
referred to as 'la revolucion moral' or 'la revolucion filosofica,' are not really
surprising. In the first place, Bustamante had been an ally of the federalists since his
28 Bustamante, El gabiente mexicano, vol. I, pp. 38-39.
29 VGFA no. 419. Juan to Valentin Gomez Farias, Mexico City, 10 October 1837.
30 Bustamante, El gabiente mexicano, vol. I, p. 39. Malo, Diario de sucesos notables, vol. I, p. 140.
Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 290.
31 Manuel de la Pefia y Pefia, Luis Gonzaga Cuevas, Mariano Michelena and Joaquin Lebrija to
Bustamante, 13 October 1837, in Ellmparcial, 17 October 1837.
32 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. I, p. 39.
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days in Guadalajara between 1823 and 1824. He had later been an enthusiastic yorkino
and federalist during the time he spent as Commander General of Coahuila, Nuevo
Leon, Tamaulipas and Texas in the late 1820s. His first administration was often
accused of being centralist in orientation. However, there is no real evidence to back
up such a charge. While efforts were made to impose the will of the federal
government on the states on various occasions, no legislation was actually introduced
to reduce the power of the states or subordinate their authorities to those of Mexico
City. The main concern of this administration had been to reduce the influence of the
sanscullotes in government. Secondly, Gomez Pedraza advocated a return to a
modified version of the Constitution of 1824. He proposed reforms which were
entirely in keeping with the position Bustamante had adopted during his first term in
office. In order to avoid the clashes between state and federal authorities, which had
occurred in the past, Gomez Pedraza wanted to see the position of central government
strengthened, and the power of the states to legislate independently to be curtailed. He
also called for the electoral system to be reformed in order to prevent those unworthy
of participating in elections from taking part.33 In effect, this was a middle way
between the two existing constitutions, without the hindrance on the part of powerful
states or the Supreme Conservative Power. As Josefina Vazquez has recently pointed
out, the Constitution of 1836 was a modification of the Federalist Constitution rather
than a radical shift away from it. It did not remove all power from the departments,
but conserved 'un espacio de autonomia administrativa y hasta politica en los
departamentos. ,34 Finally, Gomez Pedraza wanted his revolution to be undertaken
33 Manuel G6mez Pedraza, "Exposicion al buen sentido de la naci6n para que sin mas efusion de
sangre se vade la actual forma de gobierno," in Laura Solares Robles (ed.), La obra politico de
Manuel Gomez Pedraza. /813-/85/ (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Instituto Matias Romero/Acervo
Hist6rico Diplomatico de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1999), pp. 227-232.
34Josefina Zoraida Vazquez, "Centralistas, conservadores y monarquistas, 1830-1853," in Humberto
Morales and Will Fowler (ed.), El conservadurismo mexicano en el siglo X/X. 1810-19/0 (Puebla:
Benemerita Universidad Aut6noma de Puebla/University of St. Andrews/Secretaria de Cultura,
Gobierno del Estado de Puebla, 1999), p. 117.
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peacefully without the descent into chaos that had marked other pro-federalist
movements. Bustamante, like many other hombres de bien. had been profoundly
shocked by the riot of the Parian market in 1828 and probably found the idea of a
peaceful, orderly revolution quite attractive.
In the event, Gomez Pedraza was not appointed to the new cabinet. The new
members were: Jose Antonio Romero as Minister of the Interior, Jose Maria
Bocanegra as Minister of the Exterior and General Ignacio Mora y Villamil as Minister
of War.35 No-one could be persuaded to undertake the position as Minister of
Finance, and so this brief was also given to Bocanegra/" Gomez Farias's
correspondent, Juan, attributed Bustamante's failure to appoint federalists to the new
cabinet as a sign that the President wished to proceed with moderation.Y This might
well be the case, as in the following weeks it became clear that the strategy of Gomez
Pedraza was to induce peaceful change within the Republic by means of mobilising
public support.38 From the end of October a number of representations by
Departmental Juntas, garrisons and groups of private citizens were addressed to the
President calling for the reintroduction of the federalist system. First to be published
was the representation from the Departmental Junta of Durango on 30 October.i"
Second was Gomez Pedraza's, published in his newspaper, El Cosmopolita on 1
November.4o These were soon followed by publications by the Departmental Junta of
Zacatecas, the citizens of Puebla, Queretaro, Toluca and Mexico City;41 and the
35 Malo, Diario de sucesos notables, vol. I, p. 142. Entry for 25 October 1337.
36 Ibid., Entry for 4 November 1837.
J7 VGFA no. 420. Juan to Gomez Farias, 19 October 1837.
38 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, pp. 290-291.
J<) "Exposicion del Departamento de Durango a Anastasio Bustamante," (30 October 1837), in Berta
Ulloa and Joel Hernandez Santiago (eds.), Planes en lu nacion mexicana (Mexico City: Senado de la
Republica/ El Colegio de Mexico, 1987), vol. 3, pp. 111-118.
40 Bocanegra, Memorias, vol. 2, pp. 153-155.
41 "Representacion dirigida al presidente de la republica," (3 November 1837), in Ulloa and
Hernandez Santiago (eds.), Planes en la nacion mexicana, vol. 3, pp. 119-121. "Representacion de la
ciudad de Mexico," in ibid., pp.121-122. "Representacion de 528 vecinos de Toluca por cl
restablecimiento del sistema federal, dirigida al presidente," (21 November 1837), in ibid., pp. 123-
128. "Representacion del municipio de Toluca por el restablecimiento del sistema federal." (22
November 1827), in ibid., pp. 128-129. "Exposicion de la capital del Departamento de Puebla." (12
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garrisons of Morelia, Puebla, Oaxaca and San Luis Potosi. 42 The influence of Gomez
Pedraza was discernible in all these representations. All followed the same general
pattern. They called for the Constitution of 1836 to be set aside and for that of 1824
to take its place. However, they recognised that the first federal constitution had not
been perfect and so advocated that an assembly or convention be elected by a popular
vote. This body should reform the charter in a period of about six months. While this
reformation was being undertaken, Bustamante would remain in power.
Therefore, Bustamante might well have believed in October, that it was wise to
placate the centralists and to avoid appointing federalists to his cabinet. He was
probably aware that many of his former allies were considering ways of ridding
themselves of his Presidency and knew that it would not be wise to precipitate any
reaction against his government while Gomez Pedraza was in the middle of
implementing his plans. Jose Antonio Mejia informed Gomez Farias on 28 November
that he had heard that 'los Alamanes, Tagles y compania estaban muy disgustados con
Bustamante.' He noted that the aristocrats (hombres de bien) and clergy were now
looking to Santa Anna as a replacement for the President.43 This opinion is also
offered by Malo, who records that on 6 November he visited the President to warn
him that 'el temor del Clero y de los buenos, los obligan a entregarse en las manos de
Santa Anna como los libra de Farias esperaban [que] los liberase ahora. ,44 Santa
Anna was still very much in disgrace in Veracruz, and unlikely to pose a real threat to
the President. Even so, the possibility that the hombres de bien might find another
military figure prepared to act as the saviour of the new constitution could not be
completely discounted.
December 1837), in ibid., pp. 129-131. "Representacion de varios vecinos de la ciudad de Queretaro
dirigen a Anastasio Bustamante," (28 December 1837), in ibid., pp. 136-13R.
42 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 1, p. 43.
43 VGFA no. 423. Jose Antonio Mejia to Gomez Farias, La Habana, 2R November IR37.
44 Malo, Diario de sucesos notables. vol. 1, p. 142. Entry for 6 November 1837.
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The publication of the representations created stir amongst the political groups
in Mexico City.45 Pakenham's replacement as British minister in Mexico, Charles
Ashburnham, reported to London that he feared that a revolution was imminent.46 His
American counterpart, Jones, made a similar report to Washington. Jones also noted
that he had been secretly informed that Bustamante was at the head of this moral
revolution.47 On 7 November this came to a head after a petition, repeating Gomez
Pedraza's plan and signed by 'some of the most wealthy and influential persons of the
Republic, ,48 was presented to the President by a commission headed by Anastasio
Zerecero. The same day the Minister of the Interior, Romero, sent the petition to the
Council of Government for its consideration. In the note accompanying the petition
Romero made it clear that the President considered the content of the petition to be of
the most grave importance.Y The Council gave an unequivocal and immediate
response. It declared the petition to be a simple expression of public opinion, that the
President ignore what it recommended. For, if he were to do so, the Council warned,
he would be overstepping his constitutional power. 50
The President was quite obviously faced with a dilemma. Either he could
accept the Council's recommendation and take the matter no further, or he could defy
their wishes and openly support the proposals of the petition, therefore inciting change
through illegal means. He decided to let the matter lie. Sordo Cedeno believes that
Bustamante did not dare choose the latter route. He asserts that 'el hombre debatia
entre sus convicciones personales y sus principios morales y no se decidia con
intensidad ni por unos ni por otTOS.,51 Charles Ashburnham was of a similar opinion.
He told Lord Palmerston that the President 'had not the courage as yet to undertake
45 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 291.
46 FO no. 50/108, p. 65. Charles Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 7 November 1837.
47 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 292.
48 FO no. 50/108, p. 145. Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 30 November 1837.
49 Sordo Cedeno, E/ congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 292.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., p. 293.
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so serious a responsibility as to abrogate by his own authority [...] the law of the
land. ,52 Bustamante's choice, however, cannot simply be defined in terms of courage
or indecision. As we shall see later in this chapter, despite his opposition to the Siete
Leyes, the President almost always respected its laws and did not overstep his powers.
Equally, despite the disclaimer that accompanied his constitutional oath; Bustamante
always acted legally, in stark contrast to Santa Anna, who during his brief stint as
Interim President in 1839 completely ignored the protocols laid down by the
Constitution of 1836 constitution. In this case, we cannot ignore the possibility that his
decision was taken mainly on moral grounds, and that he chose not to pursue the
petition out of respect for the law.
The failure of the federalists to incite the fall of the Siete Leyes in November
1837 did not mark the end of their struggles. If anything the pressure upon the
government intensified. Rebellions in favour of federalism had been a feature of the
landscape since the introduction of the Siete Leyes.53 These had generally been small,
local affairs without great influence. However, in the wake of the events in Mexico
City, a larger more threatening pronunciamiento was launched in Sonora on 26
December by General Jose Urrea. His plan resembled the moral revolution in that it
called for the establishment of an assembly to reform the Federal Constitution of 1824
within a period of six months, and proposed that Bustamante remain in charge of the
executive in the meantime. 54 However, it differed significantly from this movement in
its execution. Gomez Pedraza advocated revolution by peaceful means only. He
wished to bring about the end of the Constitution of 1836 through political pressure
on Congress and the executive.55 Urrea, on the other hand, had embarked on what
52 FO no. 50/108, p. 145. Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 30 November 1837.
53 For a run down of the rebellions and pronunciamientos faced by Bustamante's government between
1837 and 1841, see Appendix Three.
54 "Proclama y plan de Jose Urrea y pronunciamiento de la guarnicion de Arizpe," (26 December
1837), in Ulloa y Hernandez Santiago (eds.), Planes en la nacion mexicana, vol. 3, pp. 135-136.
55 Laura Solares Robles, Una revolucion pac (fica: Biografla political de Manuel Gomez Pedraza.
1789-1851 (Mexico City: Instituto Moral Acervo Historico Diplomatico de la Secreta ria de Relaciones
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would become a violent rebellion. He sent copies of his plan to most of the
Departments: Chihuahua, Queretaro, Baja California, San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas,
Coahuila, Sinaloa and Oaxaca. Only Sinaloa decided to adhere to his plan. Even so,
this transformed Urrea's rebellion as it gave him access to the custom house at
Mazatlan.56 Armed with this important resource and, joined later in October 1838 by
the custom house at Tampico, Urrea would provide the strongest military challenge
for the centralist regime for the next 18 months.
The return of Valentin Gomez Farias from his exile in New Orleans in February
1838 also increased the strength of the federalist position in Mexico. Gomez Farias
was the accepted leader of the radical federalists. He had occupied the Vice-
Presidency between 1833 and 1834, and had been seen to be responsible for the
radical policies of this period, including the attacks on military and ecclesiastical
fueros, the abolition of the tithe, and the infamous ley del caso.57 Therefore he was
naturally viewed with suspicion by the hombres de bien and the centralists, who had
engineered his downfall in 1834 with the aid of Santa Anna. In terms of federalism,
Gomez Farias' aims differed little from those of Gomez Pedraza. In essence, Gomez
Farias advocated the return to the 1824 constitution, without the need for the reforms
proposed by Gomez Pedraza (hence the title of 'pure' federalists given to Gomez
Farias' supporters), and was not prepared to accept that Bustamante should continue
Exteriores/Consejo Estatal para la Cultura y las Artes del Gobierno del Estado de Queretaro. 1996). p.
144. Manuel Gomez Pedraza. "Exposicion al buen sentido de la nacion para que sin mas efusion de
sangre se varie la actual forma de gobierno," pp. 330-332.
56 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 294.
57 Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals. pp. 196-199. Fowler argues that Gomez Farias was not the
fire-brand radical he has often been portrayed to be. He claims: 'While Mora, Zavala. and a radical-
dominated Congress pressed for immediate and major reforms that would secularise and demilitarise
society, abolishingfueros and redistributing Church wealth, Gomez Farias held back and attempted
to stall the pace of reform, while at the same time he attempted to disassociate himself from the
radical factions, stressing how important it was to go by the book, respecting, wherever possible, the
compromises that had come to be represented by the constitution.' However, Gomez Farias in the
position of Vice-President not unnaturally was perceived by many of his contemporaries as the author
of the radical reforms of 1833 and 1834, and with the death of Zavala and the continuing absence of
Mora from Mexico, he became the undisputed leader of the radical taction by 1838.
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in power. He also supported the armed rebellions and uprisings for federalism.i" while
Gomez Pedraza called for his plans to be implemented 'sin mas efusion de sangre. ,59
Aside from for this, the differences between the two men lay in a personal animosity
which has, as yet, an undiscovered cause.60 It was clear that the federalist star was
rising. In February 1838, the month of Gomez Farias' return, petitions calling for the
re-establishment of federalism in Mexico were being received by the executive almost
daily." In the same month there were even rumours that Bustamante was set to
appoint Gomez Farias to his cabinet.62
As this rumour suggests, the President had not abandoned his federalist
sympathies after the events of November 1837. However, the return of Gomez Farias
presented a new challenge. He recognised that Gomez Pedraza's plans needed the
support of the radicals and their leader if they were to be successful. Therefore, when
Gomez Pedraza suggested another scheme to bring about the desired re-introduction
of federalism in June, he agreed to the proposals on the condition that Gomez Farias'
participation could be arranged. Gomez Farias was not interested, and told Pedraza
that he would oppose these plans with all his influence.63 In fact, Gomez Farias,
perhaps because of his personal dislike of Gomez Pedraza and distrust of Bustamante,
regarded both men and their plans in obvious contempt. In July 1838 he wrote:
El senor de quien me habla Ud. [Pedraza] en su apreciable tiene mucho
rniedo y mucho apetito de mandar, y esta es la razon porque varian
58 Lilian Briseno Senosian, Laura Solares Robles and Laura Suarez de la Torre. Valentin Gomez
Farias y su lucha par el federalismo (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Gobierno del Esado de Jalisco,
1991), p. 146.
5<) Gomez Pedraza, "Exposicion al buen sentido de la nacion para que sin mas efusion de sangre se
varie la actual forma de gobierno," pp. 311-335 (Quotation taken from title).
60 Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals. p. 154. Fowler suggests the men had an original
disagreement in 1828, basing himself upon a letter which Gomez Pedraza wrote to Gomez Farias in
1832 asking him to take up a position in his cabinet. In this letter. Gomez Pedraza notes that he
hoped that their past personal feud could be forgotten.
61 VGFA no. 431. A.Viesco to Gomez Farias, 18 February 1838.
62 VGF A no. 439. Jose Amata to Gomez Farias, 28 February 1838.
63 U.S. Consulate Dispatches, no. 161, Mexico City 1 October 1838, quoted in Sordo Cedeno, El
congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 297.
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tanto sus proyectos, ya ha hecho seis diferentes unos de otros, y si
seguirnos sus pasos, no nos fijemos en ninguno con perjuicio evidente
de la causa publica. lQue se puede esperar de un hombre que habla mal
de Bustamante, que se queja de que 10 ha engafiado varias veces, y que
conociendo su tendencia al absolutismo, pretende robustecerlo,
depositando en el mayor poder? [...] iNo es Bustamante el mismo que
dijo en una carta que hemos visto yo y otros que podia escribir para
que se hiciesen representaciones pacific as en favor de la federacion, y
que habiendo recibido un gran numero de elIas, no solamente las ha
desentendido, sino que ni aun ha querido leerlas, y ha dejado encausar a
algunos de los peticionarios? [...] i,Quien no ve que corrompe, que
disirnula, que alhaga segun le conviene, que es en fin de cuentas et
Fernando septimo mexicano? [...] La revolucion esta comenzada, y 10
que debemos hacer es continuarla. Pedraza y otros sefiores trabajan
para deshacer todo 10 hecho. Yo estoy al alcance de sus designios, no
obraban de buena fe, y si Ud. se deja engafiar, se arrepentira tarde.64
He was more inclined towards the plans of Jose Urrea, with whom he had maintained
d . hi M . 65a constant correspon ence SInce ISreturn to eXlCO.
This opposition from the leader of the radical faction obviously placed the
plans of Gomez Pedraza and Bustamante in danger. Moreover, it was also clear that
Gomez Farias was drawing up his own plans for the re-establishment of federalism and
the immediate deposition of the President. In these, it appeared that the French
blockade of Mexico's Atlantic seaports, begun in April 1838 and which shall be
studied later in the chapter, played some small part. Ashburnham, the British
Plenipotentiary in Mexico, believed that the federalists regarded the French blockade
as an ideal moment to seize power. He informed Lord Palmerston in May 1838 that
the government's refusal to bow to French intimidation had foiled these plans as it
'deprived the federalists of one weapon by which [...] [they] had expected to effect
their downfall: the charge of base submission to France and treason to their
country. ,66 In fact, the truth was somewhat different. On the one hand, Gomez Farias
(,4 VGFA no. 505. Gomez Farias to Manuel Gonzalez Cosio, 28 July 1838.
es Briseno Senosian, Solares Robles and Suarez de la Torre, Valentin Gomez Farias, p. 148.
bb FO no. 50/114, p. l.Ashburnham to Palmerston, 5 May 1838.
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and his allies did exploit the blockade as a manner of attacking the government and
accusing Bustamante of ineptitude in his dealings with the French.67 However, it also
appears that Gomez Farias regarded the French as his allies in the struggle against the
centralist system. The French always protested that their quarrel was not with the
people of Mexico, simply their government. They did not blockade the ports in the
hands of the federalist rebels. Gomez Farias' writings of the time show that it was his
belief that the French also wished to see a federalist government re-established III
M . 68eXlCO.
On 7 September 1838, Gomez Farias and a number of his supporters,
including Father Jose Maria Alpuche e Infante, were arrested and imprisoned. They
were accused of being in league with the French and of plotting a revolution against
the government.?" It appears that in light of their failure to win Gomez Farias' support,
Bustamante and Gomez Pedraza had taken action to neutralise the threat of the
radicals. The order to arrest these men was given by the Minister of the Interior, Jose
Joaquin Pesado, who was also involved in the plans for the moral revolution.i" In the
Manifiesto that Alpuche e Infante published soon after his arrest, he made it clear that
Gomez Pedraza, Pesado and Bustamante had planned the arrests to rid themselves of
the awkward opposition of the radicals to their own plans for revolution.l ' Charles
Ashburnham viewed the arrests in a similar light. He reported that it was generally
known in the capital that Bustamante and Gomez Pedraza were organising a
revolution and noted that the two men arranged the arrest of Gomez Farias because
67 Ibid .• no. 501115. p. 78. Ashburnham to Pakenham, 13 September UB8.
68 Briseno Senosian, Solares Robles and Suarez de la Torre, Valentin Gomez Farias. pp. 146-148.
6<) Jose Maria Alpuche e Infante. Primera philipiea al Exmo. sr. D. Anastasio Bustamante (Mexico
City: Imprenta de Luis Heredia. calle de San Sebastian no. 7. 1838). p. 7. In the British Library.
Those also detained were Joaquin Cardoso. Francisco Modesto Olaguibel, Ignacio Basadre, Juan
Zalaeta, and D.N. Envides. Costeloe, The Central Republic. p. 140.
70 Sordo Cedeno. El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 300.
71 Jose Maria Alpuche e Infante. Manifiesto que el ciudadano Jose Maria Alpuche e Infante cura
propio de Cuduacan haee a la nacion, de su escandalosa prision (Mexico City: Imprenta de Luis
Heredia, calle de San Sebastian no. 7, 1838), pp. 6-18. In the British Library.
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they feared he was about to undertake, 'a revolution in which they would have no
share.,n
Even so, the conspirators made no immediate efforts to implement their plans.
The expected revolution did not get underway until 13 December 1838 when
Bustamante finally appointed Gomez Pedraza and his moderate federalist colleague,
Juan Rodriguez Puebla to his cabinet. The reason for the delay is unknown. Perhaps as
Sordo Cedeno claims, it was merely another example of Bustamante's indecision.f ' Or
perhaps Bustamante and Gomez Pedraza were simply biding their time for a suitable
moment in which to act. In September 1838, due to the six months of French blockade
amongst other things, President Bustamante did not enjoy widespread popularity or
support, and any move made then might well have foundered. However, there was
every hope of things getting better. The French blockade had suffered terribly during
the summer in the waters off Veracruz. Originally composed of six ships, one frigate
and five brigs, the fleet had been forced to separate to patrol the Atlantic coastline.
Only one ship was visible in Veracruz and this was in a sorry state of disrepair. Also,
the sicknesses associated with the rainy season were taking their toll upon its crew.
The French minister, Baron Deffaudis, had retired to France complaining of violent
headaches and hallucinations in June. By August, a third of all the sailors patrolling the
coast had died or were suffering from the vomito negro. The commander of the
blockade, Post-Captain Bazoche, recognising the futility of his position had requested
leave to return to France.74 The President can have been forgiven for thinking that the
weather might quickly ensure a French retreat. In this case, his own position would
almost certainly have been strengthened, and the success of any attempt at moral
revolution would have been more likely.
72 FO no. 50/115, pp. 77-78. Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 13 September 1838.
73 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 30 I.
74 Nancy Nichols Barker, The French Exprience in Mexico. 1821-1861. A History of Constant
Misunderstanding (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 71-73.
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Of course this is all mere speculation. After all, the circumstances which
surrounded Gomez Pedraza's eventual attempt to lead the President to sanction the re-
introduction of the federalist system were less than ideal. The French situation became
much worse in October when re-enforcements arrived from France bearing new
demands on the government. The failure of the government to resolve these
differences in negotiation led to the French opening fire on Veracruz on 27 November.
The next day, the Conunander of the fortress of San Juan de Ulua, completely
outgunned, was forced to surrender the castle. In response, the Mexican government
declared war upon France. On 5 December, a raiding party from the French fleet
landed in Veracruz with the apparent aim of capturing Mariano Arista and Santa
Anna, who had been charged with the port's defence. Arista was taken, but Santa
Anna managed to make his escape and led an attack on the party as they returned to
their ship. In the ensuing gun-fire, Santa Anna lost his leg and was reported to be near
to death.75 His attack, however, became instantly translated as a great victory; and
Santa Anna reclaimed all his lost popularity in a matter of hours. 76
In fact, Bustamante's decision to appoint Gomez Pedraza and Rodriguez
Puebla to the cabinet on 13 December and thereby set in motion the moral revolution
does not appear to have been planned in advance. It merely seems to be a reaction to
the events with which he was surrounded. The failure of the negotiations with the
French and the subsequent surrender of San Juan de Ulua, created a volatile political
atmosphere in the capital. The American envoy, Jones, reported that on 21 November,
the principal chiefs of the army met to arrange a triumvirate which could take over the
government during this crisis. Neither Santa Anna, Bustamante, nor Gomez Farias
featured in their plans. According to Jones, another junta was convened a week later,
75 Ibid., pp. 74-80.
76 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. I, p. 143.
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and in this it was proposed instead that Bustamante be proclaimed dictator. 77
However, despite this, it appears that the prevailing mood was not in favour of the
President. Carlos Maria de Bustamante reports that in the days following the capture
of Ulua, 'no pocos generales, diputados y senadores mumuraron altamente del
gobierno [..J y trataron en el Pelicano de quitar la presidencia a D. Anastasio
Bustamante.' These men even sent a commission to see Bustamante and ask him to
resign.78 The obvious replacement for the President was, of course, Santa Anna. On I
December, Malo noted in his diary that in Congress there had been 'mas fuertes
conatos por algunos jefes para echar de la Presidencia al senor Bustamante y colocar
en ella al senor Santa Anna.,79 On 4 December, the British Minister, Ashburnham,
reported to Lord Palmerston that on the streets voices could be heard shouting 'down
with Bustamante!' He noted that all shops were shut and business at a total standstill,
concluding that revolution was in the air. He warned London that 'there can be little
doubt that in a short time [... J I shall have to announce the election of Santa Anna by
the soldiers [... J with the title of dictator. ,80 When on 8 December, Bustamante asked
Congress to approve his request to lead the troops personally against the French, the
speed with which the motion passed through both chambers was indicative of his
unpopular position. As Sordo Cedeno notes, the members' decision was taken
although it was clear that the President's absence would provoke a revolution and their
disregard of this fact, 'daba la impresion de que los hombres de bien ten ian prisa de
deshacerse del general Bustamante. ,81
In the light of this hostility towards his position and the sudden rehabilitation
of Santa Anna's image, Bustamante must have known his days as President were
77 u.s. Consulate Dispatches, (Mexico City), nos. 176 and 180, Mexico City, 22 and 27 November
1838, quoted in Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 301.
7K Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 1, p. 137.
79 Malo, Diario de sucesos notables, vol. I ,p. 155.
80 FO. no. 501116, pp. 3- 4. Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 4 December 1838.
81 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la prim era republica centralista, p. 287.
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numbered. His request to take personal control of the troops seems a recognition of
this fact. As we saw in the previous chapter, such a departure from the capital could
provide the only honourable way out of a desperate situation. Therefore, if he really
wished to effect a change in the constitution, he would have to act in the next few
days. The advantages of leading a successful movement would be huge. In the first
place, it would mean the destruction of the Constitution of 1836. Secondly, the
assumption of power by the moderate federalists would undoubtedly help
Bustamante's personal position. The success of the moral revolution would
outmanoeuvre the schemes of the hombres de bien to replace him with Santa Anna or
any other military figure. In terms of Gomez Pedraza's original plans, his tenure as
President would be cut short. However, as the leader of the revolution, his popularity
would be sure to grow. It was not inconceivable that he could be re-elected as
President in the new federal elections.
The ideal opportunity to initiate the revolution came on 10 December, when
his entire cabinet resigned once more. Three days later he appointed Gomez Pedraza
as Minister of the Exterior, Rodriguez Puebla as Minister of the Interior, Jose de la
Cortina as Minister of Finance and Benito Quijano as Minister of War. H2 Both
Rodriguez Puebla and Gomez Pedraza state that they accepted their position on the
condition that Bustamante would initiate a change in the constitution immediately. H3
Consequently, the same day Gomez Pedraza and Rodriguez Puebla held a meeting
with Bustamante to discuss their strategy. The ministers presented the President with a
proposal for a decree. This paper called for the convocation of a new National
Assembly, elected under the same criteria as the Constituent Congress of 1823, to
82 Ibid., p. 302.
8J Manuel Gomez Pedraza, "Aclaracion sobre su conducta en el ministerio de Anastasio Bustamante
en diciembre de 1838, y refutacion a Carlos Maria de Bustamante que desvirtua su actuacion en El
gabinete mexicano durante el segundo periodo de la administracion del exmo. sr. presidente don
Anastasio Bustamante," in Solares Robles, La obra politica de Manuel Gomez Pedraza, p. 354. Juan
Rodriguez Puebla, "Tres dias de ministerio," in El Restuarador Mexicano. )9 December UD8.
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oversee the reform and implementation of the 1824 constitution over a period of six
months. The new Congress would also appoint a new executive. In the meantime
Bustamante and his cabinet would remain in power. X4 Gomez Pedraza wished
Bustamante to sign this decree and implement its measures without referring to
Congress. However, it appears that the President was not happy with this strategy. In
an article published in 1842, Gomez Pedraza claims that Bustamante was opposed to
this idea of a new executive. According to his account, the President made it clear to
him, 'aunque no de palabra [...] de modo que esas cosas se indican, el deseo de
continuar con el mando.· He also states that Bustamante insisted that the proposed
decree be first presented to Congress, agreeing to sign the decree later even if it were
rejected.85 So, at five o'clock that afternoon Gomez Pedraza and Rodriguez Puebla
presented their proposed decree to the Council of Ministers, who, during a meeting
that continued until eleven that evening, rejected the proposals. The next day, the
ministers were interviewed by a commission from the two chambers of Congress. This
meeting failed to come to any decision but arranged for the Supreme Conservative
Power to be consulted the following day. However, neither Congress nor the SPC
convened on 15 December. Gomez Pedraza and Rodriguez Puebla tried to convince
the President to sign the decree without the approval of Congress, as he had
promised/" When Bustamante refused, both men resigned convinced that 'no se
llegaria a publicar el proyecto. ,87
Anastasio Bustamante's behaviour during what would come to be known as
the Three Day Ministry, has been generally described as indecisive and he has been
blamed for the failure of the enterprise. He is accused of lacking the strength of
character to continue with the fight once it was begun and is condemned for not
84 Rodriguez Puebla, "Tres dias de ministerio."
8S Gomez Pedraza, "Aclaracion sobre su conducta," p. 355.
86 Sardo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 304.
87 Rodriguez Puebla, "Tres dias de ministerio."
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supporting his two ministers in such a way as to guarantee the success of their
schemes. Sordo Cedeno claims that Bustamante 'no se atrevio a dar el paso decisivo'
to fully support the plans of Pedraza and Puebla. X8 Costeloe suggests that
Bustamante's wavering was an example of his characteristic 'vacillation and a chronic
inability to act decisively. ,89 Certainly at first glance this interpretation does not seem
too short of the mark. After all, it was Bustamante who invited Pedraza and Puebla to
take up positions in his cabinet and who promised them his support for their plans. It
was Bustamante who insisted that they first present their decree to Congress. He must
have known that the predominantly centralist members would have opposed these
plans.
However, this explanation fails to take into account the reaction of the capital's
population to the news of the proposals in Congress.Y On 14 December, during the
commission's interview with the ministers, a crowd of around 2000 people gathered
outside the National Palace. According to the newspaper, El Restaurador Mexicano:
Un fuego electrico se apodero de todos y comenzaron a dar las voces:
[viva la federaci6n sin cola! [viva la libertad! [viva el pueblo soberano y
muera el centralismo! [...] Las calles y plazas se veian inundadas de
gente que coma y gritaba muy llena de entusiasmo. El numero que se
reunio bajo de la habitaci6n del presidente Bustamante era considerable
y terrible, y fueron tan repetidas las insistencias por la federacion que
tuvo que presentarse al baleen y decir tambien, [viva la federaci6n!91
Later that afternoon the mob headed for the Convent of Santo Domingo, where
Gomez Farias and Padre Alpuche were being held prisoner. They poured into the
square outside the convent and demanded their release. When Gomez Farias appeared
he was feted as a hero and the saviour of the federation, and in the face of a
88 Sordo Cedeno. El congreso en la primera republica centra/isla. p. 307.
89 Coste!oe, The Central Republic in Mexico p. 144.
90 Gomez Pedraza. "Aclaracion sobre su conducta," p. 356.
91 El Restaurador Mexicano, 15 December 1838.
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clamouring crowd was obliged to climb into a carriage for his own protection.I'' The
mob then proceeded to lead the carriage back to the centre, passing by the National
Palace, where according to El Restaurador, the procession made another stop to 'dar
las voces de [viva la federacion sin cola! [viva la libertad! [viva el ilustre y gran Farias!
[muera el centralismo!' before taking Gomez Farias back to his home.93 Father
Alpuche found himself abandoned, and having no where else to go, returned to the
convent.94
Without a doubt, the street demonstrations spoiled the plans of Bustamante
and Gomez Pedraza. The actions of the mob, as Gomez Pedraza noted, aroused 'Ia
alarma de la gente pacifica de la capital' and undermined their support for his plans.95
The street demonstrations also meant that Congress and the Supreme Conservative
Power did not convene to decide upon Gomez Pedraza's proposals on 15 December.
This meant that any hopes Bustamante had cherished of persuading Congress to
support the moral revolution disappeared. It seems likely that the President had
insisted that Gomez Pedraza and Rodriguez Puebla present their proposals to
Congress because he wanted to bring them to the attention of the public at the same
time. He probably hoped that professions of support from the Departmental Juntas and
other bodies, who had supported the first attempt at the moral revolution the year
before, might have forced Congress' hand and induced them to acquiesce to the moral
revolution. The scenes of chaos in the street meant that this plan could not take effect.
The crisis had now to be resolved immediately, so as to avoid any repetition of these
scenes. Congress' refusal to convene on 15 December placed the onus for resolution of
92 Not before the more enterprising amongst the crowd had stolen his watch and cape. El Mexicano, 8
January 1838.
9.1 El Restaurador Mexicano, 15 December 1838. The newspaper also claims the crowd shouted
'imuera comehuevos! [que se ponga a dieta que es muy gloton y se vaya a su casal Ya entrego a Ulua,
no queremos que entregue toda la republica.' Egg-eater was one of the nicknames given to
Bustamante as he had the reputation for frequently enjoying the consumption of soil-boiled eggs.
94 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. I, p. 148.
95 Gomez Pedraza, "Aclaracion sobre su conducta," p. 256.
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the problem solely in Bustamante's hands. If the moral revolution were to be
successful, he would have to implement the reform by decree. It is not surprising that
he would shrink from such a step. Throughout his time as President, he respected the
conventions of the Constitution of 1836. He never attempted to introduce any decree
or other legislation without the approval of Congress and the Supreme Conservative
Power. Moreover, he had always shown a marked dislike for the interference of the
lower classes in the business of government. He had led the Plan of Jalapa in 1829
against Vicente Guerrero, who had been brought to power partly by the riot of the
Parian market. The demonstrations of 14 December were unlikely to encourage him to
continue to work for the triumph of the revolution. Moreover, it was obvious that the
popular leader of the federalist movement was Gomez Farias, not Gomez Pedraza. It
was clear that Bustamante and Gomez Pedraza's attempt to neutralise his influence had
been utterly unsuccessful and that in his new found liberty, he could easily hijack their
plans and tum them to his own advantage. It is not improbable that, as Jose Ramon
Malo reported in his diary, this eventuality was only avoided on 14 December by the
fact that the city's garrison remained loyal to the government and did not join the
mob.96 This of course meant, that any decision to introduce a change in government
would be unlikely to benefit Gomez Pedraza, but rather Gomez Farias. Moreover, on
14 December the Supreme Conservative Power had decided, in the face of
Bustamante's obvious betrayal of centralism, to call upon Santa Anna to come and
restore order in the capital if this should become necessary.97 This could be no idle
threat, for if Santa Anna were to be able to come he would probably be able to count
on the loyalty of the troops in Mexico City and the departments, thanks to his recent
victory over the French. In this case, Bustamante's presidential career would be well
and truly over.
<J6 Malo, Diario de sucesos notables, vol. 1, p. 159. Entry for 14 December 1838.
97 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 1 p.149.
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Therefore, for Bustamante, there was no real choice but to abandon Gomez
Pedraza and his plan. Continuing his support meant laying aside his moral convictions
and quite clearly represented political suicide. Even if he had agreed to decree the
acceptance of the plan, he would have survived a very short time in office before being
deposed by Santa Anna, or another General. The explanation for General
Bustamante's change of heart during the events of the Three Day Ministry is as a
consequence, probably less to do with his lack of courage or hesitation and rather
more to do with pragmatism. He chose the only sensible course open to him, which
was not to press for change at this juncture. In this way he conserved his position for
at least a few more weeks, and could try, as we shall see in later in the chapter, to
bring about change by reforming the Constitution of 1836. However, it is evident that
both centralists and federalists believed he betrayed their cause during December
1838. This placed him in a very delicate position as head of the executive. He had lost
the confidence of two of the most important factions in government and would have to
face the following three years in power in a very hostile atmosphere. Furthermore, this
feeling of betrayal would undoubtedly colour any judgements given upon Bustamante's
government by centralist observers such as Carlos Maria de Bustamante, or federalists
like Gomez Pedraza. It is little wonder that both sides would later be so critical of his
administration.
B: The French Blockade (1837-1839)
The French crisis, which was one of the major causes of dissatisfaction with
Bustamante's government during its first two years, had its origins in the Parian riot of
1828. Many French traders claimed that they had suffered great losses in the events of
4 December. With the help of their government they attempted to extract
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compensation of 163, 378 pesos from the government. 98 One of these traders was a
baker, which explains why the short-lived military conflict of 1838 would be dubbed
'la guerra de los pasteles.' This diplomatic process began in 1829 and dragged on for
the next decade. Tensions between the French and the Mexicans were also increased
by a number of complaints made by the French minister in Mexico concerning the
discriminatory treatment and violence he alleged had been suffered by his countrymen.
The main complaint concerned the execution of two French subjects in Tampico in
December 1835. These men had been part of an expedition against the government of
Santa Anna led by General Jose Antonio Mejia which had landed in Tampico in
December. When Mejia's party was captured, all his men, including the Frenchmen
were executed. The French government wanted the officials who had ordered these
executions to be removed from their positions. Another complaint concerned the
murder of five Frenchmen in Atencingo in 1833. The inhabitants of that village
accused these Frenchmen of poisoning their water supply with cholera morbus. As a
result of this accusation the men were murdered by the residents of Atencingo. Those
who carried out the murders later confessed, but were never prosecuted. Again, the
French government demanded that the officials who oversaw both cases be removed
from their positions.99 Eventually, to ensure payment and satisfaction on the matter of
their complaints, the French resorted to blockading Mexico's Atlantic seaports until
the compensation, then assessed at 300, 000 pesos, almost three times the original sum
was paid and the officials in question were replaced.
However, the French agenda was not limited to securing compensation, nor
even justice for its subjects. Instead, its government also wished to secure an
98 Suplemento al numero J077 del Diario del Gobierno del miercoles 11 de abril. Continuacion de
los documentos relativos al Ultimatum (Mexico City: Imprenta de Galvan, 1838), pp. 104-108,
carries details of the claims made by the traders of the Parian. The document can be found in the
British Library.
99 FO no. 50/98 pp. 14-16. This is a copy of the letter from Deffaudis to the Minister of the Exterior,
26 Deecmber 1836, included by Pakenham in his dispatch to London of 6 January 1836. Also see,
Suplemento al numero J077 del Diario del Gobierno, pp. 52-54.
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advantageous trade treaty with Mexico. By 1836 Great Britain, Prussia, Holland,
Denmark, Saxony and the United States had all signed trade treaties with Mexico.
France, on the other hand, whose citizens were more numerous in Mexico than any of
the above nations, had so far been unable to negotiate a successful treaty with the
M . 100exican government. The difficulties lay in the French demands for certain
guarantees upon the government. The French population in Mexico was almost
entirely devoted to retail trade, mostly of luxury and fancy goods such as silk.lOl For
this reason, the French government wished to ensure that its traders would be
protected in Mexico. It wanted its subjects to be given the same rights as Mexicans to
practise retail trade (currently foreigners were allowed to practise trade, but could be
individually deprived of this right by the government), but also wished that they should
be exempted from military service and all forced loans and contributions levied by the
government. In 1827, when Mexico was still struggling to achieve international
recognition of its independence, Sebastian Camacho had signed an agreement with
France acceding to these requests. This had not been a treaty, however, as France at
this stage was unwilling to recognise Mexico's status, and two years later Vicente
Guerrero's government took the decision to declare it invalid on the grounds that
neither the French king, nor the Mexican Congress had validated the agreement.102 In
1831 and 1832 two further attempts had been made to draw up a full treaty but, on
both occasions, they had come to nothing.103 It was clear to the French government
that a new approach had to be found.
In April 1837 the first step of a such a new strategy was taken by the French
Plenipotentiary Minister, Baron Deffaudis. He sent a letter to the Mexican Ministry of
the Interior which demanded that compensation be paid to those French traders who
100 Barker. The French Experience in Mexico. p. 52.
101 Ibid., p. 19.
102 Ibid., pp. 12-14,28.
10~ Ibid .• pp. 40-41, 46-52.
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had suffered losses during the Parian riot; that the French residing in Mexico be
reimbursed for all taxes and forced loans that they had been obliged to pay; that those
officials who had overseen the execution of the Frenchmen in Tampico and had
refused to prosecute the murderers in Atencingo be immediately punished and what
was most important, that the informal trade treaty signed between France and Mexico
in 1827 be fully recognised by the Mexican government until a new one could be
drawn up. This new treaty should be written '10 mas pronto posible.' If these demands
were not met, the Baron threatened the government, France was prepared to take
matters into their own hands.'?' In the words of Pakenham, to whom Deffaudis
showed the orders he had received from this government, they were 'prepared to
resort to the mode of obtaining satisfaction as was triumphantly put into practice at
Lisbon and Algiers' (i.e. forcej.!" The Bustamante government attempted to settle the
issue peacefully with the Baron and Luis G. Cuevas was ordered to begin negotiations
with the French representative. In June of that year the two men met and discussed the
situation, but were unable to come to any agreement. From a letter Cuevas wrote to
the Baron just after this meeting it is clear that the Mexican government was not keen
to set a precedent whereby foreign governments could demand compensation for
losses suffered by their nationals during Mexican unrest, and it certainly was not
prepared to exempt the French from taxes or forced loans, nor reimburse those who
had already paid. 106
Cuevas' position is easily understood if we consider that France was not the
only country making complaints against Mexican treatment of their nationals and
104 Baron Deffaudis to the Minister of the Exterior, 13 April 1837, in Suplemento al numero lOll del
Diario del Gobierno, pp. 43-45.
105 FO no. 50/106, p. 24. Pakenham to Palmerston, 4 March 1837.
106 Luis G. Cuevas to Baron Deffaudis. Palace of the National Government, Mexico City, 27 June
1837. in Suplemento al Diario del Gobierno de Mexico num. 1066. del Sabado 31 de Marzo de 1838.
Contiene el ultimatum remitido par S.E. el sr. baron Deffaudis, ministro plenipotenciario de Francia
al gobierno mexicano (Mexico City: Imprenta de Galvan a cargo de Mariano Arevalo. calle de
Cadena num, 2, 1838), pp. 20-26.
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claiming for compensation for the damage suffered. In September 1836 the United
States had also presented the government with a series of grievances concerning the
treatment of its citizens in Mexico. Their minister, Powhatan Ellis, had likewise
demanded that proper redress be given to those who had complained. When these
demands had not been met, Ellis requested to be furnished with a passport and left
Mexico. Richard Pakenham is probably correct in his assessment that these grievances
were exploited deliberately by Ellis to manufacture a rupture with the Mexican
government in order to add pressure upon them 'in favour of the cause of the
separation ofTexas.'I07 Even so, the government must have been acutely aware that if
it were to concede France's right to demand the dismissal of its employees and extract
compensation for its subjects, this could only open the floodgates for other disgruntled
nations to demand similar rights.
If we consider that the Mexican government had been fielding such demands
from the French for nearly ten years, it is quite possible that neither Bustamante nor
Congress was prepared for the way events would develop after this failed meeting.
After all, Deffaudis' demands in 1837 had included the threat 0f military interference.
In the event, this had not materialised. A small French fleet had appeared in Veracruz
in March 1837, but had made no attempt to support Deffaudis in his demands against
the government. This led many to believe that Deffaudis' letter had no special
significance. Deffaudis found himself the object of ridicule in the press of the capital
and, in the face of the government's refusal to accede to his demands, resigned and
made plans to return to France.108 However, in January 1838 as Deffaudis sailed out
of Veracruz his progress was halted by a small fleet of French ships, consisting of a
frigate and five brigs, speeding towards the port. He was ordered to turn around and
accompany the fleet back to Mexico, where in February it anchored off the coast of
107 FO no. 50/105, pp. 1-2. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 14 February 1837.
108 Barker, The French Experience in Mexico, p.65.
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the island Sacrificios. 109 On March 21 Deffaudis published an ultimatum to the
Mexican government. This demanded 600, 000 pesos from the Mexican government
as compensation for the losses its nationals had suffered during the Parian riot and
other disturbances; the replacement of named officials who had been instrumental in
the ill-treatment or false imprisonment or illegal execution of its citizens; the
exemptions of its nationals from forced loans; the treatment of France as the most
favoured nation as far as diplomatic agents, consulates, navigation and trade were
concerned; and the privilege that its own traders should be treated as Mexicans in the
execution of their business. The ultimatum gave the Mexican government until the 14
April to comply with these demands. It threatened that, should the demands not be
met, the French fleet would take steps to deprive the national authorities of the income
of their marine customs houses, or in other words, to blockade their ports.IIO The
response of the Bustamante government was uncompromising. The Minister of the
Interior, Cuevas, wrote to Eduoard de Lisle, who had replaced Deffaudis as the
French representative in the capital that 'nada puede tratarse sobre el contenido del
ultimatum mientras [que] no se retiren de nuestras costas las fuerzas navales
111 hfrancesas.' Consequently, on the 16 April, t e French blockade of Mexico's
Atlantic ports began.
In the light of the prolonged nature of the blockade which would cost the
government over five million pesos in lost revenues,112 Bustamante's the decision to
adopt such a position seems quite ill-advised. It was also quite unexpected. The
French had clearly expected the Mexicans to capitulate immediately to their ultimatum.
A significant number of French passenger ships arrived in Veracruz in April and May.
109 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista. p. 276.
110 Suplemento al Diario del Gobierno de Mexico num 1066, pp. 3-20. The quotation is taken from
page 18.
III Cuevas to Eduoard de Lisle, 30 March 1838., in ibid.; p. 39
112 Luis Gonzaga Cuevas, Exposicion del ex ministro que la suscribe sobre las diferencias con
Francia (Mexico City: Impreso por Ignacio Cumplido, cane de los Rebeldes, no. 2, 1839), p. 51. In
the British Library.
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Their captains had obviously not been informed of a proposed blockade, tor it is
unlikely that they would have made the crossing in such circumstances. I 13 Nancy
Nichols Barker, in her study of the contlict, attributes this to the superiority the French
believed they enjoyed over Mexico, and 'never doubted the ease with which this
country could be subdued.' Baron Deffaudis himself had claimed that a single war-ship
could demolish the fortress of Ulua in less than an hour. 114 However, the
administration, already considerably unpopular, could ill afford to be seen to placate
the French. As Minister of the Exterior, Cuevas, explained to the British and Prussian
ministers, he did not doubt that the government's enemies would seek to exploit the
crisis in an attempt to overthrow it. In his opinion, the government's only option was
to take the lead in the resistance against the French, and exploit the excitement and
passions of the population in their support. I IS In this vein, the President published a
manifesto on 31 March, in which he called for national unity in the face of this foreign
aggression and concluded:
Tan dispuesto a una paz con honor como decidido a una guerra sin
termino, vuestro presidente nada ornitira para prevenir por su parte
nuevas dificultades que prolonguen un estado tan perjudicial a los
. db' 116mtereses e am os parses.
These were not idle sentiments. On 2 April, a law granting amnesty for all those who
had been engaged in political crimes since 1835 was passed.117 Two days later, a
second law announcing an amnesty for all army deserters was also introduced. I IS In
113 FO no. 50/114, p. 120. Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 24 May 1838.
114 Barker, The French Experience in Mexico, pp. 67-68.
115 FO no. 501113, pp. 199-200. Ashburnham to Palmerson, Mexico City, 4 April 1838.
116 Anastasio Bustamante, El presidente de la republica mexicana a sus habitantes (Mexico City:
Imprenta del Aguila, dirigida por Jose Ximeno, 1838), p. 7. In the British Library.
117 Manuel Dublan and Jose Maria Lozano, Legislacion mexicana 6 coleccion completa de Ills
disposiciones legislativas expedidas desde la independencia de la Republica (Mexico City: Imprenta
del Comercio, a cargo de Dublan y Lozano, hijos, calle de Cordobanes, no. 8, 1876), vo!. 3, p. 468.
Law dated 2 April 1838.
11K Ibid. Law dated 4 April 1838.
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May and June two laws were passed that allowed the government to increase the size
of the army to 60, 000 men and to undertake all the necessary expenditure to prepare
for the defence of the Republic.i" The government had originally proposed to
Congress in April that 'las atribuciones del presidente de la republica se extiendan a
tomar cuantas medidas juzgue convenientes para poner la republica en estado de
defensa, mantener la integridad del territorio cuidar la paz y tranquilidad interior.' 120
But this and a subsequent request made in May, was rejected by the Senate.
Therefore, all measures had to be approved individually by Congress. Sordo Cedeno
explains that the hombres de bien in the Senate were suspicious of Bustamante's
motives. They were fearful that Bustamante was organising a coup d'etat with the aim
of bringing back the Constitution of 1824. He sees the tact that Congress approved
measures to strengthen Mexico's defence individually as proof that Bustamante did not
need the extraordinary powers he solicited, and suggests that the hombres de bien
were correct in thinking that he was driven by motives 'mas alla de la sola defensa del
pais.,121 However, we must also consider that the delays necessarily imposed by
having to submit each proposal to Congress to be debated separately might also have
motivated Bustamante's request. At the time he was faced with much criticism over his
slow response to the French threat. 122
From a French point of view, the blockade of Mexico's ports was entirely
unsuccessful. Even as the weeks turned into months, the Mexican government showed
little sign of backing down. Moreover, by August the French fleet was in serious
trouble. A third of its crew was either ill or had died from the vomito negro. Baron
Deffaudis had fled back to France, defeated by the climate and the commander of the
IIQ Ibid., pp. 512, 533-534. Laws dating 25 May and 13 June lR38.
120 The text from the bill presented to Congress is quoted from Sordo Cedeno, El congreso cn la
primera republica centralista, p. 279.
121 Ibid .• pp. 280-281.
122 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 1, pp. 112-113.
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fleet was petitioning to be allowed to retreat. 123In order to avoid this humiliation, the
French decided to step up their presence in Veracruz. Three frigates and nine brigs
arrived in Sacrificios on 26 October, under the command of Rear-Admiral Charles
Baudin, a veteran of the Napoleonic wars. He was ordered to repeat the French
demands, and add a further 200, 000 pesos to the claim for compensation for the
losses incurred thus far by the French fleet. He was also under instructions to insist
that the French should be in future exempted from forced loans and allowed to engage
in retail trade. Ideally these aims were to be achieved through negotiation, but he was
authorised to resort to the use of arms if necessary. The increased military presence at
Sacrificios, and the rapidly escalating losses from the closed customs houses, induced
Bustamante to enter into negotiation with Baudin in November. However, despite
concessions made by both sides, the two parties were unable to reach agreement in
negotiations which took place from 17 to 21 November in Jalapa. The Minister of the
Exterior, Luis Gonzaga Cuevas, head of the Mexican delegation, agreed to pay the
600, 000 peso compensation by instalments and promised that in future the French
would be exempt from forced loans. Baudin agreed to drop the demand for the extra
200, 000 pesos and granted the Mexican authorities huge leeway in the way in which
they were to punish their offending officials, practically assuring their immunity.124
The negotiations broke down on the subject of the French demand that the provisional
treaty of 1827 be enforced while a new trade treaty was negotiated.125 The main
sticking point was that of retail trade. Baudin was willing to waive this demand, if the
Mexican government would agree to indemnify those French subjects who were
deprived of this right. Cuevas refused to give such assurances and the negotiations
broke down on 21 November. Baudin returned to Veracruz and addressed his final
In Barker, The French Experience in Mexico, pp. 72-73.
124 Ibid., p. 74.
125 FO no. 501116 p. 38. Ashburnham to Palmerston, 10 December 1838.
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warning to Cuevas; either they agreed to his terms by noon on 27 November or he
Id h '1" 126wou commence osti ines.
Their demands remained unmet and the French began firing upon Veracruz on
27 November.127 General Rincon, the commander of the fort of Ulua, surrendered
almost immediately; and the government, indigent at the treachery of this officer
appointed General Santa Anna to take his place. The General arrived in Veracruz in
the morning of the 4 December and reinforcements under General Mariano Arista
followed later that evening. On the morning of 5 December the French disembarked
into the town of Veracruz and with the aim of capturing Santa Anna and Arista. Arista
was taken prisoner, but Santa Anna managed to escape and rally enough troops to
attack the enemy as they returned to their ships. In this action Santa Anna's horse was
shot from under him and he was seriously wounded in his leg, which was later
amputated. 128 The French were not really expulsed by this action and remained in their
ships blockading the port of Veracruz. The Mexican pride was however somewhat
mollified. Santa Anna quickly became a national hero overnight, his disgrace at San
Jacinto quite forgotten.
Despite the capture of the Ulua fortress, the French still did not have the
upper hand in the conflict. Baudin did not possess sufficient force to capture Veracruz
and could make no advance from his new position.129 Baudin recognised that unless
his government sent an expeditionary force to launch an invasion, he had exhausted his
military options. He could only continue the blockade, for which he had no great
hopes. 'Mexico is adapting itself to poverty' he wrote, 'and, ruined though it may be,
126 Barker, The French Experience in Mexico, p. 74. Baudin to Cuevas. 21 November UDR. in
Documentos relativos a las conferencias en Jalapa entre el ministro de relaciones exteriores y et
contra-almirante plenipotenciario de Francia. sobre el arreglo de las diferencias entre ambas
naciones (Mexico City: Impreso por Jose M. Lara, calle de la Palma no. 4, 183R), p.49. In the British
Library.
m Malo, Diario de sucesos notables, vol I, p. 154 and Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano vol. 1. p.
122.
128 Costeloe, The Central Republic in Mexico p. 146.
129 Barker, The French Experience in Mexico, p.76.
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it can long sustain the struggle against us relying simply on the force of inertia. ' 130It
seemed that negotiation was the only answer. In January 1839 a British fleet of 13
ships, carrying the returning minister Richard Pakenham, also appeared in the water
off Veracruz. Pakenham was authorised by his government to act as an arbitrator in
any negotiations and to work to bring both sides to an agreement. 131This was a blow
to the Mexican government, who had thought that the British might have been
persuaded to aid their cause against the French Navy.132 Initially, the Mexican
government opposed his arbitration, using the accusation that Baudin had supplied the
federalist rebels in Tampico with weapons as an excuse to stall negotiations. 133Barker
suggests that the administration preferred to rely on the climate of Veracruz eventually
to defeat the French.134 Even so, Pakenham was able to brush aside this question
relatively easily135 and new negotiations were begun in March.136 On 14 March, the
chief government negotiator, Manuel Eduardo Gorostiza presented the agreed treaty
and convention to Congress for its approval.137 In ratifying this, Congress committed
itself to paying the original sum of 600, 000 pesos to the French government and to
arrange for a lasting peace between the two nations. It also agreed to begin
negotiations for a treaty to be drawn up. It did not however include any clauses upon
the exemption of French citizens from forced loans or guarantee their right to retail
130 Baudin to Mole, La Nereide, IS December 1838, in ibid.. p. 81.
131 FO no. 501117, p. 110-112. Report to Lord Palmerston, Port Royal, II December 1838.
132 Bustamante, El gahinete mexicano vol. I pp. 163-165. El Restaurador Mexicano, 19 January
1839.
133 FO no. 50/123, pp. 100-104. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 26 January 1839.
134 Barker, The French Experience in Mexico, p. 81.
135 Carlos Maria de Bustamante reports that the British minister in Mexico, Richard Pakenharn,
threatened that unless Congress agreed to begin negotiations he would demand his passport. This,
claims Bustamante, was akin to threatening war, as the minister was in command of a fleet in
Mexican waters. Congress had little choice but to agree to the new attempt to end the contlict through
negotiation. Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. I pI6S-166. However, I have been able to find
no evidence of this in Pakenham's dispatches to Palmerston.
136 FO no. 50/123, p. 163. Pakenham to Palmerston, 23 February 1839.
m Malo, Diario de sucesos notables. vol. 1 p. 165.
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trade. Nor did it promise the removal of Mexican officials who had taken what the
French viewed as illegal action against its citizens. 138.
On the whole, it cannot be said that the Mexican government was humiliated
by the terms of the treaty. It was the French who were forced to moderate their
demands and to abandon many of their complaints. Carlos Maria de Bustamante and
other critics of the government would later make unfavourable comparisons of
Mexico's treaty with that extracted from Juan Manuel de Rosas in Argentina, after a
three year blockade of Buenos Aires by the French Navy between 1838 and 1840.
Carlos Maria de Bustamante in particular would see this as evidence of Bustamante's
weakness and ineptitude for government.Y' This would seem to be somewhat unfair.
Rosas, like Bustamante, was obliged to concede the payment of the indemnities
demanded by the French. He did not succeed in defeating his French enemies, although
it must be noted that he resisted for a much longer period than Bustamante.140
Bustamante's enemies chose to see the treaty as a humiliating failure, partly because
they opposed his government and therefore, we must be careful before we accept their
opinions uncritically. It is difficult to see how Mexico, or the President, could have
escaped any better from the French crisis. It is true that the blockade was extremely
expensive for the Mexican government, and can hardly be described as a famous
victory. It is also clear that if Bustamante had ceded to French demands at the start,
the treasury would have been saved over five million pesos in lost revenues. However,
this would have been a real humiliation for Mexico, and would no doubt have allowed
m Dublan and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, vol. 3, pp. 617-619. Treaty dated 29 April 1838.
J.N Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 1, p. 175. He writes: 'Buenos Aires ha conservado su
honor en la lid con Francia; i.S por que? Por la enorme diferencia que hay entre Rosas y Bustamante.
Aquel pueblo estaba regido por una aguila y el nuestro por un tortuga.' His italics. El Sonorense of 13
February 1841 writes after publishing the treaty: 'nos provoca una comparicion triste y desagradable,
humillante y fea cual resulta entre Buenos Aires y Mexico, entre el poseer de una y otra, los
sufrimientos y resultados que han tenido, y la gloria de los directores y nacionales de aquella y la
infamia y vergiienza de esta y sus mandatarios. '
140 "Convencion entre la Francia y el gobierno de Buenos Aires, encargado de las relaciones
exteriores de la Confederacion Argentina," (29 October 1840). in El Sonorense, 13 February 1841.
The French blockaded Buenos Aires between 1838 and 1840.
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other nations to bully the Republic into acquiescing to other more outrageous
demands. Moreover, it would almost certainly have spelt the end of Bustamante's
career. His enemies would have surely capitalised upon the general outrage which
would have been provoked by an early surrender and they would have almost certainly
have tried to depose him.
C: The Struggle for Survival (1839-1840)
Throughout the French Crisis and Bustamante's dealings with Manuel G6mez
Pedraza, the armed rebellion in favour of federalism continued in many of the
provinces. This had begun long before Bustamante took office on 19 April 1837 and
involved various areas of the country. In January 1837 a federalist pronunciamiento
was issued in Alta California. On 14 April, another was announced in San Luis Potosi.
In May, General Esteban Moctezuma issued a federalist plan in Rio Verde, Queretaro.
In November, pronunciamientos for federalism were announced in Papantla and
Michoacan.141 In Michoacan the rebellion was led by the veteran rebel, Gordiano
Guzman, and soon spread to parts of Jalisco and Guanajuato.142 The most significant
of these rebellions was that of Jose Urrea, which as we noted previously began in
Sonora in December 1837. This rebellion became stronger throughout 1838, as his
forces were joined by those of Jose Antonio Mejia in Tampico. Soon the rebellion
spread from Sonora and Sinaloa into Tamaulipas. During the French crisis these rebels
were pursued by government troops with varying degrees of success. However, in
January 1839, following the failure of the Three Day Ministry, Bustamante requested
141 Appendix Three carries a list of the rebellions and pronunciamientos during Bustamante's
administration.
142 For a detailed description of Guzman's activities see: Juan Ortiz Escamilla, "El pronunciamiento
federalista de Gordiano Guzman, 1837-1842," Historia Mexicana 38:2 (1988), pp. 241-282.
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Congress to allow him to lead a new offensive against the federalist rebels.143 Why
Bustamante should want to do this is clear if we consider the circumstances in which
he now found himself As we have already commented, support for Bustamante
amongst the centralists in Congress by December 1838 was non-existent. They had
long suspected he was a closet federalist, and his behaviour during the Three Day
Ministry had appeared to confirm this. Moreover, in failing to insist that the moral
revolution be enforced, Bustamante had burnt his boats with the moderate federalists,
who regarded him as little better than a traitor. Therefore, he occupied an extremely
solitary position at the head of the executive and, shorn of practically all support,
could not have expected to continue long in the Presidency. Leaving the capital to
fight the rebels was certainly a better departure than being forced to leave by a
rebellion. He may have even hoped that he could restore his popularity amongst the
centralists with a successful campaign against the rebels, from which could then
organise a victorious return to Mexico City.
That Bustamante wanted to avoid being toppled by rebellion is obvious from
the manner in which he organised his departure. He proposed that his interim president
should be none other than Santa Annal44 and appointed the well-known santanista,
Jose Maria Tornel, as Minister of War. Santa Anna represented the greatest threat to
Bustamante's position by January 1839. His popularity had undergone a meteoric rise
after his display of heroics against the French and there had been many rumours
alleging plans in favour of the General's return to power. During the crisis of the moral
revolution, the Supreme Conservative Power had gone as far as deciding that, should
law and order break down, Santa Anna should be sent for to restore peace. It seems
clear that Bustamante wished to try to prevent a rebellion against himself by making
143 Malo, Diario de sucesos notables, vol., p. 162. The motion was proposed to Congress on 21
January.
144 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, pp. 311-312. Sordo Cedeno
rejects the idea, popular at the time, that the centralists forced Bustamante to accept Santa Anna as
his replacement. He shows that the request for Santa Anna came from the executive itself
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any movement in favour of Santa Anna unnecessary. This strategy appears to have
been successful. In February Carlos Maria de Bustamante introduced a bill to
Congress which proposed that the legislature declare Anastasio Bustamante morally
unfit to continue as President, or even to lead the army against Urrea. He presented his
proposal on 28 February, eleven days after Santa Anna's arrival in the capital. He
argued that President Bustamante had disappointed all those who had supported his
election. He blamed the President for all the problems now facing the Republic,
including the internal unrest and aggression from the French. He described the
negotiations with the French as shameful and criticised the President for not
immediately leaving the capital to march against the rebels upon the arrival of Santa
Anna.145 According to Sordo Cedeno, this feeling was not confined to Carlos Maria
de Bustamante, but was shared by many centralists.146 However, Congress rejected
Carlos Maria de Bustamante's petition and the writer's colleagues in the Supreme
Conservative Power quickly made it clear that they had played no part in the drawing
up of the proposal.147
General Bustamante did not leave Mexico City until 18 March, more than a
month after Santa Anna's arrival. He rode as far as Guadalupe, where he remained
until 20 March. Although Carlos Maria de Bustamante claims this is because he did
not wish to hand over command, 148 this is unlikely considering it was Bustamante who
suggested Santa Anna as a replacement in the first place. Instead, it seems that in the
weeks after Santa Anna's arrival, the two Generals worked together to agree upon the
best way to tackle Mexico's mounting problems. General Cortazar was summoned
from Guadalajara to take part in these discussions. On 7 March, the three Generals in
the company of various ministers, deputies and senators held an important meeting, in
145 Bustamante, E/ gabinete mexicano, vol. I, pp. 169-170.
146 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista. p. 313.
147 Ibid., p. 314.
148 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. I, p. 176.
239
The Second Administration (l837-184l)
which it was decided that both the Constitution of 1824 and its successor of 1836
were not suitable for government. It was agreed that the latter should be reformed and
that this should be undertaken by Congress. The meeting also discussed military
strategy and a plan to suppress the two major rebellions of Urrea and Guzman was
formed. According to this plan, Cortazar would return to the Bajio and lead the fight
against Guzman; Bustamante would head North to recapture the ports of Tampico and
Tuxpan; and Santa Anna would remain in Mexico City, where he should prevent the
federalists from reaching the capital, should they evade Bustamante's troops.149 Sordo
Cedeno also suggests that Bustamante wished to see the French crisis resolved before
he left the capital. Senate approved the articles of the French treaty on 20 March, the
day that Bustamante finally left his camp at Guadalupe and headed for Queretaro. 150
General Bustamante's campaign against Urrea was generally regarded as a
failure. The slow progress of his army, which was interpreted by the official Diario de
Gobierno as being motivated by a desire not to spill Mexican blood, lSI allowed Urrea
and Mejia to leave Tampico and head south. This was seen by many, including Carlos
Maria de Bustamante, as the fault of Bustamante's incompetence and as proof of his
unwillingness to fight against federalism.152 Urrea and Mejia headed for Puebla and
Santa Anna, hearing of their arrival, immediately set out to confront them,
accompanied by TomeI and Gabriel Valencia. Government troops met the rebels in
Acajete on the border between Puebla and Veracruz and won a decisive victory. Mejia
was caught and shot within three hours, but Urrea managed to make his escape and
return to Tampico. Although Valencia led the attack, while TomeI apparently directed
military operations, it was Santa Anna who took the credit for this achievement. 153
149 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, pp. 313,317.
150 Ibid., p. 315.
151 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 1, p. 192.
152 Ibid., pp. 192, 196-197. Costeloe, The Central Republic, p.154.
153 Will Fowler, Tomei and Santa Anna. The Writer and the Caudillo. 1795-1853 (Westport,
Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp. 169-170.
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This of course reflected badly upon Bustamante, who was now seen to be a much less
effective soldier than a one-legged man. To add further embarrassment to the General,
the eventual defeat of the rebels in Tampico on 4 June was achieved without his
presence. According to Carlos Maria de Bustamante, Bustamante was in Padilla at the
time, paying his respects to the memory of Iturbide, a fact which hardly endeared him
to the diarist.154 Finally, Bustamante also failed to play any part in the eventual capture
of Urrea, who gave himself up to General Paredes y Arrillaga in Tuxpan a few days
later.155
In the manifiesto that Bustamante later published to defend his role in
Tamaulipas, he attributed his slowness in attacking Tampico to two main reasons. The
first was the distance between the major focuses of revolt in the North. Rebellion was
not confined to the two ports of Tampico and Tuxpan; and federalist rebels also
threatened other towns, such as Matamoros, Monterrey, Soto la Marina and Saltillo.
This meant Bustamante was obliged to divide his forces and resources; and quite
obviously was unable to be in all places at all times.156 This problem was aggravated
by the second cause Bustamante attributes to his slow progress: the general lack of
money and supplies.157 Bustamante sent repeated appeals to Mexico for more money
and supplies; but by May, the problem had become acute. Bustamante directed this
warning to TomeI in Mexico City:
Los escasos fundos que han quedado en la comisaria del ejercito de mi
mando, no son suficientes ni aun para cubrir las precisas atenciones de
la segunda quincena de las fuerzas que operan en este Departamento
[...] Se aproxima elIde junio, dia en que mis angustias han de ser
inauditas, porque en el me voy aver privado de auxiliar a los cuerpos
154 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 1. p. 196.
155 Malo. Diario de sucesos notables, vol. 1, p. 170. Entry for 18 June 1839.
156 Anastasio Bustamante, Manifiesto que el ciudadano Anastasio Bustamante dirige 1I sus
compatriotas como General en Gefe de Operaciones sobre Tamaulipas y demas departamentos de
Oriente (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila, dirigida por Jose Ximeno, calle de Medinas, no. 6, 1839),
f' 22. In CONDUMEX.
57 lbid., pp. 23-24.
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aun para que por ellos se ministre el rancho del soldado en un pais en
que no se encuentran recursos.158
He went on to plead that 'se apresure a disponer la pronta remisi6n del numerario
suficiente' adding that 'ni yo debere ser responsable de las resultas,' which would
surely be the desertion of large numbers of his men.159 Even so, whatever
Bustamante's explanations may have been, his image as a soldier suffered greatly from
the campaign in Tamaulipas, and can have done little to reawaken confidence of
centralists or others in his Presidency.
Despite this, Bustamante found himself summoned back to the capital on 23
June 1839. According to the letter sent to him by the Minister of War, Tornel, Santa
Anna's health no longer permitted him to act as interim and he wished to return to
Veracruz.160 The truth, however, was a little more complex. Santa Anna had governed
since April more or less by decree, showing a marked disregard for Congress and the
Supreme Conservative Power. On 8 April he issued a decree which denounced those
who abused the freedom of the press, naming specifically three guilty newspapers: El
Cosmopolita, El Restuarador and El Voto Nacional, and announced new measures for
dealing with this crime. Henceforth those editors deemed to be guilty of such a crime
would lose their constitutional rights and be imprisoned in the fortresses of San Juan
de Ulua or Acapulco.i'" The three newspapers closed down almost immediately and
their editors were subject to persecution.162 On 30 April, without asking for Congress'
permission, he left the capital to fight Urrea.163 On I July he agreed to seek a loan in
London to the value of £ 130, 000 sterling. 1M Once more he failed to seek approval
158 Bustamante to Tomei, Santander, 16 May 1839, in ibid., p. 71.
159 Ibid.
160 Tomei to Bustamante. Mexico City, 23 June 1839, in ibid., p. 75.
161 Dubbin and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, vol. 3. pp. 616-617.
162 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 318.
16~ tua.. p. 330.
164 Ibid., p. 322-323.
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from Congress in this matter. All this had given the centralists and hombres de bien in
Congress a lot to think about. On Santa Anna's triumphant return to Mexico in May,
after the action of Acajete, he was met by a welcoming committee from the Chamber
of Deputies and the Council of Government. The senators refused to participate in
protest at his infringement of the constitution.i'f But most worrying of all were Santa
Anna's plans for the reformation of the constitution, which when they were sent to the
Council of Government on 15 June, included this article: 'para que durante el tiempo
que estas [reformas] se efectuen designe [el Consejo] la persona que se encargue del
ejecutivo, atendida aun la situacion en que se encuentra la republica.' 166 Given that the
reforms were about to be undertaken by Congress, this article appeared to suggest that
Bustamante should be prevented from returning to the Presidency. It is little wonder
that Bustamante's friends in the capital wrote to the General begging his prompt
return. They saw this article as proof that Santa Anna wanted to remove Bustamante
1 d his oositi 167permanent y and suspected that he really wante to usurp IS position.
Santa Anna's behaviour during his three months in power convinced the
centralists that it was better to support the submissive Bustamante, who observed the
constitution and respected Congress, than the more dynamic Santa Anna, who rode
roughshod over the law.168 Santa Anna, recognising that his popularity was on the
wane in Congress, abruptly announced his intention to retire from the executive on 24
June. He left on 10 July, nine days before Bustamante arrived, thus avoiding a meeting
with the President. He retired to his hacienda to await a better opportunity to arrange
his rival's fall. As a parting shot he published a manifesto, in which he claimed
responsibility for the peace with France, the suppression of the federalist rebellion and
the prospective reforms of the constitution.169 In this way, he would be remembered
165 Malo, Diario de sucesos notables, vol. I. p. 168. Entry for 8 May 1839.
166 Proposal quoted in Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la prim era republica centralista, p. 325.
167 Olavarria y Ferrari, "Mexico independiente," p. 443.
168 Sardo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 327.
169 Ibid., pp. 326-327.
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as the one who had saved 'la patria en una de las crisis mas terribles en que se
viera,,170 and Bustamante, who had overseen the peace negotiations, participated in
drawing up the plans for constitutional reform and played a more active part in the
fight against the rebels,171would be forever seen as ineffective,
The federalist revolt was far from over, however. In the North, Antonio
Canales and Pedro Lemus continued to lead the fight, while in Michoacan, Guzman's
rebellion continued unabated. General Urrea also did not abandon his plans for re-
introducing federalism into Mexico. In April 1840 he wrote to Valentin Gomez Farias
from his prison in the fortress of Perote describing what he believed to be the universal
rejection of the centralist system in Mexico and proposed an alliance between Farias
and Gomez Pedraza in order to save the country from total ruin.!" Later that year he
was transferred from Perote to the prison of the ex-Inquisition in Mexico City from
where he organised one of the most daring pronunciamientos of the early decades of
independence. In the early morning of the 15 July 1840, Urrea escaped from his prison
with the help of the 5th Infantry Regiment and quickly moved to enter the National
Palace, surprising the guards and capturing Bustamante in his bedchamber. According
to various accounts, Bustamante faced the intruders calmly, but with a sword in his
hand ready to defend himself. Apparently, the soldiers were ordered to fire upon the
President, but refused. Carlos Maria de Bustamante later recounted that their reticence
was due to their memory of his friendship with Iturbide. m Another writer claimed that
they were instead affected by respect for Bustamante himself. He says: 'en este
momento tan critico el Presidente domino a los sublevados por su extremada calma e
inalterable fimeza, presentandoles su pecho y desafiandolos a que tiraran.' I7l The
170 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 1, p. 202.
171 Sardo Cedeno. El congreso en la primera republic centralista, p. 327.
172 VGF A no. 625. Jose Urrea to Valentin Gomez Farias, 16 April 1840.
173 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 2, p.63.
174 Relacion de los principales sucesos que tuvieron lugar el dis 15 de julio proximo pasado y
pormenores acaecidos en las 24 horas de prision del exmo. sr. presidente de la republica, p. 2.
Quoted in Sardo Cedeno. El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 367.
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President was held hostage for the rest of the day while the rebels attempted to
convince him to accept their demands. In return for his freedom, Urrea suggested,
Bustamante should commit himself to the re-establishment of the federalist
constitution; that a new congress be convened to reform this Constitution of 1824; and
in the meantime he should remain in power, appointing a new cabinet to support
him.m While Bustamante remained a prisoner, Generals Valencia and Almonte
organised the troops loyal to the government in the Ciudadela, and began firing on the
National Palace. According to Urrea, Bustamante expressed a mixture of approval and
repugnance to the various details of the plan but agreed to negotiate with Valencia and
Almonte in order to re-establish peace. lib According to another witness, the interview
between the President and the federalists went like this:
Pasado un rato llego otra comision, y el presidente les dijo :
-lamas firmare las proposiciones que me han mandado, y creo que
bast ante me conocen uds. para no dudar ni un momenta que antes
preferiria perder la vida que el honor.
A 10 que contestaron:
-Que sabian de un modo positivo que era incapaz de cometer una
bajeza.
-Entonces son uds. unos viles, pues se han atrevido a proponer una
infamia. Les repuso el S.E. con una dignidad que siempre le es
caracteristica.
-En manos de V.E. esta el bien del pais, le decian estos senores.
-Si, les contestaba el Presidente, pero no con semejante gente,
agregando, tan mexicano como uds. soy y aun creo alga mas; de modo
que con mucho dolor veo el derramamiento de sangre entre hermanos;
por 10 que si quieren que salga, hare mis esfuerzos para que el General
en Jefe de las tropas fieles al gobiemo escuche sus proposiciones, S1
bl IT,estas son razona es. Yo no me comprometo a otra cosa.
175 VGFA no. 639. This document is the plan which Urrea showed to Bustamante.
176 VGF A no. 642. Jose Urrea to Juan Alvarez. 18 July 1840.
177 Relacion de los principales sucesos que tuvieron lugar el dia J5 de julio proximo pasado y
pormenores acaecidos en las 24 horas de prision del exmo. sr. presidente de la republica, pp. 6-7.
Quoted in Sordo Cedeno. El Congreso en la primera republica centralista, pp. 369-370.
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Accordingly, he was released the next day. Once outside the Palace,
Bustamante soon joined up with the troops that had remained loyal to him in the
Ciudadela. It was quickly decided to reject Urrea's proposals and the firing of cannons
from their position in the Ciudadela upon the National Palace continued unabated. In
fact, both sides would fire indiscriminately from their positions upon the buildings
surrounding their enemy for the next twelve days. This brought chaos to the streets as
businesses shut down and the well-to-do classes fled the city. Food and water were in
short supply." Many civilians who ventured on the streets were caught in the crossfire
and their bodies left to rot on the streets or be eaten by packs of marauding dogs.I7'1
Carlos Maria Bustamante estimates that 986 people died in the twelve days of fighting;
the US ambassador reckoned the figure was between five and seven hundred.!" and
Richard Pakenham put the figure at 400.181 It was clear that the government had the
upper hand. The rebels had lost all their advantages of surprise and confusion; and
their trump card of being in possession of the president, by the second day and from
that point on were effectively isolated in the National Palace. They received no
support from outside the capital and were faced with the prospect of reinforcements
being sent for the government under General Santa Anna. Moreover, their supplies
were quickly running out and in their position they faced considerable difficulties in
finding more.:" All this considered, it is not surprising the rebels surrendered after only
twelve days of hostilities.
The July Revolt failed because the federalists could not count upon support
amongst the hombres de bien and the military. These groups instead remained on the
side of the government. However, this support was essentially based upon their
178 Frances Erskine Calderon de la Barca, Life in Mexico: The Letters of Fanny Calderon de la Barca
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966), pp. 296-306.
179 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 2, p. 74.
180 lbid., p. 80. Costeloe, The Central Republic in Mexico. p. 162.
181 FO no. 50/136, p. 172. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 29 July 1840.
182 Michael P. Costeloe, "A Pronunciamiento in Nineteenth Century Mexico: '15 de julio de 1R40,",
Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 4:2 (1988), pp. 255-256, 263.
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opposition to Urrea and Gomez Farias, but above all to the army of lepcros who had
been seen to join their cause. President Bustamante's performance in the events of July
1840 did not boost his popularity. Federalists came to believe that the President had
betrayed them once more, agreeing to their demands while a prisoner and then
abandoning them as soon as he was released. 1li3 Centralists saw the whole sorry affair
as proof of his government's weakness. They were disgusted that despite twelve days
offighting, the troops had been unable to gain any real advantage.11i4 The peace treaty
signed with the rebels which granted a general amnesty for the rebels and guaranteed
their jobs,185 was not that of a strong government. Perhaps they compared the fate of
Urrea, who was returned to prison, only later to be appointed Commander General of
Sonora once more,186 with that of his former comrade-in-arms, Jose Antonio Mejia,
who was shot after his defeat at the hands of Valencia, Tornel and Santa Anna.
Finally, the events of July 1840 convinced many hombres de bien that the Siete Leyes
and the President were a failure. As Costeloe points out, 'the sight of rotting corpses
on the streets being torn apart by packs of dogs was deeply offensive to them and it
seemed that the long-feared social dissolution had finally happened.' 187 Neither the
new constitution, nor its leader could be seen to be living up to their promise to
protect the interests of the hombres de bien and ensure peace, if rebellions of this
188nature could take place.
183 Sardo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centralista, p. 369.
184 Ibid., p.372.
185 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 2, pp.74-75.
186 lbid., p. 77.
187 Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 163.
188 Ibid.
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D: Constitutional Arguments, 1839-1841
Opposition to the constitution of 1836 had existed from the moment of its
conception. In the first three years of its jurisdiction the most vocal objections
appeared to come from the federalists. However, as the threat that the federalists
might succeed in provoking the overthrow of the Siete Leyes diminished with the
failure of the moral revolution and the rebellions of Jose Urrea, a different type of
opposition began to be heard. This opposition was generally found amongst the
hombres de bien and other parts of the oligarchy, who had originally supported the
centralist project but had become disillusioned in the face of the failure of the
constitution to restore peace and stability to the Republic. In general terms, they
objected to how government was organised by the Constitution of 1836, especially in
terms of the division of power, which was regarded as creating a dangerously weak
executive. Two broad solutions were put forward by these opponents. The first was
that the constitutional law should be reformed in order to create a more balanced
system of government. The second was that the project should be abandoned and a
new form of government be set in its place. As can be imagined, neither idea was very
popular with the architects of the Siete Leyes: the centralists, creating a dangerous
divide in the ruling coalition of hombres de bien.
In order to understand the opposition to the Siete Leyes, we must first examine
the manner in which this constitution envisaged government should be organised. It
divided power into a judicial, legislative and executive section just as the previous
Constitution had done. It also created a Council of Government rather like that of the
Federal Constitution. The Council was made up of thirteen individuals, whose task it
was to examine and express its opinion on all proposals or initiatives presented to
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it. 189 Its role, as was illustrated during the crisis of the federalist petitions of 1837,
could be extremely important as its approval often decided whether the government
would present a bill before Congress. The major innovation of the Siete Leyes was the
creation of a new government body: the Supreme Conservative Power. The Supreme
Executive Power was a five man council, made up of individuals who had served
either as a member of Congress, a cabinet minister, a Supreme Court Judge, President
or Vice-President of the Republic. It was designed to be a neutral power which
oversaw all branches of government. It could not present initiatives of its own accord
to Congress, as could members of the legislative and executive. But all initiatives had
to be presented to the SPC for final approval once they had been passed by Congress.
It could veto any law, decree or executive action if this was called for by one of the
three other powers. It was also the only body authorised to sanction reforms upon the
constitution.190 In other words, the SPC was allowed the final word on any subject.
The executive on the other hand, had very little power. The President, as El
Investigador Mexicano described him in 1837, was: 'reducido a nulidad, lleno de
responsabilidades, sujeto a corporaciones a mas de la legislativa, que tiene
superioridad de poder, rodeado de cuerpos consultivos, cuyos dictamenes son
obligatorios.Y'" His proposals had to pass first from the Council before being
presented to the Chamber of Deputies, from there if its project were approved it
would be sent to the Senate. Finally, if the senators voted in favour of the motion, it
would finally pass to the SPC for judgement. As can well be imagined, all legislation
or action proposed by the executive could take weeks, even months to be approved.
Above all, opponents of the Siete Leyes objected to the Supreme Conservative
Power. Those who advocated the reform of the constitution, generally called tor the
18<) "Leyes constitucionales: December 29 de 1836," In Secretaria de Gobernacion, Leyes
fundamentales de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos ,p. 193.
1<)0 Ibid., pp. 182-184.
191 El Investigador Mexicano, 2 August 1837.
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abolition of this body. President Bustamante was without a doubt one of the leading
figures in this campaign. After the failure of the moderates' moral revolution in 1838,
he appeared to have finally abandoned his attempts to replace the Constitution of 1836
with the federalist charter, and instead he concentrated upon reforming the Siete
Leyes. This was not such a change of direction as might be thought. Bustamante had
supported Gomez Pedraza's plans for the re-establishment of a reformed version of
Federal Constitution of 1824. As we noted earlier, this called for the power of the
states to be curtailed, especially in terms of their ability to introduce legislation, so that
their power and that of the federal government would not clash, and for a new election
system to be arranged, which prevented those 'indignos' of election from taking
part.192 The Siete Leyes, shorn of the cumbersome SPC, could be said to realise this
project quite well.
Before he left for Tampico, Bustamante agreed with Santa Anna that Congress
should be charged with this reformation. When he returned in July 1839, the Chamber
of Deputies began to discuss the proposal that the constitution be reformed. It is clear
that the centralists blamed Bustamante for this tum of events, even if it had been Santa
Anna as interim President, who had presented the motion for discussion. During the
debate on reform, Jose Maria Jimenez made a speech in which he traced the movement
for reform back to Bustamante's first speech in April 1837, when he had sworn to
obey the Constitution, 'en cuanto me permite el honor y la conciencia' and added:
Todos sabemos tambien cual ha sido entre tanta murmuracion que se
ha hecho de las leyes constitucionales en este mismo palacio, el empefio
que se ha tornado para que nada se organice bajo su intluencia, a fin de
presentar a aquellas como fuente de las calamidades publicas, 193
192 Gomez Pedraza, "Exposicion al buen sentido de la nacion," pp. 227-232.
193 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la prirnera republica centralista, p. 335.
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The proposal was eventually passed by both chambers of Congress in September and
presented to the Supreme Conservative Power, who gave its approval on II
November 1839, albeit with certain conditions. It stated that reform should only be
undertaken following the guidelines of the constitutional law, and that the division of
power envisaged by these laws should not be changed.i " In February 1840 a
commission of deputies was set up to draw up proposals for reform. This group would
deliberate for the next five months. 195
Meanwhile, Bustamante's opposition to the constitution, and above all to the
Supreme Conservative Power became more marked. On 12 March, Congress passed a
law submitted by the executive which called for all thieves to be henceforth tried in a
military tribunal, under military law. The Supreme Court considered this law to be
unconstitutional, and for that reason, petitioned the SPC for its annulment. The SPC,
which had already annulled this proposal twice when it had been submitted as an
executive decree in the previous six months, annulled the law on 13 May. Bustamante
refused to accept this and asked instead that Congress annul the SPC's decision. What
is more, he also issued an order instructing the army to ignore the SPC's resolution. A
public argument then ensued between the executive and the SPC on this subject. The
government argued that the SPC had waited too long before announcing its decision;
it was authorised to annul laws only during the two months following its issue (13
March to 12 May), further maintaining that the annulment had only been signed by
four members of the SPC, when it should be signed by all five. The SPC argued that
the full five members were only required to be present at the time of the debate and
only three out of five votes were necessary to carry a motion. All five members had
been present during the discussion of the disputed law and the motion had been carried
by a majority. It also claimed that the two months allowed for a law to be annulled
194 Ibid., p. 336. Resolution of the Supreme Conservative Power, included in Dublan and Lozano,
Legislacion mexicana, vol. 3, pp. 664-665.
195 Ibid., p. 342.
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should be counted from the day after its issue (14 March to 13 May), which thereby
made its decision lawful. In order to resolve the issue, the government introduced a
new law in Congress in July which resolved that while the SPC only needed three
votes to carry a motion, the two month period for annulment should be counted from
h d f i 196t e ay 0 Issue.
On 30 June, just before the close of the spring session, the commission on
reform presented its proposals. This advocated what was described as 'un proyecto
intermedio [...] entre las dos consituciones del 24 y del 36.' Most importantly it
proposed that the supression of the Supreme Conservative Power be considered; that
the power of the Council of Government be reduced; that the executive's powers be
amplified; and that departmental governors and other officials be granted more
197autonomy. Comment and proposals from the departments were now sought before
any action should be taken. While this was going on, the President entered into yet
another conflict with the Supreme Conservative Power. On 3 August, in the wake of
the July revolt, he sent an initiative to Congress which asked the body to submit a
proposal to the SPC for consideration. The proposition read: 'Se declara voluntad de
la nacion, que mientras reforma la cuarta ley constitucional, puede el gobierno adoptar
cuantas medidas juzgue necesarias para restablecer cl orden turbado y conservar la
tranquilidad publica, respetando en 10 esencial el actual sistema de gobierno.' 19X This
was passed by Congress, but rejected by the Senate. The government then returned
the matter to Congress, qualifying its original request quite significantly. It now
proposed that it should have the power to suspend members of the judiciary should it
deem this necessary and make temporary replacements; to increase the number of days
196 Anne Worthington Surget MacNeil, 'The Supreme Harmonising Power (El Supremo Poder
Conservador), 1837-1841," (University of Texas: Unpublished Masters' Thesis, 1969), pp. 134-143.
Linda Arnold, Politica y justicia: la Suprema Corte Mexicana (/824-1855) (Mexico City: UNAM,
1996), pp. 90-93.
197 Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la primera republica centra/isla, pp. 343-344.
198 Ibid., p. 376.
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a suspect could be held without being brought before a tribunal, from three to 30 days;
and to be allowed to employ whosoever it wished in government, without having to
obey constitutional restrictions.199 It also included the concession that Congress
would be allowed to suspend these powers whenever it considered it necessary. This
reformed proposal was passed by both chambers in Congress and presented before the
Supreme Conservative Power on 30 September. In the discussions, Carlos Maria de
Bustamante, one of the authors of the Constitution of 1836, presented his
recommendations. He unsurprisingly resented the President's attempt to modify his
charter. He argued that the President's request was unconstitutional. The control over
judicial appointments and the ability to lengthen the period of permitted custody,
would put him in effective charge of the judicial power, he claimed. He also pointed
out that the government's insistence that it needed extraordinary powers was at odds
with the daily reports it published in the official newspaper, El Diario de Gobierno.
Perhaps these reports were false, he commented, adding, if that were the case, why
were they being published? On 19 October, the SPC announced it would not grant all
the powers requested. It only consented to the final request: the power tor the
executive to appoint those it saw fit to government positions. However, the
government refused to publish this ruling. The SPC was incensed and on 18
November, published Carlos Maria de Bustamante's speech in El Cosmopolita. The
ruling was finally published on 4 December.20D
The result of this contlict was that in his address to the opening of Congress on
1 January 1841, President Bustamante launched into an extraordinary attack upon the
SPC:
Si el Ejecutivo, senores, no ha de estar suficientemente autorizado, si
sus actos y los del Congreso General se han de anular por otro cuerpo
desconocido en las instituciones modernas, no tengais la menor
199 Ibid., p. 377.
200 MacNeil, "The Supreme Harmonizing Power," pp. 88-92.
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esperanza de la felicidad publica. Lejos de que se conserve el equilibrio
entre los Supremos Poderes, como se intento con la mejor buena fe al
dictarse la actual Constitucion, se suscitaran a cada paso cuestiones que
dividan los animos, den pretexto para el desorden y privar a la
Administracion Suprema de los respetos que se la deben. Sea en buena
hora el Gobierno responsable por todos sus actos; administren los
jueces y tribunales justicia con toda la independencia y libertad
consignadas en los codigos de las naciones civilizadas; limitese el
Congreso a sus funciones legislativas; pero no se confundan las ideas
ni se usurpen los Poderes sus facultades peculiares bajo el pretexto
vano y contradictorio de evitar con esta usurpacion que traspasen sus
I, . .. I 201imues constituciona es.
In the same speech, he also made clear his support for the reformation to the Council
of Government suggested by the committee of constitutional reform the previous
year.202 It appeared, therefore, that constitutional reform, agreed in principal m
Congress and possessing the full support of the President, was now inevitable.
This was not to be, however, as Bustamante and the Siete Leyes would be
overthrown in September 1841. As we will go on to examine in the following section,
the government was overthrown by a coalition of the military, merchants and
dissatisfied hombres de bien. This group proposed a second solution to the defects of
the Constitution of 1836. It advocated the abolition of the Siete Leyes and the election
of a new constituent Congress to draft a new constitution. In the meantime, Santa
Anna, who was one of the powers behind the movement against Bustamante, would
be appointed as a temporary dictator. Signs of support for such a proposition as an
alternative to the Siete Leyes had been long visible in Mexico. As we commented
previously, rumours announcing an imminent pronunciamiento in favour of
proclaiming Santa Anna, or at times, Bustamante, as dictator were frequent from the
very moment of Bustamante's inauguration. Santa Anna's brief sojourn in power
201 Anastasio Bustmante, "El general Bustamante al abrir las sesiones del primer periodo en I de
enero de 1841," in Los presidentes de Mexico ante la nacion, vol. 1, pp. 214-215. My italics.
202 Ibid., p. 214.
254
The Second Administration (1837-1841)
during 1839 gave an indication of his support of such an option. Opinions in favour of
other variations on the theme of a dictatorship could also be heard in Mexico during
the tenure of Bustamante's Presidency. Plans for establishing a European as Mexico's
monarch were in evidence, the most famous of course being contained in Jose Maria
Gutierrez Estrada's public letter to Anastasio Bustamante published in September
1840.203 However, the monarchists would still have to wait a long time before their
proposals were adopted by the nation. In 1841, it would be the santanistas, with their
plans for a new republican constitution and a period of dictatorship, who would
prevent Bustamante and Congress from realising the reformation of the Siete Lcyes.
E: The Triangular Revolt: The Final Fall (1841)
After the experiences of Santa Anna's brief period as Interim President in 1839,
many people believed that he harboured ambitions to overthrow Bustamante's
government. This ambition did not appear to recede even when he resigned his interim
position and returned to Veracruz. Just before his departure from the capital in July
1839 he named himself Commander General of Veracruz and, on his arrival to his
native department gathered a large military force stationed in both Jalapa and
Veracruz. It seemed clear to observers that he was spoiling for a confrontation with
the newly restored President Bustamante.204 However, over the last six months of
1839, it would seem that Bustamante held the upper hand in his government. In
October 1839 he felt confident enough of his position to order that Santa Anna be
replaced as Commander General of Veracruz by Guadalupe Victoria.2os During these
months Bustamante had worked hard to restore the credibility and strength of his
203 Jose Maria Gutierrez Estrada, Carta dirigida al exmo. sr. presidente de la republica sobre la
necesidad de buscar en un convenio el posible remedio de los males que aquejan la repuh/ie(l Y
o;;:.inionesdel autor acerca del mismo asunto (Mexico City: Imprenta de Ignacio Cumplido, 1840).
2 4 FO no. 50/26, pp 45-46. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 1 August 1839.
205 Bocanegra, Memorias, vol. 2, p. 792.
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government, appointing a new cabinet which was said to contain an 'absoluta
confonnidad de ideas y de opiniones,206 and, as we saw, embarked upon a drive to
increase the power of the executive in government. Unfortunately for Bustamante,
the July Revolt swung the pendulum back in Santa Anna's favour, as once more the
President's regime was seen as being weak and ineffective. From that point on,
Bustamante retired to conduct his government from the convent of San Agustin,
surrounded by 'canones y centinelas,' guarded always by a regiment of soldiers from
Guanajuato and protected by a bodyguard.i'" This was perfectly comprehensible at
first, as the President had only recently been captured in his own bedchamber by
soldiers who appeared with orders to shoot him, and the National Palace needed to
undergo repairs after twelve days of bombardment. However, as the months passed,
this state of affairs only served to emphasise the weakness of his government and
exposed the President to ridicule. El Sonorense on 13 February 1841 wrote:
El gobierno de Mexico no sabiendo defender y guardar su palacio,
apenas sostiene y guard a el convento de San Agustin que sus religiosos
han conservado cerca de 200 afios sin soldados ni canones. (,Se
atrevera alguien a Hamar gobierno al que hoy tiene la republica
mexicana? Su presidente esta reducido a una celda y no puede recibir al
cuerpo diplomatico extranjero sino es en el refectorio. Quiza para
demostrar que la iglesia no se mete en el gobierno, el gobierno se mete
en la iglesia con infraccion de la regIa del santo obispo de Hipona. [Que
vergiienza, cuando los hombres y las cosas de las epocas desaparezcan,
caeran en el dominio del ridiculo y ni aun puede prometerse el
d . 1 d ., ,208esprecio y as excusas e compasion:
Worse still for Bustamante, it was becoming clear to many people that it was
not simply the constitution which had failed to live up to its promises. President
Bustamante had been elected on the strength of many peoples' memories of his Vice-
206 Ibid., p. 790.
207 Bustamante. El gabinete mexicano, vol. 2. p. 85.
208 El Sonorense, 13 February 1841.
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Presidency in which a strong government had controlled Congress and the states; had
dealt harshly and swiftly with its enemies; had strengthened the army; had protected
the Church; and had brought new hope of economic prosperity to the Republic. It had
been hoped that he could deliver a repeat performance as President. However, this had
manifestly failed to materialise. The public quarrels between Bustamante and the
Supreme Conservative Power had demonstrated that the President was far from being
in control of government. His poor showing in his campaign against Urrea and the
leniency with which he dealt with the rebels after the July revolt, showed that he could
not be relied upon to vanquish his enemies or enforce his authority upon the nation.
Moreover, Bustamante had not convinced many of his strength or influence as
President. Many observers believed that he was being controlled by his senior
ministers and members of the clergy. In 1837, Charles Ashburnham wrote that
f he vori 209Bustamante 'was greatly under the domination 0 t e pnesthood.' Another
commentator claimed that the President showed '[una] deferencia [...] casi ciega hacia
los hombres sacro-profanos de esa porcion acomodada y feliz de los ministros del
altar.'210 Following his return from Tamaulipas, it was widely thought that his new
cabinet was the true power in the executive.211 In the course of his Presidency he had
been seen to waver between supporting centralism, federalism and dictatorship; and it
appeared that he lacked any true political or moral principles. As one observer put it:
'hombres de todas creencias y colores, de todas capacidades y partidos, de todos
indoles y afectos tuvieron lugar en el gabinete.'212 In short, Anastasio Bustamante was
regarded as a weak man, with no political beliefs of his own and let himself be
209 FO no. 50/108. p. 145. Ashburnham to Palmerston, Mexico City. 30 November IS37.
210 Causas y efectos de la Ultima revolucion en Mexico (Mexico City: Imprenta de la Lima. dirigida
~or Jose Uribe y Alcalde. calle de San Miguel. no. 5. IS41). p. 5. In the British Library.
_II El Sonorense, 15 December 1840 and 1 January 1841.
212 Causas y efectos de la ultima revolucion en Mexico. p. 5.
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dominated by his advisors. In the words ofPakenham, he appeared to be afflicted by 'a
state of mental disability quite unfitting for the arduous duties of his office. ,213
In terms of his treatment of the army, the comparison between his Vice-
Presidency and his Presidency could not be starker. In his new administration,
spending on the army never reached the colossal sums seen during his Vice-
Presidency.t'" Various laws were introduced with the aim of reducing desertion and
improving discipline within the ranks.215 The Plana Mayor del Ejercito, which
provided an organisational and judicial backbone for the military, was also set up.216
Even so, these failed to have the obvious effect that the reforms made by Facio had
done. As Bustamante himself commented during his campaign in Tamaulipas, the army
suffered from an overwhelming lack of food, weapons and money. Many believed that
this general lack of resources made the military quite ineffective. They pointed to the
ignominious capture of the fortress of Ulua by the French and the loss of Yucatan and
Tabasco.217 (Garrisons in Merida and Valladolid announced the separation of their
province from Mexico in 1840; but during Bustamante's government, no force was
able to quell them successfully.)
However, it was the government's econonuc policies which caused most
unhappiness. A considerable number of hombres de bien who had supported
Bustamante were disgusted by its use of Church property as security tor loans. This
was begun in 1837 when the government contracted a $750,000 loan in 1837 in this
213FO no. 50/145, p. 180. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 10 June 1841.
214Spending was at $8, 790, 662 in 1837-1838, $7,088. 140 in 1839, $5.998,908 in 1840 and $6,
720, 383 in 1841. Barbara Tenenbaum, Mexico en la epoca de los agiotistas (Mexico City: Fondo de
Cultura Economica, 1985), p. 74.
215 For example, in two circulars in June and October 1837 new rules were introduced for the
prosecution of those men who deserted, and the practise of officers who remained absent from their
units for a longer period than allowed by their leave, was now included in the offence of desertion.
Dublan and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, vol. 3, pp. 410, 431. Circulars dated 12 June and 19
October 1837. In 1839, the pracise of recruiting by levy was replaced by a lottery system. Ibid., vol. 3,
~1~',;82-589 ..Ci.rcular dated 30 September 1~~9.. . "...
- Establecimiento de la plana mayor del ejercito mexicano, ID ibid .. vol. 3. pp. 558-561. Dated 30
October 1838.
217 Causas y efectos de la ultima revolucion en Mexico, pp. 13-14.
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fashion and continued throughout the administration. 21 II The government's reliance on
these loans probably explains Bustamante's close relationship with the Church. It was
necessary for him to have the support of the senior clergy for these loans to continue.
It was also the case that Bustamante used the threat of radicalism to convince the
Church of the importance oftheir aid. His negotiators reminded the clergy that, should
Bustamante's government fall, there was always the danger that it would be replaced
by a regime that might attempt to expropriate Church assets, as Gomez Farias
administration's had tried to do in 1833.219 Even so, the hombres de bien, who had
led the overthrow of Gomez Farias at least in part because of his ecclesiastical
policies, were liable to see Bustamante's use of Church property as collateral as the
thin end of the wedge. Many must have asked themselves in unison with El
Investigador Mexico: 'el modo de reformar el clero, i,es por ventura, comenzando por
. I bi ?,220apropiarse os ienes.
These hombres de bien were also badly hit by the government's introduction of
a huge range of direct taxes on their wealth and property. In June 1838 in an effort to
raise funds for the expected war against the French, an emergency tax which
authorised the government to raise up to four million pesos from urban and rural
property, commerce, professions and trades, wages and salaries and luxury items was
introduced. This levied a one-off charge of between one and three pesos per thousand
of the value of property and introduced payments for the holders of business, ranging
from 300 pesos for large businesses and ten pesos for small ones. Those in professions
and trades were expected to pay a fixed contribution: 300 pesos for lawyers, business
agents 50 pesos and teachers between eight and 25 pesos. Salaries and regular
incomes were taxed at a rate from two and half to twelve and a half pesos depending
on their values. Finally luxury goods such as carriages and even horses, were also
m Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. I. pp.17-18. Costeioe. The Central Republic, pp. 130-131.
219 Costeioe, The Central Republic, pp. 127-128.
220 El Investigador Mexicano. 21 June 1837.
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subject to a one-off charge.221 Later that year a poll tax was also introduced on the
incomes of the heads of families; they were to be taxed between one and 100 pesos
depending on the size of their earnings. The minimum income needed to be liable for
this tax was twelve reales a day and this meant that the poorer elements of society
were excluded from the tax; and the burden of taxation fell upon the richer classes. 222
In March 1841 another tax upon urban and rural property was announced, of three
pesos per thousandth of the value of the property to be paid every four months.223 In
April a personal contribution tax was introduced. Anyone earning over 500 pesos a
year was liable for this tax, which demanded a contribution of between one real and
two pesos each month, depending upon the income of the contributor.v'"
This concerted attack on their wealth and property was not the kind of policy
that the hombres de bien expected from a government which had been set up to
protect their interests and they generally refused to contribute to these taxes. In 1841,
Manuel Maria Canseco complained that of the 200, 000 pesos that the government
had hoped to receive from the first payment of March's tax upon urban and rural
property, only $100, 000 had been collected. This was the only income the treasury
could count on in April and the loss of one half of the expected money meant that it
had an even larger deficit then usual. 225 In fact, during the years of Bustamante's
Presidency, only between three and ten per cent of the government's Income was
derived from direct taxation, such was the elites' hostility towards it.226 This
reluctance to pay taxes amongst the elites was nothing new. As Barbara Tenenbaum
notes, the habit was acquired during Iturbide's Empire, when in efforts to win
221 Dublan and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, vol. 3 pp. 512-529. Law dated 8 June 1838.
m Costeloe, The Central Republic in Mexico p. 133.
m Dublan and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana,vol. 4 pp. 6-9. Law dated II March 1841.
~24 Ihid , pp. 11-21. Law dated 26 April 1841.
225 Manuel Maria Canseco. Memoria de la hacienda nacional de la Republica Mexicana presentada
a las camaras par el ministro del ramo en julio de 1841. Prim era parte (Mexico City: Imprenta de J.
M. Lara, calle de la Palma, no. 4, 1841), p. 4.
2~6 Tenebaum, Mexico en la epoca de los agiotistas, p.69.
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popularity, he had abolished or abandoned most of the old colonial system of
collecting revenues_227 There had been various attempts subsequently to introduce
new systems, but all were met with similar hostility. It seemed that once the habit of
paying tax had been lost, as Canseco commented dispiritedly in his annual report, it
was difficult to persuade people of the importance of such contributions.v ''
The failure of the government to introduce a successful system of taxation
made it reliant upon custom duties and loans, usually acquired from moneylenders, or
agiotistas, who charged extortionate levels of interest. It also meant that the treasury
regularly suffered from a worrying deficit in its budget. For example, it stood at $9,
773, 573 in 1837_229 In tum this meant that the government was unable to meet its
financial obligations. Government salaries (including that of the President) and
pensions were regularly unpaid, and a Finance Minister was often 'obliged to furnish
sums from his own private fund for the mere payment of the Troops from day to
day. ,230 This of course, increased the President's unpopularity and laid him open to
charges that he was incapable of creating a stable economy. His image was not helped
by those who protested at the increased taxes levied against them, and painted a vivid
picture of continued economic decline to illustrate their inability to pay. At least in
some areas, such as agriculture, this picture was not entirely correct. As Margaret
Chowning comments, as clear signs of a recovery were underway in the late 1830s and
early 1840s. She believes that many hacendados felt threatened by increased taxation
and 'they used all the rhetorical tools available - including painting a vivid picture of
economic disaster - to ensure that the fragile recovery [...] was protected.'231
m Barbara A. Tenenbaum, "El poder de las finanzas y las finanzas del poder en Mexico durante el
sirlo XIX," Siglo X/X 3:5 (1988), p. 208.
22 Canseco, Memoria de la Hacienda ... /841. Primera parte, p. 6.
229 Tenebaum, Mexico en la epoca de los agiotistas, p. 73.
230 FO no. 50/116 p. 30. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 10 December 1838.
231 Margaret Chowning, Wealth and Power in Provincial Mexico. Michoacan from the Late Colony
to the Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 196.
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Without a doubt, therefore, Bustamante was in the weakest position he had
ever been after the July revolt. He had no allies left. The centralists blamed him for the
attacks on their constitution and the federalists believed he was a traitor who had
betrayed their cause time and again. He was hated by large sections of the hombres de
bien for his financial policies and what they regarded as his general mismanagement of
the economy. In contrast, Santa Anna's position strengthened, as many groups began
to regard him, and the rebellion he wished to lead, as the best way to rid themselves of
Bustamante. One of the first groups to be associated with Santa Anna was domestic
and foreign merchants and traders who felt badly used by the economic policies of the
Bustamante administration. In November 1839 the levy on foreign goods sold in
Mexico was increased from five to 15 per cent, which caused much anger in their
community.232 The merchants of Mexico City, Guadalajara and Morelia issued
immediate protests to the government. The departmental juntas of Zacatecas,
Durango, San Luis Potosi and Veracruz also sent representations to Congress
criticising the measure. The Plenipotentiary Ministers of Great Britain, Prussia and
France, also protested to Congress against the injustice of the scheme, which it was
argued would damage overseas trade and increase smuggling.233 In December 1839
Congress passed a law postponing the introduction of the increase for a month, but did
not overturn the legislation.r'" As a consequence some merchants began to believe
that only a change of government could ensure that the law be repealed; they therefore
became involved with Santa Anna in Veracruz and Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga in
Guadalajara. The community in Guadalajara addressed a petition to Santa Anna in
April 1841, asking for his support for the reduction in the levy. Foreign merchants sent
a representative to Santa Anna in the summer of 1841, with the same declared aim.
This representative made two trips in total to Veracruz and, on his return from the
m Dublan and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, vol. 3, pp. 667-668. Law dated 26 December 1839.
m Sardo Cedeno. El congreso en la primera republic centralista. p. 349.
234 Ibid., p. 350.
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second, also visited Guadalajara. It seems, in the light of the events of the rebellion,
which began only three weeks after his departure from Guadalajara, his purpose was
to co-ordinate the events of both cities.235
The second group which became identified with Santa Anna in 1841 were the
cotton growers and manufacturers. In September 1840, The Minister of War, Juan
Nepomuceno Almonte, gave General Arista permission to import foreign cotton yam
to the value of 500, 000 pesos into Matamoros, in order to make uniforms for the
troops who were destined to form part of the campaign in Texas.236 The import of
foreign yam had been illegal in Mexico since 1837 in an attempt to protect domestic
industry from cheap foreign competition,237 and the cotton industry was furious at this
breach in the law, which they saw as a threat to their struggling industry. Vocal
protests were made in Congress and to the Supreme Conservative Power. As a result
the SPC annulled the permission given to Arista. Almonte waited a considerable
amount of time before relaying the decision to Arista, which meant he had time to
make the necessary arrangements with the importers before the nullification of the
permission reached him. As a consequence the yam arrived in Mexico in January 1841
much to the disgust of the cotton manufacturers and merchants.238 This body turned
to Santa Anna for help, who wrote to Bustamante in February to protest against these
illegal imports and to demand that they be stopped.239 General Valencia, an ally of
Bustamante, also added his voice to the protest. The recently formed Junta de
Fomento de la Industria Nacional, led by Lucas Alaman issued a statement in which it
forecast disaster for the cotton industry if such imports continued. In the face of this
overwhelming protest, especially by two important figures as Valencia and Santa
235 FO no. 501147, pp. 58-60. Pakenham to Palmerston, Mexico City, 9 October 1841.
236 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 2, p. 93.
m Sordo Cedeno "El pensamiento conservador del partido centralista en los afios treinta del siglo
XIX," in Morales and Fowler, El conservadurismo mexicano en el siglo XIX, p. 161.
m Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 2, pp. 93, 100-101. Also see, Sordo Cedeno El congreso
en la primera republica centralista, pp. 383-4
239 Santa Anna to Bustamante, 6 February 1841, in El Sonorense, 13 February 1841.
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Anna, it was clear that something had to be done. An agreement was reached with the
merchants and manufacturers and compensation was promised to make up for any
losses they would suffer.240
The political damage had already been done, however. Almonte and Arista, it
was claimed, had arranged the deal with the notorious agiotista Cayetano Rubio and
were callously intent on making a profit out of the suffering of the cotton growers and
manufacturers.Y' Once more, Bustamante was seen as a weak leader, who in this case
was being controlled by his 'aborrecibles favoritos:' Almonte and Arista.242 Carlos
Maria de Bustamante, not to be outdone, reminds us that the President recently 'habia
encompadrado con Almonte' in the wedding of Manuel Barrera's eldest daughter.243
But, most significantly, the cotton growers and the manufacturers had been pushed
into the arms of Santa Anna, who by championing their cause, had made himself a
more palatable alternative to Bustamante. During the summer of 1841, Santa Anna
received several delegations from the cotton growers, who begged for his support in
h . I . h 244t err strugg e against t e government.
The financial masters of the capital, the money lending agiotistas, were the last
group to become identified with Santa Anna. The agio lis las had enjoyed a close
relationship with the Bustamante administration from the start. This was due in some
part to their readiness to provide loans to the cash-strapped treasury. Even so, the
bedrock of their relationship was their control of the tobacco monopoly. which was
sold to a consortium of agiotistas, including Benito Maqua, Cayetano and Francisco
Rubio, Felipe Neri del Barrio, Miguel Bringas and Manuel Escandon in November
240 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 2, pp. 103-104. Also see, Sordo Cedeno El congreso en la
primera republica centralista p. 387 and Costeloe, The Central Republic in Mexico p. 165.
'41- El Sonorense, 6 February 1841.
'4'- - El Sonorense, 13 February 1841.
243 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 2, p. 102.
244 Michael P. Costeloe, "The Trangular Revolt in Mexico and the Fall of Anastasio Bustamante.
August-October 1841," Journal of Latin American Studies 20 (1988), p. 343.
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1837 by the Banco de Amortizacion.245 This bank had been established in January
1837 with the aim of amortising the huge amounts of devalued copper money in the
market place by using income from the monopoly. The consortium which became
known as the Empresa del Tabaco, soon found out that the administration of the
tobacco monopoly was not a lucrative investment. Mexican tobacco was not of first-
class quality and could not compete with foreign leaves smuggled into the country.
The Empresa was forced to employ a private police force to try and maintain its
monopoly by capturing this illegal tobacco. This necessarily pushed costs up. At the
same time, the consortium as part of the deal with the Banco de Amortizacion, was
paid for the tobacco it produced in copper money. The failure of the bank between
1837 and 1840 to complete the successful amortisation of the money made this a
further liability for the Empresa. The value of copper currency continued to fall
consistently even after it was devalued by 50 per cent in 1837; and the result was that
the Empresa was unable to administer the monopoly at a profit. It was forced to take
out loans with the financial houses in Mexico City; but even with these loans, by
December 1840 it suffered from a deficit of $1.7 million.246
In the light of this situation, the Empresa's shareholders tried to re-negotiate
their contract with the government. They proposed that this should be abandoned and
replaced with a new company, which would be a joint enterprise between the former
Empresa and the government. This new company would have three aims: to provide a
loan of half a million pesos to the government to finance its campaign in Texas; to
amortise the copper money; and to administer the tobacco monopoly. Working in
partnership with the government had three main advantages for the shareholders of the
Empresa. First, it meant that they would no longer have to pay rent to maintain the
monopoly; second, it shifted the expense of maintaining the monopoly on to the
W David W. Walker, "Business as Usual: The Empresa del Tabaco in Mexico, lR37-l844," Hispanic
American Historical Review 64:4 (1984), p. 680.
246 tu«. pp. 693-695.
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shoulders of the government; and thirdly, it meant that the government would pay the
shareholders for the tobacco it currently had in store, to the value of $2 million.
President Bustamante intially approved the plan and a law was passed to set up the
new company in April 1841. However, the law met with fierce opposition from the
Banco de Amortizacion, which feared the new enterprise would usurp its position, and
the law was abandoned. Subsequently the shareholders began to look for new ways to
rescue the Empresa. In July, the shareholders entered into negotiation with Santa
Anna in Veracruz, and arranged to aid the caudillo financially with his rebellion. In
gratitude for this support, once Santa Anna was in power he agreed to the
shareholders' plan. The Empresa's contract was cancelled in November 1841, its
existing stock purchased and a new government company to administer the tobacco
247monopoly created.
All in all, by August 1841, Santa Anna could count on an impressive coalition
of support for his plans for rebellion and it appears that he felt it was now the right
time to begin to implement his schemes. The first signs of this were visible in
Guadalajara in the early days of August 1841. The city was awash with soldiers, 1,100
arriving in one week alone. The merchant community supplied them with uniforms and
arrangements were made with the local treasury to cover their pay. The Commander
General of Guadalajara, Paredes y Arrillaga, informed the department's governor that
the garrison of the city was ready to rebel against the increased levy on foreign goods,
due to pressure from the merchants. On 8 August, the definitive move was taken and
at 11a.m. Paredes y Arrillaga announced his plan to the assembled troops outside the
city's garrison. It demanded that Bustamante be declared unfit to remain in power, a
replacement to be named and that a congress be assembled to reform the
constitution.i" If the Bustamante government first hoped to confine the revolt in
247 Ibid.. pp. 696-699.
248 Costeloe, "The Triangular Revolt," pp. 343-345. Also a detailed account of events can be found in
Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 2, pp.131-133.
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Guadalajara and deal with it as yet another localised rebellion, events soon made this
impossible. On 31 August, General Valencia, the hero of July 1840, abandoned the
government's cause and issued his own plan which called for the replacement of the
tyrant Bustamante and the convention of a new congress to draft a new constitution.i"
He took up position in the Ciudadela, occupying the prison of La Acordada with
around I, 000 men.?' Then, while the government was recovering from this shock,
Santa Anna also issued a plan for revolution, which seconded that proclaimed by
Valencia and called for Bustamante's resignation. The situation, that had been far from
hopeless in the early weeks of August, was now looking very grim. Both Paredes y
Arrillaga and Santa Anna were marching towards the capital, half of which was
already under the control of Valencia. Almost daily, troops were deserting Bustamante
to join Valencia. To make matters worse the revolt was gaining support in the
provinces. Luis Cortazar in Guanajuato and Juan Alvarez in Acapulco publicly
supported the rebellion. Nicolas Bravo in Chilpancingo refused to condemn it and
moreover, refused to march upon the capital to aid the struggling government. The
garrisons in San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas and Oaxaca also declared their backing for the
plan." It appeared that the government could not win.
However, far from giving up, General Bustamante adopted measures that
indicated his desire to fight on. The Supreme Conservative Power was convened and
declared that it was the will of the people not to be governed by any form of
despotism and Bustamante was authorised to take whatever steps necessary to restore
order in the country.252 It seems that faced by a revolution led by Santa Anna, who
had already proved himself to be no friend of the SPC, that body had decided it was
safer to support Bustamante. The capital was declared in a state of siege, limits on
249 Bocanegra, Memorias vol. 2 pp. 805-6.
250 Costeloe, "The Triangular Revolt," p. 348.
251 Ibid. pp.351-2.
252 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano. vol. 2, p. 173. Dublan and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana .vol.
4, pp. 29-30. Law dated 2 September 1841.
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press freedom were introduced and significantly the increase on the levy on foreign
goods returned to its original level and the personal contribution tax was reformed to
exempt the lowest earners_253Once more the capital echoed to the sound of cannon
fire as troops of both sides fired at each other from behind their fortified positions.
Buildings were destroyed and the innocent were again caught between the crossfire.
Shops shut, church bells were silenced and the rich fled the city. According to Fanny
Calderon de la Barca, it was impossible to find a house, much less a room in any of the
villages surrounding the capital. 254 Bustamante was granted leave to lead the army
against the rebels himself,255 and organised his sadly dwindling troops to prepare for
an assault upon the arriving Paredes and Santa Anna. In the event, he marched to
Guadalupe just outside the city and began by attempting to negotiate with the two
rebel leaders. Almonte was sent to talk to Paredes and Santa Anna and eventually
agreed to what would be called the Bases de Tacubaya on the 28 September, which
effectively suspended the Constitution of 1836 and provided for a new congress to be
set up. This was to be composed of deputies of Santa Anna's choosing and would
dedicate itself to draft a new constitution.256 This apparent surrender on the part of
Bustamante however was little more than a ruse to win a little more time. The next
day he and his men marched back into the city. He resigned his Presidency and on the
following morning issued a plan in favour of re-introducing the federalist Constitution
of 1824.257 This was obviously an attempt to win over extra support to boost his
falling numbers. But despite receiving some popular support, he failed to gather the
numbers necessary to have a chance of defeating Santa Anna. In one skirmish with
Santa Anna in the outskirts of the city, he did score a small victory, but in the long run
m Costeloe, "The Triangular Revolt." p. 349. Dubbin and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, pp. 30-31.
Law dated 2 September 1841.
254 Calderon de la Barca, Life in Mexico. p. 502.
255 Malo, Diario de sucesos notables. vol. I p. 196.
256 Bustamante, E/ gabinete mexicano, vol. 2 pp. 177-8.
m Ibid. p. 180 and Costeloe 'The Triangular Revolt,".p. 354.
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it was clear his position was untenable. Once the National Palace fell into the hands of
Valencia on 5 October, he agreed to negotiate once more with the rebels. The next
day his delegates agreed once more to the terms of the Bases de Tacubaya25X and
Bustamante's regime officially came to an end.
Bustamante's failure to survive this final challenge against his Presidency can
be explained in three ways. The first is that unlike during the July Revolt he could not
count on the loyalty of the majority of the army, and more specifically, he had lost the
support of General Valencia. We should not be surprised that Valencia joined the
rebellion. Throughout 1837 and 1838 this general's name was linked with Santa Anna
and it was rumoured that he wished to proclaim Santa Anna as dictator. 259 At this
time, Valencia existed very much in Santa Anna's shadow. However, his leadership at
the battle of Acajete marked the beginning of his increase in stature. His leadership of
the loyal troops in 1840 only increased this further. Valencia now showed clear signs
of ambition. According to Gomez Farias' correspondent, Juan, now writing to
Francisco Garcia, Valencia was now at the head of a group of military officers
'quienes solo esperaban una oportunidad favorable para asegurarse del poder, y
establecer un gobiemo dictatorial.' Valencia, says Juan, had broken his relationship
with Santa Anna, and 'tiene la impresion de haber ganado gran popularidad con el
. , . 1 b d 1 .. ,260 W d dejercito como para ponerse a a ea eza e os acontecnruentos, e can e uce
therefore, that once the rebellion had broken out in Guadalajara in August, Valencia
decided to seize his chance to join the bandwagon and extract whatever advantage
possible from his contribution to the overthrow of Bustamante. However, without
Valencia, Bustamante lost the support of a significant section of the capital's garrison.
The second explanatory factor also stems from Valencia's desertion. In 1841,
258 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 2 pp. 211-212 and Costeloe 'The Triangular Revolt," p.
355.
259 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 1, p. 152.
260 AFG folder 6 no. 45. Juan to Francisco Garcia, 26 August 1S46.
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Bustamante found himself attacked from both inside and outside the capital, which
naturally made his position extremely weak, and meant he could not concentrate his
attack at anyone front individually. Finally, the third factor is that the President was
almost completely without support in the capital itself. As we have seen, he had very
few friends left by 1841. This undoubtedly led him to take the desperate measure to
pronounce in favour of federalism in an attempt to strengthen his position by
increasing his following. The failure of this attempt to mobilise more support for his
rapidly decreasing army meant that his defence was inevitably doomed.
E: Bustamante, a Weak Leader?
The traditional interpretation of Bustamante's Presidency portrays the General
as a weak and ineffectual leader, beset by indecision and controlled by stronger
personalities around him. This is certainly the impression left by his contemporaries.
However, as Michael Costeloe has already pointed out, the decision and energy he
demonstrated in defending his position in 1841, sits uncomfortably with this view of
Bustamante." It is probably fair to say Bustamante showed the same qualities in 1840.
There are perhaps two possible explanations for this apparent contradiction. The first
is that Bustamante was simply a brave soldier who was at his best in a crisis. This
coupled with the obstinate nature and ambition also attributed to him by his
contemporaries meant that he was not prepared to give up the Presidency without a
fight. However, despite his talents as a soldier and leader of men, he could not transfer
these skills into the realm of politics." Here he was indecisive and weak as accepted
wisdom would have us believe.
261 Costeloe "The Triangular Revolt,"pp. 356-357.
262 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 1 p. 42 says: . [pobre republica en que manos te vimos! En
las de un hombre de bien, caballero e hidalgo como el que mas, compasivo y generoso, bravo en la
campafia; pero sin disposicion para gobemar en grande.'
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The second, more convincing explanation is that Bustamante demonstrated the
same character as both soldier and politician. This character is shown off at its best
during his Vice-Presidency when surrounded by allies, he was able to impose himself
upon the government of the day. During his Presidency, however, circumstances
conspired against him, preventing him from truly exercising command. In the first
place the Constitution of 1836 was expressly designed to prevent strong leadership
from the President;" lumbered as it was with an unwieldy system of four powers: the
Chamber of Deputies, Senate, the Council of Government and the Supreme
Conservative Power, which deprived the President of all real power in decision-
making." Bustamante almost always respected the Siete Leyes and its protocols
throughout his Presidency. For this reason he appeared slow and indecisive in his
actions and Santa Anna, during his brief stay as interim president, so active and
decisive. Santa Anna ruled by decree and paid little heed to the posturing of the
Supreme Conservative Power or Congress. Bustamante also opposed this constitution
consistently throughout his years in power. In the first two years he conspired with the
moderate federalists to replace the Siete Leyes with a reformed version of the Federal
Constitution of 1824. Between 1839 and 1841 he supported reforms on the
Constitution of 1836, which if they had been implemented would have introduced a
constitution not dissimilar to a reformed version of the federal charter. He did not
263 Sordo Cedeno suggests that the SPC was based upon Benjamin Constant's ideal of a neutral
power, which would police the branches of the legislative, executive and judicial powers. It was to
prevent the arbitrary or despotic use of power. Sordo Cedefio.rEl pensamiento conservador del partido
centralista en los afios treinta del siglo XIX mexicano." pp.148-151. Edmundo O'Gorrnan, for his
part. sees the SPC's role as being akin to that of a monarch. He writes that the Siete Leyes created
'una monarquia disfrazada con mascara republicana, de una republica monarquica, valga la
expresion, 0 si se prefiere, de una monarquia sin principe, pero con soberano colegiado.' Edmundo
O'Gorman, La supervivencia politica Novo-Hispana. Monarqula 0 republica (Mexico City:
Universidad Iberoamericana, 1986), p. 27. Whatever the ideological basis of the Supreme
Conservative Power, it seems clear that it was designed precisely to be the highest power in the land,
and therefore prevent the President from occuping this position.
21>4 Josefina Z. Vazquez, Don Antonio Lope= de Santa Anna: Mito y enigma (Chirnalistac: Centro de
Estudios de la Historia de Mexico, 1987), p. 26: 'A Bustamante se le acusaba de ineficiente, sin
contar que las Siete Leyes Ie negaban al Ejecutivo casi toda autoridad pues el Congreso y el Poder
Conservador monopolizaban el poder de decision. '
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waver between federalism and centralism as his contemporaries believed. Rather, he
supported the moderate federalist plans for a change in the constitution until these
became untenable. He then turned his attention to changing the Siete Leyes through
reform.
Perhaps the bad reputation he earned during his time in the Presidency simply
reflects the mood of those writing the character descriptions. Carlos Maria de
Bustamante, for example, had been one of the architects of the Constitution of 1836.
He was not ready to accept that there may have been problems with its make-up.
Instead he preferred to blame the incompetence of his namesake to explain its
failure/" Both centralists and federalists believed by 1841 that Bustamante had
betrayed their cause. Other commentators were simply disillusioned with the
constitution's failure to live up to its promise. They had placed their hopes in the fact
that the Siete Leyes would immediately solve all the problems they attributed to the
federalist system: political chaos, financial crises and general instability within the
nation. When this failed to happen they blamed both Bustamante and the constitution.
~65 Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol.l , p. 212. He refuses to accept that extraordinary powers
were the answer to the problems of Bustamante's government. Instead he argues that giving such
power to the General would be '10 mismo que dar una espalda de dos filos a un nino 0 un loco
furioso. '
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Chapter Six: The Final Campaigns (1845-1853)
After the fall of his government in October 1841, General Bustamante once
more undertook exile in Europe. He left Mexico City in November,' and embarked
upon the Spanish war-ship the Jason, on 9 January 1842.2 After a brief sojourn in
Cuba, where he socialised with fellow exile Jose Maria Gutierrez de Estrada, the
former Spanish Ambassador to Mexico, Angel Calderon de la Barca and his Scottish
wife, Frances, he boarded another ship bound for England.' He arrived in Falmouth in
May and immediately set out for London.' I have been unable to find evidence of his
stay in the British capital, but it seems that he soon moved and fixed his residence once
more in Paris. During Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna's time in power, General
Bustamante made no attempt to return home. However, once his enemy was
overthrown in December 1844, he immediately began to plan his departure from
Paris.' In March 1845 he wrote to the government, announcing his decision to return,
and offering his services in the light of the threat of war with the United States." His
I Jose Ramon Malo. Diorio de sucesos notables. 1832-1853 (Mexico City: Editorial Patria, S.A ..
1948). vol. I. p. 204.
2 SDN:AH XI/IIIIl-235/1-31100304. Gregorio Gomez to the Minister of War, Commandacy General
of Veracruz, 10 January 1842.
:I Frances Erskine Calderon de la Barca. Li/l' in Mexico: The Letters of Fanny Calderon de la Barca.
(Garden City. New York: Doubleday and Company. 1966). pp. 613, 625-626. It is curious to note that
Gutierrez Estrada had in fact been exiled by Bustamante himself in September 1840 for the
publication of his pro-monarchist proposals. It seems that yet again. personal friendships could
survive political animosity.
4 SDN:AH XIIIII/I-23S/I-31/00302. Bocanegra to the Minister of War. Ministry of Exterior
Relations. 14 July 1842.
5 MRP A no. 1521. Francisco Modesto de Olaguibel to Mariano Riva Palacio. 19 December 1844.
Olaguibel wrote to Riva Palacio. then Minister of Justice. on behalf of Bustamante and other exiles.
including Valentin Gomez Farias and Jose Maria Luis Mora. asking that they might be aJlowed to
return to Mexico.
Cl SON: SC XIIIII/l-235/1-31/00309. Anastasio Bustamante to the Minister of War, Paris. 26 March
1845.
273
The Final Campaigns (1845-1853)
offer was welcomed with open arms and when he arrived in Veracruz in 16 June,7 an
armed escort was provided to accompany him on the journey to Mexico."
General Bustamante was now in his sixty-fifth year. He would never again
attain the political power he had enjoyed as Vice-President and President in the 1830s
and 1840s. However, he remained an important figure within the army for the rest of
his life and for that reason, still enjoyed a relatively influential position within the
political sphere. This chapter will examine Bustamante's activities in the last eight
years of his life. It will concentrate upon four main areas: Bustamante's association
with President Jose Joaquin de Herrera in 1845; the drawing up of his final will in
1846; the war with the United States, 1846-1848; and the rebellions in the Sierra
Gorda, 1847-1849. The discussion will focus on how these events relate to the picture
of Bustamante that has been drawn thus far by his study.
A: Bustamante and Herrera (1845-1846)
The diarist Jose Ramon Malo tells us that Bustamante arrived in Mexico City
on 26 June 1845. That evening he hosted a dinner for his friends, including the
ministers and Generals who had supported his previous administration. Following the
meal he visited President Jose Joaquin de Herrera in the National Palace." From the
evidence of their association over the corning months, Bustamante and Herrera seem
to have been allies, if not friends. On his arrival to the capital, Bustamante was
immediately appointed as a senator." In July the General was designated as the
General in Chief in charge of a proposed expedition to protect Upper California from
7 Ibid., XI/JIll 1-235/1-31/00315. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Jalapa, 16 June 1845.
K Ibid.. XI/JIll 1-235/1-31100308. Ministry of War to the General in Chief of the 2nd Division, 27
May 1845.
q Malo, Diario de sucesos notables, vol. 1 p. 280.
10 Ihid.
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the United States. II However, this expedition was never undertaken. Instead,
Bustamante remained in Mexico City. In November of 1845, his name was suggested
as one of the two top choices for the short list drawn up by Herrera to replace him if
he were to take a six-month leave of absence to recover his health." During the
rebellion instigated by Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga in December 1845, Herrera
appointed him Chief of the Armed Forces in the Capital" and asked him to remain in
the National Palace with him during the rebellion." Bustamante stayed by Herrera's
side in the National Palace until he resigned on 30 December." Subsequently, the
victorious Paredes invited him to take part in a general meeting of generals to discuss
appointments to a new Junta Legislativa to replace Congress. Bustamante declined to
attend on the grounds of ill health, the usual excuse of all politicians at the time to
avoid participating in unpalatable events."
Any association between Bustamante and Herrera may seem strange at first
glance. Herrera had not supported or collaborated in any obvious way with
Bustamante since the days of Iturbide. In fact, in 1841 he was suspected of plotting
against Bustamante's government. In February Herrera wrote to the Minister of War,
Juan Nepomuceno Almonte, to complain that he was being watched and followed by
government agents. In this letter he denied he was involved in any rebellious activity. I?
However, if we take a closer look at the events of 1845, any relationship between the
two men becomes easier to understand. Herrera had come to power in December 1844
II Carlos Maria de Bustamante. El Nuevo Bernal de Castillo 0 sea, historia de la invasion de los
angloamericanos en Mexico (Mexico City: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 1990). p.
S2.
12 Jose Maria Tomei to Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, Mexico City. 15 October 1S45. in Gaston
Garcia Cantu, El pensamiento de la reaccion mcxicana. Historia documental (Mexico City:
Empresas Editoriales, 1965). p. 247.
1.\ Malo. Diario de sucesos notables, vol. 1. p. 2S9.
14 Bustamante. El Nuevo Bernal Diaz , vol, 1 p. 133.
15 Malo. Diario de sucesos notables, vol. 1. p. 291.
to SDN: SC XIIIII/I-235/1-3J/00330. 1. Mariano de Salas to the Minister of War. Mexico City. 5
January 1S46.
17 T. Ewing Cotner. The Military and Political Career of JOS(; Joaquin de Herrera (Austin:
University of Texas Press. 1949). p. 99.
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in the wake of a revolution against Santa Anna. Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga had
begun the movement by issuing a pronunciamiento in November from Jalisco, but
Herrera had assumed its leadership by taking control of the rebel troops in the capital
in December and orchestrating the fall of Santa Anna." Herrera was part of the
moderate faction that had been linked to Bustamante between 1837 and 1838. In 1845
he refused to placate the radical ('pure') federalists, led as ever by the indomitable
Valentin Gomez Farias, by sanctioning the replacement of the centralist Bases
Organicas of 1843 by the Constitution of 1824. He believed that the threat posed by
the United States' expansionist policies and their desire to annex Texas made the
political situation too dangerous for another abrupt constitutional upheaval to take
place. Iq He wanted to undertake reform at a slow pace and insisted that the Bases
Organicas should remain in force while the departments were fully consulted on the
issue of constitutional reform."
In the light of this policy, Anastasio Bustamante does not seem an unlikely ally
for Herrera. After all, General Bustamante had unsuccessfully supported two sets of
proposals for peaceful constitutional reform during his presidency: the first to re-
establish a reformed version of the Constitution of 1824, organised by the moderates;
and the second to reform the Siete Leyes, debated in Congress. Moreover, he and
Herrera appeared to share some of the same friends and advisors. Luis Gonzaga
Cuevas, who served twice as Bustamante's Minister of Relations and was named as
one of the executors of the General's will of 1846,21 occupied the same position under
Herrera. Manuel Gomez Pedraza, who had a long history of association with
Bustamante, was also frequently linked to President Herrera. He was named as one of
18 Michale P. Costeloe, The Central Republic in Mexico. 1835-1846. Hombres de bien in the Age of
Santa Anna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 250-257.
19 Will Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals. 1821-1853 (Westport, Connecticut and London:
Greenwood Press, 199R). p. 155.
20 Costeloe, The Central Republic. p. 263. 266-267.
21AGNCM. Notaria: Francisco de Madariaga, vol. 2R69, f. 9. Last Will and Testament of Anastasio
Bustamante, dated 12 January IR46.
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the favourites to be appointed as Herrera's interim replacement in November 1845:::'
and was regarded to be 'el alma del gabinete' by some observers."
What is interesting, however, is that Bustamante should have remained loyal to
Herrera until the bitter end. In the rebellion of 1845, most of Herrera's military allies
deserted him, including Juan Nepomuceno Almonte and Gabriel Valencia. There were
even rumours that Gomez Pedraza was associated with the rebels." A significant part
of the hombres de bien had become disillusioned with Herrera's government. The
military elite opposed the President's resurrection of the civil militias; the radical
federalists disliked his unwillingness to restore the Constitution of 1824; and a great
number of the elites opposed his readiness to accept an indemnity from the United
States in return for Mexico's acquiescence for their annexation of Texas (the Texans
had voted to join the Union in July). Bustamante's stubborn loyalty in this case seems
to hark back to the position he took in 1823, when he supported Agustin de Iturbide
until his abdication. It is probably true that Bustamante did not support the plans of
Paredes y Arrillaga, which appeared aimed to introduce a centralist dictatorship in
Mexico, based on the traditionalist stance of reducing suffrage to the point at which
only the wealthy property-owning professional would be allowed to vote." Even so,
his decision to stay in the National Palace with Herrera and to rebuff Paredes y
Arrillaga's offers to join the rebels, certainly indicates a significant level of friendship
or commitment to the President.
In keeping with this position, General Bustamante played little part in public
events during Paredes y Arrillaga's tenure in power. He spent the first two months of
~2 Jose Maria Tornel to Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, Mexico City. 15 October 1845. in Garcia Cantu.
El pensamiento de la reaccion mexicana, p. 247.
~.1Laura Solares Robles. Una revolucion pacifica: Biografla political de Manuel Gomez Pedraza,
1789-1851 (Mexico City: Instituto Moral Acervo Historico Diplomatico de la Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores/Consejo Estatal para la Cultura y las Artes del Gobierno del Estado de Queretaro. 1996), p.
208.
~4 Ibid .• p. 206.
~5 For a discussion of the proposals of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, see Fowler, Mexico in the Age of
Proposals, pp. 71-75.
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1846 in Queretaro visiting his sister, Maria Anastasia, who had become extremely ill in
November." On his return to the capital, he was granted a leave of absence to cure the
rheumatism brought about by the inclement weather he had experienced during his
journey back from Queretaro." Bustamante's return to public affairs was not to be
until June when he was appointed President of Congress. However, he did not take up
this appointment, pleading ill health once more. It is likely that illness was again simply
an excuse, as the General simultaneously asked to be employed within the army."
Perhaps he still did not want to be associated with Paredes y Arrillaga's government.
Or he might have considered himself more useful in military affairs than political ones.
Or he simply felt uncomfortable in the political role of a senator and was unwilling to
shoulder the responsibility of the Presidency. In any event, he had to wait until
September before he was given a military command and he appears to have played no
part in Santa Anna's triumphal return to the presidency during the summer of 1846.
B: The Last Will and Testament
Immediately following the fall of Jose Joaquin de Herrera's government,
General Bustamante drew up his final will. He was now a rich man. In his first will,
written in 1838, he declared his assets to be 52, 002 pesos, deposited in various
financial houses in Mexico City, Bordeaux, Paris and London.i" In his second will,
drawn up in 1846, he also mentioned 'cantidades de alguna consideracion en el Banco
Real de Escocia. ,30 However, he did not specify the sums that were deposited with
~6 SDN: SC XIIIIIII-235/1-31/00317. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Mexico City, 18 December
1845.
27 Ibid.. XIIIIl/I-235/1-31 100325. Record of the granting of the license, dated February 1846.
1K Bustamante. El Nuevo Bernal Diaz . vol. 1 p. 256.
29 AGNCM .. Notaria: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2855. fT. 1078-1081. Last Will and Testament of
Anastasio Bustamante, dated, 1 October 1838.
~o Unfortunately the archives of the Royal Bank of Scotland do not retain any documents involving
Bustamante.
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each house, and the will suggests that much of the money placed in Bordeaux, Paris
and London before 1838 had been spent during his second exile in Europe. The three
beneficiaries of Bustamante's final will were his sister, Maria Anastasia Bustamante,
her son Francisco Figueroa and his illegitimate sons: Anastasio Bustamante y Trevino
and Leandro Anastasio Bustamante y Manzano.31
It seems that Bustamante acquired such a fortune from his involvement in
mining and agriculture. In his will of 1846 he asserts that the national treasury still
owed him his salary for the years he spent as President. He also claims that he did not
receive the payments he was due during his second exile. He appears to have owned
no property outright at the time of drawing up his second will, although he does claim
as his possessions: 'las decoraciones, los libros, armas y demas objetos de mi equipaje
y algunas otras alhajadas [...], caballos, monturas etcetera.' Instead, he records that he
holds shares in the estate of his nephew, Francisco Figueroa (the hacienda del Fresno,
in Queretaro) and in the mining company, Minas de la Canal, in Zacualpan." From
other documents we also know, that he had a further interest in the ranch and the
livestock of La Ventana (part of the Hacienda de San Agustin de Amoles in San Luis
Potosi)." Due to a lack of any other evidence we must conclude that these three
investments provided the bulk of Bustamante's income. The fact that he never married,
nor seems to have purchased any houses or estates that might have placed a drain on
his purse, might explain why such small scale involvement proved extremely profitable
for him. Even so, in the light of the amount of money Bustamante possessed at his
.11 AGNCM. Notaria: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2869, ff 7-10. Last Will and Testament of Anastasio
Bustamante, dated, 12 January 1846. In fact, Bustamante recognised three illegimate children. The
third, Jesus Rivera, died in the period between the drawing up of Bustamante's first will in 1838 and
the writing of his second in 1846. He was born in the Valle of Santiago in 1821. Leandro Anastasio
Bustamante y Manzano was born while Bustamante occupied the Presidency in 1840. He died in
1850. Anastasio Bustamante y Trevino, who was born in Saltillo in 1829, was the only son to survive
his father. According to the provisions laid out by Bustamante in a codicil to his will, it appears that
he paid for this young man to be sent to Paris in the early 1850s .
.12 Ibid.
BAGNCM. Notaria: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2866, ff 428-430. Dated, 19 April 1844.
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death, we cannot discount the possibility that the General also acquired money from
other sources, legal or illegal, at various times during his life. Most Presidents abused
their position to their own financial advantage during this time (and after), and it is not
far-fetched to suppose that Bustamante also benefited from his two periods in office.
C: The War with the United States (1846-1848)
On 11 September 1846 General Bustamante was appointed as the General in
Chief of the Western Division, in charge of the defence of the states of the two
Californias, Sinaloa and Sonora." However, he made no move to leave the capital until
December. This may seem to be extremely negligent considering the desperate
position of Upper California during the autumn of 1846. During the summer months,
the troops of Captain Fremont and Commodore Robert F. Stockton had effectively
captured Monterey and Los Angeles. Since then, the salvation of the Mexican cause
depended on the resistance of the Mexican Californians to the imposition of U.S.
authority. In late September, a rebellion led by Jose Maria Flores brought Los Angeles
back under the control of the Mexican population." Even so, the prospects for
retaining this authority were not good, since the volunteer troops commanded by
Flores had few weapons or munitions." Despite this, it appears that the policy of the
Mexican government was to consolidate the rebellion in Los Angeles, by sending
munitions and ammunition, before sending Bustamante. It was probably hoped that
from a secure base in Los Angeles a strong army could be organised to drive the U.S.
invaders out of California. Accordingly, a deal was struck with Jose Limantour, the
~4 SDN: AH XII481.3/2242/00017.The Minister of War to Bustamante, Mexico City, 11 September
IR46.
J5 John S.D. Eisenhower, Tan lejos de Dios. La guerra de los Estados Unidos contra Mexico, 1846-
1848 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 2000), p.279 .
.1<> SDN: AH XII481.3/2479/00019. Jose Maria Flores to the Minister of War. Hermosillo, 31 March
1847. Ibid.. XII481.3/23/68/00002-00004. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Tepic, 30 January
1847.
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father of the Porfirian Finance Minister of the same name, to provide weapons,
munitions, uniforms and food by sea from Acapulco." Unfortunately these supplies
would never reach the beleaguered Californians. Negotiations for the deal dragged on
for nearly 4 months between September and December. Consequently, the ship sent by
Limantour from Acapulco did not arrive until 29 January 1847. By that point the
United States had managed to recapture Los Angeles."
Bustamante left Mexico City in December 1846. He passed through Queretaro
and Guadalajara before arriving in Tepic, near the port of San BIas, at the end of
January 1847. He appears to have made preparations to march to the Sinaloa port of
Mazatlan" and was probably planning to sail for California within the next month.
However, things would not go according to plan. A rebellion in Mazatlan against the
Santa Anna government ruled out this port as a base for Bustamante." The expedition
also suffered from a severe lack of supplies and men. From the very moment of his
arrival in Tepic, Bustamante refused to continue his march upon Mazatlan until
reinforcements were sent, pointing out that the men he commanded were not nearly
enough to mount a proper defence against the U.S. troops, or to bring the rebels in the
port under his command." Although orders were issued from central government
requiring these troops and arms be sent from the surrounding states of Jalisco and
Guanajuato, the supplies never arrived as neither the Commander Generals of Jalisco
nor Guanajuato were prepared to weaken their own states' defence in favour sending
an army to defend Sonora and Sinaloa." Worse still, it appeared that the central
37 AGNCM. Notaria: Manuel Orihuela, vol. 18, tT. 72-77. The contract is dated, 2 December 1846.
3R Jan Bazant, "El general Anastasio Bustamante y Joseph Yves Limantour. Cronies de un negocio,
1846-1847," Historia Mexicana 30: 4 (1980), pp.649-650.
)Cl SON: AH XII481.3/2199/00161. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Mexico City, 13 December
1846. Bustamante asked that the General Commanders of Queretaro, Jalisco and Guanajuato be
ordered to facilitate supplies to his Division to aid his march from the capital 'hasta Mazatlan.'
40 Ibid.. XII481.312368/000l3-000l4. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Mexico City, 27 January
1847.
41 lbid., XII481.3/2368/0053, 0092. 0029 and 0023. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Tepic,
February 2, 6, 13 and 14 February. lbid., XII481.3/2478/00067. Bustamante to the Minister of War,
Tepic, 20 April 1847.
42 lbid., XI/481.3/2478/54. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Tepic, 15 April 1847.
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government had decided to abandon the West to its fate. In March a circular was sent
to all Commander Generals informing them that the National Guard of their states
should be ready to assist the Generals in Chief of the Eastern and Northern Divisions,
should these men be required. No mention was made of the Western Division." In
April the government informed Bustamante that they would not be able to send any
troops to man any new expedition to California in the near future as all their resources
were currently engaged in Veracruz." It is little wonder that by this time Bustamante
was disillusioned with his position and despaired of the possible influence he could
have on the outcome of the war. On 15 April he resigned his command. He warned the
Minister of War that if no new General were sent with the necessary supplies, all the
Western states, including Jalisco, were under severe danger of occupation by the
United States!' Bustamante's resignation was not accepted and he continued in this
largely useless role throughout the summer months, unable to pacify Mazatlan or
defend Sinaloa or Sonora from his base in Tepic:b
Once Mexico City had been captured by the United States and the Supreme
Government had transferred to Queretaro, Bustamante was ordered to march to that
city to receive new orders." Here he was appointed as head of the Reserve Army and
later Commander General of Guanajuato. He was also charged with the protection of
Guanajuato, San Luis Potosi and Michoacan from the invaders. It is unclear what
exactly he did in the first few months of this appointment, although a year later the
santanista newspaper La Palanca would claim his aim was to bring together an army
43 Ibid., XII481.3/2478/0069-0070. Bustamante to the Minister of War. Tepic, 10 April 1847.
44Ibid .. XII481.3/2478/0046.Supreme Government to Bustamante, Mexico City. 8 Apri11847.
"tu«. XII481.3247811000S4-000SS.Anastasio Bustamante to the Minister of War. Tepic, IS April
1847.
4(, This is not to say that he did not try. He continued to make appeals tor reinforcements and supplies
throughout the summer and sent his second in command. Teofilo Romero, to Mazatlan to try and
bring the port back under government control. He had no success. Ibid., XI/481.3/26S4/00006-
00007. Bustamante to the Minister of War. Silao, IS August 1847. and Ibid., XI/481.3/26S4/00009-
00010. Te6fi10 Romero to Bustamante. Cuilacan, 28 July 1847.
47 Ibid., XII481.312697/0000l.The Supreme Government to Bustamante. Toluca. 28 September 1847.
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of anti-santanistas for unspecified purposes." In terms of concrete evidence we only
have two definite records of his actions. The first is that in December he submitted a
plan to central government outlining the measures he thought most effective to
prevent an advance by U.S. troops upon Queretaro from Mexico City. This plan
proposed that groups of soldiers should be organised around key positions between
the capital and Queretaro, such as Huichapan, Tula and San Juan del Rio. These units
should operate like guerrilla bands, launching surprise attacks upon the marching
columns of the enemy before disappearing into the countryside to regroup. 49 This was
the strategy the Spanish had employed against the Napoleonic invaders in the early
part of the century. The insurgents had used the same tactics successfully against
Bustamante's comrades in the Royalist Army. However, Bustamante's plan would
never be necessary. The U.S. army did not attempt to over-stretch itself by pushing
North from the capital. Instead, peace negotiations were begun between the Mexican
government and the U.S. commanders in January 1848. The treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo was signed on 2 February. In response to the government's negotiation with
the enemy, the Vice-Governor of San Luis Potosi, Mariano Avila, launched a
pronunciamiento against the Queretaro government. This plan was in favour of
declaring San Luis Potosi an independent state. It called upon the other states to join
with it in confederation in order to continue the war with the United States." Avila
wrote to General Bustamante, who was currently in charge of military operations in
the state, to invite him to lead the rebellion. 'il However, Bustamante declined to
support him. He explained to the Vice-Governor that his plan could only help the U.S.
cause, as it would lead the Republic into more chaos." It seems that, even though the
4R La Palanca, 19 October 1848.
49 SDN:AH XII481.3/2687/00009-00013. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Guanajuato, 24
December 1847.
so El Monitor Republicano, 23 January 1848, includes the plan.
51 Mariano Avila to Bustamante, San Luis Potosi. 16 January 1848, in ibid.
52 Bustamante to Avila, Guanajuato, 18 January 1848, in ibid.
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General elaborated military strategies with the aim of continuing the war, he also
generally supported the peace negotiations undertaken by the moderate government in
Queretaro.
D: The Rebellion of the Sierra Gorda (1847-1849): Origins and Aims
The year 1848 would mark the beginning of General Bustamante's last military
campaign: the persecution of the rebels of the Sierra Gorda. This campaign would be
interrupted by various other crises, such as the pronunciamiento of Mariano Paredes y
Arrillaga in June 1848, but would undoubtedly occupy the majority of the General's
time between 1848 and 1849. It is highly ironic that the persecution of the rebels of
the Sierra, whose revolt was characterised by the sacking of ranches and haciendas,
the plunder of villages and the murder of local landowners and the wealthy, should be
Bustamante's final campaign. In this way his military career can be seen to have turned
in a full circle, as he ended his days in much the same way as he began them: pursuing
small bands of what he described as canal/a, in order to restore the rule oflaw and the
authority of what he believed to be the legitimate government. This section will
examine the origins and aims of the revolt, while the following section will investigate
Bustamante's role in pacifying the region.
The Sierra Gorda forms part of the Sierra Madre Oriental in the centre of
Mexico. It is a mountainous region of about 200 square kilometres, situated between
the modern day states of Guanajuato, Queretaro and Hidalgo at about 2, 000 metres
above sea-level." It was originally populated by three nomadic tribes, called pames,
ximpeces andjonaces by the Spanish. Colonists first arrived in the Sierra in the
53 Map 3 shows the extension of the Sierra Gorda, now called the Sierra de Queretaro. For an in
depth description of the geography of the Sierra Gorda, see Maria Elena Galaviz de Capdevielle,
"Descripcion y pacificaci6n de la Sierra Gorda," Estudios de Historic Novohispana 4 (1971), pp.
115-117.
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sixteenth-century, and tensions arose almost immediately between the indigenous
people and the settlers. Sporadic rebellions by the serrano people against the colonists
flared up throughout the Colonial period. The disputes mainly concentrated upon land,
which the serranos believed was being stolen from them by the colonists."
Immediately after the insurgency, the region enjoyed a period of relative calm. This
was rudely shattered in 1847, when a new revolt broke out in the small village of San
Juan de Xichu in the heart of the Sierra. It appears to have been sparked off by a
personal feud between the Alcalde Mayor of Xichu, Jose Maria Ramirez and a local
family, the Chaires. The Chaires were members of the local elite. One of their senior
figures, Miguel Chaire, was the commander of the local voluntary force of auxiliares,
and he was in competition with the Alcalde for political control in Xichu. In August of
1847 the Alcalde arrested one of Miguel Chaire's sons, Francisco, who had deserted
from the army. On 1 September, when Francisco was being escorted to the nearby
town of San Luis de la Paz, a group of 30 armed men led by his brother, Guadalupe,
managed to rescue him. However. in the following chase, Guadalupe and a few other
men were captured and imprisoned in Xichu. Later that evening the same band of men
stormed the village jail, rescued Guadalupe and his accomplices and destroyed the
mayor's office. The Alcalde himself fled to San Miguel de Allende. These then
returned to the hacienda of Palmillas (probably the property of the Chaires), where in a
very short period of time they managed to bring together a group of 300 armed men.
The situation was soon diffused by Manuel Ignacio Caballero. the Chief of the
Department of San Miguel Allende. With the help of Miguel Chaire, he persuaded the
men at Palmillas to return to their homes. According to Caballero. this might have
been the end of it, but for the petty behaviour of the Alcalde of Xichu. The Alcalde
S4 For more information concerning the Sierra Gorda during the Colony see, Galaviz de Capdevielle,
+Descripcion y pacificacion de la Sierra Gorda," pp. IIR-137; Carmen Vazquez Mantecon, "Espacio
social y crisis politica: La Sierra Gorda, 1850-1 R55," Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 9: 1
(1993), p. 51; and John Tutino, From Insurrection to Revolution in Mexico. Social Bases ofAgrarian
Violence. 1750-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 199-20 I.
285
Tile Filial Campaigns (1845-1853)
Map Three: The Sierra Gorda
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began to try and exact revenge on those who had humiliated him, making scores of
unnecessary and unjustifiable arrests amongst the residents of Xichu. This increased
the mayor's unpopularity and created a volatile atmosphere in the village and its
d. 'i'isurroun mgs.:
Following the events of September 1847 small groups of armed men began to
appear in the hills around Xichu, There was no shortage of men ready to take up arms
against the authorities in the Sierra, as had already been aptly proven by the ease with
which the Chaire family had organised a group of 300 men after the arrest of
Guadalupe. The leadership of the rebels in the Sierra Gorda had been taken up in
October by another army deserter, Eleutorio Quiroz. The Chaires continued to
support the rebels for a further year until they were captured by Bustamante's troops
in February 1849.'ib The rebels soon began to terrorise the settlements around and
about Xichu with their robberies and violence. According to Munoz Ledo, it should
have been possible to defeat these forces quite easily with the right number of soldiers.
Unfortunately the soldiers sent by the state of Guanajuato were certainly not enough
and during November and December the size and power of the rebels grew
enormously until:
Hacia fines de diciembre de 1847, la revolucion habia tornado un
caracter alarmante: masas numerosas de hombres bien montados y
armados, dirigidos por individuos de la mas baja extraccion, pero
famosos por sus crimenes se entregaban en distintos puntos de la
Sierra, a toda especie de excesos: robaban haciendas, asaltaban las
poblaciones, ejerciendo sobre sus moradores actos de personal
venganza, saqueaban e incendiaban las habitaciones, vivian
verdaderamente sobre el pais.":'
55 These details are taken from the Archivo General del Gobierno del Estado de Guanajuato
(henceforth referred to as AGGEG) Fondo del Gobierno, Serie de Tranquilidad Publica: CI-20S-E2:
Octaviano Munoz Ledo, Memoria del Gobierno del Estado de Guanajuato presentada a su
Honorable Legislatura en 11'0 de Enero de 1851 (Mexico City: Imprenta de Lara, 1852): LAF 796.
O.L.A. Sublevacion en la Sierra, (San Luis Potosi: n.p., 1849): and El Sig/o XIX. 7 May 1849.
5<> SON: AH X1I481.3/2916/00170. Bustamante to the Minister of War. Queretaro. 10 February 1849.
57 Munoz Ledo. Memoria del Gobierno del Estado de Guanajuato. p. 68.
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By January the residents of Xichu and surrounding settlements had fled to the nearby
town of Casas Viejas", and it was feared that the rebels were now so strong as to be a
real threat to the town of San Luis de la Paz, which was situated on the outskirts of
the mountains of the Sierra".
The governor of Guanajuato, Octaviano Munoz Ledo, believed that the main
reason for this was the poverty and discontent that existed amongst the indigenous
population, although he also pointed out that these local men were quickly joined by a
steady stream of deserters from the army, who in their already lawless condition were
attracted to a way of life that would provide for their daily needs and would prevent
them from being arrested. The anonymous chronicler, O.L.A., specifics that the
residents in and around Xichu were generally disgusted with 'las contribuciones,
alcabalas, derechos parroquiales, estanco de tabaco y la formacion de las levas.?" For
this reason they were ready to ally themselves with a rebellion. This discontent was not
new. In 1844 a group of men had attacked the ayuntamiento in Xichu in protest over
the new taxes introduced to finance a war with Texas." Even so, the ideas that
motivated the men in the Sierra Gorda to take up arms can never really be known, as
no document appears to exist in which Quiroz or anyone else amongst his band sets
forth a reasoned argument or explanation. The plan of Rioverde, held by many to
outline the wishes of the rebels, was not written by Quiroz. It was penned by a
government official of Rioverde, Manuel Verastegui, and only signed by the rebel
leader. This plan called for the expropriation and redistribution of untilled hacienda
land among the people of the Sierra; the supression of free labour (,fcina') upon estate
58 AGGEG, Fondo del Gobierno, Serie de Tranquilidad Publica CI-216-E26. Manuel Ignacio
Caballero to the Secretary of the Governor of the State of Guanajuato, Allende, 2 January 1848.
59 Ihid. Caballero to the Secretary of the Governor of the State of Guanajuato, Allende, I January
1R48.
«o O.L.A, Sublevacion en la Sierra, p. 4.
61 El Siglo XIX, 12 May lR49.
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lands; and demanded that hacienda tenants only be charged moderate rent by their
landlords. It also insisted that the serranos in Quiroz's band be henceforth exempted
from all taxes and parish duties. Quiroz was to receive a 100 peso monthly pension
and his fellow leaders smaller pensions."
Quiroz and Verastegui were old acquaintances. The Verastegui family owned
most of the haciendas in Rioverde. Quiroz had worked as a tenant farmer in that area
before the war with the United States. Coincidentally or not, one of the first properties
that the serranos had attacked in September 1847, the hacienda Albercas in Rioverde,
was administered by the Verastegui family. While in the hacienda, Quiroz also
recruited many of the tenant farmers to join his band. These facts had led some to
accuse Manuel Verastegui, now the Prefect of Rioverde, of being in league with
Quiroz. Whether this was true or not, it appears that the Verastegui clan did wish to
exploit the rebellion to their own advantage. Manuel's uncle, Paulo Verastegui, was
elected as the President of the State Congress in 1847 and was involved a rebellion
against the Governor, Ramon Aldame in January 1848. He gained support for his
revolt amongst the elites by pointing to the rebel unrest in the Sierra as an example of
the social dissolution that was being provoked by Aldame's Governorship."
However, by 1849 the Verasteguis were regretting their part in the dismissal of
Aldame. The new Governor, Julian de los Reyes, did not prove to be helpful for their
interests. He introduced a fiscal policy that seemed to favour the merchants in Mexico
City and Monterrey rather than those in San Luis Potosi. He did not reward the family
for their support against Aldame, and instead, showered favours upon the Verasteguis'
rival in San Luis, the Barragan family. Manuel Verastegui was dismissed as Prefect of
62 "El plan politico y eminente social: proclamado en Rioverde par el Ejercito Regenerador de Sierra
Gorda." (14 March 1849). in Berta Ulloa and Joel Hernandez Santiago (eds.), Planes en la nacion
mexicana (Mexico City: Senado de la Republica/El Colegio de Mexico. 1987). vol. 4. p. 380.
63 Barbara Corbett. 'La politica potosina y la guerra con Estados Unidos.' in Josefina Zoraida
Vazquez (ed.), Mexico al tiempo de su guerra con Estados Unidos, (Mexico: Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores/Colegio de Mexico/Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1997). p. 473.
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Rioverde and Jose Maria Barragan was named as Military Commander and General
Treasurer of the state. Therefore it appears that when the serranos occupied Rioverde
in March 1849, Manuel Verastegui saw his chance to undermine the Governor and
strengthen him family's position. Not only did he write the 'Plan politico' on behalf of
Quiroz, but he also took up nominal leadership of the rebellion and offered to act as
negotiator between the rebel forces and the federal government. The influence of
Verastegui on the plan is clear; for, aside from calling for agrarian reform, the plan
also demands that de los Reyes to be replaced. t>l
Quiroz claimed during his later trial that he was illiterate and had merely signed
unquestioning the documents with which Verastegui had often presented him." This
assertion is questionable, considering the circumstances in which it was made. Even
so, it does appear that within the ranks of the serranos there was much disquiet on the
subject of Verastegui's involvement in the revolt and the peace negotiations he
initiated. In fact, while negotiations were being undertaken the serranos continued to
attack ranches and haciendas. The treaty drawn up in May 1849, promised Quiroz the
military command of Xichu and a monthly pension of 100 pesos; it committed the
government to introducing legislation which would better the condition of the
hacienda labourer; and promised that the Church would be encouraged to reduce the
parish duties demanded in the Sierra." Quiroz continually refused to verify this
agreement, probably because of opposition amongst his men. In June, Verastegui
informed Bustamante that Quiroz was preparing to fight his fellow serrano leader,
Juan Ramirez, because '10 ha tratado de traidor entre la gente que forma su gavilla,
M 'El plan politico y eminente social: proclamado en Rioverde por el Ejercito Regenerador de Sierra
Gorda, 'p, 380. Article three.
65 SON: AH XI/481.3/3069/00033. Testimonio de la declaracion tomada (II cabecilla de los
sublevados de fa Sierra, Eleutorio Quiroz, pOI' et fiscal capitan de la Guardia Nacional de
Querertaro D. Luis G. Arranachera, en Peiiamiller II tres de octubre pasado. Dated, 3 October 1849.
Quiroz was about to be executed.
66 El Monitor Republicano, 20 May 1849.
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por haber iniciado [...] las mencionadas negociaciones de la paz. ,07 The result of this
confrontation was that the serranos abandoned their relationship with Verastegui.
They made no more effort to communicate with Bustamante or the government. In
order to underline this definite break, on leaving Rioverde in June, Quiroz ordered that
the San Diego hacienda, property of Paulo Verastegui, be burnt."
Such behaviour by Quiroz and his fellow rebels certainly gives weight to the
belief, widely held at the time by many observers, that their uprising had no political or
social motivations whatsoever. They seemed ready to join any uprising against the
government. During Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga's revolt in Guanajuato during June
and July 1848, the rebels of the Sierra Gorda appeared to back his pronunciamiento.
There were very strong rumours at the time that the serranos had entered Guanajuato
on the request of Paredes and Manuel Doblado, who had been appointed Governor of
the state at Paredes' instigation." All in all, Quiroz's men had all the appearance of
thugs for hire. According to El Monitor Republicano, Quiroz and his accomplices
were nothing but groups of bandits and robbers, whose movement lacked a political
end, and whose only objective was robbery and murder." Ledo, in his Memoria of
1852, expresses a similar point of view. He points out that although many of the rebels
were members of the discontented indigenous population, a large part of them was
made up army deserters, who used robbery, violence and intimation to provide for
their needs and to escape arrest. 71
Even so, it does seem that the agrarian reform demanded by the 'Plan politico'
did reflect the aims of the serranos. In the first place, the agrarian reform it proposed
echoed the conflict for land that had raged between the indigenous population of the
Sierra and the immigrant settlers since colonial times. Secondly, it reflects the opinion
67 Bustamante to the Minister of War, Casas Viejas, 11 June 1849, in ibid., 7 July 1849.
ilK Corbett. 'La politica potosina y la guerra con Estados Unidos,' p. 47R.
b9 El Siglo XIX. 19 June 1848. El Monitor Republicano, 25, 29 June, 8 and 11 July 1848.
70 El Monitor Republicano, 22 April 1849.
71 Munoz Ledo, Memoria del Gobierno del Estado de Guanajuato ... J852, p.67.
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of the revolt held by those had close contact with the rebels. Colonel Valentin Cruz,
who fought throughout the conflict, defined the serranos' rebellion as 'una revolucion
que proclama independencia absoluta de toda autoridad y todo orden, abolicion de
toda clase de contribuciones y reparticion de tierras. ,72 Manuel Verastegui described it
as 'una guerra [...J del pobre contra el rico,' a fight against the misery inflicted upon
them by the hacienda system." Finally, the plan also fits into the later development of
rebellion in the Sierra during the following forty years. The most obvious point of
comparison here is the 'Plan Socialista,' issued in 1879. This proposed the same
expropriation and distribution of hacienda land and demanded the abolition of debt
peonage, amongst other things." The problem for Quiroz and his followers was simply
that their lack of education and literacy denied them the opportunity to express their
ideas independently. They were therefore reliant upon the mediation of others, who
sought to exploit their protest for their own ends.
E: The Rebellion in the Sierra Gorda and the Revolt of Paredes y Arrillaga: The
Military Response (1848-1849)
General Bustamante was charged with the suppression of the rebels in the
Sierra Gorda in March 1848. On 24 March he issued a proclamation from Silao to the
forces of the Reserve Army that were to accompany him, exhorting their loyalty and
support in the re-establishment of law and order in the territory of the Sierra." The
situation was now quite serious, as the rebels had begun to menace towns and villages
n Valentin Cruz to the Minister of War, Hacienda de Tapanco, 30 July 1848, in El Sig/o XIX. 1 April
1849.
7~ SON: AH XII481.3/2936/00012. Verastegui to General Romulo Diaz de la Vega, Alaquines, 1
April 1849.
74 Gaston Garcia Cantu, El socialismo en Mexico. Siglo XIX (Mexico: Ediciones Era. 1980). pp. 66-
68.
75 SON: AH XII481.3/2768/00003-00004. El General en Gefe del Ejercito de Reserve a SIIS
subordinados, Silao, 24 March 1848.
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outside the Sierra. In February 1848 the town of San Luis de la Paz, which had felt
exposed to the rebels since January, began now to fearfully construct defences against
an expected attack." This came on 12 March.77 Two days earlier, one of the few
officers sent into the Sierra, General Manuel Romero was killed in a skirmish with the
serranos near Pefiamiller and Tollman." However, Bustamante did not seem in any
rush to enter the Sierra. Instead he marched as far as Dolores Hidalgo, where he set up
his headquarters. One observer commented 'los expropiadores de la Sierra siguen
cometiendo deprediaciones [...]; entretanto On. A. come huevos tranquilo en Dolores.'
7<l Meanwhile, another attack was made on San Luis de la Paz!K1and many ranches in
the surrounding of Casas Viejas were pillaged."
Bustamante's reticence to march into the Sierra, or at least to one of the towns
on its outskirts, such as San Luis de la Paz or San Jose de Iturbide, seems to be
extremely negligent. However, it may be that the General's sights were not fixed
simply upon the suppression of the serranos. He probably also wished to contain the
threat posed to the government by Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, who had recently
returned from exile and was living in San Luis Potosi. It was generally believed that he
had returned to instigate a pronunciamiento and that his motive for staying in San
Luis Potosi was to make the necessary arrangements to bring about this rebellion."
According to a government official sent to San Luis assess the situation, things were
perilous. He reported in March that those involved in the pronunciamiento begun in
76 AGGEG Fondo de Gobierno, Serie de Tranquilidad publica CI-2l6-E26. Caballero to the Secretary
of the Governor of'Guanajuato. San Miguel de Allende. 27 February 1848.
77 SDN: AH XII481.3/2901100007. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Guanajuato, 19 March 1848.
78 SDN: AH XII481.2/2901/00023. Francisco de Viellesca to the Minister of War. Queretaro, 13
March 1848.
79 Correspondence of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American
Collection, University of Texas at Austin (henceforth referred to as CMPA), wallet 148. no. 54. J.
Anno Portillo to Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, San Luis. 26 April 1848 ..
80 AGGEG Fondo de Gobierno, Serie de Tranquilidad publica CI-216-E26. Caballero to the Secretary
of the Governor of Guanajuato, San Miguel de Allende. 4 April 1848.
8! Ibid., Caballero to the Secretary of the Governor of Guanajuato. San Miguel de Allende. 20 April
1848.
82 El Monitor Republicano, 10, 18, 20 and 31 March 1848.
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January by the Vice-Governor of San Luis, Mariano Avila, had still not been punished.
He wrote that the state was still without a congress and that, in the east of the
territory, there were 'numerosas partidas de bandidos [... ] recorren los campos y las
pequefias poblaciones, cometiendo robos y desordenes, sin que haya bastante fuerza
para reprimirlos. ,83 He believed that a rebellion begun on the behalf of Paredes or
Santa Anna in San Luis would be very likely to flourish in such conditions. H-l It is likely,
therefore, that the government was a good deal more concerned with Paredes y
Arrillaga's plans, than it was with a localised indigenous rebellion in the Sierra. A
further pronunciamiento could only weaken the Republic further and leave her
completely defenceless against any U.S. attempt to invade the entire nation. It seems
that Bustamante had dual instructions to try and repress both these threats. He was
expected in San Luis Potosi anytime from the end of March by both general observers
and Paredes y Arrillaga's spies." Yet, he made no move until June. Instead, he
remained in Dolores Hidalgo, a point between both the capital of San Luis Potosi and
Sierra. It appears he was hedging his bets, maintaining a close eye on the two trouble
spots without committing himself to either.
In the event, he was unable to deal with either problem adequately. He directed
a very small operation against the rebels in the Sierra between March and June without
any discernible success. On 1 June, the government's worst fears were realised. Father
Jarauta (an ally of Paredes y Arrillaga) issued a revolutionary plan in Lagos. He called
for the overthrow of the government, a return to state autonomy and the continuation
of the fight against the United States." The government immediately appointed
83 As the east of the State of San Luis Potosi is partly taken up by the mountains of the Sierra Gorda.
it is probable that these groups of outlaws were in fact the rebellious serranos.
84 Francisco Estrada to the Minister of Interior and Exterior Relations. Queretaro.l S March IR4R. in
El Monitor Republicano, 31 March 1848.
85 El Monitor Republicano, 31 March 1848. CMPA wallet 148 no. 47. Eusebio Anaya to Mariano
Paredes y Arrillaga, Guanajuato, 27 March 1848.
86 Plan of Padre Jarauta, Lagos. I June 1R48. in Daniel Molina Alvarez. La pasion del padre Jarauta
(Mexico City: Gobierno de la Ciudad de Mexico. 1999). pp. 144-145.
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Bustamante as Chief of Operations against Jarauta. He was given the authority to co-
ordinate a response to the rebellion across the states of Guanajuato, Queretaro, San
Luis Potosi, Jalisco and Zacatecas." He was removed from the command of the
Reserve Army and given control of a new division: the eponymously named Division
Bustamante. He immediately sent a section of his soldiers and men from the St.
Patrick Brigade to Lagos to aid General Mifion who had already begun to besiege
Jarauta's position." Jarauta escaped Lagos on 10 June and headed for Guanajuato,
where he met with Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga. The two men captured the state
capital on 15 June and issued a new plan." The newly formed Division Bustamante
was now ordered to march upon Guanajuato. Before heading for the capital,
Bustamante organised his force first in Silao. By 29 June he could count on a force of
three thousand, under the command of himself and Generals Cortazar and Mifion." On
7 July he moved his headquarters to Marfil, on the outskirts of Guanajuato to begin his
operations against the rebels."
By all accounts, Bustamante's troops far outnumbered those at Paredes y
Arrillaga's disposal. He and Jarauta had taken Guanajuato on 15 June with 400 men
and since then, had managed to recruit another 200.42 The greater part of these
recruits, however, was rumoured to be local leperos, who had been given weapons by
Paredes y Arrillaga's ally, the state deputy and future Governor: Manuel Doblado." It
was also widely believed that the rebels from the Sierra Gorda had also entered
Guanajuato at the request of the pronunciados. <J.l As a result of this, many army
87 SDN: AH XII481.3/2803/000 11. The Minister of War to Bustamante, Mexico City, 15 June 1848.
88 El Monitor Republicano. 16 June 1848.
89 El Siglo XIX, 19 June 1848. This plan contained the same demands as the Plan of Lagos.
90 El Monitor Republicano, 3 July 1848.
91 Bustamante to the Minister of War, General Barracks at Marfil, 7 July 1848, in El Monitor
Republicano , supplement to the edition of 10 July 1848.
92 El Siglo XIX, 19 June 1848.
93 Ibid., 19 June 1848,EI Monitor Republic-ana. 27 June 1848 and SDN: AH XII481.3/2803/00512.
Bustamante to the Minister of War, Silao, 20 June 1848. Ibid., Xl/481.3/280300686. Bustamante to
the Minister of War, Silao, 1 July 1848. Ibid., XII481.3/2803/00791. Bustamante to the Minister of
War, Marfil, 11 July 1848.
94 El Monitor Republicano, 25, 29 June, 11 and 18 July 1848.
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officers who had originally supported Paredes y Arrillaga began to change their mind
and made attempts to bargain with Bustamante for their impunity. gr,
However, despite this obvious numeric superiority, Bustamante's troops did
not put down the rebellion quickly. In fact, it took his Division eleven days from
arriving in Marfil to capture Guanajuato, much to the disgust of the newspapers in
Mexico City and the trapped residents of Guanajuato. One such resident, the future
Governor of Guanajuato, Octaviano Munoz Ledo, told Mariano Riva Palacio that
each time Bustamante delayed his attack the rebels became more powerful. He feared
that Bustamante would eventually be defeated." An anonymous correspondent of El
Siglo XIX described Bustamante's plan as appearing to be 'aburrir a la tropa
trayendoles de cerro en cerro sin emprender un ataque formal. ,97 However, it would be
quite wrong to say that Bustamante and his men did nothing during these eleven days.
Many skirmishes took place between the two sets of forces and Bustamante's men
captured a number of strategic positions, such as the village of Valenciana." The long
awaited final attack eventually came on 18 July and Guanajuato was quickly captured.
Father Jarauta, who had been fighting on the front-line, was caught and shot the next
day." Paredes y Arrillaga however, managed to make an escape and was rumoured to
have headed for the Sierra, seeking the protection of Quiroz and his men. llXl
The support that Paredes y Arrillaga had received from the lepcros and
serranos convinced the government that a firm hand was needed to deal with the
captured rebels. Bustamante was ordered to court martial each suspected rebel within
twenty-four hours of their capture and to immediately impose the court's sentence
(which would be execution in this case). There was to be no use of the customary
95 SON: AH XII481.3/2803/00655. Bustamante to the Minister of War. Silao, 27 June 1848.
% MRPA no. 2779. Octaviano Munoz Ledo to Mariano Riva Palacio, Guanajuato, 8 July 1848.
97 El Siglo XIX, 17 July 1848.
9k El Monitor Republicano, 18 July 1848.
99 SON: AH XII481.3/2803/00517. A certification of the arrest and execution of Jarauta signed by
General Jose Lopez Uraga and dated 19 July 1848.
)00 El Monitor Republicano, 9 August 1848.
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amnesty for the captured officers and men.'" The scenes of Guanajuato in 1848
forcibly reminded Bustamante of similar events that had engulfed the state capital
thirty-eight years previously (the taking of the Alhondiga in Guanajuato by the
insurgents in 1810) and he was determined to prevent a repeat of the terrible
destruction that had then occurred.:" In his opinion:
La absoluta impunidad [...J de diversas maneras que han obtenido por
un largo tiempo los revolucionarios, si bien ha dado margen a la
escandalosa repeticion de las asonadas militares, tambien ha sido para
que muchos por insensatos mas que por malicia se adhieran, a ciegas,
por decirlo asi, a cualquier plan que le propone el primer audaz que por
fines innobles tiene la hostilidad propia para alucinar a los incautos. Itn
However, it must be pointed out that Bustamante's support for the execution of the
Guanajuato rebels, both officers and soldiers, was not completely all-inclusive. He had
Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga's ally, Father Jarauta, summarily shot, but he did not call
for Paredes y Arrillaga's execution. In fact, he would later support moves to grant the
fugitive General an amnesty." It seems that Bustamante's attitude towards execution
had changed little since 1831. He believed that executing rebels was the only way to
prevent future revolts, unless the rebel was personally known to him. Then, as in the
cases of Vicente Guerrero and Paredes y Arrillaga, he was unwilling to advocate the
death penalty.
The generally merciless approach to punishing the rebels in Guanajuato would
have unpleasant consequences for Bustamante. One rebel who was executed for his
part in Paredes y Arrillaga's rebellion, Captain Ramon Carrera, obviously had powerful
101 SDN: AH XI/481.3/2803/00017. Boldin de Noticias. Guanajuato, 3 July 1848. The Minister of
War to the Commander General of Guanajuato, 17 June 1848. lbid., XII481.3/2803/00795. Minister
of War to Bustamante, Mexico City 21 July 1848.
101 Ibid., XI/481.3/2803/00003-00004. El Correo Nacional, 7 September 1848. Bustamante to the
Minister of War, 4 August 1848.
Ill3 Ibid.. XII481.3/2803/00023. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Guanajuato, 24 July 1848.
104 AHG: Archivo Particular del sr. licenciado D. Manuel Doblado, no. 48. Bustamante to Nicolas
Moral, Queretaro, 9 February 1849.
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friends in Guanajuato. When his sentence was learnt, various delegations composed of
the most important residents of the city, dignitaries from the town council, members of
the clergy and a number of women visited Bustamante to ask that his sentence be
delayed until the government decided to offer amnesty to those captured. Bustamante
was disgusted by these efforts and he ordered that the execution of Carrera go ahead
as planned." However, this was not the end of the matter. The supporters of Carrera
now accused Bustamante of not giving him the appropriate form of court martial,
which his rank of officer required.:" They tried to prosecute him for the unlawful
execution of Carrera. An inquiry into the circumstances of Carrera's death was
conducted by the Supreme Tribunal of War. This case dragged on throughout the rest
of Bustamante's natural life and was only closed at his death, as the documents
surrounding the case were never found."
As can be imagined, during the Paredes' uprising the rebellion in the Sierra
Gorda had gone from strength to strength. If before the uprising their activities had
mostly been confined, with a few notable exceptions, to the centre of the Sierra, now
these were being felt 'por mucha parte de Guanajuato, Queretaro, y principalmente en
el de San Luis. ,108 According to Colonel Cruz, during this time, the towns of Nuevo
Gamotes, Lagunillas, Rioverde and La Palma had been sacked along with others in
the neighbouring part of the Huasteca (in the state of Hidalgo). Countless haciendas
and ranches in the area had been destroyed and their owners made bankrupt. Whole
villages had adhered to the scrranos, and it was impossible to calculate their exact
105 SON: AH XII48J.3/2803J00023. Bustamante to the Minister of War. 24 July 1848.
roo SON: SC XIIIII/I-23511-31/00337. Diaz Torres to the Supreme Tribunal of War and Marine.
Mexico City. 29 September 1848.
J07 Ibid .. XIJIIIJI-235/1-31/00404-00405. Escudero to the Supreme Tribunal of War, 24 February
1853.
J08 Cruz to the Minister of War. Hacienda de Tapanaco. 30 July 1848. in El Siglo XIX, 14 August
1848.
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number. His was the only force in the Sierra itself: and its number was sadly incapable
of making any impression upon the rebels."
It did not appear that the situation could soon be remedied. In Guanajuato,
Bustamante complained that his troops had been reduced to uselessness by widespread
desertion, a lack of food and clothing, and above all an extreme want of arms. He
believed it hopeless to send his men out on any campaign when no money existed even
to pay their salaries. He refused to send troops into the Sierra until he received some
money with which to finance such an expedition.!" Therefore, Cruz was left to his own
devices in the Sierra throughout the months of August and September. In late
September, the Commander General of Queretaro informed the Minister of War that
he had devised a plan for the pacification of the Sierra Gorda. He explained that he
had begun negotiations with Tomas Mejia, a rebel leader, who had formerly been an
ally of Paredes y Arrillaga. He told the Minister that he had every confidence that he
could persuade Mejia to accept a government amnesty and to join his own troops.
Jarero proposed to set up a meeting with Mejia in the heart of the Sierra, preferably in
Pefiamiller or Toliman. He hoped that once Mejia had decided to leave the serranos,
he and Jarero could lead a new expedition against the rebels from this central position.
To facilitate this scheme he asked the government for extra munitions and arms to be
sent for his troops in Queretaro. The government refused, telling him that he must arm
the expedition with those arms that he already had. III Jarero's plan was intially
successful. Mejia accepted a government amnesty almost immediately after meeting
with Jarero in Toliman and quickly decided to join his troops." However Jarero was
10<) Ibid.
110 SON: AH XII481.312803/00220-00221. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Guanajuato, 25
August 1848.
III Ibid.. XI/481.3/2874/00047-00049. Jose Maria Jarero to the Minister of War, Queretaro, 29
September 1848.
112 Ibid., XII481.3/2874/00027. Jarero to the Minister of War, San Pedro de Toliman, 9 October
1848.
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unable to launch his planned expedition from his base in Toliman. As usual, he was
crippled by a lack of supplies and money.
Meanwhile, the government had new plans for Bustamante. It wanted him to
leave Guanajuato and lead his division to Tampico, which it believed was under threat
of a U.S. invasion.:" Bustamante, suffering from acute rheumatic pains, asked to be
excused from this commission. He pleaded that he be allowed a temporary leave of
absence instead; stating he would like to ease his condition with a visit to the thermal
baths in Guanajuato or Queretaro."! In response, the government proceeded to
reappoint him as the Commander General of Guanajuato. It extended his authority to
cover the states of Jalisco, San Luis Potosi, Queretaro and Zacatecas and charged him
with the pacification of the Sierra Gorda. He was told that, if he completed this
mission, his leave of absence would be approved." Bustamante declared that he would
only undertake the commission, provided that new troops were immediately sent to
aid him. He warned the government that if these men were not sent, he would not
make himself responsible for maintaining order in the state and its surroundings, and
much less for carrying out any orders relative to the pacification of the Sierra.!"
Bustamante launched a new offensive against the serranos in October 1848.
He sent a strong force into the Sierra under the command of General Jose Lopez
Uraga and submitted a plan of action to the government. Bustamante's idea was to
follow similar tactics to those used during the war of insurgency. He proposed to arm
the hacendados and their peons, and to encourage the different haciendas to work
together in mutual defence against the serranos. Small sections of cavalry should be
sent to the various groups of haciendas to form 'secciones volantes' that would ride
out in the principal roads of the Sierra keeping watch and providing an early warning
11.1 lbid., XI/481.3/2841/00001-00003.The Minister of War to the Governor of Tarnaulipas, Mexico
City. 30 September 1848.
114 Ibid., XII481.3/28901000 128. Bustamante to the Minister for War. Silao, 16 October 1848.
115 Ihid.,XII48 1.3/289010001 29. The Minister of War to Bustamante, Mexico City, 21 October 1848
= tu«. XII481.3/2879/00074. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Silao, 19 October 1848.
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system against attacks. These would be made up of both regular troops and volunteers
from amongst the hacienda workers. The involvement of the hacendados and their
workers in the defence of the Sierra was essential for two reasons. In the first place, it
discouraged the tenant farmers and peons from joining the serranos. Secondly, it
meant that fewer troops needed to be deployed in defence of property. As a result,
more troops could be sent on missions to seek the rebels in the mountains.:"
Bustamante had used these tactics to great effect in both the Llanos de Apan
and the Bajio during the wars of insurgency. From experience he would have known
that progress would be slow. He probably did not expect to complete the pacification
in less than six months. After all, he and his colleagues had taken more than two years
to pacify the Bajio. In the event, his campaign would not end until October 1849,
when the rebel ringleaders were caught and shot. However, it is extremely likely that
the pacification of the Sierra would have been completed much sooner, if certain
internal military problems had not diverted attention away from the rebels in the first
six months of operations. The first of these problems was caused by the fact that
Bustamante intially avoided entering the Sierra to take personal control of the military
operation against the rebels. This meant that there were two senior officers in the area:
Jose Maria Jarero, the Commander General of Queretaro and Jose Lopez Uraga, who
led the forces of the Division Bustamante in the Sierra. Bustamante had appointed
General Uraga as his representative in the military operation and had given him full
authority over all the troops in the Sierra. This arrangement irked Jarero, who believed
that he should have been given this authority, because he was a higher ranking officer
than Uraga.:" He declared that he would not take orders from Uraga. In response,
Bustamante asked the Minister of War to order Jarero to return to Queretaro and to
117 Ibid., XII481.3/2890100034-00035. Bustamante to the Governor of Queretaro, San Miguel de
Allende, 21 November 1848. Ibid.. XII481.3/2890/00037-00039. Bustamante to the Minister of War,
San Miguel de Allende, 22 November 1848.
liS Jarero was a General de Brigada, while Uraga, the other commanding officer in the Sierra, was a
rank below him as Colonel graduado de General.
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appoint another officer to take his place. He did not want his operation to be
handicapped by internal squabbling.!" The government did not approve of this
measure. Instead, it advised Bustamante to avoid any possible trouble by sending a
separate brigade into the very heart of the Sierra under the command of General Angel
Guzman. This brigade would be made up of half the men currently under Jarero's
command, half those under Uraga's control and the remaining soldiers of Colonel
Cruz. Jarero and Uraga would stay in the outskirts of the territory, each working
independently to provide a defensive line around the Sierra.l" The government also
wrote to Jarero clearly informing him that General Bustamante was his superior officer
in these operations," and that his orders must be obeyed.!"
Unfortunately it appears that this effort on the part of the government to avoid
confrontation arrived too late. Uraga and Jarero were already in position in the Sierra
by the second week of November. By the time Bustamante received the above orders
the situation had already become dangerous. Jarero was now refusing to obey orders
that were sent to him from Generals Uraga and Bustamante. In tum, Uraga refused to
obey orders emanating from General Jarero. The general result of this lack of mutual
co-operation was that no progress was made against the serranos. In fact, on 14
November, the rebels descended en masse from the Sierra into the plains of Queretaro
and Guanajuato. The village of Casa Viejas, and the neighbouring haciendas of
Chichimequillas and Buenavista were sacked first, followed by the haciendas and
ranches in the surroundings of San Miguel de Allende. m This was an impressive show
of strength by the serranos, who had not before ventured so far into the plains. It was
119 Ibid., XII481.3/2890100104-00107. Bustamante to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 6
November 1848.
120 Ibid., XII481.3/28901 00108-00111. The Minister of War to Bustamante, Mexico City, 14
November 1848.
121 Bustamante was a General de Division, the highest rank in the Mexican Army.
122 SON: AH XI/481.3/2889/00020-00021. The Minister of War to Jarero, Mexico City, 19 November
1848.
121 lbid., XII481.3/2889/00029-00031. Cayetano Munoz to the Minister of War, Queretaro, 16
November 1848.
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generally feared that it would not be long before they would attack the city of
Queretaro itself m Quite unsurprisingly Uraga and Bustamante blamed this disaster on
Jarero's failure to send reinforcements to Casa Viejas as ordered. Jarero claimed that
Bustamante's refusal to implement a plan of attack he had submitted was the true
cause of the disgrace.:" Probably nearer the truth was the view expressed by the
exasperated Francisco de Paula Mesa, an official in the state government of Queretaro.
He informed Bustamante that the refusal of Uraga and Jarero to work together meant
that the state troops defending the area around Casa Viejas had no idea who was in
charge of their operations and were thus rendered useless.!" All in all, it was obvious
that while Jarero and Uraga refused to co-operate with each other, no progress could
made in the pacification of the Sierra. In the wake of these events, Bustamante
summoned Jarero to San Miguel Allende.:" Here he held a private interview with the
Commander General, and must have managed to smooth matters sufficiently to
d J 128prevent any further squabbles between Uraga an arero.
Jarero did not abandon his pretensions of power, however. Things came to a
head in December when another of Bustamante's officers in the Sierra, General Rafael
Vazquez, failed to obey one of Jarero's direct orders. Vazquez had been posted to
command a defensive line in the plains of Queretaro by Bustamante and believed
himself to be answerable to this General. Jarero did not share this view, and when
Vazquez repeatedly refused to obey his order to move his barracks from the hacienda
124 Ibid., XII481.3/2890/00064. Bustamante to the Minister of War. San Miguel de Allende, 17
November 1848.
125 Ibid .• XII481.3/2890/00070. Uraga to Bustamante. Hacienda de Charcas, 15 November 1848.
Ibid .• XII481.3/2890/00075-00076. Bustamante to the Minister of War. San Miguel de Allende, 15
November 1848. Ibid .• XII481.3/2889/00018-00019. Jarero to the Minister of War, Cadereyta, 17
November 1848.
126 Ibid .• XI/481.3/2890/00029. Francisco de Paula Mesa to Bustamante, Queretaro, 20 November
1848.
127 Ibid .• XI/481.3/2890/00012-00015. Bustamante to the Minister of War. San Miguel de Allende, 24
November 1848.
128 Unfortunately as this was a personal meeting, no record appears to exist of how exactly
Bustamante managed to calm the situation.
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of Esperanza to Ajuchitlan, he accused him of insubordination.:" He also issued a
circular to all the officers in the Sierra to this effect, warning them not to follow
Vazquez's orders. This was too much for Bustamante and he immediately demanded
that Jarero recall this circular. He also wanted orders to be given to counter its
content. When Jarero did not respond, he appealed to the government for support.:"
The government immediately wrote to Jarero, ordering him to obey Bustamante's
orders. I31 Still, Jarero refused to retract his orders. Finally, Bustamante accused Jarero
of insubordination and ordered him to march to Mexico City to face a court marital. I:l2
Jarero obeyed this order and marched for the capital. He refused, however, to drop the
charge of insubordination against Vazquez. Jarero was eventually acquitted in
December 1849.!Xl However, he spent the intervening months conducting a hate
campaign against General Bustamante. He wrote to the Minister of War, alleging that
Bustamante was inept and unable to organise the campaign in the Sierra. He also
accused Bustamante of abusing his authority by interfering in the trial of Rafael
Vazquez.:" Vazquez was not prosecuted until the Sierra was pacified. He was
eventually found innocent by a military court in August 1851.13'>
The fortune of the government troops in the Sierra improved considerably after
the departure of Jarero. The troops of General Uraga marched to the heart of the
129 SON: AH XII481.3/30591 00017-00018. Jarero to Bustamante, Queretaro, 15 December 1848.
DO lbid.. XII 481.3/3059/00020-00023, 00032-0034. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Queretaro,
23 and 26 December 1848.
DI Ibid., XII481.3/3059/00030.The Minister of War to Jarero, Mexico City, 30 December 1848.
132 Ibid .. XII481.3/3059/00041-00042. Bustamante to the Minister of War. Queretaro, 4 January
1849.
m lbid., XII48 I. 3/3059/0000 I.Quijano to the Minister of War, Mexico City, 9 January 1850.
134 Ibid.. XII481.3/3059/00094-0099. Bustamante to the Minister of War. Queretaro, 20 January
1849. Ibid .. X1I481.3/30591 00075. Jarero to the Minister of War, Mexico City 3 February 1849.
lbid.. XII481.3/3059/00107-0108. Jarero to the Minister of War. Mexico City 22 March 1849. AGN:
Archivo de Guerra. vol. 1428. Jarero to the President of the Supreme Tribunal of War and Marine.
Mexico City, 22 January 1849. Also see, Jose Maria Jarero, "Esposicion del general Jarero al consejo
de guerra de oficiales y generales." (Mexico City, 5 December 1849). in El Siglo XIX. 12 December
1849. This is his speech in his defence at the close of the trial. He neatly turns this defence into an
attack on Bustamante. Vazquez and Uraga in which he implies that Bustamante and Uraga should
have been brought to trial rather than himself.
1.15 AGN: Archivo de Guerra, vol. 1428. Miram6n and Zapata to the Supreme Tribunal of War and
Marine, Mexico City. 23 August 1851.
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rebellion, defeating the rebels in a series of encounters, before finally entered the
village of Xichu on 5 January 1849. J:lo They only passed one night in the village, but
the symbolic achievement of capturing this settlement served to strengthen the position
of the government troops. Two important victories were also won over the leaders of
the revolt: Eleutorio Quiroz, Juan Ramirez and the Chaire family.m In the second of
these, Miguel Chaire and his son were captured. This was also a landmark
achievement for Bustamante. For, as he reported to the Minister of War on 10
February, the Chaires had been the first instigators of the revolt. He was sure that this
event would have a profound influence on the situation in the Sierra. Moreover, in the
face of the army's growing supremacy, many of the serranos accepted the amnesty
that the government had recently introduced. At last, it seemed that at last the
pacification of the territory was within the grasp of Bustamante's men.:"
However, all did not continue in that positive vein. In fact, on the very day that
Bustamante composed the above letter to the Minister of War, one of his officers in
the Sierra, Leonardo Marquez, issued a pronunciamiento in favour of the return of
Santa Anna. With a group of 25 of his soldiers, he proceeded to capture and imprison
his commanding officer, General Guzman. The rebellion was short-lived. Guzman
managed to make his escape the next day. nq Marquez's men quickly began to desert
him and his position soon became untenable. He fled the Sierra just over a week
later." Even so, the rebellion had a very adverse effect upon Bustamante's campaign.
The serranos were quick took advantage of the confusion caused by the
pronunciamiento. During February and March they made fresh attacks against
136 SDN: AH XII481.3/2916/00034-00036. Uraga to Bustamante, Hacienda de la Noria, 6 January
1849.
mIbid .. XII48 1.3/29 I6/00138. Uraga to Bustamante, Campo en el Palote, 6 February 1849. Ibid.,
XII481.3/2916/00170. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Queretaro, 10 February 1849.
1.18 Ibid., XII481.3/2916/00170. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Queretaro, 10 February 1849.
1.19 Angel Guzman to Bustamante, Casas Viejas, 12 February 1849, in El Sig/o XIX, 17 February
1849.
140 Manuel Gutierrez to Mariano Arista, Queretaro. 16 February 1849, in ibid., 21 February 1849.
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haciendas in the plains of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi. 141 This new frenzy
culminated in the capture of the town of Rioverde and the defeat of Colonel Cruz in
the nearby hacienda of Javali, on 12 March.:" The serranos seemed now to have a
clear path towards the city of San Luis Potosi and were more confident than ever. In
Rioverde, the Prefect Manuel Verastegui, had joined their forces. His presence and
apparent leadership gave the rebels new prestige, while the capture of the town
furnished them with new bargaining power. 1B It appeared as if the military pacification
of the Sierra was now once more an impossible object.
In the face of this situation, the government authorised Bustamante to begin
negotiations with Verastegui. A cease-fire was agreed and peace talks began in April.
Bustamante was then ordered to use the opportunity provided by the cease-fire to
regroup and reinforce his forces.:" These negotiations lingered on for two months. A
peace treaty was finally agreed on 14 May and sent to Mexico City for ratification.
The terms of the treaty show that Bustamante and the government were desperate to
end the rebellion. Quiroz was given the military command of Xichu and a personal
army of one hundred men and the government further undertook to introduce laws to
improve the lives of the serranos." These terms were highly criticised by the papers of
the capital. 1-10 In the end, the government's concessions failed to bring the rebellion in
the Sierra to a close. It soon clear that the various groups of rebels did not agree with
the call for peace. Despite the cease-fire many bands continued to attack villages and
141 SDN: AH XII481.3/2916/00178. Bustamante to the Minister of War. Queretaro. 27 February
1849.
142 Ibid., XII481.3/2958/00012-00015. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Queretaro, 12 March
1849.
14J Ibid., XII481.3/2938/00052-00052. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Queretaro, 10 April 1849.
144 lbid., XII481.3/2936/00001-00002. The Minister of War to General in Chief of the Bustamante
Division, Mexico City, 14 April 1849.
145 The agreement is printed in El Monitor Republicano. 20 May 1849.
146 See for example the editorial of El Siglo XIX, 30 May 1849.
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pillage haciendas throughout April and May. '~7 Neither were these groups ready to
accept the treaty brokered for them by Verastegui. It seems that Quiroz abandoned the
peace process to regain their favour. He continually refused to ratify the treaty and
finally broke from Verastegui in June. H8
By this point though, the impetus that had carried the scrranos into the plains
of San Luis Potosi had run out. Bustamante's troops had now recovered from the
chaos caused by Marquez's rebellion. During the peace negotiations they had
regrouped and rearmed. When hostilities officially recommenced in June, Quiroz and
the other serrano leaders were quickly driven back to the safety of the mountains." At
the end of August a new offensive was launched into the heart of the Sierra led by
Generals Uraga and Vazquez.!" On 3 September, Quiroz and his band were
comprehensively defeated by the troops of their former ally, Captain Mejia. Quiroz
fled the scene on foot, leaving his horse for the victors. Fifty-three of his men were
killed on the field, including his second-in-command: Lazaro Cuillen."' This defeat
encouraged many rebels to seek a government amnesty and to return to their homes.!"
By 9 September, Bustamante could tell the Minister of War that he was confident that
the rebellion was reaching its end.!" A fortnight later, Quiroz and Juan Ramirez were
the only rebels left in the Sierra. They were captured in the first week of October.'?'
147 El Siglo XIX, 17 and 22 May 1849. AGGEG, Fondo del Gobierno, Serie de Tranquilidad publica,
CE-223-E7, and EI0. 1. Isidrio Chavez to the Governor of Guanajuato, Silao, II April 1849. and 1.
Urbano Rodriguez to Secretary of the Governor ofGuanajuato, San Miguel de Allende, 3 May 1849.
14R Bustamante to the Minister of War. Casas Viejas, 11 June 1R49. in El Monitor Republicano, 7
July 1849.
149 Ibid. Also see: SON: AH XII481.3/3010100078-00081, 00075-00076. Bustamante to the Minister
of War, 16 and 21 July 1849.
150 Ibid., XII481.3/3028/00013. Rafael Vazquez, El General en Gefe de la Brigada Vazquez a los
habitantes de Rioverde, (unpublished), Hacienda de San Diego. 29 August IR49.
151 El Monitor Republicano, 12 September 1849.
'52 SON: AH Xl/481.3/3028/00060-00061. Uraga to Bustamante, Macuala, 5 September 1849.
mBustamante to the Minister of War. San Luis de la Paz, 9 September 1849, in El Monitor
Republicano, 18 September 1849.
154 SON: AH XII481.3/3020100002. Pedro Cortazar to the Minister of War, Celaya, 4 October 1849.
lbid., XII481.3/3020100004. Bustamante to the Minister of War, Casa Viejas, 4 October 1849.
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The rebellion in the Sierra was finally over. lor, The Division Bustamante was dissolved
in December and General Bustamante was granted his promised leave of absence. 10"
Bustamante retired to San Miguel de Allende after the events of the Sierra
Gorda. He held the title of Commander General of Guanajuato for the rest of his
natural days, but illness prevented him taking an active role in any military operation.
In June 1850, cousins Evaristo and Feliciano Liceaga, old allies of Mariano Paredes y
Arrillaga, began a rebellion in Penjamo, which called for the return of Santa Anna to
the Presidency.157 There were fears that the revolt would spread to the capital of the
state.15S Bustamante sent General Vazquez to confront the rebels, and the revolt was
quickly quashed.159 In January 1851, the cousins tried once more to achieve their
objective. This time they managed to effect the capture of Guanajuato. Bustamante
sent General Uraga to take control of the situation. Uraga marched on the city with a
force of a hundred men, accompanied by a company of infantrymen and artillery men.
He soon defeated the Liceagas, who fled in the direction of penjamo.160 In December
1852 the General suffered what appears to have been a stroke and became unable to
speak.161 He died at five past nine on 6 February 1853.162 In accordance with his
wishes his heart was removed and placed in a flask, which was later transported to
Mexico City. With the gracious permission of Iturbide's widow, it was laid to rest
155 It would quickly flare up again in 1854, but for Bustamante the campaign was certainly over.
156 SDN: AH XII481.3/3053/00029-00030. Bustamante to the Minister of War, San Jose de lturbide,
6 December 1849.
157 lbid., XII481.3/3298/00007. The Minister of War to the Commander General of Michoacan,
Mexico City, 12 June 1850.
ISH lbid., XII481.3/3298/00032-00033. Mariano Leal y Araujo to Bustamante, Guanajuato, 6 June
1850.
159 Ibid.. XII481.3/3298/00009. Bustamante to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 28 June
1850.
160 Ibid., XII481.3/3293/00102-00108 and 00146. Bustamante to the Minister of War. San Miguel de
Allende, 17 January 1851. Uraga to the Minister of War, Guanajuato, 21 January 1851.
161 Ibid., XIIIII/I-235/1-31/00402. Anaya to the President of the Supreme Tribunal of War and
Marine, Mexico City, 30 December 1852.
161 Ibid., XI/III/I-235/1-31/00410. Luis Quintanar to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 6
February 1853.
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beside the remains of the former Emperor in the capital's cathedral.163 He was buried
in the church at San Miguel de Allende the next day. The government pronounced nine
days of mourning be observed by the Mexican Army164and it was generally expressed
by the capital's newspapers that Mexico had lost 'uno de sus hijos mas ilustres.' 165
F: The Final Campaigns: Concluding Remarks.
The final events of Anastasio Bustamante's career give his life an appearance of
neat symmetry. His final military expedition against the rebels in the Sierra Gorda
mirrored his first campaign against the insurgents and employed many of the same
tactics. He even died in Guanajuato, the state in which he had been most successful
during the insurgency; from where he also began his political career in 1821,
seconding Agustin de Iturbide's Plan of Iguala. Moreover, our study of these years has
shown a number of interesting parallels between Bustamante's actions during this time
and his behaviour in previous years. In keeping with the stance he adopted during his
Presidency, Bustamante supported the moderate government of President Jose
Joaquin de Herrera in 1845. In an echo of his loyalty to Iturbide in 1823, he refused to
betray Herrera in December 1845, even when it became obvious that the President
would be deposed. He also rejected the opportunity to take part in Paredes y
Arrillaga's government in 1846. Finally, as is shown by his behaviour in Guanajuato in
1848, the long years of opposing rebellions had left Bustamante convinced of the
merits of execution as the best deterrent against future unrest. This strategy had been
introduced to him during the insurgency, and was employed during his Vice-
Presidency to varying degrees of success. Despite this, he remained unwilling to
16.1 lbid., XIIIII/I-235/1-31/00410. Quintanar to the Minister of War, San Miguel de Allende, 6
February 1853.lbid., XIIIIIII-235/1-3/ 00417. Manuel Gutierrez to the Minister of War, 14 February
1853. El Monitor Republicano, 10 February 1853.
164 SON: se XIIIIIII-235/1-31/00413. Decree, 8 February 1853. Signed Manuel Maria Lombardini.
165 El Universal, 10 February 1853.
309
The Final Campaigns (1845-1853)
advocate the execution or punishment of Paredes y Arrillaga, the leader of the 1848
rebellion. This reluctance appears to be rooted in the tact that Bustamante knew
Parades y Arrillaga personally, just as he knew Vicente Guerrero. However, it could
reflect Bustamante's usual practice of approving the execution the lower class rebels,
but pardoning the elites, who often had powerful friends to protect their interests.
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Conclusion: Anastasio Bustamante's Position •In
Society, Politics and Government
A: Bustamante's Place in Society
General Anastasio Bustamante, by the virtue of his birth and education,
belonged to the ranks of the middle classes or hombres de bien. More or less like the
imaginary hombre de bien described by Michael Costeloe, I Bustamante was born into
the Creole bourgeoisie in the final years of the Colony. He was educated by the
Church in the Seminary in Guadalajara, before moving to Mexico City to study
Chemistry and Medicine. As a doctor before the outbreak of the insurgency and
afterwards, as a military officer, he occupied a respectable position in society. At
various points in his career he acquired rural property and mining interests that, linked
with his military salary, provided him with an income of well over a thousand pesos a
year.2 He probably lived in rented houses during his time in Mexico City, but he
owned his own horses, various weapons and items of jewellery.' He was a religious
man, probably a regular church-goer, who made provisions in his will that thirty
masses be said for his soul as soon as possible after his death.4 He amassed a personal
library during his life-time,s most likely containing books upon the study of medicine
and science, subjects which he appears to have continued to study throughout his life,
most obviously during his first exile in Paris, even though he never returned to the
medical profession after 1810. Bustamante never married, although he did father three
I Michael P. Costeloe, "Hombres de bien in the Age of Santa Anna," in Jaime E. Rodriguez O. (ed.),
Mexico in the Age of Democratic Revolutions, 1750-/850 (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1994), pp. 249-257.
2 To be eligible for the Presidency in 1R3 7. he was required to have an income of at least 4, 000 pesos .
.~ AGNCM. Notaria: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2869. f.9. Last Will and Testament of Anastasio
Bustamante. dated. 12 January 1846.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., Notaria: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2855. f. 1078. Last Will and Testament of Anastasio
Bustamante. dated. 1 October 1838.
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illegitimate children. He outlived two of his sons, while the third became his legitimate
heir.
In many ways Bustamante's life and career reflect these origins as an hombre
de bien. In the first place, it seems to illustrate Costeloe's observations that 'despite all
the potential conflict among hombres de bien [...J there was loyalty to their class, a
social solidarity, that allowed bitter rivals to retain respect for one another. ,6 This
study has noted on various occasions that political animosity was not sufficient to
disrupt all of Bustamante's personal relationships. For example, Manuel Gomez
Pedraza allied himself with Bustamante in 1838, despite their hostility during his Vice-
Presidency. Bustamante was able to strike up a friendship with Lorenzo de Zavala in
Paris in 1833, even though his administration had persecuted Zavala and ordered the
execution of his friend and ally, Guerrero, only a few years earlier. Similarly, he was
able to socialise with Jose Maria Gutierrez Estrada in Cuba in 1842, although he had
personally ordered the latter's exile in 1840.
However, where Bustamante's life seems to demonstrate the most shocking
example of this class solidarity is his approach to the execution of his enemies. During
his first administration there was a strong contrast between his treatment of Mariano
Zerecero and Vicente Guerrero. He interfered in the judicial process to save Zerecero,
pardoning him on the eve of his execution; but he refused to extend a similar amnesty
to Vicente Guerrero. The different social origins of Zerecero and Guerrero must have
had some bearing upon the way Bustamante treated them. Mariano Zerecero was the
brother of Anastasio, who was a lawyer. Although Anastasio Zerecero had been an
insurgent during the wars of independence, was still an hombre de bien by virtue of his
profession and status as a deputy. Guerrero on the other hand, was a poorly educated
mulatto, who was resented in Mexico City society for his colour and lack of social
"Costeloe. "Hombres de bien in the Age of Santa Anna," p. 256.
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gracea' Throughout this period it was usual, as we noted in Chapter One, to execute
lower class rebels, but to spare the wealthy middle-class elites; and it seems that
Bustamante's treatment of Guerrero was influenced by this practice. It does not seem
far-fetched to believe that Bustamante also supported the execution of the wandering
priest, Father Jarauta, but opposed the punishment of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga's
for similar reasons.
Amongst the hombres de bien, the perception that any organisation or
movement of the lower classes presented a direct threat to orderly society and
government was common. Bustamante does not seem to be any exception. He enlisted
in Felix Maria Calleja's army in 1810 in order to defend the social order threatened by
the marauding mobs of the insurgent under-class. He adhered to Agustin de Iturbide's
Plan of Iguala in contrast, because this plan offered the prospect of an orderly
rebellion and was championed by a fellow member of the Creole elite. In 1829 he led
the Plan of Jalapa against the government of Vicente Guerrero, which had been
brought to power as a result of the riot of soldiers and leperos in the Parian Market in
1828. His administration dedicated itself to removing the influence of the radicals,
whom it termed sanculottes and jacobinos in memory of the mobs of the French
Revolution. In 1838 he conspired with Manuel Gomez Pedraza to re-introduce the
Federal Constitution. However, following an afternoon in which a mob of lower class
supporters of Valentin Gomez Farias demonstrated upon the streets and stormed their
leader's prison to rescue him, Bustamante abandoned Gomez Pedraza and his plans.
7 Lorenzo de Zavala. Ensayo historico de las revoluciones de Mexico (Mexico City: Oficina
Impresora de Hacienda. 1918). vol. 2. p.52.
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B: Bustamante and Politics
Bustamante's position in the world of politics was defined by two important
features. The first was his membership of the army. The army had a strong position in
Mexican society and politics. By and large, its generals dominated the executive in
independent Mexico. Between 1824 and 1855, 15 out of 22 Presidents were military
men.8 Bustamante counted as one of the most elite officers in the army. From 1823 he
held the highest rank possible, General de Division, a distinction he shared with only
eleven others." This position, probably as much as any ambition he held, was key to his
own success in occupying the executive on two occasions. Other military
contemporaries in the Presidential chair, such as Guadalupe Victoria, Vicente
Guerrero and Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, all shared the same rank. It seems that
the Generals provided high-profile, respected leadership around which political
coalitions could form. They also could be relied upon to have a sufficient following in
the army to ensure its support could be organised at important moments.
There is little doubt that Bustamante was proud of his position in the army. In
his will he specified that he wished to be buried in his uniform.1O In 1848 he fought
fiercely with Jose Maria Jarero, whom he believed was trying to usurp his authority it
the Sierra Gorda. He eventually sent Jarero to be court-rnartialled in Mexico City on
the charge of insubordination. He also appeared to wish that the army should make
itself worthy of respect. As a commander in the Army of the Three Guarantees, he
worked hard to ensure discipline amongst his ranks. During his first administration
8 Michael P. Costeloe, "Mariano Arista y la elite de la Ciudad de Mexico, I S51-1852," in Humberto
Morales and Will Fowler (eds.) El conservadurismo mexicano en el siglo XIX, (Puebla: Benemerita
Universidad de Pueblal University of St. Andrews/ Secretaria de Cultura, Gobierno del Estado de
Puebla, 1999), p. 188.
C) LAF no. 425. Decree of24 October 1823.
10 AGNCM. Notaria: Francisco Madariaga, vol. 2R69, f.S. Last Will and Testament of Anastasio
Bustamante, dated, 12 January 1846.
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new uniforms were designed for the class of general, and many attempts were made to
ensure that officers always presented a dignified spectacle when wearing their
uniforms. As President he oversaw the setting up of the Plana Mayor del Ejercito, a
body that would co-ordinate the regulation of the army in the matter of rules and
discipline.
The second feature that defined Bustamante's place within the political sphere
was the ideas he supported and followed as a politician. As was noted in the
introduction, many of his contemporaries believed that the General had few consistent
political opinions of his own, but was entirely dominated by his advisors. This idea
seems to stem from the fact that Bustamante seemed to dally between the factions of
centralism and federalism in the 1820s and 1830s, appearing to betray one side for
another on more than one occasion. Bustamante's ideas, like those of all politicians,
evolved over time. In common with the majority of his contemporaries, he began his
political career as an iturbidista, a supporter of a centralised constitutional monarchy.
However, his support for centralism did not survive long past Agustin de Iturbide's
abdication in April 1823. By the autumn of that year he had become associated with
the federalists in the state of Jalisco. It is possible, therefore, that his initial support for
a central system had been more based upon loyalty to Iturbide than to anything else.
Once he had disappeared, Bustamante seems to have become convinced that a
federalised system was more suitable for governing the vast territory of Mexico. This
is probably because Iturbide's abdication removed Bustamante from the capital and the
seat of power: thus introducing him to the frustrations of provincial government.
Whatever the case, Bustamante remained a federalist of sorts for the rest of his career.
It is true that while he was in Guadalajara he became involved in a plot to restore
Iturbide. However, as we noted in Chapter Two, this did not necessarily mean he
wished to restore a centralist system. Iturbide could have also functioned as head of a
federalised state.
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Bustamante joined the yorkinos. the Masonic lodge most associated with
federalism, in the late l820s. He was never associated with its radical wing, but rather
emerged in the 1828 Presidential Elections as the moderate candidate to complement
the more radical Guerrero, and to oppose Manuel Gomez Pedraza. His first
administration did not, despite all the assertions of the radical yorkinos, try to impose a
centralist system upon the Republic. It merely sought to strengthen the position of the
executive within the framework of the Federal Constitution. He spent two years of his
second administration conspiring to bring a modified form of federalism back to
Mexico with the leader of the moderate federalists, Gomez Pedraza. This programme
was abandoned not because of Bustamante's lack of resolve, but rather as it was clear
it could not be successful. In 1846 he became one of moderate President, Jose Joaquin
de Herrera's trusted generals and remained loyal to his government in the face of a
rebellion organised by Paredes y Arrillaga.
It seems clear that by the late 1830s, Bustamante had become a moderate
federalist. He supported the Constitution of 1824, but wanted, like Gomez Pedraza, to
see it modified in certain key areas. The example of both his first administration and
his involvement with Gomez Pedraza in 1838, indicates that Bustamante preferred a
system of more limited autonomy for the states than that envisaged in the charter of
1824. In his Vice-Presidency, his regime had sought to prevent the states from
opposing the federal government by dissolving potentially rebellious state legislatures.
As President, he supported Gomez Pedraza's plans to reduce the legislative power of
the states. The same example also demonstrates that Bustamante wished to reduce the
participation of the lower classes in politics. His first administration introduced
legislation to reduce suffrage and to ensure that candidates in elections could only be
hombres de bien. During his second administration, he endorsed Gomez Pedraza's
plans to introduce a federal system that prevented those he deemed unworthy
('indignos'), from taking part in elections. Finally, the evidence collected in this study
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shows Bustamante had a preference for a strong executive government. He disliked
the constraints placed upon the President by the Federal Constitution of 1824, which
invested more power in the legislative bodies than in the executive. During his first
administration Bustamante's regime sought to strengthen the power and intluence of
the executive by intimidating the Federal Congress and by exploiting its conventions to
force through legislation. As President he made his opposition to the Supreme
Conservative Power widely known. He repeatedly requested the Congress grant him
emergency powers, which would have allowed the executive to legislate and act
without the approval of Congress or the Supreme Conservative Power. Even so, it
appears that Bustamante did not support the idea of dictatorship. Between 1837 and
1838, many people appeared to want Bustamante to make himself into a dictator, yet
he did not associate himself with these schemes. He refused to introduce Gomez
Pedraza's moral revolution by decree and, throughout his Presidency respected
(however grudging at times), the authority of the institutions established by the
constitution of the Siete Leyes.
C: Bustamante's Role in Government
Anastasio Bustamante's contemporaries considered that he was a weak.
indecisive figure in government. Carlos Maria de Bustamante wrote that Bustamante
was 'bravo en la campafia pero sin disposicion de gobemar en grande. II, Guillermo
Prieto described the former President's worst faults as those of ignorance and
indecision.12 It was generally accepted that Bustamante was an ineffectual leader. It
was said that his flaws were disguised during his first administration by the work of his
II Carlos Maria de Bustamante, Continuacion del cuadro historico de lu revolucion mexicana: El
gabinete mexicano durante el segundo periodo de la administracion del exmo. senor D. Anastasio
Bustamante (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica/Instituto Helenico, 1985), vol. I, p. 42.
12 Guillermo Prieto, Memorias de mis tiempos (Mexico City: Porrua, 1996), pp. 180-181.
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cabinet, and that his weakness was only revealed during his Presidency. This study has
cast doubt upon these assertions. As we noted in Chapter Four, Bustamante became
Vice-President and acting Head of State in 1830 under the Federal Constitution of
1824. He came to power as a result of a successful rebellion, organised by a wide-
ranging coalition of the Church, the army and the hombres de bien. During the first
year of his administration, every effort was made to strengthen his position in
government. Potential enemies in the Federal Congress were nearly all exiled. Other
deputies and senators were intimidated by the army, whose officers often attended
Congressional sessions. All state legislatures which appeared to pose a threat to his
government were dissolved and replaced. Terror tactics, such as the execution of
enemies, and violent attacks upon critics, were also employed to subdue opposition to
his government. Therefore, in this administration the executive power enjoyed a strong
position of influence within government and was rarely thwarted in their actions by
Congress.
In 1837, the situation was entirely different. On this occasion, Bustamante
came to power through an election. He served under the Centralist Constitution of
1836. This constitution established a system of government whereby the President's
initiatives needed to approved by four separate government bodies (the Council of
Government, the Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and finally the Supreme Conservative
Power), before they could be enacted. In other words, Bustamante's position was
weak by its very nature. Moreover, in 1837, he did not enjoy the broad based support
of a coalition within government circles. He had been proposed as President by some
members of the centralist faction. However, he could not count upon the support of
the other main factions: the federalists and the santanistas. Later, he lost the
endorsement of the centralists when it became clear that he did not support the
Constitution of 1836. He became associated with the federalists in 1837 and 1838, but
this alliance disintegrated in the wake of the failure of the moral revolution. This meant
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he could not use the same tactics of coercion upon Congress, or any of the other
institutions, that he had employed in his first administration. Coercion had only been
successful in 1830 because the number of dissidents was inferior to the coalition of
supporters of the Bustamante regime. When the balance shifted, Bustamante found he
had to leave his position. Finally, unlike Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, Bustamante
proved to respect the institutions and laws of the Constitution of 1836. He did not
attempt to rule by decree, as Santa Anna did during his brief period as interim
President. This meant he was confined to the weak position established by the
constitution, and effectively barred from imposing himself upon his government.
It is worth noting at this point that neither the Federal Constitution nor the
Siete Leyes allowed for a strong executive. Both constitutions fixed power firmly with
Congress and required the President to seek its approval for all its initiatives.
However, almost paradoxically, it seems that most members of the political elite
actually expected the President to have the dominant position. Those like Bustamante
in his second administration, and Guadalupe Victoria (1824-1828), who obeyed the
dictates of the constitution and consequently failed to impose their authority upon
their administrations, were generally characterised by contemporary observers as weak
and ineffective Presidents. This is not to say that the President was expected to ignore
the constitution entirely and behave in an authoritarian manner. When Bustamante
tried to control Congress during his Vice-Presidency, and when Santa Anna ignored
both Congress and the Supreme Conservative Power during his interim Presidency in
1839, both men were condemned by the same observers for acting dictatorially. It
seems that politicians and the political elite were unable to define adequately the role
that a President should have in the Republic.
Despite the constitutional problems faced by Bustamante, this study has shown
him to be a pragmatic figure in government and a resolute leader during times of crisis.
He acted realistically rather than idealistically during the Three Day Ministry of
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December 1838. It became clear that imposing Gomez Pedraza's moral revolution
would inevitably lead to his own downfall and the ultimate failure of the scheme; so,
he abandoned the plans. He weathered the subsequent political storm by diffusing the
mounting threat of a rebellion in favour of Santa Anna by suggesting that this caudillo
replace him temporarily, while he attempted to re-coup his lost popularity in the
battlefield. In July 1840, while he was being held prisoner by General Urrea, he
refused to agree to his demands. He remained calm throughout his capture and was
not intimidated by threats to his life, or swayed by the promises of the rebels. In
September 1841 he fought Santa Anna, Paredes y Arrillaga and Gabriel Valencia with
stubborn determination. He only surrendered once all hope of victory was lost.
In summary, the conclusions that can be drawn from this study are the
following: Bustamante was a man of his time; an hombre de bien, whose attitudes
were shaped in no small measure by the society in which he lived. Despite beginning
his political career as an iturbidista, he evolved into a moderate federalist, who wanted
to see a strong executive power control the federation. His own weak position during
his Presidency was probably due to the organisation of the Constitution of 1836 and
the fact that, for most of his period in government, he could not rely upon a great deal
of support in or outside Congress. He was able to remain in the Presidency for such a
long period despite his unpopular position, because he was a pragmatist who could
keep his head in a crisis. Even in the most desperate situations he was not prepared to
capitulate, but always tried to defend his government with courage and determination.
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Appendix One
A Selection of Bustamante's Diaries of Operations (1818-1819)
March 1818 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 477 f 187]
4. Salio la seccion de Salamanca a Pueblo Nuevo.
s. Marcho a Santa Catalina.
6. A Cerro Prieto.
7. A Irapuato a buscar auxilio.
8. Permanecio en el mismo lugar.
9. Se dirigio a Piedras Negras.
10. El Rincon de Cora.
11. Contramarcho al Valle de Santiago en solicitud de una reunion que amenazaba a
los destacamentos de Salvatierra.
12. Por las inmediaciones de luriria a Juan Luaces con cuyo movimiento se disperso la
reunion que habian hecho Olivares y Miguel Torres en Jumilla a dos leguas de dicho
rancho de Juan Lucas.
13. Se avisto en la hacienda de la Calvera la partida de Miguel Torres que fue
perseguido por distancia de tres leguas y por la grande ventaja que llevaba solo se le
pudieron quitar algunos caballos. La seccion hizo noche en el rancho de San Andres y
se le oficio por triplicado al Sr. Aguirre para que si fuese posible obrase en
cornbinacion con nosotros las tropas de Valladolid que un dia antes habia estado en
Puruandiro distante legua y media de dicho rancho de San Andres sin haber tenido
contestaci6n hasta ahora.
14. Se dirigio la seccion al rancho de los Frijoles y continuando su marcha por la
noche puso cerea al cerro de Huanimaro en donde al amanecer del dia siguiente se
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aprehendieron cuatro rebeldes con nueve pistolas, cuatro espadas, una carabina,
veintiuna monturas, treinta y cinco caballos utiles y treinta y nueve mulas de cargas sin
aparejo pertenciendo todo a la gavilla de Vicente Garcia, sin contar con los rebeldes
que murieron a balazos entre las malezas, ni con varias prendas de vestuario y otros
frioleras que aprovecho la tropa.
15. Descanso la seccion en Huanimaro.
16. March6 a Cerritos.
17. A Santiago Cunguripo. En este dia fue herido de bala un cabo de San Luis. Se
mato un rebelde y se recogio un machete.
18. Despues de haber buscado al enemigo por San Francisco Angamacutivo y
Villachuato Ie avistamos en el rancho de los Tres Mesquites y habiendo hecho frente
en Zurumuato donde tenia varios enboscados, rebatimos y dipersamos completamente
siguiendo el alcance mas de tres leguas en que tuvo varios muertos y heridos con mas
cuatro prisioneros que cogimos los que declaran que el padre Torres tenia alii sobre
quinientos 0 seiscientos bandidos con los cabecillas Borja, Magana, Vargas, Huerta,
Calisto, Aguirre y otros varios, habiendo perecido a nuestras manos el cabecilla Sixtor
Martinez, comandante de Penjamillo, quedando igualmente en nuestro poder varias
armas de fuego y blanca, habiendo tenido la desgracia de haber muerto un cabo y dos
Dragones de S. Carlos, con un sargento y tres Dragones del mismo cuerpo heridos,
como igualmente un Dragon de San Luis tambien herido. Despues de concluido el
alcance paso la noche la seccion en el rancho del Rincon de los Martinez.
19. Despues de haber libertado seis arrieros que tenian presos los rebeldes en una de
las carceles subterraneas a las inmediaciones del expresado rancho, destruido
enteramente los zipos y prisiones regresamos a descansar a Huanimaro.
20. Al rancho de la Estrella.
21. A Salamanca.
22. En idem.
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23. En idem.
24. Marcho la seccion a la hacienda de la Tinaja.
25. Al rancho del Jinaja. En la noche de este dia salio la seccion a hacer una correria
por Pantoja y sus ranchos, logrando aprehender cincuenta individuos de los que huyen
de la tropa de Rey bien sea por delincuencia 0 por una orden que tienen para hacer 10
del infame padre Torres, de los cuales solo queda prisionero Rafael Silva por haberle
encontrado armas y caballos en su casa, habiendo puesto en libertad a los demas
despues de haberlos exhortado a la obediencia que deben al rey, ya que detesten la
insurnision, todo a la vista de un ejernplar que hizo con tres insurgentes que se pasaron
por las armas en dicha hacienda.
26. El rancho de Piedras Negras.
27. Al Rincon del Cora.
28. Descanso la seccion en el mismo Cora y en la noche hizo una correria por la
hacienda de Zururnucito y los ranchos del Roda, la Yacata, el Zapote y la Calle en los
cuales se reunieron sesenta individuos entre ellos un cabo Esquadra y tres insurgentes
con dos fusiles y una lanza y habiendo pasado por las armas estos ultimos se pusieron
en libertad los demas despues de haber hecho conocer sus obligaciones hacia el rey y
los dafios que recibir del tirano, padre Torres, a excepcion de Francisco Hernandez
alias el Fuerte que se hizo prisionero en el nominado rancho de la Yacata nombrado
administrador general por Lucas Flores de las haciendas de la demarcacion del Valle.
29. Al rancho del Ointo.
30. A San Francisco Xavier.
31. A Pueblo Nuevo.
May 1818 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 488, f. 127, vol. 478, f. 249]
1. En Tamasulco desde donde salio el resto de la seccion por el rurnbo de Penjamo de
perseguir a los dispersos de la accion del 28 proximo pasado de abril, y con el fin de
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proteger un partido que habia salido la noche anterior a Barajas para adquirir noticias
del paradero del padre Torres, no habiendo podido lograr en ambas correrias noticia
alguna de dicho Torres, y solo sirvio de cerciorarnos de que su perdida habia excedido
de trescientos hombres entre muertos, heridos y prisioneros (segun confesion de ellos
mismos y de todos los rancheros) por 10 que careciendo enteramente de noticias de
aquel malvado y sabiendo de positivo que los Ortices a gran prisa dispercion se habian
retirado ya a sus madrigueras, marche el 2 a Irapuato en donde permaneci hasta el 8
con el objeto de recoger los haberes de la seccion, darle algun descanso, pasar revista
de comisario y esperar al sr. comandante general de la provincia. Porque aunque
estabamos habilitados de todo para marchar el 8 al tiempo de salir se avistaron los
rebeldes a Irapuato dando muerte a un realista, y fue necesario perseguirlo, por 10 que
volvimos a quedarnos en el expresado punto.
9. A la hacienda de la Tinaja.
10. Al Valle de Santiago con el objeto de llevar dinero y retraer las varias partidas de
insurgentes que hostilizaron aquella guarnicion y su destacamentos, por 10 que
permanecimos alli el 11 y 12.
13. Al pueblo de Amoles con el fin de auxiliar el convoy que segun noticias debia ser
atacado por las gavillas de Jalpa y del giro en el intermedio de Celaya a Salamanca,
mas no habiendo habido novedad en el convoy solo tuvimos un fuerte tiroteo en la
retaguardia por una partida que nos salio en las inmediaciones de Pitallo, la que
escarmentamos persiguiendola por mas de dos leguas, dando muerte a dos rebeldes,
quedando en nuestro poder un prisionero, tres caballos, tres machetes y una carabina.
14. A la Hacienda de la Zanja que se hallaba amenazada por una partida de mas de
doscientos bandidos que venian por el rumbo de Yuriria, mas estos retrocedieron
Iuego que supieron nuestra aproximacion.
15, 16, 17,18, 19. En el Valle de Santiago protegiendo las cosechas de los frutos de
las haciendas, habiendo salido la noche del 17 a recoger gente tanto para los trabajos
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de la fortificacion como para la cosecha, en cuya correria que se hizo por diferentes
rumbos cayo en nuestro poder un insurgente con una carabina y sicte caballos, ademas
de doscientos trabajadores que reunimos.
El 20. A esta villa con el objeto de recoger la segunda data.
21. Permanecio la Seccion en Salamanca para percibir la segunda data y acordar con el
senor Comandante General varios asuntos del servicio.
22. Al Valle de Santiago conduciendo tabacos para el socorro de aquella guarnicion.
23. Al rancho de los Frijoles.
24. Al Rodeo de Villachuato.
25. A la hacienda del mismo nombre. En esta noche se ha hecho una correria par los
Ranchos de Janamuato, Herruruta y el Cacalote con el fruto de haber aprehendido a
un capitan de rebeldes con dos pistolas guarnecidas de plata, una carabina, dos sables,
una mula y seis caballos.
26 y 27. Permanecimos en Puruandiro en union de la segunda seccion, con el objeto
de dar algun descanso a la tropa y de inspirar confianza a aquel numeroso pueblo, que
por haber pemanecido en el algunos dias antes una gran reunion de rebeldes habria tal
vez formado una opinion favorable asi del injusto partido.
28. Al rancho de los Cerritos.
29. Al Rodeo. En este dia se han reunido a Ceniza una porcion de barrancas que el
padre Torres tenia en el cerro de Zurumuato, habiendo recogido alli mas de
ochocientas artas para lanzas, que por no haber mulas en que conducirlas se
entregaron tan bien al fuego la mayor parte y igualmente se recogieron veintiseis mulas
flacas, quedando alli una porcion de maiz por no haber tampoco en que cargarlo.
30. Al rancho de San Francisco Javier habiendose aprehendido en el camino un rebelde
de la gavilla del padre Torres uniformado y montado pero sin armas.
31. Al Valle de Santiago despues de haber recorrido los ranchos de Cerro Colorado,
Lorna Tendida y Copales, donde segun noticias se creia encontrar la gavilla del Giro,
325
Appendix One
la que en efecto ayer tarde ha pasado por aqui y se ignora el rumbo que torno en la
noche.
June 1818 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 478, f 287, vol. 279, f 42.]
I. Descanso la Seccion en el Valle de Santiago.
2. Marcho a Pueblo Nuevo.
3. Hizo una correria por el Rancho de Curadero y Hacienda de Peralta sin haber
encontrado enernigos.
4. A Irapuato con el objeto de pasar revista de Comisario y recibir la primera data de
los Cuerpos.
S. A Salamanca.
6. Permanecio la Seccion en esta Villa habiendo dado una partida fuerte para conducir
el convoy a Irapuato.
7. Despues de haberse incorporado la partida que salio el dia anterior a Irapuato, se
dirigio la Seccion al Valle de Santiago.
8. Al Pueblo de Amoles, habiendo aprehendido en el camino a un insurgente montado
yarmado con s610 carabina.
9 y 10. Al pueblo de Apacio.
II. A la hacienda de los Potrero, sin haber logrado ventaja alguna apesar de haber
destacado una partida fuerte la noche anterior, con el objeto de sorprender una gavilla,
que acostumbra guamecerse en el Rancho de las Pulgas, y de haber recorrido en este
dia otras varias madrigueras en las pertenencias de la hacienda del Pichacho, Jalpilla y
la referida de los Potreros, porque aunque se avistaron algunos rebeldes tiroteando a
grande distancia desde las alturas huyen con la mayor velocidad en el momento que se
trataba de perseguirlos.
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12. Al pueblo de Ixtla despues de haber incendiado todas las barrancas que tenian los
rebeldes en un cerro irunediato a Jalpa, en donde parecia trataban de sostenerse
desafiandonos con sus acostumbrados aprobios, tiros y toques de cornetas, pero bien
pronto fueron desalojados por los piquetes de Infanteria de Zaragoza y Celaya que con
los esquadrones de San Luis y Fieles del Potosi me acompafiaron a subir aquella
escarpada eminencia, sin haber habido desgracia alguna por nuestra parte ni por la de
los enemigos que huyeron vergonzosamente, dispersandose y escogiendose a otras
varias alturas. Tambien al anochecer de este dia han tiroteado unos pocos rebeldes en
el referido pueblo de Ixtla al abrigo de los cerros que Ie dominan sin sufrir nosotros
daiio alguno, a causa de haber destacado algunas partidas de Infanteria para alejarlos
ya que se dificultaba su aprehension por la naturaleza del terrreno y fugas de la canalla
tan cobarde, como insolente en palabras.
13. Al pueblo de Apaco: habiendo contramarchado en la manana por el camino de
Jalpa con el objeto de ver si encontrabamos alguna partida, mas no habiendo logrado
nuestro deseo registramos las cafiadas del las Haciendas del San Penon y Rancho de
las Pulgas en donde igualmente hemos condenado a las llamas todas las chozas de las
insurgentes, sin encontrar mas interesante que ocho bueyes de su pertenecia los que
recogunos.
14. A Celaya en donde permanecio este dia y el siguiente para dar descanso a la tropa
y caballada, que justamente 10 necesitaba por el estropeo que sufrio los dias anteriores
en las correrias de la venta.
16. A Salamanca prosiguiendo al paso la marcha del convoy, que salio este dia de
Celaya.
17. A Irapuato para recoger la segunda data de la tropa que compone la seccion,
18 y 19. Permanecio la seccion en Irapuato esperando al senor comandante general
para percibir la segunda data.
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20. Marcho a Cueramaro conduciendo dinero para aqul destacamento, habiendo
tenido la desgracia de que se inutilizase una carga de municiones en el paso del rio
Turbio, quedando igualmente enterrados en el fango del camino de Tupargo veinte
caballos que fue imposible sacar de aquellos profundos pantanos.
21y 22. Fue indispensable permanecernos en el referido destacamento, sacando el
parque y limpiando las armas mojadas el dia anterior.
23. Nos dirigimos al rancho de la Sabor con el doble objeto de una entrevista con el
senor coronel D. Jose Antonio Andrade, comandante de la primera Division de N.
Galicia (que se suponia en Penjamo) y con el de recoger algun maiz para la guarnicion
de Cueramaro, que se hallaba muy escasa de este articulo, mas no habiendo logrado
aquella entrevista, que tanto interesa el mejor servicio, por las crecidas ventajas que
deben esperarse de la combinacion de nuestros movimientos para el total exterminio
de los pequeiios restos que han quedado en la jurisdiccion de Penjamo de la extinguida
gavilla del apostata Torres (quien ha desaparecido enteramente de su antigua
demarcacion) dispuse regresase a su destacamento el 24 con el maiz que se pudo
cargar en las pocas mulas que teniamos el capitan D. Vicente Endorica, a quien
acornpafie hast a San Gregorio, marchando despues a la hacienda de San Isidro, en
cuyas inmediaciones tuvo la desgracia de que fuere gravemente herido el bizarro
alferez de Dragones de San Luis D. Esteban Perez, comandante de mi descubierta en
la carga que dio a la partida del cabecilla Jose Negrete, haciendo prisioneros en cl
alcance a Felipe Chagoya comandante que fue de la hacienda de Burras y a otros
rebeldes, quedando en nuestro poder dos sables y un fusil.
25. Permanecio la seccion en la referida hacienda con el fin de que se repusieron
algunos de los caballos y en la noche de este dia se hizo una correria por los ranchos
de Tamasula, Ojos de Agua y Copales con el fruto de haber recogido quince caballos,
habiendo aprehendido igualmente un rebelde con un machete.
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26 y 27. Se mantuvo la secci6n en el rancho de San Juan, con el objeto de ver si
llegaba a Penjamo la mencionada Division para los fines ya indicados.
28. A la hacienda de Santa Catalina cuyo dia se emple6 en pasar la secci6n el rio
Grande, habiendo sorprendido en la madrugada a los rebeldes que guardaban el paso
llanado de las Estacas, mas estos liberaron la vida arrojandose a la agua y
abandonando la causa con cuatro fusiles que quedaron en nuestro poder.
29. Al Valle de Santiago con el objeto de reponer la caballada, no encontrandose ya
forrajes para este importante fin en todo el resto de la demarcaci6n de mi cargo.
July 1818 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 479, f 124]
1, 2, y 3. Permaneci6 la expresada seccion en el Valle de Santiago, habiendo pasado
revista de comisario el 2.
4. Ocurri6 a la villa de Salamanca par la primera data.
5. Regreso al Valle.
6. Continu6 en dicho pueblo.
7. Par la noche sali6 a hacer una correria par varias madrigueras de la gavilla del Giro
en que se 10gr6 la aprehensi6n de cuatro insurgentes con dace fusiles, una espada y
una lanza.
9, 10, y II. En el Valle de Santiago.
12. A la hacienda de San Nicolas con el objeto de hacer alguna correria por aqucl
rumba y de introducir maiz al Valle de Santiago que se habia escaseado y hacia falta,
tanto para el consumo de la tropa y caballada como para los habitantes del pueblo.
13. Permaneci6 la secci6n en dicha hacienda esperando una partida que habia
marchado a Salvatierra para escoltar dicho grana.
14. Regreso al Valle donde se mantuvo ell5 y 16.
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17. Vino a Salamanca por la segunda data y volvi6 al Valle donde mantuvo hasta la
noche del 25 en que se hizo una correria por la hacienda de Uruetaro con cl fruto de
haber aprehendido a dos rebeldes, cuatro fusiles, dos pares de pistolas, una espada y
doce caballos, con mas una hermosa canoa que nos facilita con seguridad y prontitud
el paso de rio Grande a varios puntos de la demarcaci6n que antes no podiamos
recorrer por el obstaculo de dicho rio.
26. A esta villa donde hemos permanecido hasta la noche del 29 en que dividida la
secci6n en varias partidas fue recorriendo las madrigueras del Giro a derecho e
izquierda del rio Grande hast a el Pueblo Nuevo, cuyos movimientos se executaron con
la mayor prontitud y acierto pero los rebeldes alarmados ya por las anteriores correrias
han abandonado sus antiguas madrigueras eligiendo nuevas en puntos mas distantes
por 10 que solo hemos logrado esta vez a pesar de nuestra actividad y diligencia dar
muerte a un insurgente y tomar cuatro prisioneros con un fusil.
30. Descans6 la secci6n en Pueblo Nuevo y el31 regres6 a Salamanca.
August 1818 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 479, f 309]
1. En Salamanca, donde permaneci6 la Secci6n hasta el 5 y en la noche de este dia
hizo una correria por el Anc6n y Alarigomez. Habiendo logrado tomar al enemigo
treinta chaquetas.
5, 6, 7 y 8. Continu6 en Salamanca.
9. March6 a Irapuato por el convoy y regres6 a dicha villa el 10 habiendo hecho
tambien en la noche de este dia una correria por el rumbo de Santa Cruz, con el objeto
de sorprender al Giro que se hallaba en el rancho de la Guitarrera, mas esta empresa se
frustro a causa de la fuerte abarida de un arroyo que no se pudo pasar.
11. Regres6 a Salamanca.
12. A Irapuato conduciendo el convoy.
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13. Volvio a Salamanca donde permanecio hasta el 14.
15. Marcho al Valle de Santiago donde se mantuvo hasta el 18.
19. Regreso a Salamanca por la segunda data, donde permanecio hasta e123.
24. Habiendo hecho en la noche de este dia una correria por Valtierrilla, y no se logro
sorprender a los rebeldes, porque poco antes se fugaron de alli.
25. AI Valle de Santiago donde permanecio hasta eI 28 que salio una partida a Iurira
con el objeto de escoltar los bagajes que llevaban las compafiias de Tres Villas y
Cazadores de San Luis, cuya partida aprehendio en el camino dos rebeldes que dejo en
dicho pueblo para ser pasados por las annas.
29. Regreso logrando la aprehension de otro insurgente.
30 y 31. Permanecio en el Valle la seccion y en la noche de este dia salio una partida
con el objeto de sorprender una reunion que se hallaba en las haciendas de Pantoja y
Santa Catalina, pero esta importante empresa se frustro a causa de haberse dirigido la
referida reunion en la misma noche a estas inmediaciones, por otro camino diverso del
que llevaba la partida, habiendo logrado solamente recoger doce caballos, y cincuenta
cabezas de ganado vacuno que tenian los insurgentes, de las que se han devuelto
varias a sus legitimos duefios, y tambien se han cobrado en esta expedicion algunas
contribuciones para gastos de la fortificacion de este punto.
October 1818 [AGN: Operacioncs de Guerra, vol. 480, f 198]
7. Trasladados ya del Valle de Santiago a Salamanca los enfennos de la seccion, y
establecido el hospital provisional para su asistencia por disposicion del senor
comandante general de esta provincia, marcho la corta fuerza que quedaba disponible
a dicho Valle con el objeto de conducir las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnicion y sus
destacamentos.
331
Appendix One
8. Se dirigio a la hacienda de Santa Catalina en solicitud de los enemigos, en donde
permanecio el nueve y diez.
11. Marcho al Rodeo de Villachuato.
12. Se dirigio a la hacienda de Zurumuato para una entrevista con el senor coronel D.
Jose Joaquin Marquez y Donallo.
13. Regreso a la hacienda de Santa Catalina.
14. Al rancho de la Estrella, y en la noche de este dla habiendo tenido noticia que los
rebeldes se aproximaban a los destacamentos del Valle, nos dirigimos inmediatamente
hacia aquel punto, en donde amanecimos el quince, y no habiendo encontrado a los
enemigos que buscabamos por haber variado de intento a causa de nuestros
movimientos se retiro la seccion a la hacienda de Guentes en donde descanso dicho
dia.
16. Recorrio las haciendas del Pirallo y Uruetaro donde se decia estaban las gavillas de
rebeldes que intentaban hostilizar a los destacamentos del Valle, mas solo se encontro
una partida del Giro, a la vista de Uruetaro, pero de la otra parte del Rio Grande, la
que no se perseguio por no poderse pasar dicho rio, y aunque hubo un corto tiroteo no
tuvimos novedad por nuestra parte, y los enemigos tuvieron algunos heridos, segun las
noticias que se han adquirido posteriormente. En la noche de este dia permanecimos
en dicha hacienda con el objeto de ver si se reunian las gavillas para batirlas, mas no
habiendose verificado, nos retiramos el 17 a esta villa.
18. Se dirigio a Celaya con el objeto de recibir un convoy que venia para el interior, y
en este dia habiendorne separado con una partida corta para el pueblo de Amoles logre
dar muerte a cuatro insurgentes hacer dos prisioneros, recogiendo igualmentc dos
carabinas, seis lanzas y ocho caballos asillados, con la desgracia de haber perdido el
guia de la seccion y un Dragon de San Carlos que fueron mortalmente heridos por la
gavilla que encontramos a la entrada de dicho pueblo.
19. Regresamos de Celaya a esta villa con el convoy.
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20. Marcho el convoy a cargo del teniente coronel D. Francisco Romero y la seccion
descanso aqui.
21. Se dirigi6 al pueblo de Santa Rosa.
22. Al rancho del Tecolote, y en la noche de este dia hizo una correria la seccion por
la hacienda de Aguilares, rancho de la Guitarra y otras madrigueras del Giro, hacia el
rumbo de Santa Cruz, con el fruto de haber aprehendido tres rebeldes, tornandoles tres
carabinas, dos lanzas y ocho caballos, mas no habiendo logrado mas ventajas porque
alarmados por los movirnientos que hizo la primera seccion a las inmediaciones
ordenes del sr. comandante general el dia anterior, en el pueblo de Santa Cruz, se
habian retirado, abandonando las citadas madrigueras.
23. Regreso a Salamanca en donde permanecio hasta la noche del 28 en que hizo una
correria con el objeto de sorprender al comandante de aquella gavilla y su partida, mas
no habiendose encontrado volvio el 29 a esta villa.
30 y 31. Permanecio en Salamanca.
November 1818 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 480. f 236]
1. Se practico una correria por la Hacienda de la Tinaja y no habiendo encontrado
enemigos regreso dicha seccion a Salamanca.
2. Permanecio en ella y paso revista de comisario.
3. Marcho a la hacienda de Buena Vista a proteger el paso del convoy de 10 interior.
4. Se hizo una correria por la hacienda de Uruetaro y regreso sin novedad a este
punto.
5. Se dirigio al Molino de Saravia con el objeto de auxiliar al convoy que salio de
Celaya, creyendose fuese atacado segun las noticas que corrian.
6. Paso la seccion al Valle con dinero y municiones para aquella guarnicion.
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7. Condujo dicha seccion el citado convoy a Irapuato yen la noche regreso a esta villa
para auxiliar al Valle de Santiago que se hallaba atacado por todas las partidas del
Giro, y habiendole dado un corto descanso continuo su marcha hacia aquel punto, de
donde ya se habian retirado los enemigos con alguna perdida y sin desgracia por
nuestra parte.
8. Descanso alii.
9. Se hizo una correria por Santa Rosa y varios ranchos, con el objeto de buscar al
enernigo, mas no habiendole encontrado regreso a este lugar en donde permanecio
hasta el 18 practicando siempre diariamente sus correrias en todas estas inmediaciones
y hostilizando las partidas de rebeldes que impedian el ingreso de sus viveres.
19. Habiendose dirigido la seccion por rancho Nuevo y el de la Pefia, perseguio a
escape una partida de rebe1des, quitandoles nueve caballos.
20. Condujo a Irapuato el convoy que salio de Celaya, acornpafiado e1 21 hasta la
hacienda de San Antonio a la seccion del teniente coronel D. Franciso Romero para
mayor seguridad de dicho convoy, y regresando en el mismo dia a Irapuato.
22. Volvio a Salamanca.
23. Hizo un movirniento sobre el Valle.
24. Habiendo hecho una correria por Valtierrilla, puerto de Valle y el Piralto logro
aprehender a dos rebeldes que se fusilaron, previos los auxilios cristianos, sin haber
tenido mas novedad en esta vez que un cabo y un Dragon de San Luis levemente
heridos.
25. Volvio hacia el rnismo rumbo porque habia noticias de que esperaban los enemigos
reunirse en mayor numero, pero ni habiendolos encontrado se regreso a este punto.
26. Reunida a la del teniente coronel D. Ramon Galinsoga, marcho a la hacienda de
Burras en solicitud de la gavilla del cabecilla Borja, de donde regreso el 27, sin
novedad.
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28. Marcharon ambas secciones al Valle de Santiago, en cuyas inmediaciones se estaba
haciendo una gran reunion de los cabecillas Huerta, el Giro y Antonio Garcia para
atacarle de nuevo, pero se disolvio esta en la noche anterior a causa de nuestros
movimientos y los de las fuerzas del Sr. Marquez Donallo que se hallaba en Pantoja.
29. Descanso en Salamanca.
30. Salio a auxiliar el paso del convoy de 10 interior a esta villa en el de Buenavista.
December 1818 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra. vol. 481, f 67]
1. Marcho de Salamanca a Celaya escoltando el convoy.
2. Descanso en Celaya.
3. Regreso a Salamanca con el convoy del interior.
4. Escolto dicho convoy hasta la hacienda de Buenavista y regreso a Salamanca.
5,6 Y7. Hizo una dilatada correria por el rumbo de Santa Cruz en union de la primcra
seccion a las ordenes del teniente coronel don Ramon Galinsoga.
8. Descanso en Celaya.
9. En la noche volvio a praticar una correria por el mismo rumbo de Santa Cruz.
10. Regreso a Salamanca.
11. Marcho al Valle de Santiago conduciendo las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnicion
y su destacamentos.
12. Regreso a Salamanca despues de haber recorrido las madrigueras del Pirallo,
Puerto de Valle y Valtierrilla.
13 y 14. Se hicieron varios movimientos por las haciendas de Cruces, Mendoza y cl
Ancon,
15. A la hacienda de Uruetaro de donde salio la seccion a practicar una correria esta
noche sobre las madrigueras del Giro hacia el rumbo de Santa Cruz, habiendo logrado
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las ventajas indicadas ya en el parte que se dio al senor comandante general de la
provincia coronel D. Antonio Linares, con fecha del 16 en el rancho de los Damianes
donde descanso este dia.
17. Se dirigio al pueblo de Huaje y en el transito fue aprehendido un rebelde con una
lanza y una espada.
18. Regreso a Salamanca.
19. Habiendo salido a buscar a los rebeldes hacia el rumbo de Pantoja, se nos
presentaron antes don fuerzas superiores en las inmediaciones del rancho del Tecolote,
en donde fueron batidos y escarmentados conforme expresa el parte dado al senor
comandante general de la provincia coronel On. Antonio Linares con fecha de 20 en
Valtierrilla donde descanso la seccion,
21. Se dirigio a Salamanca.
22. Marcho a la hacienda de San Nicolas continuando sus movimientos con los de la
prirnera seccion.
23. Al pueblo de Santa Cruz en donde se reunieron las dos secciones.
24. A Celaya donde permanecio e125.
26. Marcho al pueblo de Amoles.
27. Al rancho de los Comaleros.
28. Al del Cerro Colorado.
29. Al rancho de Borija despues de haber hecho una correria por Pantoja.
30. Al rancho de las Tetillas.
3 I. A Salamanca.
March 1819 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 481, f 301]
I, Y 2. Permanecio la seccion en Irapuato con el doble objeto de pasar revista de
comisario, lirnpiar las armas y reponerse en algo la tropa y cahallada estropeada en las
expediciones anteriores.
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3. Se dirigi6 a Salamanca para sacar la primera data de los cuerpos.
4. Escolt6 un convoy de dicha villa a Irapuato.
5. Permaneci6 en el expresado pueblo, mas en la noche de este dia se practic6 una
correria por la estancia de Cruces en donde logr6 aprehender tres rebeldes con una
espada, dos lanzas y dos caballos ensillados.
6. Volvi6 a Salamanca a recoger las buenas cuentas de la guamici6n y destacamentos
del Valle de Santiago, las que condujo el 7.
8. Permaneci6 en dicho Valle, pero en la noche de este dia se han registrado la mayor
parte de las madrigueras que tienen los rebeldes al suroeste del Valle extendiendo
nuestros movimientos hast a el puerto del Aguila y rancho de las Jicamas con el fruto
de haber aprehendido a tres rebeldes, dos lanzas, seis monturas, cuarenta caballos, cl
equipaje, correspondencia y ganado del Apostata Fray Benigno Barr6n, con algunos
paramentos y varos sagrados que escandalosamente tenia mezclados con su ropa.
9. Al rancho de Botija.
10. Se dirigi6 al de la Estrella.
11. A Pueblo Nuevo.
12. Hizo una corerria por Perata y regres6 a dicho pueblo.
13. Se dirigi6 a Cerro Prieto y habiendose avistado en la tarde los enemigos fueron
perseguidos por Cerro Blanco y bosques de Santaguillo, sin haber logrado ventaja
alguna porque se concluyo el dia y apesar de haberse hecho este movimiento march6 a
las doce de la noche una fuerte partida de caballeria al bosque de la Ratonera
inmediato a Pueblo Nuevo con el objeto de sorprender a los rebeldes que
frecuentemente ocurren los domingos al citado pueblo, pero se frustro el fin a causa de
no haber concurrido los malvados seguramente recelosos de una sorpresa.
14. Se reunieron las partidas en el mismo pueblo.
15. Se dirigio al rancho de la Noria.
16. March6 a Salamanca con el objeto de sacar la segunda data.
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17. Hizo una correria la caballeria por el Aucon y regreso sin novedad a dicha villa.
18. A Irapuato escoltando el convoy del Interior.
19. Permanecio en dicho pueblo.
20. Por la noche marcho la seccion a ocupar las madrigueras que tienen los rebeldes en
Peralta y Molinos de Quirisco, en que logro dar muerte a tres rebeldes y aprehender a
nueve con seis armas de fuego, dos lanzas, siete monturas y veinte caballos.
21. A Pueblo Nuevo donde permanecio el 22, 23, y 24, haciendo algunas correrias por
sus inmediaciones.
25. Marcho a Cerro Prieto yen esta noche se dirigio a registrar las madrigueras que
tienen los rebeldes en las inmediaciones de la hacienda de Parangueo.
26. Al la estancia de Quiricco.
27. A Irapuato, despues de haber escarmentado en las inmediaciones de Santiaguilla la
partida de Simon Pantoja, perteneciente a Antonio Garcia (una de las gavillas
perniciosas por sus robos y asesinatos) dando muerte a tres rebeldes y quedando en
nuestro poder cinco prisioneros, una carabina, cuatro espadas, tres lanzas y diez
caballos.
28, 29,y 30. Descanso la seccion en Irapuato.
31. Se dirigio a esta villa escoltando un convoy.
April1819 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 481, f 301]
I Y2. Permanecio la expresada seccion en el Valle de Santiago a donde marcho para
relevar con la Infanteria de Celaya a la de la Corona que se hallaba en aquella
guarnicion.
3. Regreso a Salamanca y al pas ado por Uruetaro persiguimos a una pequefia partida
de rebeldes que abandonaron dos caballos ensillados.
4. Condujo el convoy de dicha villa a Irapuato.
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5. Se dirigio a Pueblo Nuevo.
6. Al rancho de Toconostle.
8. Se dirigio al Valle de Santiago donde permanecio el 9, I0, Y II sin omitir alguna
correria por sus inmediaciones de que resulto alejar algunas partidas de enemigos que
hostilizaron a los destacamentos.
12. Al rancho de la Barquilla, en este dia se dio muerte a un rebelde y quedo en
nuestro poder un prisionero con catorce caballos.
13. Habiendo tornado la direccion a Salamanca y dejando emboscados unas partidas
de caballeria en las inmediaciones de Pantoja con el objeto de sorprender a los
rebeldes que frecuentemente concurren en dicha hacienda, despues de praticada la
operacion contramarcho hast a el espresado rancho de la Barquilla, no habiendo
logrado aprehender mas que un rebelde con tres caballos, a causa de haberse
descubierto antes de tiempo las referidas emboscadas.
14. Al rancho de Alonso Sanchez.
IS. Al Valle de Santiago, y habiendose hecho en este dia una correria por Valtierra el
Grande y Cerro del Rincon de Parangueo, se dio muerte a un rebelde, quedando en
nuestro poder un prisionero, dos fusiles, un machete y dos caballos ensillados.
16. Marcho a Salamanca por la segunda data de los cuerpos.
17. Se dirigio a Celaya por el convoy para el interior.
18. Lo condujo a Salamanca.
19. A Irapuato.
20. Permanecio en el mismo pueblo.
21. Regreso a Salamanca.
22. Se dirigio a la hacienda de la Tinaja, y habiendo mandado desde alii los tabacos
que iban para el Valle de Santiago con una partida fuerte, contramarcho en la noche el
resto de la seccion hasta mas alla de tres leguas del pueblo de Santa Cruz, en solicitud
339
Appendix One
de las partidas del Giro, y de algunos heridos de su gavilla, pero apesar de la mas
escrupulosa diligencia nada se logro.
23. Descanso la partida en el rancho de las Pilas.
24. Marcho a Salamanca.
25. Al Valle de Santiago despues de haber publicado en el pueblo de Valtierrilla al
bando que prohibe los mercados 0 tianguis.
26. Subsisti6 en el Valle de Santiago.
27.March6 a Cerro Blanco en solicitud de una gavilla que habia pasado el dia anterior
por las inmediaciones de Salamanca.
28 y 29. Se mantuvo haciendo varios movimientos entre Pantoja y Pueblo nuevo
atacando la misma gavilla, pero no habiendo encontrado se dirigio el 30 a este pueblo
habiendo registrado de paso el cerro de Panales donde perseguidos los rebeldes
abandaron una caja de guerra y dos caballos.
May 1819 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 482, t: 204]
I. Habiendo tenido noticia de que los rebeldes se reunieron para atacar a Penjamo 0 al
destacamento de la hacienda de Cueramaro, marcho la seccion hasta dicha hacienda,
en donde se supo que los enemigos habian tomado otra direccion por cuyo motivo
regreso el 2 a Irapuato.
3. Dirigio a Salamanca.
4. Al pueblo de Huaje en donde recibio el convoy del interior y regreso a dicha villa.
5. Escolto dicho convoy hasta Irapuato donde se mantuvo el 6 y 7 haciendo algunas
correrias por sus inmediaciones.
8. Marcho al Valle de Santiago a llevar las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnicion y sus
destacamentos, persiguiendo al paso una partida de Antonio Garcia por mas de tres
leguas logrando dar muerte en el aIcance a un rebelde y tomar un caballo ensillado.
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9. Permanecio en dicho punto.
10. Se dirigio al rancho de la Barquilla en solicitud de las partidas de Antonio Garcia.
11. Despues de haber recorrido las madrigueras de los ranchos de Salitre, Cerro
Colorado y las Jicamas, hizo noche en el de Borja sin haber encontrado a los bandidos.
12. Regreso al Valle de Santiago y en el camino se 10gro aprehender al rebeldc
Mariano Casares, colector de alcabalas y contribuciones por los insurgentes y a su
asistente con dos caballos ensillados y dos espadas.
13. Permanecio en el expresado punto.
14. Se dirigio a Salamanca, y en el camino se aprehendio un rebelde con dos carabinas
y un fusil.
15. Permanecio en la expresada villa.
16. Marcho a Celaya por el convoy del interior a las ordenes del capitan On Vicente
Sobrevilla, a causa de hallarse enfermo el que subscribio, cuyo convoy escolto hasta
Irapuato en los dias 17 y 18.
19, 20, y 21. Permanecio en aquel punto, esperando se desembarasen de las atenciones
del convoy la seccion del teniente coronel D. Pedro Ruiz de Otafio para emprender un
cornbinacion sobre la hacienda de Burras, 10 que en efecto se verifico saliendo de
Irapuato la noche del 22 a las ordenes del capitan D. Jose Martinez de Chavero y
habiendo amanecido el 23 sobre el rancho del Coyote avisto una partida con 0 de
cincuenta rebeldes, acaudillados segun noticas por los facciosos Arago y Erdozosa, la
que persiguio al escape a distancia de cuatro leguas hast a el rancho del Potretillo,
segun expresa el parte del enunciado Capitan Chavero y contrarnarcho sobre Burrera
hizo noche en Taripitio.
24. Hizo un movimiento sobre la hacienda del Chapia en donde se unio con la seccion
del teniente coronel Otafio, marchando ambas a la del Rodeo.
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25. Recorrio las cafiadas del padre y capiUa Colorada, habiendo encontrado en la
prirnera treinta casacas, con igual numero de cartucheras y zapatos, todo nuevo, y
paso la noche en Taripitio.
26. Regreso a Irapuato donde permanecio e127.
28. Se dirigio a Salamanca despues de haber recorrido los ranchos de Satiaguillo y el
de Yaravato.
29. Marcho al Valle de Santiago a las ordenes del capitan D. Vicente Sobrevillar
haciendo al paso una correria por los ranchos de la Palma y Valtierra donde se logro
aprehender un rebelde con cinco caballos.
30. Permanecio en dicho punto.
31. Regreso a Salamanca sin novedad.
July 1819 [AGN: Operacioncs de Guerra, vol. 483, f 35]
I. Marcho dicha seccion al pueblo de Santa Cruz, sin mas novedad que la de haber
resultado herido por los rebeldes, un dragon de San Luis.
2. Se dirigio al rancho de las Pilas, y habiendo dejado emboscado una partida en dicho
pueblo con el objeto de sorprender al Giro y a los demas rebeldes que acostumbraban
concurrir alli, solo se logro aprehender a un desertor de la tropa del rey, mas en la
noche se dirigo esta infatigable seccion a la intricada canada de la Saborsilla donde
logro en la manana del 3 la interesante presa del rebelde Giro, con las demas ventajas
que expresa el parte dado al senor comandante general de esta provincia con fecha del
4 relativo a tan feliz acontecimiento. En el mismo dia 3 no habiendose podido
encontrar viveres y forajes, fue indipensable a pesar de la crecida distancia marchar
hast a Salamanca donde permanecio e14.
5. Se dirigio a Irapuato, en donde se mantuvo hast a el II reponiendo la caballada que
se habia estropeado remanado por las correrias anteriores y la escasez de forajes.
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12. En la noche se dirigio la seccion dividida en varias partidas sobre las madrigueras
de Pueblo Nuevo, haciendas de San Cristobal, Guadalupe y Peralta, de cuyas
inmediaciones resulto la muerte de dos rebeldes, sin contar los varios que se ahogaron
en el rio Grande por escaparse, quedando en nuestro poder un prisionero, una
carabina, dos machetes, una lanza y doce caballos.
14. Regreso a lrapuato.
15. Se dirigio a Salamanca con el objeto de sacar la segunda data.
16. Habiendo hecho una correria por las madrigueras de Santiaguilla, Cerro Blanco,
Valtierra y Santa Rosa, se logro dar muerte a dos rebeldes, quedando en nuestro
poder un prisionero y 4 caballos, no habiendo podido recoger las armas de los
malvados porque prefirieron arrojarlas al rio antes que rendirlas.
17. y 18. Permanecio en el Valle de Santiago.
19. Habiendo quedado parte de la seccion en la hacienda de la Tinaja, paso cl resto al
otro lado del rio Grande en Salamanca para recorrer a un mismo tiempo las
madrigueras de Cerro Blanco, Santiaguillo, Valderrama, Dinantes, Pueblo Nuevo,
Munguia, como en efecto se verifico en la manana del 20 logrando dar muerte a un
rebelde, quedando en nuestro poder dos prisioneros, una carabina, cuatro caballos,
regresando al Valle de Santiago la partida que habia quedado en la Tinaja y marchando
a Irapuato la que paso dicho rio, en cuyo pueblo, permanecio el 21.
22. Habiendo unido los insurgentes a dicho punto con el objeto de llevarse los ganados
fueron perseguidos por nuestra caballeria a distancia de cinco leguas, logrando
rescatar la mayor parte de los que se Ilevaban, y quedando en nuestro poder un
prisionero con una carabina y un caballo ensillado.
23. Regreso a Irapuato donde permanecio el24 y 25.
26. En la noche se hizo una correria sobre las madrigueras de las haciendas de Peralta,
Guadalupe, rancho del Curadero y bosque de la Ratonera, habiendo logrado dar
muerte en la manana del 27 a dos rebeldes y hacer tres prisioneros, quedando en
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nuestro poder un par de pistolas, una espada, un machete, dos lanzas y cinco caballos
ensillados.
En el mismo dia 27 se reunieron las partidas de en Pueblo Nuevo a excepcion del que
quedo operando por las inmediaciones del Valle de Santiago que tambien logro la
aprehension de dos insurgentes con seis caballos, el dia anterior en el rancho de Cerro
Prieto.
28. Regreso a Irapuato, haciendo de paso una nueva correria por las haciendas de
Guadalupe, Cuehuenato y San Cristobal donde se logro la aprehension de un rebelde
con un fusil y un caballo ensillado.
29, 30, y 31. Permanecio en este pueblo reponiendo y herrando la caballeria para
poder continuar la persecucion de los insurgentes que contramarcho por los ccrros y
bosques.
August 1819 [AGN: Operacionesde Guerra, vol. 483, if 175-176]
1. Marcho al Valle de Santiago conduciendo las buenas cuentas de aquella guamicion,
la mayor parte de la caballeria que habia permanecido en Irapuato el 29, 30 y 31 del
anterior herrando y reponiendo la caballada, habiendo practicado en dichos tres dias la
infanteria y el resto de la caballeria de la expresada seccion a las ordenes del capitan de
Dragones de San Carlos D. Jose Martinez de Chavero, varios movimientos por las
inmediaciones de dicho punto, en persecucion de los rebeldes.
2. Reunida toda la fuerza en el indicado lugar, paso revista de comisario yen la noche
de este dia se dirigio a la hacienda de Pantoja con el objeto de escarmentar a la
perversa gavilla de Garcia, mas a pesar de haber destacado varias partidas al amanecer
de 3 nada se pudo lograr en este dia, porque los malvados dos dias antes se habian
dispersado ya por la otra parte de Rio Grande ocultandonos las canoas y barqueros
para impedimos el paso.
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4. Se hicieron vanos movimientos por las madrigueras de la hacienda de Santa
Catalina, la barquilla y Rancho de Borja, registrando al mismo tiempo el escarpado
cerro de la Torre, no habiendo encontrado enemigos.
5. Sin esperar ya de lograr ventaja alguna par aquel rumbo, regreso la seccion al Valle
de Santiago, recogiendo algunas familias de los individuos que expresa la adjunta lista
presentados en el dia anterior en Pantoja implorando la real gracia del indulto.
6. Marcho a Salamanca con el objeto de pasar el rio Grande, dejando en el Valle de
Santiago la Infanteria y parte de la caballeria para operar a derecha e izquierda de
dicho rio. quitando este refugio al enemigo como en efecto se verifico el 7 y 8
recorriendo la partida de la derecha las madrigueras de Santiaguilla . Cerro de Pemales
y Pueblo Nuevo, habiendo registrado la de la izquierda a las ordenes del capitan del
regimiento de la Corona D. Vicente Sobrevilla los ranchos de Valtierra, Cerro Prieto y
Duranes y saliendo igualmente en la noche del mismo dia 8 una guerrilla del
regimiento de San Luis a las ordenes del teniente graduado D. Jose Maria Castillo y
otra del de San Carlos a las del de la misma graduacion D. Aranacio Rojas lograron
recoger al amanecer del 9 cuarenta y cinco caballos incluso algunos ensillados que
abandonaron los rebeldes arrojandose al rio perseguidos por Castillo y Rojas, y
habiendo continuado en este dia el resto de la partida de la derecha sobre las
madrigueras de la hacienda de Peralta al mismo tiempo que la de la izquierda recorria
los ranchos de la Calara, Alonso Sanchez y San Antonio, concurrieron ambas en
Pantoja, siendo el fruto de toda esta correria la entera dispersion de los enemigos y la
presa de los cuarenta y cinco caballos expresados con las demas ventajas que
manifiesta el parte dado al sr. comandante general de esta provincia coronel D.
Antonio Linares, con fecha de este mismo dia en el rancho de Piedras Negras, en
donde se hizo noche la partida de la derecha quedando la de la izquierda en Pantoja.
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10. Se dirigio a Irapuato la partida de la derecha quedando la de la izquierda al Valle
de Santiago recorriendo la primera los ranchos del Curadero, Guanirnitiro y hacienda
de San Rique.
I 1. Permanecio en Irapuato.
12. Volvio a Pueblo Nuevo, en donde concurrio con la partida a la izquierda sin
novedad.
13. Reunida toda la seccion marcho a Irapuato.
14. Condujo el convoy del interior a Salamanca.
15. Escolto dicho convoy hasta Celaya en donde permanecio el 16, 17 y 18 esperando
eI procedente de Mexico.
19. Regreso a Salamanca con el expresado convoy, donde permanecio el 20, dando
algun descanso a la mulada que apenas pudo llegar a dicho punto el dia anterior.
21. Paso a Irapuato en donde permanecio el 22.
23. Se dirigio a Pueblo Nuevo con el objeto de pasar el rio para perseguir a los
insurgentes en combinacion con las secciones de Puruandiro y Penjamo, mas como los
rebeldes habian hecho ya desaparecer las canoas y barqueras, fue preciso continuar la
marcha el 24 al paso de Salamanca en donde habiendo tenido contestacion del
sargento mayor D. Juan Torres, comandante de la seccion de Penjamo, en que dicho
jete manifestaba la necesidad de regresar a aquel pueblo en solicitud de las raciones y
habiendo al mismo tiempo adquirido noticias de que los bandidos de Jalpa se habian
reunido con los de Santa Cruz se dirigio la secci6n a este ultimo punto el 25 en que
logr6 las ventajas que expresa el parte dado al senor comandante general con fecha del
27 del presente.
26. Se practicaron varias correrias POf las canadas y cerros de las haciendas de Suaz y
Valencia, sin novedad.
27. Regreso a Salamanca.
28. Permanecio en el mismo punto.
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29. Se practice una correria por el pueblo de Valtierrilla y habiendo perseguido
a una partida de rebeldes hasta la hacienda de Sorelo y Capilla Pintada no se pudo
a1canzar a aquello por el retardo en pasar el rio de la Lata y solo se logr6 aprehender a
dos individuos que servian de espias al finado Giro, siendo al mismo tiempo ladrones y
asesinos.
30. Permanecio la seccion en Salamanca.
September 1819 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 483, f. 361]
1. Marcho la expresada seccion al valle de Santiago.
2. Se dirigio a la Hacienda de Pantoja en persecucion de la gavilla del rebelde Garcia
pero habiendose sabido nuestro movimiento paso a la otra parte del rio Grande con
anticipacion y no se pudieron lograr las ventajas que se esperaban.
3. Despues de haber recorrido las madrigueras de los ranchos de Copales y San Pedro,
se dirigio a Santa Rosa sin novedad.
4. A la hacienda de Tinaja.
5. Al Valle de Santiago a conducir las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnicion y sus
destacamentos.
7. A Pantoja sin novedad.
8. A Santa Rosa en donde se decia habia de concurrir la gavilla de Garcia con e1
motivo de la funcion de Corpus que alIi celebraba.
9. Volvio a Pantoja con el objeto de fortificarse aquel interesante punto, madriguera
favorita y principal en donde tiempo ha solia haber sus reuniones aquel obstinado y
perverso cabecilla y desde aquella fecha ha perrnanecido alii la seccion hasta el 29,
trabajando incesantemente sin dejar de hacer frecuentes salidas, y con el fin de
proporcionar viveres y brazos para aqueUa fortificacion. ya persiguiendo a los rebeldes
hast as la distancia de seis 0 ocho leguas, de cuyos movimientos han resultado las
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ventajas de haber aprehendido a tres insurgentes con otros tantos caballos ensillados y
un fusil y la de haberse dispersado las partidas de dicho cabecilla presentandose a
gozar de la real gracia del indulto los individuos que expresa la adjunta lista a demas
de los varios que han ocurrido a Pueblo Nuevo, Salamanca y otros puntos
organizados.
30. Se dirigio a los ranchos de Salitre en donde nuevamente contaba a reunir Garcia
las partidas dispersas con el objeto de hostilizar a Pantoja luego que se alejase de aquel
punto la seccion y habiendome avistado en efecto aunque a larga distancia una partida
como de sesenta rebe1des, fue perseguida hasta los cerros de Huipana y ranchos de la
Sangijuela pertencientes al partido de Puruandiro en donde desaparececiera sin
perderles dar alcance por la espesura de los bosques y ventaja con que
emprehendieron su vergonzosa y precipitada fuga.
October 1819 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 484, tf. 66-67]
1. Al rancho de los Copales.
2. Al Valle de Santiago con el objeto de pasar revista de comisario yen el camino se
hizo prisionero a un asistente de Antonio Garcia con tres caballos y una carabina.
3. Se dirigio al rancho de Baltierra despues de haber practicado una correria por todas
las inmediaciones donde suelen guamecerse los rebeldes.
4. Marcho a Salamanca por la primera data.
5. Continuo su marcha a Irapuato a recoger viveres para el destacamento de Pantoja.
6. Salio por las inmediaciones en solicitud de mulas para conducir dichos viveres.
7. A Pueblo Nuevo y en el camino se aprendio a un rebelde montado y armado con
una lanza.
8. A la Labor de Peralta y habiendose practicado una correria por los cerros de
Guanimaro se logro la aprehension de un insurgente con siete caballos.
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9. Se practice otra correria por los ranchos del Curadero y Hacienda de Quiteco en
que se aprehendio a un bandido con tres caballos, una carabina y una lanza.
10. Marcho al Valle de Santiago a conducir las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnicion y
su destacamento.
11. Regreso a Pantoja.
12. Descanso en idem.
13. En la noche hizo una dilatada correria destacandose partidas por los ranchos del
Rodeo, de Villachuato, Huipana y hacienda de Zurumnalo del partido de Puruandiro
en que se logro dar muerte a cinco insurgentes, quedando en nuestro poder dos
prisioneros con tres pistolas, una carabina, un sable, una lanza y diez y seis caballos no
todos utiles, juntamente con el vestido, divisas, despachos y sello del titulado capitan
Ignacio Garrido que escapo arrojandose en el rio Grande.
14. Se reunieron las partidas en Huipana.
15. Marcho la seccion al rancho de las Rakes.
16. Al rancho del cerro, colorando y habiendose mandado en la noche de este dia
varias partidas por sobre las madrigueras de Cerro Blanco, Baltierra y Uruetaro, se
logro dar muerte a un rebelde, quedando en nuestro poder en la manana del dia
siguiente un prisionero y la mujer de Antonio Garcia, con mas un caballo y una
espada.
17. Se reunieron las partidas en el rancho de la Aguililla.
18. Permanecio en dicho rancho reponiendo la caballada estropeada por las correrias
anteriores.
19. Paso a Salamanca una corta partida con el objeto de conducir el convoy de
Irapuato y el resto de la seccion marcho al Valle de Santiago conduciendo la segunda
data de los piquetes de Caballeria que se hallaban en aquel destino.
20. Se condujo el convoy a Irapuato.
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21. Marcho la partida que se habia dirigido al Valle, al Pantoja, y a Pueblo Nuevo la
que condujo el convoy a Irapuato.
22. Se reunieron ambas en Pantoja despues de haber practicado una correria por las
madrigueras de Bravo.
23. Se dirigio al rancho de Borija.
24. A Santa Rosa Parangueo.
25. Al rancho de la Estrella despues de haber hecho vanos movimientos por las
inrnediaciones de que resulto la aprehension del rebelde Ramon Munoz que tanto ha
perjudicado.
26. Marcho a Pantoja.
27. Permanecio en idem.
28. Al Rancho del Rincon de Parangueo de donde salieron en la noche varias partidas
por las madrigueras de los ranchos de Cerro Colorado, de Pegueros, Huipana, Puerto
de Aguila y Cafia, en que se logro hacer a un rebelde prisionero, varios utiles de
maestranza y seis caballos.
29. Se reunieron las partidas en el rancho de las Jicamas.
30. Al rancho de Borja.
31. Habiendose practicado una dilatada correria por los ranchos de Valtierra, Cerro
Prierto y Uruetaro, se logro dar muerte al cabecilla Miguel Cervantes y a su
compafiero Jose Maria Gonzalez, que dando en el campo muerte tres rebeldes sin
contar los que se ahogaron en el rio Grande, habiendo escapado heridos los pocos que
sobraron de la gavilla de aquel pemicioso cabecilla y se han recogido su sello, dos
carabinas, dos pistolas, una espada, cuatro lanzas yonce caballos.
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November 1819 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 484, f 339]
1. Se dirigio la expresada secci6n al pueblo de Santa Rosa Parangueo con el objeto de
sorprender a los rebeldes que suelen concurrir alIi.
2. Al Valle de Santiago con el objeto de pasar revista de comisario.
3. Se practic6 una correria por el pueblo de la Magdalena, sin novedad.
4. Marcho a la hacienda de Tinaja.
5. A Salamanca por la primera data.
6. Regreso al Valle de Santiago conduciendo las buenas cuentas de aquella guarnicion
y sus destacamentos.
7. Marcho a la hacienda de Pantoja con el mismo objeto yel de llevar operarios para
su fortificaci6n.
8. Al rancho de San Francisco Javier.
9. Al de Alonso Sanchez, protegiendo la conducci6n de materiales y operarios para la
fortificaci6n de dicha hacienda.
10. Al rancho de la plaza Vieja.
11. Al de Copales.
12. Al de la Noria.
13. AI de la Estrella y en esta noche salieron las partidas de caballeria, sobre los
ranchos del Salitre, Barquilla y Rodeo de Villachuato, habiendo logrado dar muerte a
tres rebeldes, quedando en nuestro poder otros tantos prisioneros, con dos lanzas y
cinco caballos ensillados y despues de haber perseguido al escapar en todas
direcciones a la canalla, se reunieron dichas partidas el 14 en el rancho del Rodeo.
15. Se dirig6 la seccion a la hacienda de Zurumuato con el objeto de combinar sus
movirnientos con las tropas de Puruandiro que concurrieron alli.
16. A la Barquilla.
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I 7. A la hacienda de la Calera y habiendose hecho al paso una correria por los ranchos
de la Sangijuela, Tres Reyes y San Andres, se logro la ventaja de recoger solamente
tres caballos, a pesar de haber perseguido a todo escape a los rebeldes que se avistaron
en dicho dia.
18. Al de San Andres.
19. Regreso a la Calera.
20. Al rancho de Borija, y habiendome avistado varios pelotones de la gavilla del
rebelde Garcia, se perseguieron a todo escape, mas por la gran distancia en que se
devisaron, solo se logro el fruto de haberles dispersado, quitandoles cuatro caballos.
21. Se hizo una correria por el pueblo de Santa Rosa con cl objeto de sorprender a los
rebeldes que suelen concurrir en dicho pueblo los dias festivos, pero por desgracia no
se logro ventaja alguna.
22. Al rancho de las Terillas.
23. Marcho la seccion a Salamanca por la segunda data.
24. Se dirigio al rancho de Cerro Prieto.
25. Al de San Francisco Javier.
26. Al de las Raices.
27. Se dirigio al rancho de Salitre con el objeto de combinar sus movimientos con las
tropas de Puruandiro que concurrieron alli.
28. Recorrio esta seccion las madrigueras de la Lorna Tendida, Copales y pueblo de
Santa Rosa sin novedad, y segun 10 acordado, el teniente coronel D. Manuel
Rodriguez de Cela, debio registrar con las tropas de Puruandiro las madrigueras de
Puerto de Aguila, Cerro Colorado y rancho del Pozo en el mismo dia, lograndose las
ventajas que halla logrado dicho jefe.
29. A Salamanca, donde permanecio el 30 esperandose al senor comandante general
de la provincia para pasar al nuevo destino de Juan de la Vega.
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December 1819 [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 476, f 188]
1. Marcho al pueblo de Santa Cruz escoltando el convoy del interior.
2. Se dirigio al rancho de los Vascos yen la manana de este dia habiendo seguido de
un corto numero de bandidos que se avistaron a dicho pueblo se les torno un fusil y
cuatro caballos, mas destacando en la noche una partida a la hacienda de Santo
Domingo y otro al rancho de las Tortugas lograron entre ambos la aprehension del
cabecilla Simon Pantoja con otros dos rebeldes, una carabina y cinco caballos.
3. Se reunieron las partidas en el rancho de Santiaguillo.
4. Marcho dicha seccion a Salamanca por la primera data.
5. Hizo noche en Ie rancho de Copales despues de haber dispersado y perseguido por
mas de cinco leguas al rebelde Garcia, que con una fuerza de ciento cincuenta
bandidos se hallaba en el pueblo de Santa Rosa, habiendo obtenido las ventajas y
resultados que pormenor expresa el parte al Sr. coronel D. Antonio Linares,
comandante general de esta provincia en el mismo dia,
6. Se dirigo al rancho de Cerro Colorado.
7. Al de Tetilla.
8. Marcho a la hacienda de Pantoja.
9. Habiendo reunido a dicha seccion el teniente coronel D. Eusebio Moreno con
ochenta caballos se distribuyo toda la fuerza en varias partidas que recorrerion
simultanea e incesantemente todas las madrigueras que ocupa la gavilla del rebelde
Garcia desde los ranchos de Huipana hasta Guerrero en las escarpadas montafias de
Villachuato y Parangueo, ocupandonos en dicha fatiga desde este dia hasta el 12, con
las ventajas que expresa el parte dado a dicho senor comandante general con fecha de
este ultimo dia, habiendose present ado en pantija el dragon de San Carlos que se
extravio en el alcance de SS.
13. Se dirigio a Salamanca.
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14. Al rancho de Santiaguillo.
15. Al de San Francisco Javier.
16. Al Pueblo Nuevo con el objeto de una combinacion que se practico en union del
teniente coronel D. Eusebio Moreno destacando en la noche varias partidas sobre la
hacienda de Cuchimato, la Caja y Rancho Nuevo en solicitud de las partidas de
Montejano y el cabecilla Toro, dependientes de los Ortices, y aunque se continuaron
los movimientos el I 7 hasta las inmediaciones de la hacienda de Rubi, no se pudo
lograr una ventaja que la de dispersarlos y dejarlos de aquellas madrigueras.
18. Se dirigio a Salamanca por la segunda data.
19. Permanecio en dicho punto, yen la noche se practice una correria por los ranchos
de Valtierra Cerro Blanco, Uruetaro y Puerto de Valle con el fruto de haber
aprehendido a dos rebeldes con una carabina y tres caballos.
20. Se reunieron las partidas en el pueblo de Santa Rosa Parangueo.
21. Marcho al Valle de Santiago.
22. Permanecio en dicho punto.
23. Se hizo una correria por los ranchos de la Lorna Tendida, Copales y Borija, con cl
util resultado de haber quedado en nuestro poder un capitan de rebeldes con otros
cuatro de la escolta de Garcia, tres carabinas, cuatro lanzas y ocho caballos.
24. Se dirigo al Valle de Santiago yen esta noche habiendose puesto en movimiento la
seccion buscando a Garcia por diferentes rumbos se logro solamente la aprehension
del cabecilla Candelario Flores con dos pistolas y tres caballos.
25. Se reunieron las partidas en el rancho de San Felipe.
26. Se emprendio un movimiento general por todas las madrigueras que ocupan las
partidas del rebelde Garcia en combinacion con las tropas de Puruandiro y Salvatierra,
y habiendo durado esta fatiga hasta el 31 se lograron las ventajas que pormenor
expresa el parte dado al senor comandante general de la provincia con fecha de este
mismo dia.
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Appendix Two [AGN: Operaciones de Guerra, vol. 475, f. 193]
Provincia de Guanajuato. Demarcacion del Valle de Santiago a cargo del senor
graduado de colonel D. Anastasio Bustamante. Estado que manifiesta el numero de los
pueblos que se han reorganizado, y reducciones que se han formado con los habitantes
dispers~s en dicha demarcacion, desde el ano de 1818, hasta el presente, con
distincion de los puntos guamecidos con tropa y de que se hallan con patriotas
guardacampos encargados de su seguridad y buen orden.
Pueblos reorganizados y guamecidos con tropa:
Valle de Santiago
Magdalena
San Jeronimo
Santa Rosa
Reducciones que se han formado en los puntos siguientes y se hallan cubiertos
igualmente con tropa:
Haciendas: San Javier
Villadiego
Carmelita
La Grande
Tintoja
Pantoja
Rakes
Rancherias: Charco
Copales
San Felipe
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Reducciones que se han formado en los puntos siguientes y subsisten sola mente
al cargo de patriotas guardacampos:
Haciendas: San Jose de Propios
Santa Rosa
Huefanas
Pitayo
Brazo
Casas Blancas
Uruetaro
Lobos
San Vicente
Mal Pais
Guantes
Compafiia
Arostegui
La Boba
La Cal
Santo Domingo
Parangueo
Santa Catalina
Rancherias: Ojo de Agua de la Batea
Surumitaro
Puerto de Zempoala
OlIa de Sintora
Rancho Nuevo de Cal
Aguiliya
Tecolote
Valtierra
La Labor
Capilla Blanca
La Noria
Rincon de Parangueo
San Andres
Lorna Tendida
Cerro Colorado
Tinaja de Pantoja
Salitre
San Cristobal
San Antonio
San Francisco Javier
Alonso Sanchez
Paso Blanco
Duranes
Santa Barbara
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Tetillas
Cerro Prieto
Santiaguillo
Xononostle
Cerro Blanco
Resumen general:
Pueblos reorganizados y defendidos por tropa 4
Reducciones guamecidas por tropa 10
Reducciones guamecidas por patriotas guardacampos 48
TOTAL 62
Nota 1:
Que ademas de los vecinos ernigrados que se hallaban dispersos en la
mencionada demarcacion, ha venido a establecerse en los referidos pueblos y
reducciones, una considerable porcion de habit antes de otras partes en solicitud de los
auspicios y ventajas que les proporciona un sistema en que al rnismo tiempo que se
respetan las propriedades y todos los derechos del hombre en sociedad, se afianza la
tranquilidad publica de un modo inalterable con la vigilante observacion de los
destacamentos y partidos y tropa que recorren el territorio no menos que con el
cuidado de los caudillos guardacampos, estando todo muy a la mira de evitar una
nueva faccion de los indultos descontentos a su reincidencia en el latrocinio y demas
desordenes a que por tanto tiempo estuvieron acostumbrados.
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Nota 2:
Que la elevacion de guardacampos y principalmente de sus caudillos, se ha
hecho de aquellos labradores que aun en el tiempo de la rebelion han observado mejor
conducta y tienen mas ascendiente sobre el resto de los vecinos.
Nota 3:
Que no solamente se han destruido los ranchos y demas establecimientos que
habian formado los emigrados y dispersos en los cerros y bosques durante el tiempo
de la revolucion, sino tambien todos aquellos que se oponian a la pacificacion y buen
orden.
[signed] Anastasio Bustamante.
Salamanca, 4 de septiembre de 1820.
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Rebellions and Pronunciamientos, 1837-1841.
26 January: Federalist pronunciamiento in Alta California.
14 April: Federalist pronunciamiento in San Luis Potosi.
6 May: Federalist pronunciamiento in Rio Verde, led by Esteban Moctezuma.
2 June: Revolt in Chilapa under Colonel Domingo Esquivel.
9 August: Federalist rebellion in New Mexico.
16 August: Secessionist pronunciamiento in Sonora.
9 October: Pronunciamiento of Gonzalez and Fiz.
23 November: Federalist pronunciamiento in Papantla.
30 November: Federalist pronunciamiento in La Aquililla (Michoacan), led by
Gordiano Guzman.
26 December: Federalist pronunciamiento in Arizpe led by General Jose Urrea.
11 January: Federalist pronunciamiento in Culliacan.
16 January: Federalist pronunciamiento in Sinaloa.
19 May: Federalist pronunciamiento in Aguascalientes.
3 June: Federalist pronunciamiento in Monte Alto.
23 August: Revolts in Morelia and Oaxaca.
3 September: Federalist pronunciamiento in Arizpe.
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7 October: Federalist pronunciamiento in Tampico by Captain Longinos Montenegro,
joined by Jose Antonio Mejia.
5 November: Federalist revolt in Villa de Guerrero, Tamaulipas, led by Antonio
Canales.
9 November: Federalist pronunciamiento in Camargo.
12 December: Federalist pronunciamiento in Ciudad Victoria.
14: December: Uprising in Oaxaa.
16 December: Federalist revolt in Tampico. begins under Urrea and Mejia.
15 January: Federalist pronunciamicnto in Moncloa.
28 January: Federalist pronunciamiento in Toluca by Colonel Vicente Gonzalez.
27 February: Pronunciamiento of Montemorelos.
1 June: Pronunciamiento in Misantla.
11 June: Pronunciamiento in Rancho San Francisco.
14 January: Federalist pronunciamiento in Valladolid, Yucatan.
18 February: Garrison at Merida seconds the pronunciamiento in Valladolid. Its plan
declares the secession of Yucatan from the Republic until federalism is re-
introduced.
25 February: This plan is seconded in Campeche by Juan Pablo Anaya.
30 March: Federalist pronunciamientos m San Andres de Nava, Santa Rita de
Morelos and San Pedro de Gigedo.
1 April: Federalist pronunciamiento in Valle de Santa Rosa.
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16 July: Federalist revolt in Mexico City.
9 August: Pronunciamiento in Turicato (Michoacan).
1 October: Pronunciamiento in Valle de Aguililla.
7 December: Pronunciamiento in Pichuaca1co.
28 December: Pronunciamiento in San Pedro Michoacan.
1 February: Yaqui secessionist plan of independence led by Manuel Maria Gandara in
Sonora.
8 May: Pronunciamiento in Landa (Queretaro).
30 July: Pronunciamiento in Capula.
8 August: Plan of Guadalajara by Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga.
23 August: Pronunciamiento of Northern Army seconding the Plan of Guadalajara,
led by Mariano Arista.
31 August: Pronunciamiento in La Ciudadela (Mexico City) led by Gabriel Valencia.
5 September: Pronunciamiento in Santa Anna de Tamaulipas.
9 September: Pronunciamiento in Perote led by Santa Anna and ill Santiago de
Queretaro.
11 September: Pronunciamientos in Veracruz and Durango.
14 September: Pronunciamientos in Saltillo and Monterrey.
15 September: Pronunciamientos in Tlaxcala and Santa Anna Chautepam.
17 September: Pronunciamiento in Orizaba.
1 October: Federalist pronunciamiento in Mexico City.
2 October: Pronunciamiento of General Valentin Canalizo.
3 October: Centralist Pronunciamiento in Morelia.
4 October: Pronunciamiento in Patzcuaro.
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5 October: Pronunciamiento in Acuitzio.
6 October: Pronunciamicnto in Apatzingan, and a federalist pronunciamiento In
Morelia.
(Sources: Bustamante, El gabinete mexicano, vol. 1 pp. 33, 79,159. Fowler, Mexico
in the Age of Proposals, pp. 283-285. Malo, Diario de sucesos notables,
vol. 1 pp. 134-193. Sordo Cedeno, El congreso en la prim era republica
centralista, pp. 289, 365.)
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